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The understanding of sin and responsibility in Calvin differs radically from
concepts later dominant in Reformed theology and in moral philosophy. In federal
theology the covenant of works determines man's duty and culpability. Created
Into an order of justice and moral law, men is or is supposed to be en autonomous
creature who through his power, will, and ability lives by righteous works of
merit. This is his responsibility. In this light sin is legal transgression,
a failure to provide perfect moral worxe. This theology is linked with Hie
parallel concept in Kantian ethics where responsibility is defined with reference
to man's freedom and ability, and where culpability lies in moral failure.
Calvin* s teaching stands over against these ego-centric concepts, for Calvin
begins with a divine order of grace. God as father cares for man; he assumes
this responsibility. Man as son is to accept and acknowledge this care. Man
is responsible as he responds to and participates in grace. Man is not independent,
but dependent; he has no ability of his own, but is enabled and bound by grace
in ell things. He is responsible as he in fidelity, trust, obedience, love,
and gratitude, allows another to be responsible for him. but in sin man - Adam
and humanity - disdains God's grace, as he strives to raise himself up in independence
of grace and in dependence on his own ability. In infidelity, unbelief, disobedience,
concupiscent self-will, and ingratitude, he disgraces himself, iie disorders and
inverts the divine order of grace. The notion that man is or ought to be respon¬
sible to God on the basis of his own works is the essence of sin. As God does
not give up his fatherhood or the end of his creation, but continues to offer
his grace to men in nature end gives it again in law and gospel, man's culpability
lies essentially in his free and voluntary rejection of grace. This involves an
antinomy, for while man can resist God's grace and is culpable for so doing, he
is not and is not supposed to be free and able to accept grace, but is to rely
even in his acceptance upon the grace which enables him.
(over)
Use other side if necessary.
With regard to responsibility, predestination, and original sin, Calvin
teaches that the apparent conflicts here cannot always be rationally resolved.
We are not to employ the more formal and rigid development of logical argument
which characterized later Reformed thou^it, but have to acquiesce in truths of
a partly irrational nature, and make place for human responsibility alongside
our concepts of man's total depravity at birth and of God's predestination.
Thus into his concept of an immutable providence of God, Calvin incorporates
dynamic concepts, the importance of which has often been overlooked. At the
same time, under the influence of reprobation and the bias of polemic or
systematic treatment, he sometimes allows these concepts to deteriorate so
that he makes errors he has warned against and prejudices the seriousness
of his own concept of sin and responsibility.
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Preface
I entered into this study hoping at once to find something central
to the Christian faith and my Reformed tradition, and something that
would challenge me to deepen my grasp of the tenets of the faith. I
selected the understanding of sin end responsibility in the teaching of
John Calvin, a major concept in one of the intellectual giants of the
faith. Often since I have felt myself dwarfed by both the doctrine and
the man I had undertaken to study, and many questions remain unanswered,
but the study has been even more rewarding than I had anticipated. I
found that I had to re-think many of the central issues in Christianity,
and above all come to an understanding of the grace of God deeper than
I had previously known.
Some limits had to be set from the beginning. I have tried to set
forth Calvin's understanding of sin and of human responsibility, devel¬
oping each in the light of the other. Within the bounds set by the
study, sin is conceived as sin against God, rather than against our
fellow man; and responsibility is responsibility to God, rather than
to our neighbor. The study is principally an exposition of what Calvin
had to say. The aim is to present Calvin's concepts as they are most
dynamic, and at the same time give place to his strong emphasis on
providence. Where his thought, under the shadow of double predestination,
hardens and deteriorates into frozen, rigid concepts, I have tried to
set over against this a wealth of other and sometimes little known
concepts where Calvin is more flexible. In this way an attempt is made
to balance up the contradictory or seemingly contradictory elements in
his thought. I have tried also to recognize the places where Calvin
admits that he is -unable to put into logical form what seems to be the
content of Scripture, where he feels that we must set side by side
thing3 apparently contradictory.
Following the example and advice of my advisor, Dr. T. F. Torrance,
the thesis contains Calvin's teaching in the main in his own words.
Extensive citations are arranged to let Calvin speak for himself. Fol¬
lowing the suggestion of Dr. John Mclntyre, I have incorporated an
introductory chapter to deal with the influences on Calvin's thought
of the Calvinism and moral philosophy which followed him. This pro¬
cedure sets the stage for the main body of the study, and allows there
an intensive and unrestricted examination of Calvin's own thought. An
almost exclusive use of the primary sources has proved peculiarly use¬
ful in the study of Calvin, for on the one hand his very depth of
thought has lent itself to considerable interpretation, and on the other
many of his insights have been strangely lost in the course of the cen¬
turies. The Institutes is here recognized as Calvin's definitive sys¬
tematic treatise, but I have incorporated much material from his com¬
mentaries. The sermons - virtually unknown to the English speaking
world since the generation after Calvin's death - have proved peculiarly
useful in revealing thought where Calvin ranges outside the boundaries
imposed by a systematic bias and yet sticks close to Scripture.
Although I have worked from the original texts in Latin and French
and depend finally upon them, I am deeply indebted to the translators
who have gone before me. Where existing translations were adequate I
have used these. A list of these works is included in the bibliography.
To erase archaisms, to render the original more faithfully, or to bring
out similar language in various passages formerly translated independently,
I have altered these as needed, almost to the extent of re-translation
at times. Where no translation exists, I have resorted to making my
own. The Ioannis Galvlni Opera in the Corpus Reformatorum, edited by
G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss, (Brunswick, 1869-96) has been my
definitive text.
Because of the way citations are integrated into the text, I
have departed from the more customary procedure of blocking off longer
quotations in single spaced indented paragraphs. For the same reason
I have altered the strict usage demanding an ellipsis where the quota¬
tion is not the beginning of a sentence in the original, though where
this might cause misunderstanding the ellipsis i3 included. The ori¬
ginal Middle French spelling and accenting is retained, with modern
spelling also given in some cases. To avoid excessive underlining, in
some cases words that would normally be italicized are not underlined.
This is the case where Latin or French i3 obviously set off as such,
in the frequently repeated references in the notes to the commentaries,
and in some Latin works and abbreviations (ibid., etc., et al., cf.) now
long standard in English. Where good usage permits alternatives, the
shorter spelling and simpler punctuation is used. Abbreviations should
be self-explanatory. (CR - Corpus Reforms.torumj E.T. = English Transla¬
tion; et seqq. = that and all the following editions of that work)
Calvin used St. Paul in his sermons, and Paul in his Latin works; this
is retained. In the introductory part, quotations follow the original
even where spelling and punctuation differ from my own style.
To Br. T. F. Torrance and Dr. John Mclntyre, who with patient
counsel and guidance have led me through Calvin's thought, I offer my
deepest appreciation. To. Dr. J. A. Lamb and the staff of the New
College Library, who have made available a collection of Calvin's works
unsurpassed in the English libraries, I must gratefully say that with¬
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PART I: THE PROBLEMS
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in Calvin. From years of
reaction to Calvin's position, we have so markedly returned to
Reformation and Reformed theology that it may justly be said that we have
witnessed its restatement. Prevailing schools of thought now review
the teaching of Calvin with respect and sex-iousness, while not many years
ago this was too often presented only in caricature, or as a position
over against which was to be set a modern reaction. Certainly Calvin has
always been respected in some areas of the church. But only in the last
generation have he and his fellow Reformers come again to dominate the
theological scene. The interest here has primarily been stimulated by
Barth and Brunner, whose avowed intent has been to restate the Reformed
position, and whose works are permeated with their indebtedness to
Calvin. Barth writes: 'In the general rediscovery of the Reformation of
the sixteenth century, the profile of Galvin, who was its greatest teacher,
became for many once more impressive.' ^ The impact on recent theology
of Barth's Church Dogmatics and of the several widely circulated works
of Brunner has been only an index of the significance of this return to
Galvin. Following from this have arisen a number of particular* studies
in Calvin's theology, characterized by intensive study of the primary
sources, in an effort to be ti*ue to Calvin and to free his position from
much that has proved to be the addition of later philosophical thought.
From earlier studies which sought to explain Galvin in terms of the
thought of his age and generation, of his Fx-ench and Latin mind, or of
his psychological structures and disposition, Calvin study has turned
1. Karl Barth in his ' Introduction' to Paul van Buren, Christ in our*
Place (Edinburgh, 1957).
2. See 7/ilhelm Kiesel, The Theology of Calvin (London, 1956), 9ff. for
a summary of these works.
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to accept Calvin.' s work as an effort to bear witness to the Word of God,
as a theology determined by its object, and to concern itself with the
particular doctrines of Calvin, and the overall way in which Calvin
strives to point man to God and to confront man with the Word of God.
This fresh approach was pioneered by Wilhelm Diesel in 1938 in his work
Die Theologie Calvins (recentlv published in English as The Theology of
Calvin) and has been followed by a number of concentrated studies of in¬
dividual doctrines. Examples of these are : Calvin' s Doctrine of Man by
T.P. Torrance, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God by T.H. L. Parker,
1
and Calvin's Doctrine of the 'ford and Sacrament by Ronald S. Wallace.
Upon witnessing a resurgence of Calvin's theology, it would be the
impression of many that while Calvin might have much to contribute to the
doctrines of the faith, yet surely the least promising area of investigation
would be that of sin and responsibility. Calvin's extreme and controversial
position ought rather to be by-passed than to be investigated as a useful
witness to the Biblical teaching. Here Calvin ought to be abandoned in
favor of a more moderate view. But such an impression is not justified.
It seems now appropriate to examine from the original sources what is
the teaching of Calvin on sin and man's responsibility, searching for
a depth of serious thought that will point us back to the Biblical under¬
standing. This must be done critically, for there are doubtless elements
that need to be rejected, and sympathetically, allowing Calvin to speak
fox- himself, and searching for insights forgotten across the centuries, ox-
so buried under later interpretation as to be of little value.
As an introduction to such a study, we sketch in this first part the
1. Also may be mentioned: Calvin's Doctrine of the Last Things by Heinrich
Quistoxp, Calvin's Doctrine of "the vfork of_ Christ by J.P. Jansen, and
Christ in qui* Place (The Substitutionary Character of Calvin's Doctrine
of Reconciliation1) by Paul van Buren. A recent dissertation on Calvin's
Conception of the Christian Life by Ronald S. Wallace is unpublished.
See the bibliography for details of publication.
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problems out of which such a thesis arises. It will be helpful to portray
as a background certain aspects of the Calvinist position which need re¬
consideration and which generate this study. Problems arise along
theological and philosophical lines.
A. Calvinist thought in the theological situation
1. Problems arising from the covenant of works
Three characteristically problematic areas of the traditional Reformed
position need again to be considered to regain Calvin's real position.
The first of these deals with federal theology. Reformed theology has
long been dominated by what the Westminster Confession of Paith defines
as the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. This concept appeared
among continental theologians in the two generations after Calvin. It
developed through the earlier concepts of a 'covenant of nature' and a
'covenant of grace,' found in Ursinus,"1" to be given systematic form in
p
Cocceius. It is properlv a 'covenant of works' and a 'covenant of grace'
in such men as Polanus, (who preceded Cocceius) Heidegger, Fitsius, and
x
others. It found ready acceptance in Scottish theology, for example
Robert Sollock or David Dickson,^ in English Puritanism, for example in
j- 6William Ames,r and in American Reformed theology. Pollock, probably the
1. Zacharias Ursinus, Catechesis, Summa Theologiae, per Quaestiones et
Responsiones e:x?osita in Cpera Theo logicia (Eeide lberg, "lul'2;", 15 Tquestion 36)
2. J. Cocceius, Summa Theologiae ex Scriptura rewetita (Amsterdam, 1665),
XXII, Iff, 17, 18, et al.; Summa Doctrinae de Poedere et Testamento Dei
(Amsterdam, 1673), H, Iff, and IV, .Iff
5. Araandus Polanus, Syntagaa Theologiae Ohristianae (Hanover, 1625), VI, Iff;
J.H. Heidegger, Corpus Theologiae ^Zurich, 1700)", IX, Iff
Herman Fits ius, De Oeconomia Poederum Dei cum Hominibus (Utrecht, 1694), I, ii,
Iff; II, i, Iff; Ii) ii) Iff; et al; and see the bibliography. Many of these
older works now not easily obtained, or not translated, are quoted in the
source book by Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, set out and illustrated
from the sources, E.T. by C.T. Thomson (London, 1950;. Some of the trans¬
lations in this chapter are from this work.
A. Robert Pollock, Treatise of Effectual Calling in Select dorks (Edinburgh,
1849) I, 25; David Dickson, Therapeutica Sacra "(Edinburgh, £597), 35-188
5. William Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity (London, 1642), 171-74
6. See a list of works in Perry Miller. The Hew England Llind - The
Seventeenth Century (Hew York, 1939;, 502ff.
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earliest federal theologian in British theology, entitles a division of
a major theological work; 'Of the Word of God, or of God's Two Covenants,
i
both that of works and that of grace,' This dualism of covenants was
given confessional status for the first time in the Westminster Confession
of Faith in 1647,^ (although it had appeared earlier in the Irish Articles)^
and in this form it thereafter prevailed in Reformed thought.
In the beginning God made with Adam a covenant of works. 'The first
covenant made with man was a covenant of works, wherein life was promised
to Adam, and in him to his posterity, upon condition of perfect personal
5
obedience.' 'The covenant of works is God's pact with Adam in his
integrity, as the head of the whole human race, by which God requiring
of man the perfect obedience of the law of works promised him if obedient
eternal life in heaven, but threatened him if he transgressed with eternal
death.'° It is therefore a covenant based on the divine law. It was the
moral law which was first revealed to Adam in his innocence and to which
he was bound. The moral law remains the basis of our obligation to God.
'The moral law is the declaration of the will of God to mankind, directing
and binding every one to personal, perfect, and perpetual conformity, and
obedience thereunto, in the frame and disposition of the whole man, soul,
and body, and in performance of all those duties of holiness and righteous¬
ness which he oweth to God and man: promising life upon the fulfilling,
1. Bollock, op. cit., I, 25
Westminster Confession of Faith, chap. VII
3. The Irish Articles of Religion in Philip Schaff, The Greeds of the
Evangelical Protestant Churches (London, 1877), 530
4. For a study of the rise of federal theology see Gottlob Schrenk, Gottes-
reich und Bund in alteren Protestantismus (G-utersJLoh, 1923). Good sum¬
maries are found in the discursus in Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol.
4, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, part 1, (Edinburgh, 1$5o), 55ff, or
in the unpublished thesis by Donald J. Bruggink, The Theology of Thomas
Boston 1676-1732 (University of Edinburgh Ph.D. thesis, 1956;", 85ff.
See the article 'Covenant Theology' by W. Adams Brown in the Encyclo¬
pedia of Religion and Ethics, ed. by James Hastings (Edinburgh, 19lb;,
vol. IV, 2l6ffV
5. Westminster Confession, chap. VII, sec. II
6. Heidegger, op. cit., IX, 15. See Witsius, op. cit., I, ii, 1.
and threatening death upon the breach of it.'
This is a covenant of_works, the emphasis on the works of man being
all the greater when set in opposition to the latex- covenant of grace. It
promises a reward to man, if he earns it by his own good works. The
covenant of works, it is true, is set within the framework of a'conde-
scension on God's part,' yet it is seen as a real pact between God and
man whereby eternal life is promised as a reward to the perfectly obedient
man. And man is given at the first the will and power or ability to
accomplish this obedience. 'Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom
3
and power to will and to do that which is good and well pleasing to God.'
It is by his own works that he was at the first to live.
Over against this first and general covenant of works there stands a
second covenant, a covenant of grace, made after the fall, where God
freely gives by grace what he had before promised on condition of man's
perfect obedience. While Heppe maintains that there is an 'essentially
4
universalistic bias upon which the covenant of grace rests,' it was
characteristically narrowed to include the elect. 'Man by his fall, having
made himself incapable of life by that covenant (of works), the Lord was
pleased to make a second, commonly called the covenant of grace: whereby
he freely offereth to sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring
of them faith in him, that they may be saved; and promising unto all those
that are ordained unto life his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able
5
to believe.'
This is originally a covenant made between God and Christ for the
1. 'Larger Catechism,' question 93, °f • question 92
2. Westminster Confession, chap. 711, sec. 1. See Heidegger, op, cit.,
IX, 9; Cocceius, Summa Iheol., XII, 23ff.
3. ibid., chap. EC, sec. II. See Edward D. Morris, Theology of the Westminster
Symbols (Columbus, Ohio, 1906), 298ff.
4. Heppe, op. cit,, 371
5. Westminster Confession, chap. 711, sec. Ill
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elect. 'The contracting parties are indicated, on the one hand God, on
1
the other Christ, and the convention ratified between the two.' Man
was sometimes included as a 'third party.' More loosely it was seen
as a covenant of God with elect sinners. 'The covenant of grace is an
agreement between God and the elect sinner, God declaring his free good
pleasure anent the free giving of eternal salvation and all the covenanted
blessings pertaining thereto, through and because of Christ the Mediator. '3
In the thought of some this was a triple covenant scheme: a covenant of
redemption (between the Father and Son in eternity), of works (between
God and Adam), and of grace (between God and man through Christ)
The important thing is that the whole understanding of divine grace
to man had to be worked out as a second covenant which was introduced
with the failure of the covenant of works. God demonstrated his grace to
man only after man had demonstrated himself unwilling and unable to
provide his own works. Reformed thought did at times recognize that Adam
5
needed and received some ' aid of grace.' Adam ' had not sufficient
strength not to be in need of God's further grace and help in order not
6
to sin.' llor were these works exclusively thought of as works of merit.
Kollock could call them pledges of thankfulness.^ But federal theology
could not take these influences seriously enough to offset the emphasis
on works. The overall conception was that God did not come to primal man
in a relationship of grace, for man did not yet need that grace but stood
by his works. J. Macpherson teaches bluntly: 'By the creature's own
1. Witsius, op. cit., II,ii,5. F. Burmann, Synopsis Theologiae (Amster¬
dam, 1699), II. 15.2; Heidegger, op. cit., HI, 12
2. Heppe, op. cit., 383
3. Witsius, op. cit., II.i.5
4. See Bruggink, op. cit., 96; G-.D. Henderson, ' The Idea of the Covenant
in Scotland,' in The BvangeIleal Quarterly. XXVII (January, 1955), 2-14;
Dickson, op. cit., 35-188
5. Heppe, op. cit., 246; Coeccius, Summa de Foed., 11,56; Heidegger, op.
cit., IX,51
6. Peter van Maastricht, Theoretico-practica Theologia, new edition
(Utrecht and Amsterdam, 1725)"", III,i£,337
7. Bruggink, op. cit., 95
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natural strength is the covenant to be fulfilled. Grace may have been
shown in the condescension that entered into a covenant, but the covenant
in its terras is not of grace but of works.1 ^
Prom this first covenant we learn the nature of man in the beginning
and in its light we understand the nature man now has. Hodge has a section
of his Systematic Theology entitled the •Perpetuity of the Covenant of
2
Works.' 'The covenant of works is not abrogated: in so far as the natural
relation of God to man was incorporated into it.' * The fact that a new
covenant has been introduced does not negate this concept of what was man's
primal nature and what is his sin. Man may be saved by the grace of God,
but he is saved because he could not and cannot save himself by his own
fulfilment of the covenant of works. Grace is a remedy and second resort.
Originally and ideally man was to have lived in a relationship to God
where he by his works justified his own existence. Hodge admits that if
man could fulfil the covenant of works he could now be saved this way,
though of course this is impossible for man to do.^"
So marked a characteristic of Calvinist theology did this dualism
of covenants become that the central stream of the Reformed faith took
its name from the Latin word for covenant, foeaus, the federal theology,
or covenant theology. It was 'one of the prime requisites of sound ortho-
5
doxy.' The whole of Calvinist thought was remoulded into this system.
Where it was recognized that the concept was not in Calvin, this was
thought to be a positive development of his thought. Berlchof quotes
with approval a criticism of Calvin for not having adequately formulated
r
this concept.
1. John Macpherson, The Westminster Confession of Paith, in the Handbooks for
Bible glasses series, ed. Marcus Dods and. Alexander Whyte (Edinburgh,
1881) ,~TT
2. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology (Hew York, 1883), vol. II, 122
3. L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1953), 218
4. Hodge, op. cit., 122
5. Brown, op. cit., 221
6. Berkhof, op. cit., 211
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But this dualism of covenants is totally alien to the thought of
Galvin and reverses much of his thought about man's primal relation to God.
With Galvin it is from the very start the history of the covenant of
grace. There is no mention of any covenant of works by which man ought
ideally to live. Rather man ought to depend entirely and even in his
innocence upon the grace of God. lie does not think of himself as receiving
life as a reward for his works, but only demonstrates his gratitude for
God's constant blessing to him. when man sins and falls from grace, God
extends his grace to restore man again to life. But this re-creation
does not involve a new covenant of grace standing opposed to an old
1
covenant of works.
This development of the covenant theology brought with it several
marked changes which are of importance in our study, (a) It changed the
concept of sin. Men are sinners because they have failed to fulfil the
covenant of works. Heidegger writes that Adam 'broke God's universal
law and. the covenant made with him by God, rendering both himself...
and the entire human race...guilty of the death divinely threatened
2
against the transgressor.' Man's sin is always seen against this covenant
of works. Sin is seen in moral and legal terms. 'Adam sinned against
the whole moral law.' ^ The Westminster Confession speaks of sin as a
•transgression of the righteous law of God. In the classic answer of
the 'Shorter Catechism:' 'Sin is any want of conformity unto, or trans-
5 J 1 6
gression of, the law of God.' Tifolleb sees sin as fundamentally cavojj-Io< .
j '
The same is true of Heidegger and Polanus. 'Sin is or discrepancy
1. See later, especially Chap. VII, p. 205ff; and Chap. III. p. 90ff.
2. Heidegger, op. cit., IX, 11
3. Heppe, op. cit., 303
4. Westminster Confession, ehap. VI, sec. VI
5. 'Shorter Catechism,' question 14
6. J. Wolleb, Cliristianae Theologiae Compendium (Basel, 1626), I, 9, 2.
_q_
from the law of God.J ^ 'The form or formal nature of sin is deformity,
i.e. aberration from the divine law, &cvoJjl (u . Accordingly, sin is
2
nothing but what is committed against the law of God.1 Hodge
entitles a key section of his Systematic Theology: 'Sin is Related to the
Law of God.'^ Berkhof asserts: 'Sin should always be defined in terms of
man's relation to God and His will as expressed in the moral law.''4' Thus
even where a second covenant is introduced, the concept of sin is
measured by this first and perpetual law and covenant. Sin is man's
failure to provide his own righteousness; he has not been obedient to the
divine moral law, he has not from his side fulfilled the conditions of
the first covenant. Man in his sin and in the face of the covenant of
works can only be preoccupied with his own lack of good works.
In this Calvin's concept of sin has been so narrowed as to be changed.
In the thought of Calvin, where man's primal relationship to God is not
in terms of a covenant of works, but in terms of a dynamic relationship
of grace, sin is seen as a rejection by man of the grace of God. Man
has wanted to be free and independent and to care for himself. He has
thus been self-willed and ungrateful. There is a way in which this in¬
volves disobedience and transgression of the law, but this finds place
alongside Calvin's larger concepts of sin. It will be our purpose in
this thesis to open up again these further and deeper ways in which
5
Calvin describes man's root sin. This entails as well an examination
of the relation of sin to the moral law as it appears in natural ethics,
r
and in the Old Testament law.
1. Heidegger, op. cit., X,4
2. Polanus, op. cit., 71,3
3. Hodge, op. cit., 182f
4. Berkhof, op. cit., 231
5. See especially Chap. II of the main section, p. 5^ff.
6. See Chap. VI, p. 175ff•
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(b) Because later Reformed theology failed to understand God's
relationship to man as a dynamic relationship of grace, and man's sin
as a breach of this relationship, it failed to give adequate significance
to Calvin's concept of order and the effects of sin on this order. Insofar
as sin was seen to disturb the divine order, it could only be interpreted
as a lack of order, as a failure or want of conformity to an order set
by divine moral law, and based on divine justice. God is a 'moral
ruler' ana governs by 'the principles of justice.' He therefore punishes
1 j i
transgression. 'Sin is or discrepancy from the law of God, i.e.
the failure of nature and of the actions in intelligent creatures, fight¬
ing with the law of God, and involving than in punishment in accordance
with the order of divine righteousness.'2 Order is concerned prin¬
cipally with law, morality, righteousness, and justice.
Against this must be set Calvin's concept of an order of grace
reversed as man dis-graces himself in sin. The order of perfect dependence
on the grace of God is dis-ordered as man turns to depend on himself. In
this man is not only a sinner as he is immoral or fails to conform to
law. It is not so much that he fails to provide his own righteousness,
but that he takes the rectitude with which he "was blessed and ascribes
it to himself so as to make of it a curse. Having put little emphasis
on the grace of God to man at creation, much of the Reformed tradition
has not understood the character and effect of sin as that which robs
man of God's grace to him. In this study we must develop again the
concept of order and disorder in Calvin.^
(c) This emphasis on the covenant of works has severed the know¬
ledge of sin from the knowledge of the grace of God. If sin is not seen
1. Hodge, op. cit., 118f
2. Heidegger, op. cit., X, 4; Morris, op. cit., 51W
3. See Chap. Ill, p. 90ff.
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as a rejection of God's grace to man, but as a transgression of God's
law, then it is quite possible to establish the fact of sin apart
from the revelation of God's grace. Sin is to be seen in all its
clarity in contradistinction to the divine moral law.'* Prom it we
posit the knowledge of sin in an autonomous relation to the knowledge
of grace. Ivor is it necessary to have God's written Word to achieve this
knowledge of sin, for God's law is written on the hearts of all men.
'Man is aware in his conscience that he is a transgressor against God's
commandment and thereby guilty in God's sight.' 'By his natural
2
knowledge of God he knows God...as the righteous judge of good and evil.'
Sin then has to be argued apologetically with the natural man and it is
quite possible to reach some measure of agreement with the philosophers
as to what is the sin of man. ^ Wolleb is typical of Reformed theology
when he makes sin transgression of the law and identifies the law broken
by Adam with the Decalogue and the law of nature. Berkhof relates the
demands of the covenant of works, the Decalogue, and the moral law of
man's heart as in essence (though not in form) the same thing.^
In this the position of Calvin has been modified. Sin has to be
known in the light of God's grace to man at the first. As this grace is
restored to us in Christ, we come fully to know our sins. There is of
course a way in which we know our sins from the law, and Calvin makes
frequent use of this principle. But we are to understand this as a
method of pedagogy rather than as an autonomous way in which we know
our sins. There is again a way in which men are given a sense of right and
1. Hodge, op. cit., 182f
2. Heppe, op. cit., 4ff, 282ff; Heidegger, op. cit., I, 7ff, IX, 12
3. P. Burmann, op. cit., XV,3,2; Morris, op. cit., 515. Barth traces
the rise of this development, op. cit., 3o9f•
4. Wolleb, op. cit., I, 9, If.
5. Berkhof, op. cit., 216
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wrong by their conscience. Yet we do not here really come to know what
sin is, as we do not here know the grace of God. T?e must examine again
Calvin's thought about the source of our knowledge of sin."''
(d) The emphasis on the covenant of works has seriously altered
Calvin's concept of responsibility and substituted a concept that is not
only absent from Calvin but alien to his thought. It, as we later see,
arises partly from the Renaissance, and partly from Cartesian ego-centriCity.
When the question now rises as to what is man's duty, the answer has to
be stated in terns of works and moral obedience. This covenant 'exacts
from all the condition of works, i.e. the perfect obedience of original
p
holiness and righteousness which the Creator of due right demands of us.'
'On his part man promised perfect obedience to God's requirements.'^ To
federal theologians the covenant of works is 'the foundation of human
responsibility.'^" Man's duty, his obligation, and his responsibility
are thought of as that of producing works of the moral law. The federal
system gave scope to the moral will and put upon man's own shoulders
the responsibility for his fate. Man's responsibility is to justify him¬
self by his works.
Responsibility is thus also defined in terms of the divine law a.nd
government of justice. The definition of the 'Larger Catechism': 'The
5
duty which God requireth of man, is obedience to his revealed will,' is
interpreted morally and legally. 'It is in the contemplation of such
a law and of a government thus administered, that we gain some just
conception of the nature and scope of human responsibility before God.
The term, responsibility, simply implies the intrinsic and inevitable
obligation of every soul to render proper obedience... It is, in other
f. See Chap..1, p.„3bff. in the body of the thesis.
2. R. Sglin, Tr&ctatus_ Tlieo iogicus De Poena Domini et I'o edere Gratia
3. Heidegger, op. cit., IX, 15; Witsius, op. cit., I,ii, 1
4. Brown, op. cit., 223
5. 'Larger Catechism,' question 91
words, absolute amenability to the divine law, and to him who has enacted
it as, in the language of the Confession, a rule of life for the reasonable
creature.1
It was abundantly realized that man could not now in his sinful
condition fulfil his responsibility. The power, will, and ability were
given him at the first, but he had lost these. This was the cause of
the introduction of the covenant of grace. IIonetheless he had. once been
responsible on the basis of his own power or ability. 'Such respon¬
sibility implies the possession of power or ability to render obedience.'^
And he is still held responsible on this basis. His real duty was and
is to keep the law by his own strength and in this to fulfil his half
of the covenant of works. He should then discharge his obligation to
God and properly rendex" account of works. If a covenant of grace follows
a covenant of works, this in no my means that the moral law and covenant of
works do not remain to remind men of their failure to produce works of
morality by which they ought to have lived.
In the thought of Calvin, however, only in sin does man attempt to
depend on his works. Man's responsibility to God now an in the beginning
is not tlxat of producing good works by which to justify his existence,
but that of accepting and acknowledging the grace of God, of depending
wholly on God. In this fidelity to trust in the goodness of God, he
lives responsibly. It is as man is grateful to God that he is obedient
and responsible. The whole concept of responsibility has to be wrought
out in terms of man's dependence on God's grace to him. This of course
results in moral obedience and good works. But these come only by way of
gratitude and faithfulness and never as any attempt to discharge an
1. Morris, op. cit., 298f
2. Morris, op. cit., 299
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obligation or to render a meritorious account of good works. We must
in this study cut through this concept so foreign to Calvin of a man
who is supposed to live by his own works and morality, and see how man
is responsible to God as he depends on God's grace."1* Here in Calvin
responsibility has a connotation largely unknown in the legalized and
moralized, thought of traditional Reformed theology, and of moral
philosophy, especially since Kant.
(e) This concept of responsibility introduced by federal theology
deprived man's culpability in nature of much of its meaning and gave
primary emphasis to a type of moral guiltiness which had been for Calvin
a real but secondary and auxiliary way to convince men of their guilt.
Reformed theology continued, following Calvin, to argue the guiltiness of
man in his sin on the basis of a manifestation of 'God in his works and
a law of nature written on man's heart. But the argument developed.
The moral law, which taught man his responsibility, was on man's con¬
science, and in a certain way presented the requirements of the covenant
of works to all men. 'Man is enabled to recognise from his own conscious¬
ness this appointment of himself to a covenant with God resting upon
2
perfect fulfilment of the divine will.' 'It may also be recognized
3
naturally, that there is a covenant intervening between God and man..'
Man in nature knows his real responsibility to (God - obeying the divine
moral law written on their hearts. But as men did not and Could not
obey they were responsible and guilty. The culpability of man in nature
is therefore seen chiefly as his failure to produce works of morality and
righteousness.
While much of this argument is taken from Calvin, it has missed an
1. See Chap. VII, p. 205ff•
2. Heppe, op. cit., 285
5. Heidegger, op. ©It., IX, 12
important element in his thinking. Calvin saw man's culpability and
responsibility in nature primarily in terms of his thought about sin as
man's despising the grace of God. God manifests in nature the whole of
his perfections, including his grace and goodness, in such a way that if
man would allow God to come to him he could be led to that dependence
on God which issues in life and felicity. Man's primary guilt lies in
the fact that he has ignored this self-manifestation of 'God in heaven and
earth, and in his ignorance has rejected it and disdained God's grace.
He is culpably ignorant. The significance of this aspect of man's
culpability in nature has been often overlooked in later Reformed theology.
Because sin is seen primarily as a transgression of the moral law, rather
than as a wilful despising of the grace of God, the emphasis on man's
culpability in nature is placed on his failure to produce the moral works
required by the law written on his heart, rather than on his ungrateful
failure to acknowledge God in his gracious self-declaration in nature.
Certainly there is an important way in Calvin in which the natural man
is responsible for his lack of virtue, and for his failure to abide by
the natural moral lav/. But there is also and even more significantly
this primary argument for man's responsibility in nature based on his
rejection of God's gracious Word to him there. We must in this study
1
turn again to the problem of man's culpability in nature.
2. Problems arising from original sin
The second area in which problems arise in the study of sin and
responsibility is the strong and characteristic emphasis in Reformed
theology on the sinfulness and depravity of man. In an effort to do
justice to the Biblical emphasis on the sinfulness of man, Reformed
theologians have followed Calvin to think of man as conceived in sin so
as inevitably to live a life of sin. Adam and his posterity entered into
a state of original sin where their power and inclination produced only
1. See Chap. VIII, p. 22JOff.
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the sinful -works of the flesh. This transmission of sin from one man
to all his posterity has been developed in various ways. " While Calvin
cut short much of this discussion, asserting that it was by the divine
ordination and ordering that ail men were made sinners in Adam, and
rejecting all further attempts to explain the transmission of sin, later
theologians made elaborate attempts to arrive at a logical explanation
as to how sin is transmitted by natural and physical means.
In this they returned to the Augustinian and latin concept, which
Calvin had largely omitted, of an inherited sinfulness passed from father
to son by natural propagation. Heppe criticises Calvin for not having
based the propagation of sin on 'the natural unity between Adam and
his posterity,1 but simply relating it to 'a divine will and ordering
p
by which it was ordained.' This concept was forced into rigid and
logical forms to produce natural arguments for the propagation of sin and the
resulting sinfulness of man. 'Cod thus imputes Adam's guilt to all his
successors because of their natural connection with him.'^ This natural
transmission involves a congenital and hereditary flaw in our nature.
'Sin is propagated because of 'a flaw in the instrument of primogeniture,
through which we have all descended naturally.' ^ The sinful na.ture of
our first parents is propagated to all their children much as other
physical and mental traits are genetically passed down by ordinary
generation. 'From the defection of Adam's heirs in his loins immediately
flows the corruption of actual human nature or inherent original sin,
which by impure generation is propagated into human individuals.' J In
1. A good study of these is found in H.P. Williams, The Ideas of the
Fall and of Original sin, (London, 1927) •
2. Heppe, op. cit., 333
3. ibid., 332
4. Polanus, op. cit., VI, 3
5. Heidegger, op. cit., X, 39
the words of the Vfes trainster Confession: 'They (our first parents) being
the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same
death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descend¬
ing from them by ordinary generation.'
Critical reaction in theology and philosophy has been that so
strongly is the sinfulness of man depicted by this concept that all
responsibility of man for sin is immediately stifled. If sin is inherited
and passed from father to son by ordinary generation, then man is no more
responsible for his sin that he is for the other physical and mental
characteristics which are his not by acquisition or environmental
influence, but by inheritance from his mother's womb. 'An inability
to do our duty, which is born with us, is to all intents and according
to the established meaning of the word, natural. Call it moral or what
you plea.se, it is still a part of the nature which our Creator gave us,
and to suppose that he punishes us for it, because it is an inability
seated in the will, is just as absurd as to suppose him to punish us for
2
weakness of sight or of a limb.' In the face of the arguments of the
Calvinist theologians that man is sinful by birth and ordinary generation,
and naturally unable to do his duty, many found little grounds remaining
on which to found real culpability in sin. To do justice to the Biblical
understanding of man's responsibility in his sin, theologians asserted
man's freedom in his sin. Man was not bound inevitably to sin, but he
sinned by constant choice and with the power to do othexwd.se. Starting
with the necessity of sane real human responsibility, they declared that
this basic assumption logically i-equires the rejection of the theory of
the total depravity of man.
1. ",7estains ten Confession, chap. 71 sec. Ill
2. 'The Moral Argument against Calvinism' in the Yfcrks of g7illiam E.
Channing (Boston, 1849), vol. 1, 217ff
3. ibid.
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It has been in turn the reply of conservative Calvinism that here
human responsibility is affirmed in such a way as to give unsatisfactory
expression to the fact of sin. If man is not so enslaved as to be deprived
of all power to do good and if there remains in him some freedom of choice,
then man is not really a sinner in the Biblical sense. Atonement is not
so necessary as before, and the constant Biblical emphasis on the sin and
need of every man has been replaced by a concept where man is basically
good and has no need of redemption. Such has been the classic dilemma
involved in the attempt to put into logical form the sinfulness of the
nature of man and his responsibility in sin.
Has Calvin's position been adequately represented here? Certainly
it is a characteristic emphasis in Calvin to assert that all the posterity
of Adam enter into his state of sin in such a way as to sin inevitably and
with all the powers of body, mind, and soul. At this point we can only
state again the conviction of Calvin. Beyond this, however, it seems that
in exchanging Calvin's concept of the transmission of sin from Adam to
his posterity by the ordination of God, for a concept of the physical
and natural propagation of sin by ordinary generation, the followers of
Calvin, have attempted to put into a logical and rational form that
element of sinfulness in the life of mankind which Calvin had both tacitly
and frankly admitted could not be adequately explained by such means.
In further developing man's sinfulness along natural lines they did indeed
prejudice any real culpability on the part of man. Calvin's line of
solution is not without its peculiar difficulties, and we shall have to
reject it in part. But nonetheless it is an attempt, as we shall show,
to recognize from the start that there is an element in man's sinfulness
and responsibility that defies rationality. For we have to do with a
1. Hodge sketches these arguments, op. cit., 251ff.
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secret will and ordination of God which we cannot understand or grasp; it
is beyond us. This is an attempt to cut through the logical and natural
theories of the propagation of sin by recognizing that we must simply
start with the Biblical judgment that all are sinners. We must accept
this and acquiesce in it.J"
Having recognized the irrationality at this point, Calvin holds that
we may then see how man is responsible because he sins not so much by
deficiency or lack of natural ability as by the constant outworking of
the choice of his sinful will. This has also to be understood in the
light of the concept of sin not as a failure of man to live by the strong
and good choice of his will, but as a continual rejection of offered grace.
Here Calvin's constant emphasis on the fact that sin is transmitted to
Adam's posterity by divine ordination, and yet that man in his sin cannot
lay the blame on God but must assume the guilt himself is his attempt to
put side by side the twin Biblical truths of man.'s sinfulness and of
his responsibility. ,7e must re-consider Calvin's attempt to incorporate
into his teaching these contradictory elements, and his attempt to do
justice to both truths not by rigorous or apologetic logic but by
recognition of the fact that truths of an illogical and. paradoxical nature
have both to be included in the faith.
3. Problems arising from predestination
The third area in which theological problems arise in the study
of sin and responsibility is in the Reformed emphasis on predestination.
Following Calvin, the Reformed position has been that an over-ruling
providence of God extends to all events. The whole of history is controlled
by divine decrees, by a hidden counsel of God which has existed from all
1. See the second division of Chapi . II, p. 7Iff•
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time. 'The decree of God is the act of God, by which from eternity,
according to His utterly free will, He has by an unchangeable counsel
and purpose specified and resolved on the things that were to come into
being outwith Himself in time, together with their causes, operations,
and circumstances, and the manner in which they are bound to be made and
exist, for proof of his glory.'x This has meant that God predetermined
not only the salvation of the elect, together with the whole course of
their lives, but also the ruin of the reprobate, together with the history
of their evil deeds. 'By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his
glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and
others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus
predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed;
and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either in-
2
creased or diminished.' This even meant in some schools of thought that
3
Christ's atoning death was not for all men but for a limited number, and
it meant inevitably for all that God by the grace of his Spirit chose to
redeem seme from their sins, and that he withheld this same grace from
others.^"
Reaction to such counsel of God has been along two lines. It is argued
that this both males God responsible for sin in a culpable way, and deprives
man of all responsibility. The Refoimed undershanding of predestination
prejudices the question of the nature of God. If God has not moved toward
the salvation of all, but actively created some to eternal death, then he is
not a God of mercy, but an arbitrary and unreasonable tyrant. In the minds
of some the characteristic God of the Reformed faith is not a father but a
1. Heidegger, op. cit., V, 4
Westminster Confession, chap. Ill, sec. Ill and IV
3. E.g. Cocceius, Summa de Foed. , V, 108ff, esp. 349; see Heppe, op. cit., 473ff«
4. Heppe, op. cit., ISOff; Leiden ;Gynopsis, XX3V, 46; Heidegger, op. cit., V, 56
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judge, not a good and loving God but a just and awful God. And if history
is so determined in advance by divine decrees, then all that remains is
blind fatalism. Man is no more to be held culpable for his sin than a machine
obeying the instructions of its master. As no real freedom is his, so no
real responsibility can be ascribed to him. As the ultimate author of the
sinful deeds of man is God, so the culpability for sin has finally to be
imputed to God.
Is the position of Calvin adequately represented here? It is certainly
true that the Reformed position has developed from elements that are in
Calvin's teaching. Tdiile the doctrine of election and reprobation have
become more rigid and formal in later Reformed theology, Calvin did teach
that in some sense God predestinated men both to life and to death, and
that the hand and providence of God is in some sense instrumental in the
sinful thoughts and actions of men."'' In this the difficulties of the later
Reformed position are not solved by a return to the teaching of Calvin.
Here, however, an important element in the teaching of Calvin has
been left out. Having affirmed the predestination of God, Calvin attempts
to avoid the logical consequences for the sin and responsibility of men,
and for the culpability and nature of God, by the use of several concepts
that recognise that the logical consequences of the doctrine of predes¬
tination have to be limited. Assertions of the goodness of God and the
responsibility of man have to be set side by side with God's providence.
Calvin feels that so great is the irrationality here that we must posit
two seemingly contradictory wills in God. If it may be doubted whether
this is an adequate or Biblical line of solution, it is certainly by such
a recognition of logical limitations involved that a solution is to be
1. See Chap. IV, p. 135£f.
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obtained, rather than by a more rigorous and more formal development of
logic.
Further and perhaps more useful concepts, which have not always been
contained in later Reformed doctrine, are those of an accidental or ad¬
ventitious effect of the will of God and of hidden and manifest causes of
sin. Ursinus (who was not yet federal in theology) speaks of God causing
'per accidens' man's sin. There is a 'causa remota' and a 'causa propinqua'
in sin, But the ideas drop out later on. Yet Calvin had put great
emphasis on these, for they served to balance and correct the rigor of his
doctrine of predestination. Another useful concept is that of the
degrees of election, whereby all are elected by the love of God but some
are cut off through their own infidelity. We must examine again Calvin's
attempt to solve the problems raised by predestination in the matter of
p
sxn and responsibility.
Following this, it will be important to re-consider Calvin's concept
of the wrath of God, of how man in his culpability is punished for his
sin. Does Calvin, under the influence of his teaching about double pre¬
destination, substitute a God of wrath for a God of love, as has at
times been charged? Or is he able by developing these concepts to limit
the logical consequences of reprobation for the nature of God, and
present God even in his judgment and vengeance as primarily a God of
grace and love?^
B. Calvin's thought and moral philosophy
Conflicts arise between the position of Calvin on man's sin and res¬
ponsibility and the general position of moral philosophy. In the body of
1. Z. Ursinus, Loci Theologici (1562) in Opera Theologiae (Heidelberg, 1612), 624
2. See Chap. IV, p. 115ff.
5. See Chap. V, p. 145ff«
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this study we have to clarify Calvin's understanding of human respon¬
sibility and culpability, and set it over against that concept which
obtains in philosophy. Many of the theological reactions we have just
outlined appear again in the controversy between Calvinism and moral
philosophy. This is particularly true in the matters of predestination
and of the depravity of man. Where the objections of philosophy and
theology are similar we will not return to these points. We must,
however, consider the question of the responsibility of man in moral
philosophy. As later deformed theology, with its emphasis on the
covenant of works, failed to appreciate Calvin's concepts of sin and
responsibility, so .there has been in ethical thought a related concept
of responsibility that has obscured Calvin's thought.
It is the general position of moral philosophy that responsibility
mast be defined so as to be commensurate with freedom. IT. Ilartmann
v/rites: 'Responsibility, imputability, and the sense of guilt imply
that man is free to do otherwise than he actually does. If man is not
free in this sense, then his consciousness of responsibility and of
1
guilt is a delusion.' The statement of S.H. Hodgson is typical:
'"Without real freedom of choice there could be no real moral respon¬
sibility; and the sense of it, if it were still felt, would have, like
the sense of freedom, to be classed as an illusion. The question, then,
2
is one of the deepest significance for Ethic.' There must be no external
or internal compulsion or constraint. The future has to be as yet un¬
determined by fate or predestination, or by present and past inherited or
1. ITicolai ilartmann, Ethics, E.T. by Stanton Coit (London, 1932),
vol. Ill, 8,
2. Shadworth H. Hodgson, The Metaphysic of Experience (London, 1898),
vol. 17, 120, cf. 96f. See also Friedrich Paulsen, A System of
Ethics (London, 1899), 4-oOff; Wilbur Marshall Urban, Fundamentals
of Ethics, an Introduction to Moral Philosophy (London, 1931), 394ff•
environmental factors beyond the control of man. Pacing a moral situation,
man must have an equal or nearly equal choice, and the history to follow
is to be really determined by his choice.
This freedom presupposes at once an ability or power on the part of
man. Freedom here means the power of the will to choose one course of
action, and to implement it, or on the other hand, to make a contrary
choice, and to implement it. This is the teaching of the father of
moral philosophy, Immanuel Kant. Man has an 'autonomous will.' ^ Kant
combines this 'autonomy of the will' with the idea of the 'categorical
2
imperative' to form the two basic principles of his ethical system.
He assumes man has the power of will to perform his duty. 'Kant, it is
well known, goes so far as to say, that those Duties which are impera¬
tively commanded by Conscience are never Impossible, "Du kannst weil Du
i7)
so list".J Thus ethics is always concerned with the power of the agent.
»
A parallel concept is that of man's'faculties.,i;" Hartmann entitles a
5
section of his ethics: 'The Basic Ethical Capacity of a Person.'
This man who is responsible on the basis of his freedom and ability
is confronted in life with an equal or nearly equal choice, having the
possibility of doing good. Here, as its name indicates, moral philosophy
is concerned with moral value. Man is supposed to produce works of
morality. 'The fundamental idea in Morality is the idea of Value, in which
the idea of "ought" is implicitly contained.'° This concept derives in
large degree from the same source as does the idea of the autonomy of the
1. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals in the
Critique of Practical Reason, and Other 'Writings in Moral Philosophy
(Chicago, 19497, 97
2. Hastings Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Bvil, a. Treatise on Moral
Philosophy (London, 1924), vol. I, 106
3. Hodgson, op. cit., 96
4. James Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory (Oxford, 1885), vol. II, 10ff
5. Hartmann, op. cit., 161
6. Rashdall, op. cit., 137
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will, the influence of Kant. 'To Kant the performance of duty is not
merely "right"; it is the highest "good" of the agent.' 'Goodness of
conduct possesses a higher worth than anything else in the world.'
2
There is an 'imperative' for man to answer with the good.
Here moral philosophy uses the language of obligation and of duty,
of accountability, and of responsibility. 'It is our duty to produce the
greatest possible good.'^ 'With the idea of duty is thus connected that
of a debt due or owing to some one, as well as that of obedience to the
command of a superior, and both ideas are expressed in common by the
term ought, as applied to actions which are right, or due, or morally
4
fitting to be performed.' Thus man is independently accountable as he
makes a choice for the good or for the bad. He does good or he does bad.
Prior to his decision he is presented with a situation where he may create
good, where history is as yet indeterminate and without form, where he
may as it were manufacture good out of the raw materials of history set
before him. By the strong choice of his autonomous will he makes good
out of that which is not yet good but contains the possibility of good.
Finally we notice that in ethics responsibility involves rewards
and punishments. This, says J. Martineau, is a 'fundamental ethical
fact:' 'Wherever approbation falls, there we cannot heHp recognizing
5
merit; wnere disapprobation, demerit.' If a man does good, if ne
creates virtue out of what is not yet virtue, he is to be praised or
rewarded. It is a question of ' the rewards of Conscience, when its
1. ibid., 107
2. Kant, op. cit., 72
3. Rashdall, op. cit., 222
4. Hodgson, op. cit., 99; Martineau, op. cit., 9off; Hartmann, op. cit., 154ff.
5. Martineau, op. cit., 17, 75ff»
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comman&s are obeyed and its duties performed.'~ Or perhaps the rewards
of society, or a divine being are involved. And if man does evil, if he
creates vice out of that which is not yet vice, he is blameworthy and
2
culpable. There is 'regret', 'remorse', and a 'sense of failure.'
Here man may be punished by society or by the outworking of the moral
power in the universe. In this way man is always responsible or
answerable. If he is praised for his virtue, he is responsible for it.
To him is owed the credit and merit. He has made good. If he is blamed
for his failure, he is responsible. Thus responsibility is defined
with man as a center of reference, defined in terms of man's freedom,
his power and ability, his merit ana demerit, and his reward and
punishment.
This concept of responsibility can be reduced in essence to the
concept of responsibility found in later Reformed theology. Covenant
theology is linked with Kantian ethics. It is assumed that man does or
ought to have something of his own from his side, that he is able or
is ideally supposed to be able to perform certain good deeds of virtue,
and stand or fall on his own merits. Whether the disciples of Calvin
and the moral philosophers agreed about the extent to which man could
actually perform his duty is of secondary importance. They both start
from similar presuppositions concerning the ability and freedom of man.
And moreover, this concept of responsibility is one which has become
paramount in relatively recent years. In its simplest form, it is a
natural and easily grasped idea and has, in the language of duty and
accountability, been present across the centuries. Sut in the development
of the Cartesian concept of knowledge, where man subjectively by his knowing
creates ancl gives form and shape to certain formless entities presented to him,
1. Hodgson, op. cit., 113
2. ibid., 112
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and in the development of ethics in the Kantian and post-Kantian period,
where man creates good out of the materials of history, this concept of
responsibility has matured. Indeed, the word responsibility is late and
has issued from the recent development of this thought.
It is our problem in this study to cut through these notions of
responsibility to examine Calvin's concept. We must project the present
problem back into Calvin and clarify his position in regard to later
developments at several points. (a) It is necessary to recognize that
the starting point of Calvin differs from that of moral philosophy. It
is important to abandon presuppositions about man's freedom and begin,
as Calvin does, not with man but with God. Over against the basic
assumption of ethics that responsibility is co-relative with freedom, and
that man's ability is the motivating force behind all good, must be set
Calvin's basic assumption that this motivating force is the grace of God.
Goodness and virtue are present in the world only through grace. Man
participates in these, but is not responsible for than. Even the res¬
ponsibility of man must be seen with God's grace as the center of focus.
We must begin with and work from the grace of God. Only by a recognition
and appreciation of the fact that such is Calvin's conviction can we
regain his orientation with regard to responsibility.
(b) We can then recover Calvin's understanding of the ability of
man. Prom this starting point, Calvin teaches that man is a creature who
is given to reflect or image this goodness of God. He is not then one
who is,given to accept the good wrought through him and in him by his lord.
His is not the active part of making good for himself and earning praise
or reward, but the passive part of allowing another to set forbh his
glory in him. Responsibility is conceived so that there need be no
autonomous or independent power of the will to determine what was before
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undetermined. Over against the philosophical insistence that man is
responsible as he is able to do good is to be set Calvin's insistence
that man is responsible only as he depends on the grace of another,
acknowledging that he is unable to do anything alone and through his ovra
strength. While ethical thought found it necessary to assume for man
a power of the will, it is Calvin's insight that the man who depends on
grace needs no independent ability or strength of the will. Man's
ascribing to himself an autonomous ability by which he works his own
good is his primary sin.
(c) Calvin differs from ethics with regard to the freedom of
man. Having developed responsibility relative to the grace of God,
Calvin allows roan for freedom. Man's freedom is not to be understood
with man as the center of reference, but again our viewpoint is the
grace of God. Man's freedom is not to be interpreted in terms of
independence or self-reliance; rather man finds Christian liberty
in binding himself to service and dependence on God. Against the
assertion of moral philosophy that man is and ought to be free to
detemine good is to be set Calvin's conviction that man is not free and
was not creafed to be free in that sense. His desire for freedom is his
. 2
sxn.
In what sense then is man free? Man is so placed in relation to
the grace of God that while he is not free to accept God's grace, he is
yet free to reject it. If he accepts the grace of God, he may not
assume responsibility for it. He is not free to do this, for he is
created to dependence. He must depend even in his acceptance upon grace.
But on the other hand he is free to reject grace. T7hile there are elements
1. See Chap. VII, p. 224ff. and Chap. VIII, p. 250ff.
2. See Chap. II, p. 56ff. and Chap. VII, p. 229ff.
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in Calvin's thought that prejudice even this freedom, we shall attempt
to show that in Calvin man can if he will reject the grace of God. It
is with this antinomy that Calvin understands man's freedom.^
(d) This difference in the concept of responsibility influences
the matter of man's culpability. Izi the tradition of ethics, there is
blame only where this morally responsible agent defaults to choose the
wrong. Culpability is therefore seen in terms of moral failure.
Man has not by his own strength and will produced deeds of value and
merit. It is noteworthy that the concept of blame which obtains
here bears a definite relationship to the notion of guilt in covenant
theology. There sin is viewed in the light of a covenant of works. Sin
is man's failure to produce these legal works. Man is culpable for not
having created moral righteousness. If Calvinist theologians and moral
philosophers differed radically as to what ability and freedom man did
in point of fact have, they did not differ in substance as to what
ability and freedom man ought to have had and employed. So the two
were in essential agreement as to the nature or type of culpability
in question. Culpability lies in man's failure to create the virtuous
and good.
It is not surprising therefore that Calvin's Concept of culpability
has not been grasped by moral philosophy, as it was not by federal
theology. With those who start from the ethical viewpoint it has seemed
absurd to maintain culpability where neither ability nor freedom exists.
To correct this misunderstanding, it is important to see the way in which
for Calvin culpability can exist apart from either the type of ability
or the type of freedom prerequisite to the philosophical position.
While man is not free and able by his own will to choose the good -
1. See Chap. IV, p. 115ff, esp. 135ff and Chap. 711, p. 229ff.
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for it is God's grace which determines the good., and only by binding him¬
self to dependence on it is man enabled to do good - man is allowed the
freedom to reject by the choice of his will the grace of God. He is
culpable because he has freely disdained God's care. Yet he is not
responsible if he accepts God's goodness, for he is not able to do this.
Here he rests on grace. In this study we must clarify the way in which
through this antinomy Galvin develops his concept of culpability. ~
Having set out these various problems which call forth a re-study
of Galvin's understanding of sin and responsibility, we must now let him
speak for himself. We trace out in the systematic and exegetical writings
of Galvin the lines of solution which we have indicated he would take.
To develop his thought along lines that are natural to him, we follow
where possible an internal outline suggested by the elements of
Galvin's thought, rather than the external outline of this introductory
chapter.
1. See Chap. IV, p. 135ff, Chap. VII, p. 232f^ and Chap. VIII, p. 22fOff.
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PART II : SIN AND RESPONSIBILITY IN TEE TEACHING OP CALVIN
I. The Source and Purpose of our Knowledge of Sin
A. The knowledge of sin as derived from the knowledge of God
In the thought of Calvin, from the very start, all religious knowledge
is grounded in the Jbrd of God. 'The right knowledge of God is a wisdom
which far surpasses the comprehension of man's understanding; therefore
no one is able to attain it except through the secret revelation of the
1
Spirit.' This is doubly significant in our religious knowledge, in the
knowledge of God and in the knowledge of man. Primarily in this assertion
Calvin is concerned to establish the fundamental axiom of Christianity
that man does not seek out and find God, on the contrary God seeks out
O
man and finds him. * But a secondary and equally valid axiom arises from
the same truth. Man does not even know himself as an essentially
religious being until God encounters him with that truth. 'It is plain
that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself without having
first contemplated the divine character and then descended to the con-
3
sideration of his own.' The religious situation of man is properly to be
examined only in the light of revelation. He can only know himself as he
is given of God to know himself.
1. The light of the Lord (lux Domini)
This means, in this study, that our knowledge of sin is rooted in our
knowledge of God. A first article of belief with Calvin is that man's
predicament cannot be known apart from God. 'It is necessary that the Word
of God illuminate us and we must be led by it to judge what is good or evil.
'It is only the light of the Lord which can open our eyes that they may see
1. Com. on Heb. 8.11, CR 55.104* Com. on John 1.9, CR 47«9; II. 2.20, CR 2.201
2. 1.13.22, CR 2.107; Com. on Phil. 1.29, CER 52.21f
3. 1.1.2, CR 2.32. Com. on I Cor. 12.1, CR 49.496f
4. Ser. on II Tim. 3.10-13, CR 54.259. Ser. on Gal. 1.8-9, CR 50.317; 1st
Ser. on Gen. 15.6, GR 23.697ff
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the corruption which lurks in our flesh. ' Apart from this light of God
our sin will be unknown. 'The consciences of men are in a torpid state
and are not touched with any feeling of dissatisfaction on account of their
sins so long as they are enveloped in the darkness of ignorance.' 'But the
Word of God penetrates even to the farthest recesses of the mind and by
introducing as it were a light dispels darkness and drives away that
O
deadly torpor.* 'We must not judge of works in any other way than by
bringing than to the light of the gospel because our reason is wholly
blind.Thus the knowledge of sin is derived from the knowledge of God.
a. The standard (regula) of the Lord
Otherwise as men we have no adequate standard of judgment. 'God wishes
that we conduct by his Word our examination to see whether we live in Ms
fear or not. If a man intends to test a piece of coin for alloy, he will
either take a touchstone, or cast it into the fire. Now we have no other
thing by which to examine our lives and to sound our hearts except that we
4
go to God's commandments.' With no clearly established criterion man in¬
evitably reduces his understanding within very comfortable limits. 'Although
a man should sound and examine himself ever so deep, yet it is not possible
that he should attain to the knowledge of the hundredth part of his evil.
There is no one save God alone who can be the judge of it. '5 The Lord is
6
•the only standard'(regula) of judgment. Prom our natural proneness to
hypocrisy we are delighted with what is least defiled as exceedingly pure
while we confine our reflections within the limits of human corruption.
We judge that to be white which is but whitish or brown. Into this
1. Com. on Rom. 6.2, GR 49*117. Sola est lux Domini, quae potest oculos
nostros aperire, ut perspicere queant lantentem in carne nostra foeditatem.
2. Com. on I Cor. 14.24, CR 49.257. Ser. on I T±nx. 1.18-19, CR 53.102;
Com. on Heb. 4.12, CR 55.52; Com. on Is. 32.5, CR 36.545
3. Com. on John 3.21, CR 47.68. Com. on Eph. 5.13, CR 51.218
4. Ser. on Tit. 1.15-16, CR 54.491
5. Ser. on Gal. 3*7-9, CR 50.491
6. 1.1.2, CR 2.32. Ser. on Deut. 4.3-6, CR 26.121
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relative situation God introduces his will for man, erected by absolute
standards of judgment, and to which we ought to conform, whereupon for the
first time man can really see the difference between right and wrong. ■*"
•Only the will of God can guide us, it is the only standard (reigle = regie)
p
by which we can say, This is worthless, or that is good.'
b. God's will for man
Calvin* s constant reference here to the will of God as the rule by
which to measure sin needs carefully to be set in the larger context of his
thinking about what this will is. Calvin is thinking of course of God's
purity and majesty, of God's law and commandments. We know our sin as we
see here how we fall short. This is the simplest way of thinking of it.
But there is danger in oversimplification. This will is in a larger and
more important sense God's will for man as God's destiny and design for man,
God's intention for his creature. Frequently Calvin will demand that we
compare ourselves with God to measure our sin. 'Man is never sufficiently
affected with a knowledge of his own meanness until he has compared himself
with the divine majesty.'^ More specifically, however, the standard of
the lord is the destiny into which God has created man, God's will for man.
It is here that sin is seen in the light of God's will as a will for grace
to man and not simply as a will which is law and commandment. 7/hen man
falls from his high calling, sin enters and the measure of sin is the
difference between man as God has willed for him to live in grace and man
as he has re-established himself.
God's will for man is seen on two occasions: in the wonderful state of
blessedness at creation, and after the fall in redemption and restoration to
this same destiny in the grace of Christ. First we must understand sin in
1. II. 1*3y CR 2.177f» Com. on 2ph. 5.12, CR 51.218; Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20,
CR 50.542; Com. on Rom. 12.2, CR 49.236
2. Ser. on Eph. 5.8-11, CR 51.6§2
3. 1.1.3, CR 2.32
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the light of the grace displayed to man in creation that we may understand
how great the excellence of our nature would have been if it had retained
its integrity, and secondly we contemplate our miserable condition since
the fall of Adam.'1' Only in the light of man's primal origin is the meaning
of a failure to achieve this destiny to be understood. 'Before we proceed
to the miserable condition in which man is now involved, it is necessary to
understand the state in which he was first created.* ^ Sin presupposes the
fact that God intended something else for man. 'When we have come to this
conclusion, that our life in this world is a gift of the divine clemency,
which, as we owe to him, we ought to remember with gratitude, it will then
be time for us to descend to a consideration of its most miserable condition.'^
Only when we know what man's duty was and is can we evaluate his inability
to perform it. 'The definition of death' - 'under the name of death is
comprehended all those miseries in which Adam involved himself by his
defection' - 'is to be sought from its opposite; we must, I say, remember
from what kind of life man fell.
But we do not separate man's origin from his destiny in Christ. God's
will for man, if once seen in creation, is forgotten there by man in his
sin, and only when re-asserted in Christ is it clear again how far man
stands from it. We do not understand man's primal state save as we see it
again in the grace at redemption. When God re-fashions us we see the nature
c
of our first creation. Here we are thrown forward to redemption to learn
there what is the grace in creation (though Calvin holds the grace displayed
in regeneration as superior to that manifested in creation).^ Thus this
1. II. 1.1, CR 2.175f; II. 1.3, CR 2.178
2. 1.15.1, OR 2.154. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.), ch. II, pag. 19, CR 1.307
3. III.9.3, CR 2.525
4. Com. on Gen. 2.16, CR 23.45
5. Com. on Ezek. 18.32, CR ^0.456; Com. on Gen. 3.19, CR 23.75; Com. on
I Cor. 15.45, CR 49.558f; 1.15.4, CR 2.138
6. ibid., Com. on 3zek, 18.32, CR 1jj0.456; Com. on Gen. 1.26, OR 23.3&
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fact of evil can properly be perceived only where this good is known as a
standard by which to judge, but this good can only be known in faith.
2. The light of nature (lumen naturae)
There are two implications which follow from Calvin's basic assumption
of the direct relationship between the knowledge of God and the knowledge
of sin that we now discuss. Each is at an opposite end of the pole from
the other. There is implied, to begin with, that where there is no know¬
ledge of God there is no knowledge of sin. In a world where God is unknown,
sin must be unknown. Secondly, we must assume that only where our knowledge
of God is at its zenith do we have a full knowledge of sin. How far does
Calvin develop these implications?
a. The semi-dead knowledge of sin (semimortua peccati cognitio)
If the Christian doctrine of evil is to be revealed and not empirically
derived, are we then to proscribe from the faith any knowledge of sin apart
from revelation? Calvin's answer is a qualified no. 'Where the knowledge
of God is not, there darkness, error, vanity, destitution of light and life
prevail. These things, however, do not render it impossible that the ungodl}*-
should be conscious of doing wrong when they sin, know that their judge is
in heaven, and feel an executioner within them.'"1' To attach the knowledge
of sin to the knowledge of God does not mean that there is no sense of
right and wrong in the natural world. There is, maintains Calvin, 'a cold
p
and semi-dead knowledge of sin which is inherent in the minds of men.'
A theology of sin based on the knowledge of God does not of necessity
eliminate the possibility of a natural instinct of divine origin which con¬
victs man of his evil deeds. Calvin speaks frequently of the Gentiles'
'sense of sin.The Gentiles have 'by their deeds declared themselves to
1. Com. on I Pet. 1.14, CR 55*222
2. Com. on Gen. 3*7, CR 23.64 ...frigida et semimortua peccati cognitio
qualis ingenita est mentibus hominum.
3. II. 2.22, CR 2.203. Com. on Ran. 7*15, GR 49*129
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have sane rule of righteousness.* 'The distinction between good and evil
2
is engraven on their consciences.' There is *a universal judgment in man
to discriminate between good and evil. * ^ Oalvin prefers to speak of this
pagan knowledge of sin in the relative terms of good and bad rather than in
the absolute concepts of righteousness and unrighteousness, though he does
do this.
To admit this natural perception of evil does not reverse the fundamental
truth that a knowledge of evil is derived from the knowledge of God. It
comes from the grace of the Son of God.^1" In this way we may loosely say
that every man has a type of knowledge of God, though as Calvin come3 to
define the knowledge of God in more explicit terms he must modify this
to assert that such knowledge of God as the Gentile has is by ultimate
Christian standards not true knowledge but false knowledge. 'Mankind make
proficiency in the universal school of nature so far as to be affected with
some perception of deity.'The first general knowledge of God remains
in them.'^
Apart from his illumination in gospel and law the light of God shines
through in the light of nature to give a type of knowledge of good and evil.
There always remains the 'light of nature.' (naturae lumen)7 'The soul of
man is irradiated with a beam of divine light (divina lux) so that it is
never wholly destitute of some little flame, or at least of a spark of it.'®
Man has an innate persuasion of a moral order, of allegiance to political
and social authorities, of duty to family, state, and self. He has a sense
of justice. But this knowledge, though immanent and arising from the light
1. Com. on Rom. 2.14, CR 49.37
2. Com. on John 1.5, CR 47*6
3. II. 2.24, CR 2.204
4. Com. on John 1.5, CR 47*7; Com. on I Cor. 2.14, CR 49.344
5. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49*326
6. Com. on Acts 17.28, CR 48.417
7. II. 2.24, CR 2.205
8. II.2.19, CR 2.201
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of nature, is in a way divine. 'As often then as the secret compunction
of conscience invites us to reflect on our sins, let us remember that God
himself is speaking within us. For that interior sense by which we are
convicted of sin is the peculiar judgment seat of God, where he exercises
1 2his jurisdiction.'x It is 'a divine instinct.' Thus we retain the
principle that a knowledge of sin is based on a knowledge of the divine,
b. Natural ignorance of sin
But we must not mistake Calvin to mean that our sin is really knov/n
to us by the light of nature apart from revelation, for it is this mis¬
conception that has in the past severed the knowledge of sin from the know¬
ledge of grace and led to dognatic procedure that Calvin does not use. In
the most fundamental sense the natural man has no knowledge of his sin. We
must, if speaking strictly, say that the natural man has no true knowledge
of God. And so in the light of Christ at a more profound level this moral
consciousness of the light of nature is discovered to be not light at all
but only the false appearance of light. 'Out of Christ there is not even
a spark of true light. There may be some appearance of brightness, but it
resembles lightning, which only dazzles the eyes.The light which is in
is
man revealed to be darkness. If we are talking about what the Christian
really means by sin, then we must say that no Gentile has ever taken an
initial step in its comprehension.^ This is because, as we see more
thoroughly later, sin is not so much immorality as concupiscence and in-
gratitude, things unknown to the natural man. Only 'by way of concession'
in an impropriety of speech can man be said to see anything. At a deeper
level he is yet blind and asleep in sin. ^
1. Com. on Gen. 4.9, CR 23.91. Com. on Eph. 4.19, CR 51.206; II. 2.12, CR 2.195f
2. Com. on Rom. 2.3, CR 49.32. Com. on Gen. 3.H, CR 23.67
3. Com. on John 8.12, CR 47.192
4. Com. on Matt. 6.22, CR 45.207
5. II. 2.24, CR 2.205; Com. on Eph. 4.17, CR 51.205; on Rom. 7.7, OR 49.123f
6. Ser. on Eph. 4.17-19, CR 51.59&
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We cannot then sever our understanding of sin from its source in God's
revelation. We do not establish a doctrine of sin in apologetic, in the
moral terms of the wisdom of the natural man. Philosophers will either
praise the excellence of man, or the more acute will see both good and
bad in him. But original sin is a fact inaccessible to the natural man.
'The corruption of our nature was unknown to the philosophers, who in other
2
respects were sufficiently, and more than sufficiently acute.' Total
depravity becomes a statement of faith, not a theory or philosophy derived
from an observation of the world and held by Christians in common with
other acute observers.
3. The light of the gospel (lux evangelii)
We consider now the respective roles of gospel and law in the manifes-
3
tation of sin. Calvin speaks of 'the light of the gospel' (lux evangelii)
rising to disclose sins, and of sins 'brought to light by the law.,1+ The
death of Christ is a 'mirror' in which is depicted to us our sin, yet also
5
the law is a 'mirror' in which we behold our iniquity. But what are we to
say of the content of each disclosure? If the brightness of the divine
light is more fully displayed in Christ than in the law, is stTi here seen
more clearly? Do we see our iniquity more clearly reflected in the mirror
of Christ, or is the mirror of the law equally adequate for reflection of
sin? To pose the question in contemporary language: To what extent is the
knowledge of sin based in Christology and developed from this point?
a. The office of Christ (officium Christi)
The obvious implication from Calvin's attachment of the knowledge of
sin to the knowledge of God is that only when Christ comes are we really
able to see ourselves. But how far does Calvin follow this through? It is
1. II. 1.2, CR 2.177j Com. on Is. 32.5, CR 36.54-1
2. Com. on G-en. 3*6, GR 23.62. Ser. on Eph. 2.3-6, CR 51*367; 1.15.7, CR 2.142
3. Com. on Luke 2.35, CR 45.94; Com. on John 3.21, GR 47*68
4* 11*7*6, CR 2.257
5. Com. on John 19.17, CR 47*414; 11*7*7, CR 2.258
Calvin's position that only when our knowledge of God is at its zenith in
the knowledge of grace do we have the last word on sin. Structurally in
the Institutes Calvin might have made this clearer. The doctrine of sin
comes in Book II, loosely his Christology (representing the second article
of the Creed). But within the book the order is chronological. We begin
with the fall, the occasion of redemption, and then follow the history of
redemption under the one covenant in Christ, as prefigured in the Abrahamic
covenant, in the giving of the law, and then as fulfilled in Christ. This
chronological development need not mean, however, that we know all about the
fall before the coming of the covenant of grace, or that there is not a
progressive knowledge of sin as the divine light becomes clearer.
There can be no question of the fact that in Calvin's thought Christ
does unveil the sin that is in the human heart. 'Let us note that our
Lord Jesus Clarist in condemning the whole world, by showing that none can
be saved but by the free goodness of God the Father,' 'brings not sin, for
we have that in us already, but makes it known and brings it to the fore
2
to the end that we should be convicted of it.' 'Christ, by his light,
discloses every artifice, and unmasks hypocrisy. Therefore to him is
rightly ascribed the office of laying open the secrets of the heart.'^
Here the light of the Lord shines forth in the light of the gospel to open
our eyes that they may see the corruption that lurks in the flesh.
Further, Calvin does express the idea that in this light of the gospel
we have a more thorough revelation of sin than the world knew before Christ's
coming. When the light of the gospel arises there is a disclosure of the
affections of the heart which had previously been concealed. The lurking
places of human dissimulation easily remain hidden till Christ conies.^"
1. See ad loc.
2. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.432. 11.3*1, OR 2.210; Com. on John 7*7;
CR 47* 166; on John 3* 19f, OR 47* 67f; on Pom. 6.2, CR 49* 117
3. Com. on Luke 2.35, CR 45.94; Ser. on Luke 2.35, OR 46.406ff
4. ibid.; Com. on Is. 32.5, OR 36.545; on Phil. 3*7, OR 52.47
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In terns of our study of the roles of grace and law in the doctrine of sin,
this means that Christ reveals sin in a way that the law does not. On
occasion Calvin makes this quite explicit: 'We must always return to this
principle which we have treated, namely, that in the gospel we are com¬
pletely stripped of all the goodness and virtue which we thought ourselves
to have, and that God makes us so ashamed that we are obliged to come to
him as quite confounded. Because although God sets our cursedness before
us in the law, yet we perceive it not so well there as in the gosnel. *
We have then, as Calvin thinks along these lines, in Christ a revelation
of sin which is clearer and more distinct than that of the law.
Calvin discusses the point in Hebrews 4.12, where the Word of God is
as a two-edged sword which 'examines the whole soul of man, for it searches
his thoughts and scrutinizes his will with all its desires.' But 'is this
Word to be understood of the law or of the gospel?' he asks. In part of
both, but especially of the gospel. 'As it is Christ's office (officium
Christi) to uncover and bring to light the thoughts from the recesses of
p
the heart, this he does for the most part by the gospel.' God now mani-
x
fests sin by the gospel, as he did formerly by the law.
b. The vork of Christ as the mirror (speculum) of sin
The role of Christ in revealing sin assumes the form of an argument
from the contrary. We best tell man's sin from the magnitude of the divine
action required to replace man in grace. 'We are exhorted to start
recognizing and examining our sins when the death and passion of our Lord
Jesus is put before us.' 'The more that God has shown himself generous in
the person of our Lord Jesus Christ, the more we should feel from our side
what an enormity it is that we are enemies to him and fight against his
1. Ser. on Gal. 3* 1-3, CR 50.465f. Car combien qu'en la Loy Dieu nous
propose nostre malediction, si est-ce que nous ne 1'appercevons pas
ainsi qu'en l'Evangile.
2. Com. on Heb. 4.12, CR 55«52. ...id per evangelium magna ex parte efficit.
3. Com. on Ezek. 18.23, CR 40.445
1
righteousness and defy him to attack us.' 'By his grievous afflictions
he has testified to us on the one hand his infinite goodness and the love
he bears us, but on the other we must contemplate what our iniquities deserve
p
in the sight of God. * Nowhere in the writings of Calvin is this idea so
3
frequently and so clearly expressed as throughout the Sermons on Isaiah 55.
By the cost of divine forgiveness the depth of human guilt may be measured.
The ultimate rule for the measure of sin is the measure of grace.
If God had to crucify his only son to cope with human sin, then no
cheaper price could be paid. Here finally the desperate depths of iniquity
are revealed. At the cross, 'either God tortured his son capriciously, or
else he is showing us the enormity of our sins and what we have deserved.'^1"
Here must be 'measured' his wrath against sin. 'Certainly we must be stupid
beyond measure if we do not plainly see in this mirror (speculum) with what
abhorrence God regards sin; and we are harder than stones if we do not
5
tremble at such a judgment as this.' Prom this we come to know more fully
the enormity of sin. ^
This development of the doctrine of sin appears in a great many contexts.
Each time there is a demonstration of God's work of grace for us or in us and
from this there is drawn the conclusion of our complete sinfulness. The
exhibition of his work in us discovers the nature of our necessity.^ 'If
the death of Christ is our redemption; then we were captives; if it is
satisfaction, we were debtors; if it is atonement, we were guilty; if it is
Q
cleansing, we were unclean.' 'All to a man need his grace, it follows that
they are slaves of sin and are destitute of true righteousness.'9
1. Ser. on Is. 53.7-8, CR 35.644
2. Ser. on Is. 53.8-10, CR 35*649
3. See e.g. Ser. on Is. 52.13-53.1, CR 35.600f; on 53.1-4, CR 35.6l8f;
on 53.4-6, CR 35.625; on 53.9-10, CR 35.655, et al.
4. Ser. on Is. 53.9-30, CR 35.651
5. Com. on John 19.17, CR 47-434
6. Com. on John 12.27, CR 47*291
7. 11.3.6, CR 2.215; II.2.20, CR 2.301; Com. on Ezek. 11.19f, CR 40.242ff
8. Com. on Gal. 2.21, CR 50.200f
9. Com. on Matt. 1.21, CR 45*65* Com. on Hph. 2.8ff, CR 53-. l65ff
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We encounter as an extension of this notion the concept of the work
of Christ as bringing the wickedness of man into previously unknown maturity.
If he is rejected when God confronts man in his fulness in Christ, there is
man's sin called forth at its depth. A flood of evils burst forth after j
the preaching of the gospel because the world's ingratitude had arrived 'at
its highest point.' ' The more fully that God does communicate with us in
2
Christ, the more does our ungodliness grow and break out into open contumacy.'
Never is man's sin so great as when he rejects and crucifies the Christ; it
is only as men stand against the light of Christ that the depths of iniquity
can flourish. This means, in its corollary for our inquiry into the
knowledge of sin, that only in Christ's light can we formulate an under¬
standing of the final seriousness of sin.
4. The light of the law (lux legis)
The light of the gospel best and most properly uncovers sin. Here,
however, a problem arises. Calvin can, on other occasions, apparently
abandon the position he has established above to assume one where the roles
of the law and the gospel in bringing us to an awareness of sin are rather
different. Is Calvin here inconsistent and does he fail to relate the
knowledge of sin to the knowledge of grace?
a. The office of the law (legis officium)
Calvin here assigns to the law the peculiar office of revealing sin
and therefore man's ccsaxplete wretchedness before God - a role which is
played in contradistinction to that of the gospel, which brings salvation
and redemption to men thus slain by the law. 'The office of the law is to
show us the disease in such a way as to show us at the same time no hope of
cure; the office of the gospel is to bring a remedy to those that were past
1. Com. on Joel 2.90f, CR 42.572. Ser. on Is. 52.13-53.1, CR 35.606
2. Com. on Acts 2.20, CR 48.34f
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hope.* The difficulty here is that as Calvin develops this position it
leads him to assertions regarding the source of our awareness of sin that
stand in disjunction with Christ's office of laying bare the secrets of the
heart. Not only is man's cognizance of sin removed from its definitive
statement in the doctrine of grace to an equally definitive statement in the
doctrine of the law, but it is denied that the light of the gospel plays
any effective role in the revelation of sin. 'It is not the gospel which
has condemned me, it is not the gospel that has showed me my filthiness,
to make me ashamed of it; it is not the gospel that has bereft me of all
hope of salvation, but it is the law which has showed me that I am dead,
that I am damnable before God, that I am damned and lost. This comes from
2
nowhere else than from the law.' Such a position is not totally in haroiony
with Calvin's earlier remarks that by the gospel our lord shows us our sin
and makes us ashamed."* Here the law is employed as a weapon, for conviction
of sin independently of Christ, and from such use of the law a full statement
of the doctrine of sin is derived apart from Christ. From this position
Calvin develops the basis of the knowledge of sin as almost wholly in the
law. It is the great revealer of sin, here men face the fact of their
iniquity.^"
b. The law as the mirror (speculum) of sin
Man's sin is seen here as illuminated by the unequivocal demand of God
for absolute perfection. The source of our awareness of sin is not the
work and revelation of Christ, but a previously revealed, or at least pre¬
viously apprehended, knowledge of God* s righteousness apart from grace. If
the law reveals God in shadow in some respects, it is not lacking here and
5
reveals quite adequately what God expects and requires of man. 'Thus the
1. Com. on II Cor. 3*7, CR 30.42.
2. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.434. II.7.6, CR 2.257, 'The Use of the Law'
in Com. on Harm, of the Pent., GR 24.725ff
3. Ser. on Gal. 3.1-3, CR 50.465f, supra
4. Com. on Rom. 3» 27, CR 49*65; on Rom. 7.11, CR 49.126
5. Com. on Matt. 5.21, CR 45.174; Inst, of 1536, ch. I, pag. 46ff, CR 1.29f
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law is like a mirror in which we behold first our impotence, secondly our
iniquity which proceeds from it, and lastly the consequence of both, our
obnoxiousness to the curse, just as a mirror represents to us the spots on
our face.'
When he has so developed this position Calvin becomes wary of assigning
to Christ the office of revealing sin. Christ does do it, but it is not
properly his office. Commenting on Gal. 2.17: 'Is Christ then an agent of
sin?* he seems a bit perturbed about this relation; although he notes the
fact that Christ 'discovers the sin which lay concealed,* he further comments
that the law ought really to be the source of our awareness of sin, and we
should not need to turn to Christ for this. The 'direct reply' to the point
is 'that we must not ascribe to Christ that which is properly the work of
2
the law.' (proprium est opus legis) When Christ says that his Spirit will
convict the world of s±n, (John 16.8) Calvin is reluctant to say that it is
the office of the gospel to reveal sin. We are concerned here with the
demonstration of sin by the doctrine of the gospel, but there is an element
of impropriety here. 'It is undoubtedly the peculiar office of the law to
summon consciences to the judgment seat of God and to strike them with terror;
but the gospel cannot be preached in a proper manner till it lead men from
sin to righteousness and from death to life, and therefore it is necessary
3
to borrow from the law that first clause of which Christ spoke.'
c. The pedagogy of the law (legis paedagogium)
There seems to be here a way in which Calvin did not relate the
knowledge of sin to the knowledge of the gospel. But the principal
solution to this difficulty lies in Calvin's understanding of the pedagogy
of the law. The Jews were conducted to Christ by the 'pedagogy of the law.'
(legis paedogogium)^" And it can as well set before us a vivid account of God's
1. II. 7.7, CR 2.258
2. Com. on Gal. 2.19, CR 50.197f
3. Com. on John l6.8ff, CR 47.358f
4. II.11.5, CR 2.333
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reauirements, whereupon man is terror struck with his own helplessness and in
desperation for a way out turns for refuge to Christ. In this process the
source of the knowledge of sin becomes the law; grace only provides the way
of salvation and stands in sharp contrast to the death-dealing law. But com¬
ing to know oneself in this fashion, first as a helpless sinner and secondly
as saved by Christ, Calvin seems to regard not so much as intrinsically and
theoretically nccessarjr but rather an expedient operating procedure demanded
by the practical and external aspects of the situation.
That this is so Calvin reveals as he explains why the law was added four
hundred years after the covenant of grace with Abraham. 77as the covenant
promise in Abraham weak, "was the law added to save? No, Calvin replies, the
law was added to bring men to the knowledge of their sins; a thing, moreover,
which the covenant of grace ought to have done, but which on account of men's
stubbornness, it had not done. The law 'was added to make men know that God
has rightly condemned than all, and that they could not have any release but
would be continually tormented with such alarm that they -would always be in
despair, until they should rest themselves in the promise. Now if it is alleged
that the promise ought previously to have performed that function, the answer
and solution is easy. For although God in offering himself to be our Savior
does thereby show that we are all damned until he has pity on us. yet we can¬
not be helped as is requisite until he scares us. By his promise he calls us
gently and after a fatherly manner. It is true that this ought to make us
perceive our miseries and be sorry for them, but we are so fast asleep in our
sins that we never think about them unless we are forced. Although then, after
God gave the promise to men they should have had occasion to lament their sins,
to the end that they might rest themselves wholly upon the grace of our Lord
Jesus Christ, yet they did it not at all until God had struck them as with many
blows of a hammer, which he has done by the law.'1
1. Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20, CR 50.537
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The significant point here is that Calvin acknowledges that our sinful¬
ness ought to be perceived as a deduction from God's act of grace, yet the law-
is of a necessary practical value. When God on his part establishes the
covenant of grace, here is an occasion for man to lament his sin; his stubborn¬
ness, however, is such that he will not. God has to hit him over the head, as
it were with the sledge hammer of the law, to knock into him some sense and
awaken a perception of sin.
This pedagogy of the law has permeated Calvin* s thought because of his
conviction that sin is so deeply rooted that only by violent and rough
handling does man awaken. This is the orientation from which he operates as
he expounds the use of the law. Perhaps he allows it to extend beyond such
pedagogy to influence his system of doctrine. Whereas he notes that man
ought to take cognizance of his sin when God introduces the covenant of
grace, and whereas he asserts that the measure of this grace is the measure
of sin, yet simpler process - first to make a man aware of his sin by
confrontation with God* s unequivocal demand of perfection and secondly to
communicate to him redemptive grace - takes large place in his thought.
The multi-dimensional orientation, where man knows sin to a slight extent
in the light of nature, where he comes to fuller knowledge by contrast with
the revelation of the law of God, and where he can plumb the depths of sin
only with the measure of the grace of Christ, is reduced consciously or
unconsciously to a two-dimensional orientation, where man sound asleep in
his sin is suddenly and decisively confronted in the law with God's majesty
and jerked into a thorough awareness of his sin. Nor does Calvin always
return to point out the unique word about man's sin that God speaks in the
fulness of his revelation in Christ.
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B. The redemptive purpose of the knowledge of sin
We turn now to the purpose of formulating a doctrine of sin and its
implications for our procedure. If a task in Christian theology is to devote
our efforts to the truth about sin, we must do so only with an end in view.
Further, our approach and treatment of the fact of sin is to be governed by
our intent. What is our purpose and what are its implications?
1. The end and tendency of the Icnowledge of sin
We examine sin not as an end in itself, but that an awareness of human
failure and inability may point us away from ourselves and lead us to the only
source of life. The knowledge of sin ought not make us despair, or be spite¬
ful, or angry at God, or to excuse ourselves as being unable to do otherwise,
but it ought to lead us to him as Savior. So severe and unqualified are
Calvin's denunciations of man in his sin that it may well seem that he is
motivated by vehement pessimism or even a dislike of the human race. And
Calvin may occasionally be guilty of depicting man's sinfulness in a vacuum
so as to lose sight of his goal. But the end has been clearly stated.
'We hear the language God uses: that in man there is no goodness,
no understanding of truth, that he is so corrupted through sin that all the
light which we suppose ourselves to have is but pure ignorance, that all our
desires are rebellious toward God, that we are so dull as not to understand
what is profitable for our salvation, rather we draw completely backward. Let
us then plainly talk about these things, because God has taught them to us.
But at the same time let us understand to what end we must apply this doctrine.'
'The end is that knowing themselves to be men, that is, poor creatures who can
do no good, and knowing that this ought not serve to make them careless so
that they say, I can do nothing, let God work what he mil - knowing this, we
are to flee to him for refuge, knowing that it is his proper office to remedy
our vices and our faults..*-1-
1. Ser. on Deut. 29.5-8, CR 28.506. Ser. on Deut. 32.44-47, OR 29.81F
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God's pointing out man's sin is the first step in bringing him to
salvation. 'God makes manifest to mankind their great misery in order that
they may betake themselves to him, he -wounds that he may cure, and slays
that he may give life.'^ We make men 'look at themselves more closely in
order that all may be led to this knowledge of sins by which we shall be
2
led to repentance and consequently to the grace of God.' 'God fulminates
in his Word against men that he may withhold his hand from than. The more
severe God is when he chastises us, makes us know our sins, and sets before
us his wrath, the more clearly he testifies how precious and dear to him is
our salvation.'^ 'If God insists upon extorting a confession from us, he
acts rather as a physician than as a judge.We are not then to be pessimistic
in our knowledge of sin, as has often been characteristic of the
Reformed outlook, but to know that the very knowledge of our sin is the first
step to redemption.
Where this redemptive movement does not begin to take place, sin is
not yet really known, for to know sin is to turn from it to obedience and
submission to God's will. The man who has not so turned does not yet fully
know his sin. Calvin does not develop in just what way this is so, but he
affirms its truth. 'It cannot be but that a sinner, conscious of evil and
knowing that he suffers justly, will humbly and thankfully submit to the will
of God. Therefore when men perversely clamor or muaaur against God, it is
certain that they have not as yet been made sensible of their sins. I allow
indeed that many feel guilty who struggle against God, and fiercely resist
his hand as much as they can, and also blaspheme his name when he chastises
them; but they are not yet touched with the true feeling of repentance so as
1. Com. on Szek. 18.23, CR 40.445* Ser. on I Tim. 2.3-5, CR 53*153; Ser. on
Deut. 9.6-7, CR 26.657; on Deut. 4*19-24, CR 26.166; Ser. on Gal. 3*3-5,
CR 50.475; Ser. on Job 19.1-12, CR 34.93ff
2. Ser. on Acts 2.22-24, CR 48. 658. Com. on Jonah 3*13, CR 43*259f
3. Com. on Zeph. 2.If, CR 44.28f
4. Com. on Gen. 3*14, CR 23.88f
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to be displeased with themselves.' 'They seem then to be convicted sufficiently
to acknowledge their guilt and, to assent as it were to the justice of God's
judgment, but they do not really know their sins so as to be displeased with
themselves on account of their sins.' 'These two things are united together by
an indissoluble knot: to be cognizant of sin, and to submit patiently to
the will of the Judge when he inflicts punishment.' ^ Thus far from being
morbid in his doctrine of sin, Calvin asserts that those who are embittered
by the knowledge of sin do not yet really know their sin. If a knowledge
of sin is not so oriented as to achieve a purpose of redemption it is not
a real knowledge of sin at all.
When we establish the source of our knowledge of sin to be reflexive
of our knowledge of God and yet formulate this doctrine to point man out
of himself and to the grace of Christ, we must recognize an essentially
circular relationship, lest we confuse source and purpose. If the light of
Christ reveals to us most clearly our sin, our sin in turn reinforces our
p
blindness and our need of the light of Christ. There is here involved a
reciprocal relation. But Calvin's ultimate purpose in establishing the
fact of sin is not to found upon it the knowledge of grace as the only
possible remedy - as has often been the argument of later theologians.
Rather it is to use this knowledge to imp lament our comprehension and
understanding of grace.
Recognizing this we may readily see that while Calvin's basic
dognatic argument is a deduction from God's work in us to man's need, from
grace to sin, yet a reversed argument is permissible and proper once within
the faith, if used for a progressive appreciation of God's grace. 'We
never estimate aright his kindness toward us till we have been led to
view, on the other side, the unhappy condition in which we formerly
1. Com. on Micah 7«9, CR 43.413f
2. This is the theme of the Ser. on Eph. 2.1-9, CR 51* 349ff •
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were without Christ.' 'If we do not perceive our wretchedness and need
we shall never understand how desirable is that remedy which Christ has
p
brought to us.' The whole circular argument is sketched in a seimon on
Isaiah 55* We become aware of our sins in the passion of Christ and. use
this awareness in turn to help us accept the grace of Christ. 'We are
exhorted here to start recognizing and examining our sins when the death
and passion of our Lord Jesus Christ is put before us.' The greater the
grace of God to us in Christ, the more enormous our sins are seen to be.
But rwhen we have known our sins and why the inestimable grace of God is
preached to us we shall surely be touched with repentance.' ' We shall
never be able to feel to the quick what profit the death and passion of
our Lord Jesus Christ has brought to us unless we are pricked inwardly
with horror for our sins.'3
3. The way of expression (loquutio) of the fact of sin
If we are governed by our purpose in the formulation and presentation
of the knowledge of sin, there are correlative factors that must be
taken into account. It is important to note these as Calvin has been
accused of being unduly harsh in his portrayal of sin. Where this
is so, we must understand the intent and method he uses. In representing
sin to man, our condition before God ought to be 'expressed according to
the weakness of our capacity.' (pro captus nostri infimitate)^1" There are
two weaknesses with which Calvin is here concerned. So deep is man in his
sin that he has fallen into a unique stubbornness. We must recognize a
congenital tendency to be obstinate, a factor which is doubtless part of
his sin, yet one needing special recognition. 'Besides the evil that is
1. Arg. to Com. onEph., CR 51* 141* Com. on Ps. 144.3, CR 32.408
2. Com. on Is. 53.6, CR 32.258f. Com. on I Cor. 6.11, GR 49.594; Ser. on
Matt. 26.36-39, OR 46.833f; an I Tim. 1.12-13, CR 35.69
5. Ser. on Is. 55.7-8, CR 35.656ff. Ser. on Bph. 4.17-19, CR 51.595f
4. 11.16.3, CR 2.369
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in us, there is also a hardness and obstinacy such that God is obliged to
awaken us just as by force, that we may have some consciousness of our
vices to be displeased with ourselves.'"'" 'Such is the obstinacy of many
that they will never listen to Christ until they have been subdued by
violence.We so nourish ourselves in vice that we must be drawn to
3
acknowledgment of our sins by force.
But there is another type of stubbornness into which man is prone to
fall, a weakness of man at the other extreme. A man is not able long to
endure where he finds himself without hope, but will collapse into despair.
'Unless there remains a hope of forgiveness, the terror of punishment
hardens men's hearts with obstinacy.' ^ If man is unable to come to an
awareness of his sins short of rough and violent handling, it is equally
true that he cannot survive an undue amount of such energetic treatment.
Calvin expresses the difference by saying that if the human heart must
be 'softened' by a clear portrayal of Christ's revelation of his sins, yet
5it must not be 'broken down.' 'Despair hurls us into madness and then
hardens our hearts by abandoned obstinacy.*^ Coupling the redemptive
purpose from which we must never deviate in a doctrine of sin together with
these two weaknesses prevalent in the capacity of man, there are implications
obvious yet highly significant in understanding Calvin's exposition of sin.
There from this originate 'ways of expression' (loquutiones; loquutio, a mode
of expression)"^ or principles of accommodation to man's capacity.
a. The knowledge of sin 'in rough fashion' (d'une fa9on aspre)
Calvin says it may be necessary to drive man to fear with hopelessness
that having done this we may lift him up with the grace of Christ. Scripture,
1. Ser. on Eph. 5*11-34, CR 51*706. Com. on Is. 52.37*319
2. Com. on John 4*16, OR 47*83* Gom. on Ezek. 13.22f, CR 40.296ff
3. Ser. on Gal. 5*19-23, GR 51*33* Gom. on Rom. 2.8, GR 49*14
4. Com. on Acts 3*17, GR 48.69£
5. Com. on John 7.46, CR 47*185
6. Com. on Ezek. 18.22, GR 43.444* 111*3*15, GR 2.446
7. 11.16.2, CR 2.368
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employs 'ways of expression of this kind* for they 'are aceonJodated to
our capacity that we may better understand how misei'able and calamitous
our condition is out of Christ.*"'" 'God's faithful servants often inspire
terror, though only when necessary. For they cannot otherwise subdue
those who exult in their lusts, and they cannot bring them to obedience unless they
overcome them with fear. Therefore even true prophets and evangelists
cause pain; as Paul says, If I have caused you sorrow I do not repent of it,
p
for so I ought to do, for there is a salutary grief.' (II Cor. 7.8) We
3
bring men to the knowledge of sin 'in rough fashion.' (d'une fa9on aspre)
If the oil of Christ has no flavor, it ought to be mixed with wine to
sharpen its taste. To profit in the school of Christ our hardness must be
broken as the earth is prepared and softened by the plowshare.^"
b. The knowledge of sin 'tempered with sweetness1 (cum dulcore temperata)
On the other hand Calvin is at pains to limit and balance this
principle of accommodation with a reciprocal one, drawn again from the
capacity of man. The importance of this in Calvin has not always been
recognized. We must never dissever the sinfulness of man from the grace of
God. 'Sorrow for sin is necessary, if it is not perpetual. I advise you
sane times to quit the anxious and painful recollection of your v/ays, to
arise to an agreeable and serene remembrance of divine blessings. Let us
mingle honey with wormwood that its salutary hitteraess may restore our
health when it shall be drunk tempered with iramixed sweetness (cum immisto
dulcore temperata) and if you reflect on your own meanness, reflect also
on the goodness of the lord.In representing to men their sins we must
1. II.l6.2f, CR 2.368ff. Com. on Is. 52.17, CR 37.319
2. Com. on Ezek. 13.22f, CR 40.297. Com. on Hos. 6.5, 'CR 42.327f
3. Ser. on Deut. 32.20-22, CR 29.15f« Ser. on Deut. 8.14-19, CR 26.634
4. Com. on John 4.16, CR 47.83; Ser. on Job 5.17-18, CR 33.257ff
5. III.3«15, CR 2.446. Calvin quotes Bernard. Com. on Is. 52.17, CR
37.319; on Hos. 2.2, CR 42.223; on Micah 4.If, CR 43.339; on 5.If, CR
43.364; on Joel 2.12f, CR 42.541ff; on Jonah 3.5, CR 43-253f
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1
'mix sweetness with the harshness.'
There are two methods of acknowledging sin, one which tends to despair,
torment, and obstinacy, and another which tends to salvation and is built on
2
the hope of pardon. We follow the latter. By ignorance of this 'principle'
we 'make long discourses about the fear of God, only by keeping poor souls
in perplexity and doubt to build without a foundation.' ^ We say that God
is angry in such a way as not to be forgetful of his mercy. Pear ought to
terminate in humility and depart not from the hope of pardon lest the sinner
be wearied with excessive dread. 'Let us remember that sane limit must be
observed that we may not be overwhelmed in sorrow, for to nothing are
terrified consciences more liable than to fall into despair.
Here again Calvin warns against enunciating a doctrine of depravity
outside a context of grace. This may be temporarily and pedagogically
necessary, yet it is neither the ultimate logical position of Christianity,
nor can it be an unqualified operating procedure if we are to establish our
purpose in formulating a doctrine of evil. 'No one could even for a moment
continue patient in a state of misery, except he entertained the hope of
being delivered, and promised to himself a happy escape. These two things
then ought not to be separated, and cannot be; the acknowledgment of our
sins, which will humble us before God, and the knowledge of his goodness,
and a firm assurance as to our salvation. For God has testified that he
will be ever propitious to us, however much he may punish us for our sins,
and that he will remamber mercy, as Habbakkuk says, in the midst of his
wrath. (Hab, 3*2) It would not then be sufficient for us to feel our evils,
except the consolation which proceeds from the promise of grace be added.'^
1. Ser. on Gal. 4*11-14, CR 50.610. Ser. on Gal. 5*7-30, OR 50.691
2. Com. on Ps. 32*5, OR 31*319f* Ser. on Deut. 28.2-8, CR 28.370
3. Com. on Ps. 303*4, OR 32*75ff* Com. on Kicah 7*18, CR 43*428ff.
4. III. 3* 15, CR 2.44-6. Com. on I Cor. 13,32, CR 49*495
5. Com. on Micah 7*9, CR 43*414. Com. on Jer. 4*27, CR 37*599; on Gen. 3*19,
CR 23*76; on Rom. 11.9, CR 49.223^; on Ps. 19*10, CR 31*203
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It is Calvin's lesson for theology that the knowledge of sin is
to come from and point toward the knowledge of grace. Our doctrine of
sin must be Christologically centered in both source and purpose. Calvin's
thought about the source and purpose of our knowledge of sin begins with the
fact that we can realize our sins only in the light of the Lord. The will
of God reveals sin. Theology may begin here, and this is a point of
common agreement. But if our theology of sin is to be rightly oriented
it must immediately move on to recognize that this light of the Lord
shines brightest in Christ and that it is only in Christ that we finally
know our sins. God's will is law and commandment, but it is far more. It
is a will for grace and we know this in Christ. Sin can be known in its
final form only as theology contrasts it with the state of grace. Reformed
theology has not always done this, but has formulated a doctrine of sin
apart from the light of Christ, by using the light of nature or the light
of the law, by using God's holiness and majesty, or his perfection and
absolute righteousness. But that doctrine of sin which is truly centered
in Christology recognizes as well as this that sin is a corollary of the
knowledge of grace.
There are two tendencies which constantly threaten to off-center
this knowledge of sin from its Christological basis. The first of these
is the attempt to found a doctrine of sin on the light of nature. This
results in a concept of sin developed in the moral terms of the natural
man, in an apologetic attempt to find a common denominator where Christian
and philosopher can begin together. It is Calvin's emphasis here that
while this moral consciousness is to be accepted and employed as a divine
instinct, it is nonetheless to be recognized that there is not in this
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any final knowledge of what sin is. Theology must allow the revelation,
of the Tford of God to uncover sin, for here is sin seen as a concupiscence
and ingratitude which infinitely surpasses any immorality known to the
natural man.
In the second tendency which would sever the knowledge of sin from
its basis in the grace of Christ we find Calvin himself involved in a
struggle. He teaches that sin must be seen as more than the failure to
confozm to the law, it must be measured by the grace of Christ to us.
Theology must not build up a knowledge of sin under the bare word of the
law, but must constantly derive its knowledge of sin from that of grace.
Yet although such is Calvin's lesson for theology, he himself does not
always follow his better insights. On these occasions we must follow
in the direction in which Calvin points rather than that in which he
goes. It is incorrect simply to convict man of his sin with the sheer
majesty and command of God as revealed in the law. Knowledge of sin
entirely from the law in this way is true knowledge yet knowledge only
in part. It will seen impossible or inhuman and only embitter. If the
law remains for pedagogy, it does not remain as a systematic basis for
the doctrine of sin. With the coming of grace, sin must be known in con¬
trast to a God who was and is gracious, and whose very grace is the
measure of sin. It is because man was created to grace and is returned
to grace that we know he is a sinner. Theology cannot afford to remove
its knowledge of sin from a basis in the knowledge of the grace of Christ.
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II. The Nature and Propagation of Sin
Calvin's understanding of sin is an expansion of the assertion:
'He (Mam) ruined his posterity by his defection, which has perverted
the whole order of nature in heaven and earth. * So we develop it here,
turning our attention first to the nature of this defection, and then (in
the second part of this chapter) to the way in which Adam ruined his
posterity by this defection. The following chapter examines the way in
which sin perverts all of God's order for man and creation.
A. The root defection (radix defectionis) and source (fons) of sin
How does Calvin reduce man's apostasy to a fundamental sin on which
the whole complicated superstructure of sin rests? This is what Calvin
calls the 'root of the defection,' (radix defectionis) or source (fons)
or cause (causa) of sin, by which he means both the perverse movement which
led Adam to introduce sin into our creation and the basic or primary sin.
We may thus equate it with the primal or original sin (peccatum originale)
2
of man. We are 'trained in the same school of original sin' as was Adam.
This root defection is described by Calvin from various viewpoints. In
tracing these concepts we notice how Calvin's concept of sin is a broader
and a different one than that which conceives of sin as the failure to con¬
form to the law of God, or as moral rebellion. We see here how in Calvin's
thought this type of transgression is included along with and brought under
the larger concept of sin as man's unfaithful and self-willed rejection of
the grace and goodness of God.
1. Infidelity (infiaelitas)
Calvin's most specific and most direct answer to the inquiry about the
root defection is infidelity, (infidelitas) The nature of this infidelity
1. II.1.5, CH 2.179. Genus suum pessumdedit sua defectione qui totum
naturae ordinem pervertit in coelo et in terra.
2. Com. on Gen. 3.12, CR 23.67
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is important. Man was not faithful to know God and to reverence him, to
trust wholly in him, to acknowledge him gratefully as his maker and Lord.
Emphasis here is on his unfaithful rejection of the grace and goodness of
God as he turned elsewhere to look for greater security and happiness.
Adam fell through faithlessness. 'Since it must have been a detestable
crime that was so severely punished by God, we must consider the nature
(species) of Adam's sin, which kindled the dreadful flame of divine wrath
against the whole race. * 'Infidelity was the root of the defection. -*•
But from this sprang ambition, pride, and ingratitude, since Adam by
coveting more than was granted, offered an indignity to the divine goodness,
p
which had so greatly enriched him.' 'TThat was the sin of than both?'
'First the woman is led away from the Word of God by the wile3 of Satan
through infidelity.' (per infidelitatesn) 'Therefore infidelity was the
root of the defection, just as faith alone unites us to God.'^ All sins
flow from our parents exalting themselves against the honor and excellence
conferred on them. So Adam was not faithful ' to claim nothing for his
own' and 'depend wholly upon the Son of God' and 'not seek life anywhere
4
but in him,' rather he attempted to ' rel3r on his own prudence.' He did
not want to confide in God, but wanted to have something of his own
which might have resided in himself and not in God.5
Adam's root sin of infidelity is as well the root sin of mankind at
this day in his rebellion against God. 'Certainly infidelity ... is the
6
source and mother of all stubbornness.' Man has not been faithful to
trust in God's goodness, 'but having trusted such a great excellence of
his nature and having forgotten from whom it came and by whom it subsisted,
1. Infidelitas radix defectionis fuit.
2. II. 1.4, CR 2.178f
3. Com. on Gen. 3*6, CR 23.60f
4. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39
5. II. 2. ID, CR 2.193f
6. Com. on Eph. 2.2, CR 51*162. Certe infidelitas...est fons et mater
omnis pervicaciae. Com. on John 16.9, CR 47.359^
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man strove to raise himself up apart from the Lord.1 And in this
infidelity men have ever since refused to depend on God, to receive all
from him and so yield due honor and glory to him as his obedient and
faithful children. Rather they have wished to be independent, to have
inner strength of their own, to be seIf-confident and not to be bothered
with confiding in God. 'Whenever our minds are pestered with this
cupidity to desire to have something of our own, which may reside in
ourselves rather than in God, we may know that this idea is suggested
by the same counsellor who excited in our first parents the desire of
2
resembling gods, knowing good and evil.' But Isaiah invites men
'to confidence (fiducia) in God, which is the remedy that ought to be
employed against all evils, as on the other hand, all evils arise from
unbelief (incredulitas) and distrust.' (diffidentia)^
2. Disobedience (inobedientia)
Though most frequently selecting infidelity as the root sin, Calvin
can as well speak of disobedience (inobedientia) as the root defection, or
the initial and primary sin which has been transferred from Adam to all
mankind. Here Calvin rightly includes that facet of sin which often became
the sole category of thought about the nature of sin in later Reformed
thought. And in attempting to follow through Calvin's wider concepts for
the root defection, we must not obscure the fact that sin as disobedience
and rebellion against the law of God is one - but only one - of the ways
of defining sin.
Adam's sin was disobedience. In the assertion: 'He ruined himself by
his defection, which has perverted the whole order of nature in heaven and
earth,'""1" Calvin can as easily say that he 'ruined himself by his disobedience. '5
1. Instruction in Paith, 1537, sec. 4.
2. II. 2.10, CR 2.193f. Com. on Zeph. 3.12f, CR 44.66f; on John 16.9, OR 47.359f
3. Com. on Is. 57-13, CR 37.315, Com. on Ex. 17.2, CR 24.176
4. II. 1.5, CR 2.179
5. II. 12.3, CR 2.341
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The tree of knowledge was a 'test of obedience' and 'it is evident that
the fall commenced in disobedience.'"*" It was 'by the disobedience of Adam
2that sin entered the world.' This disobedience must be understood as a
fundamental transgression of the law of God where Adam overthrew all order
and desired to occupy a place in creation which he had not been given. It
is not then a simple matter of infringement or violation but of the whole
rejection of God's law of creation, complete and unqualified rebellion
against God's government. Adam would not submit to the divine government
and he was not content with his dependent condition, but wanted something
higher - independence, or self-sufficiency. He did not want to be a subject
as he had been created to be; he wanted to be his own law-giver, to occupy
for himself the place of God, and so depend on himself, and be subject to
no one. He did not keep himself obedient but coveted a higher position
3
which did not belong to him. 'The cause of the ruin of Adam was that he
wished to raise himself up more than was lawful for him, he wished to be
wiser than God, who had not so permitted him.'*f
Yle may generalize that mankind stands in need of redemption because
he has 'ruined himself by his disobedience.'^ This is clear by comparison
with the work of Christ. Righteousness now comes through the obedience of
Christ to us who in our disobedience could not attain to it. 'It was necessary
that man's disobedience against God should be purged from the nature of man. '^
Obedience is the essence of righteousness, the 'mother and guardian' or 'the
origin of all virtues,'^ but 'by nature we are rebellious, our affections
draw us contrary to his will.'The natural disposition of men such as it
1. II.1.4, CR.178f. Initium ruinae apparet fuisse inobedientiam.
2. Ccmi. on G-en. 3*6, CR 23.61. Com. on Gen. 3* H, CR 23.67
3. Ser. on I Tim. 2.12-14, CR 53*214; Com. on Deut. 18.9, CR 24.266
4. Ser. on Eph. 1.13-14, CR 51*305
5. II. 12.3, CR 2.341. Inst, of 1536, ch. II, Pag. 123, CR 1.66; of 1539
(et seqq.) ch. IV, pag. 126, CR 1.518
6. Genevan Catechism, French, 1541, 7 Sunday, CR 9*25
7. II. 8.5, CR 2.270. Ser. on I Tim. 1.14-15, CR 53*84
8. Ser. on Deut. 4.1-2, CR 26.98
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is before it is renewed by the Spirit of God' is such that men are
'foolish* and 'disobedient' and always 'go astray.' This is 'the nature
of unbelief' and from this proceed all the fruits of sin."'" 'The source of
2
all evils' among men is 'their revolt from God.' Isaiah describes, in
terms of rebellious Israel, 'what is the nature of men before the Lord
anticipates them by his mercy,' and this is ' the nature of that rebellion,
namely that the people walk after their own thoughts. Nothing is more
displeasing to God than for men to be c* t cfe IS (self-willed),
that is, devoted to their own inclinations.
3. Unbelief (incredulitas)
Having noted already the significant position which unbelief taires in
Calvin's notion of infidelity, it is not surprising to find that on
frequent occasions Calvin designates the primal sin to be unbelief.
(incredulitas) Rather than using the term root defection, Calvin here
more often speaks of the fountain or source, (fons) the origin (origo) or
cause (causa) of all our evils. Adam was prompted to sin by his incredulity.
He doubts that the life which God has chosen for him is the true life of
felicity and wonders if perhaps a life of his own choosing would not yield
greater happiness and more security. Satan's first move is to call into
doubt that which is non-reasonable and therefore to lead our first parents
to question the Tightness or desirability of God's rule and order for thesn.
'He wished to inject into the woman a doubt which might induce her not to
believe (credo) that to be the Word of God for which a plausible reason
did not appear.'^" Calvin seems to feel that sin which did not spring from
some unbelief or doubt would have been impossible, as it is unthinkable
that Adam and Eve should resist God unless they first doubted either his
goodness to them - thinking perhaps to find a higher goodness in their
1. Com. on Tit. 3.3, CR 52.427
2. Com. on Is. 1.4, CR 36.32. Com. on Deut. 18.9, CR 24.266
3. Com. on Is. 65.2, CR 37.417f. (cf. II Pet. 2. ID)
4. Com. on Gen. 3*11, CR 23*57
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own strength - or his power to punish them. 'For never would they have
1
dared to resist God unless they had first been incredulous of his Word.'
Only when a belief in God's Word has been left behind does it occur to
man to break his ties to God.
In singling out' unbelief as the first of Adam1 s perverse
affections, we are only emphasising one aspect of what Calvin includes
under infidelity, as we have already seen. Adam's unbelief gives rise
immediately and necessarily to unfaithfulness; he in incredulity doubts
God's goodness to him and in infidelity turns elsewhere to look for strength
and happiness, and these two are both included in Calvin's infidelitas.
As belief or faith gives immediate and inseparable rise to a fidelity which
leads us to turn to him alone and so be united to him - and these are both
2included in fides - so the sin of Adam was an unbelief which led to infidelity.
This is infidelitas. And in it Adam overthrew the law and order of God to
prove his inobedientia.
Adam's sin in us is depicted in terms of unbelief. In this we
emphasize the nature of the primal sin as mankind inherits it from Adam,
and we may specifically call it unbelief, (incredulitas) Here Calvin
distinguishes more clearly between unbelief (incredulitas) and infidelity
(infidelitas) though the two are inseparably related and inevitably overlap.
'Unbelief is the source and cause of all evils.'3 Peter says that 'unbelief
is the fountain of all our evils.'4 'Unbelief not only hinders men from
being delivered from the condemnation of death, but is the source and
cause (fons et causa) of all our evils.' 5 Man will not believe, accept,
and come to trust in God and so be faithful to him. This is his unbelief.
It rises from an innate persuasion that man must be independent and self-
1. Com. on Gen. 3*6, CR 23.60
2. ibid.
3. Com. on John 8.24, CR 47.197• •. • incredulitatem malorum omnium fontem
ac causam esse... Com. on Ps. 32.6, CR 31.321
4. Com. on I Pet. 1.14, CR 55.221
5. Com. on John 15.22, CR 47.351
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sufficient, that he must believe in his own strength. But it in turn
gives rise to this same persuasion and fosters his self-will. In this
movement man is cut off from a right relation to God, he cannot receive
and live in his grace as he ought to do. If we believe we seek what we
need from God's gratuitous goodness, but the unbelieving try to secure
themselves.^ We cannot receive the blessings which God would give to
us because of our unbelief. 'And therefore let us note that men never
deprive themselves of the blessings of God except through their own
distrust.' (deffiance) 'This is the source of all evils: that we are not
fully convinced that in God is everything that can be desired for our
salvation.'^ 'All evils arise from unbelief (incredulitas) and distrust.'^
Israel's chief sin was unbelief. The 'principal' thing in which
Israel erred is 'that it did not put its trust (fiducia) in God. This
also is the cause and origin of all superstitions, for if men felt assured
that God alone is enough for them, they would not follow here and there
their own inventions. We from this see that unbelief (incredulitas) is
not only the mother of all the evil deeds by which men wilfully wrong
5
and injure one another, but that it is also the cause of all superstitions.'
4. Concupiscence (concupiscentia)
Calvin denotes the root failure of man to be concupiscence, (concupiscentia)
By this he means again to describe the perverse, depraved motion all mankind
have inherited from Adam, this time with emphasis on the self-willed and
selfish aspects of man's continual revolt from God. Concupiscence is
basically self-love and so is the opposite of the love of God. In his Word
and lav/ God has required of man a grateful and selfless love in all heart,
1. Com. on Hab. 2.4, CR 43*529
2. Ser. oil Deut. 2.8-23, CR 26.27
3. Com. on Is. ID. 21, CR 36.226
4. Com. on Is. 57.13, OR 37*315
5. Com. on Zeph. 3. If, CR 44.48. Com. on Heb. 3.17, CR 55.44; on Jude 5,
CR 55.491
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body, and soul; in this man would have been faithful and obedient and would
have reached his highest state of blessedness, but man in his concupiscence
has loved himself and sought out his ovm felicity. Here Calvin continues,
in the language of his thinking about unbelief as the sin of sins, to
employ the ideas of a fountain or source of all evils, and returns as well,
in the language of his exposition of infidelity as the primary sin, to the
notion of a root of sin. Concupiscence is the fountain (fons) and root
(radix) of all our sin.
Adam's sin was concupiscence. Adam 'is tempted by his own concupiscence'
(concupiscentia) and 'not otherwise than knowingly and willingly set himself
as a rebel against God.'"'" So it is with his wife. It was 'the poison of
concupiscence' that affected Eve.^ With us concupiscence is the inverting
and corrupting power that makes sin of our whole life. 'Concupiscence' is
not ' just any kind of evil affection, but that which is the fountain of all
evil affections.' (appetituum omnium fons) All depraved desires root in
concupiscence.^ In short, we may not improperly define original sin as
concupiscence if we understand that man is of himself nothing else but
4
concupiscence. 'Paul gives the appellation of sin to this, from which ail
sins proceed, to concupiscence.'^ And Peter points out the primal sin
6
by the name concupiscence.
".That do we mean by concupiscence as the original sin? A complicating
factor here is the fact that the word concupiscence is used in various ways.
Calvin directs himself in particular to the doubly complicating factor that
Roman Catholic tradition behind him had held that concupiscence was the
sin of Adam, and from this the sin of man, but had meant by that a very
1. Com. on Gen. 3*12, CR 23.67
2. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.59
3. Com. on James 1.15, CR 55.390f. Com. on Ex. 20.17, CR 24.717f; on
Eph. 4.17, GR 51.205
4. II. 1.8, GR 2.183. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.) ch. II, pag. 21, GR 1.311
5. III.3.30, GR 2.441. Calvin quotes Augustine. Cf. II.3.1, GR 2.2096. Com. on II Pet. 1.4, CR 55.447. Ser. on Deut. 28.1-2, CR 28.348
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different thing. Some held, for example, that Eve's concupiscence was
lusting with intemperate appetite, and Adam's concupiscence was allowing
himself to be seduced by Eve. Such suggestions Calvin rejects roundly. •*-
Concupiscentia may mean several things, Calvin notes in a discussion of
'lust' in I John 2.16. It may mean the whole depraved nature of man.
Calvin rejects such an interpretation in this context, but clearly uses
2
it elsewhere, as we have seen above. Or it may mean, as Calvin thinks it
does in I John 2.16, a grosser lust a oupiditas, e.g. 'the cupiditas of
the eyes,' 'libidinous looks as well as the vanity which delights in pomps
and empty splendor,' etc. Erom concupiscence as the root defection there
arise in us these several lusts. 'Various concupiscences, (concupiscentias)
3
all of which are adverse to God, bear rule in us.' As men desire felicity
they generally turn to the more sensuous and physical delights and so
concupiscence as man's self-love and desire to be happy usually degenerates
into lust. Calvin may then use the word to mean a gross or crass lust.^"
But in all this we cannot lose sight of a secret and more fundamental
form of concupiscence. All of the Greek and pagan virtues - justice, upright¬
ness, moderation, prudence, fidelity, and temperance - are rejected because
natural man does not know concupiscence.^ (We examine this later in the
discussion of ethics.) The keeping of the law, if done in self-will, may
be concupiscent (as we will also see later in the discussion of the law).
The law alone 'indeed bridles our external actions, but does not in the
6
least restrain the fury of our concupiscence.' We may 'agree with the law
of God in regard to the mere outward actions'^ but be inwardly concupiscent.
Man may come to covet or desire salvation out of selfish and self-willed
1. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.6lf. II. 1.4, CR 2.178
2. Com. on James 1.15, CR 55»390f; on Eph. 4.17, CR 51.205; on II Pet. 1.4,
CR 55.44; II. 1.8, CR 2.183; IlI.3.I0f, CR 2.441P
3. Com. on I John 2.16, CR 55»319f
4. Com. on II Pet. 2.10, CP. 55.464
5. Com. on Mark 10.21, CR 45*540, and see later.
6. Com. on Rom. 7.6, OR 49.123
7. Com. on Eph. 4.17, CR 51.205. Com. on Ex. 20.17, CR 24.717
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motives. There is a concupiscentia which does not f low out immoderately,
but which keeps the letter of the law and is zealous for the serving of God.
What we mean, by concupiscence is well illustrated in the tenth
commandment. Covetousness, in Biblical usage, is at times but not always
synonymous with concupiscence. ^ Paul's reference in Romans 7.7: 'I should
not have known what concupiscence is if the law had not said, Thou shalt
not lust,' (non concupisces) is to concupiscence as this primal sin.
p'Paul under this word contains the whole law;' this summarizes all that
the law forbids. Concupiscence is here whatever is not of a motion
compatible with loving the Lord in all body, soul, mind, and heart, or
loving the neighbor as oneself. In this way, understanding covetousness
very broadly to mean concupiscence, we may refer back to the tenth command¬
ment as God's commandment to search out the perversity of man and to
'require integrity' of him.^ Concupiscence is the opposite of conforming
j /
our life to the will of God, it is the c*~t c*. £ I ot (disorder) which
enters when man does not depend on the will of God.^" Concupiscence is the
will (voluntas) which is intemperate unreasonable, and pervei'ted.
We learn what concupiscence is from Paul, for he was ignorant of sin
until he recognized what was meant by the word concupiscence. Paul had
formally and sincerely so he thought kept the law. He was irreproachable
before men, yet the chief of sinners in a literal way because he most of
all believed himself to have life, he thought that he was righteous before
God on account of his works and did not desire mercy. Paul's trouble was
that 'being puffed up with confidence (confidentia) in his righteousness, he
c
expected salvation by his works.' So we understand by concupiscence any
1. Ser. on Deut. 5.21, OR 26.371ff
2. Com. on Rom. 7.7, GR 49.124 Ser. on Deut. 5.21, OR 26.371ff, esp. 382
3. Com. on Rom. 7.7, CR 49.124
4. Responsio contra Pighium de IAbero Arbitrio, CR 9.362
5. 1.15.6, CR 2.142. Com. on I Pet. 4.2, CR 55.271
6. Com. on Ex. 20.17, CR 24-719. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.436;
Com. on Ps. 119.36f, CR 32.230
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affection that is not directed toward the selfless and grateful love of
God. It is a question not of an external but of an internal obedience.
Concupiscence is man's primal sin of refusing to love God and living in
self-love, of resting on his own strength and virtue rather than on the
strength and goodness of God. In this way ' <j> l ^uTlo( (self-love)
2
blinds us so much a3 to be the mother of all iniquities.* But 'he who
has denied himself has cut out the root of all evils.'^
More rarely, yet often significantly, Calvin can call the cause of
sin simply the lusts of the flesh. 'Sin dwells in us... because its cause
is the depraved lust (cupiditas) of our flesh.'^ On these occasions
cupiditas is nearly synonymous with concupiscentia.^ Lust (cupiditas) is
c
the opposite of devotion and obedience to God.
5. Ingratitude (ingratitudo)
Calvin can view man's primal sin from an all embracing viewpoint as
ingratitude, (ingratitudo) Sin is here seen in the light of the bountiful
and unlimited blessings which God wills to bestow on man, but which man has
cut off through his refusal to accept and to depend, on then, turning to his
own devices to seek greater happiness. In this way man* s most fundamental
sin is ingratitude. If man had been grateful, he would faithfully,
obediently, and with selfless love of God have lived as God willed; but man
was ungrateful. This is the source (source) or fountain, or the seed (semen)
from which sin arises. Adam's sin was his unthankfulness. He was created
in an earthly paradise which produced for him all the good things that he
wished. He bore the image of God and was as the angels of heaven, he
might have dwelled here in felicity. But when God had thus dealt so gently
1. Cf. II Tim. 3.2
2. Com. on Deut. 6.5, CR 24.724. Com. on II Tim. 3.2, CR 52.377
3. Inst, of 1536, ch. I, pag. 93, CR 1.52
4. Com. on Rom. 7.7, CR 49.123
5. Com. on Ezek. 18.22, CR 40.Wfj on I John 2.16, CR 55.319f
6. Com. on Rom. 7.8, CR 49.W; on Is. 57.17, CR 37.318f; Ser. on Eph.
4.20-24, CR 51.6llf
-67-
with him, when God had thus enriched him with his gifts 'Adam could not
abide that, and by his ingratitude he alienated himself from God.' 'God
was not niggardly in his blessings, but poured them out bountifully, just
an he who is the fountain of all liberality. He showed himself more than
liberal toward mankind in the person of Adam. Sut we lost those blessings,
God had to curtail his blessings which he had given us, because Adam
2
through his ingratitude became corrupted.' 'On account of his ingratitude
(ingratitudo) man has been hurled from the summit of glory to the abyss
3
of ignominy. *
Man has ever since repeated this ingratitude of Adam. Though all
have not had the felicity of Adam, yet all have had blessings in abundance
enough to evoke from them an expression of gratitude, and all have been
ungrateful. 'All mankind from the beginning of the world' are to be con-
4 , \damned 'for ingratitude.' 'The nature of man contains the seed (semen) of
all evils.' 'Thus Paul in Roman 1 piles up many different kinds of vices
and crimes which arise out of the ignorance of God and that ingratitude of
5which he had shown all unbelievers to be guilty.' This is 'the source of
the evil' by wfhich men turn from God: ' that men are ungrateful and forget
God.It is this fundamental sin that cuts off the gifts of God to us.
'Since God is by nature disposed to acts of kindness, nothing but our
ingratitude and enmity hinders us from receiving the goodness which he
freely offers to all. ' 7
This is 'the filthy ingratitude of men, seeing they all enjoy the
common life, not to consider to what end God has given them life' nor 'to
remember the creator of heaven and earth, whose good things they devour.'
1. Ser. on Deut. 28.46-50, CR 28.443f
2. Ser. on Job 3.2-ID, CR 33.114-
3. II.2.1, GR 2.186. Inst, of 1539 (et seqci.), ch. II, pag. 19, GR 1.308
4. Arg. to Com. on Rom., GR 49.1
5. Gom. on I Cor. 6.11, CR 49*394
6. Ser. on Deut. 8.10-14, CR 26.394
7* Com. on Is. 1.19, OR 36.46f
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They have revolted to break the order of nature and fallen away from God
the Father in whom all concord depends. The fountain (source) from which
idolatry springs is the ingratitude and malice of men, and idolatry in its
2
turn is the root and source of all evils. So Calvin makes constant
reference to 'the blessings which we have lost through our ingratitude.1^
Here then is summed up in the most comprehensive way all that is included
in the other more specific terms we have used to describe the sin of sins.
Infidelity, disobedience, unbelief, concupiscence - these taken together
simply mean that man ungratefully chose to reject, to be unfaithful, to
disobey, to disbelieve, to be concupiscent and self-willed, and thus to
destroy the life that God had chosen for him to live, that through our
ingratitude we have alienated ourselves from God and the life in paradise
for which we were created.^4"
1. Com. on Acts 17.26, CR 48.414
2. Ser. on Deut. 5.4-7, CR 26.252; Com. on Is. 27.9, CR 56.456; on 65.7,
CR 37.421
3. Ser. on I Tim. 2.12-14, CR 53.215; on Job 5.19-27, CR 33.276
4. Calvin can on a few occasions speak of the cause or the root of sin in
further terns. He puts less weight on these and can often as well say that th
are inadequate categories with which to depict the primal sin.
Following Augustine, Calvin notes in the Com. on II Cor.: 'The poison of
pride (superbia)' 'unquestionably was the cause (causa) of man's ruin,' 'it by
nature inhabits us with pertinacity, and is so deeply rooted that it is ex¬
tremely difficult to extirpate it.' (Com. on II Cor. 12.7, CR 50.140) 'Pride
is more displeasing to God than all other sins.' (1st Ser. on Gen. 15.6, CR
23.699) 'Pride is the mother of all violence.' (Com. on Ps. 73.6, CR 31.677)
'The worst and deepest rooted vice in our nature is pride (orgueil) and pre¬
sumption (presumption = presumptiousness, or self-conceit), when we 7/ill and
desire to be something in ourselves.' (Ser. on Gal. 3.7-9, CR 50.490). This
fits well into Calvin's total picture of the root sin of man and there is no
inconsistency. But in his definitive discussion in the Institutes Calvin
clearly rejects pride as an inadequate description of the root sin. 'Augustine
indeed, properly observes that pride (superbia) was the first of all evils;
because if ambition had not elated man beyond what was lawful and right, he
might have continued in his honorable situation. But we may obtain a more
complete definition from the nature of the temptation' depicted in Genesis,
and this more conrolete definition is 'disobedience' or 'infidelity.' (II.1.4,
CR 2.178f)
'Avarice' (avaritia), according to Paul's witness in I Tim. 6.10, may
loosely be said to be 'the root of all evils.' (Com. on Ps. 119.36f, CR 32.230
Cor. on Ex. 23.8, CR 24.686) This is done through 'synecdoche' (Com. on Is.
57.17, CR 37.318;, a figure of speech where a part is taken for the whole. In
this way it is the same as covetousness, or concupiscence, (ibid.) But
Calvin is clear in his exegesis of I Tim. 6.10 that avarice is an inadequate
description of the central sin. 'He (Paul) does not mean that all the sins
(over)
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Calvin's insights into the sin. of man are unusually clear and well
integrated. He is to be credited with seeing sin in its broad dimensions
by choosing a number of fluid concepts which revolve around his single
great Biblical insight of sin as man's dis-gracing himself in self-7/ill.
Prom this point he works with several concepts which each include a facet
of this self-will and disgrace. He does not cast his whole concept of sin
into any rigorous or intensively systematic form, but develops it by regard¬
ing the root defection in a large number of overlapping ways. He is aware
that to include all that is comprehended by sin under one category of
thought would inevitably miss much of its significance.
Calvin's concept of sin follows consistently from his dynamic concept
of man as a creature upon whom God has bestowed his grace. We will study
this in detail in the chapter on order. Yet we may already note how in
each of his ways of thinking about sin -infidelity, disobedience, con¬
cupiscence and self-love, and ingratitude - Galvin keeps in constant
focus the breaking of this original relationship of grace. Sin has to
which men commit proceed from avarice.' (Ser. on I Tim. 6,9-11, CR 53*585»
Com. on I Tim. 6.10, CR 52.327
'Polly (stultitia) is the root of all wickedness' as men are cut off from the
only light of the lord which can lead them to ' integrity.' (Com. on Ps. 14* 2, CR
31.137) 'Integrity is the chief of all virtues, and in like manner hypocrisy is
the mother of all vices,' (Com. on Is. 10.6, CR 56.215) 'Ignorance' (ignorantia)
is the source (fons) of all evils,' as 'the fear of the lord is the beginning of
wisdom.' (Com. on Is. 27.11, CR 36*458) 'Depravity is the fountain of all vices.'
(De Scandalis, CR 8.37) 'Here we are shown what is the source of all evils: that
is, our withdrawing from him who is the fountain of all righteousness.' (Ser. on
Job 54*26-29, GR 35.181. Com. on Jer. 1.16, CR 37*489f)
Jeremiah 'shows here what is the source of all evils: they had cast aside
every knowledge and every thought of God. 7fe indeed know that when God is really
known, his fear must necessarily influence our hearts, and the knowledge of God
begets reverence and a regard for religion. It is indeed true that God is some¬
what known by the ungodly and the wicked, and that they have some notions respect¬
ing him, but it is no more than an empty knowledge. When indeed we are fully
persuaded that God is the judge of the world and when we have also a knowledge of
his goodness and paternal favor, we necessarily fear him and spontaneously and
willingly worship and serve him. Ignorance of God then is a kind of madness which
carries men headlong into every sort of impiety.' (Com. on Jer. 9*3, GR 38.28)
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be set opposite the love of God as man's refusal to be loved by God and
his desire to love himself. Theology will do well to listen to Calvin
as he constantly interprets sin in the light of the grace of God. Our
thought about the nature of sin has to recognize that sin is essentially
that movement on the part of man where man by ascribing independence to
himself cuts off the grace of God to him.
The primary tendency which has threatened to obscure this concept
of sin is that concept which does not see sin as opposed to the grace
of God but regards sin in the simpler terms of a moral transgression of
or want of conformity unto the law of God. In the introductory chapter
we sketched the way in which this concept took large place in later
Reformed thought and, through the Westminster Confession of Paith, came
to dominate the thought of the English-speaking Reformed churches. It
had also been characteristic of medieval scholastic theology before
Calvin to interpret sin in moral and legal terms. But Calvin broke
away from this simplar analysis. While Calvin sees full place for sin as
disobedience to the law, he yet subordinates this to ways of thinking of
sin as set opposite the grace of God. Here in particular Calvin's con¬
cepts of the primal sin as man's distrust of God's grace, and as man's
infidelity in turning from complete dependence on God's goodness can serve
to correct and balance this notion. Above all Calvin's notion of the
primal sin as essentially ingratitude ought to be restored to the categories
of thought of contemporary theology.
B. The propagation (propagatio) of sin
We find ourselves in a world where sin has invaded and permeated the
human race. 'The dominion of sin, from the time of its subjection of the
first man, not only extends over the whole race, but also exclusively
possesses every soul.' For an explanation Calvin looks, in accordance
with the Bible, to the first sin of Adam. In the compact statement that
we have taken as the core of his understanding of sin, Calvin asserts that
Adam's sin has become the ruin of the world: 'He ruined his posterity by
his defection, which has perverted the whole order of nature in heaven and
p
earth.' We now expand the way in which sin has extended from Adam so that
it is propagated to all and as a result has proved the ruin and destruction
of mankind.
1. The fall of Adam (Adae lapsus)
Calvin accepted the Biblical story of the fall as literal history, as
did his contemporaries, and he does not discuss any other possibilities.
But with appropriate changes the modern mind may accept his thought, for
beyond this he saw it as history divinely recorded for us because it is
significant for our understanding of sin. It is what is taught by this
story that is important. He thus elicits doctrine from the various details
of the story and centers his understanding of this aspect of sin upon it,
adding other passages of Scripture where they are helpful. We must here
attempt to analyze the truths about sin that Calvin saw contained in the
Genesis accounts and the ways he incorporated these into his doctrine.
Above all, it is necessary to remember, as Calvin constantly points out,
that we have here even after our attempts at systematization, doctrine in
story form and that for this reason the categories of natural logic cannot
be pressed upon it. There are then certain facets of the concept which reveal
1. II. 2.1 GR 2.185
2. II. 1.5, CR 2.179
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to us the character of sin, but other points at which investigation is only a
curiosity which leads man into difficulties.
Calvin holds that the events of the Genesis narrative point toward a
divine ordination where sin is propagated from one man to all. God has
ordered things this way. Only with such an assumption can it be understood.
Calvin also at times speaks of a will, a wish, or a desire on the part of God
that all men be made sinners in Adam. But the way in which Calvin regards this
divine ordination is important, as there are assumptions that we can and can¬
not make from it. In this sense it is not as many of the other volitions of
God, but a secret or hidden judgnent revealed to us for a single and specific
purpose. We examine here the part of this divine ordination in the propagation
of sin, noticing in particular the usage that Calvin makes of it and the con¬
clusions that he feels are proper and improper to draw from it.
a. Adam as our father and representative
In his sin Adam stood as our father ana as our representative. 'God
did not adorn Adam with the gifts of the Spirit so that he susta.ined as it
were a private character, (privatus homo) but he conferred on his person all
that he wished to be common to the whole human race.'^ 'We were all enclosed
2
(enclore) in his person, according to the rri.ll of God.' God so ordained
things that in Adam the gifts conferred on the first man should be preserved
or lost both for himself and for all his posterity. A divine judgment is
involved. So 'if Adam had stood upright, (integer) all men would have in
A
a similar manner stood in their integrity.' But Adam fell, and by the order
of God all fell "with him. 'The Lord deposited with Adam the endowments he
chose to confer on the human nature, and therefore when he lost the favors
5he had received, he lost them not only fox" himself, but for us all.' It is
1. Com. on Ps. 51.5, CR 31.534. II.1.5f, OR 2.179f
2. Ser. on Job 14.1-4, CR 32.661. Inst, of I536, ch. I, nag. 42ff, CR 1.27f
3. II.1.7, CR 2.182. Confession of Faith of the Reformed Churches of France,
(E.T. by Calvin Translation Society) 141f, CR 9.756
4. Com. on Mai. 1.2ff, CR 44.4C5. Com. 011 Gen. 3.17, CR 23.72f
5. II. 1.7, CR 2.181. Ser. on Bph. 2.1-5, CR 51.356
1 by the ordination, of God1 (Dei ordinatio) that he gave and took away in
Adam and made him determinative for the whole human race. 'Whatever Adam
lost we also lost by the fall, because he was not created for his own self
alone, but in his person God showed that would be the condition of the human
race. Dor this reason after he had been spoiled of the excellent gifts by
which he was adorned, all his posterity were reduced to the same want and
2
misery.' He suffered not alone but involved all his posterity -with him
and plunged them into the same sinful state.^
It is important to recognize that Galvin will not debate the light¬
ness of this, but realizes that it is not a logical concept. He maintains
that this secret judgment of God is not to be measured by the canons of
logic. This is not a truth which is obvious to all, but is a truth of
faith. ' We must not here dispute by natural reason to know whether it is
so or not. We must know that it was the will of God to give our first
father that which he would have us to have, and when he took it from him,
we were put in the same ruin and confusion with him. Then let us accept
this judgment of God, let us stop there, and let us not believe our own
understanding and imagination.' ^ Indeed, it does not comport with natural
5
reason, or the laws of earthly justice, that it should be this way. This
is a fact which cannot be observed by the philosophers. Experience may
lend secondary support, once Scripture has revealed it, but primarily it
is a truth of faith. Ultimately there is an acquiescence involved. 'Since,
however, none bOtGod alone is a proper judge in this cause, we must
acquiesce (acquiesco) in the sentence which he has pronounced in the
Scripture.'^
1. Gom. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.62. Can. on John 3*6, CR 47*57
2. Com. on Ezek. 11.19f, GR 4Q.242ff. Com. on I Gor. 15.45, CR 49.558
3. II. 1.5, CR 2.179
4. Ser. on Job 14.1-4, CR 33.661
5. Ser. on Deut. 24. 34-18, CR 28.191f
6. Com. on Gen. 3.6, GR 23.62. Ser. on I Tim. 2.12-14, GR 53.213ff
-74-
When God curses a whole race for the sin of one man, he is not
subject to the laws of natural justice, or the earthly rule he would have
us to follow. ^ We are not able to see why, but he knows why and we must
reverence in all humility these judgments so strange which tempt us to argue
2
with him. We are too weak and too rude to understand. 'It is true that
this will seem strange to many fanciful persons who may wish to constrain
God to their measure and who are so rash that when the judgments of God
surpass their earthly reason they soon condemn him fox- being evil and
cruel. But nonetheless St. Paul would have us to acquiesce in this fact
that God has shut up all in sin.' 'He could indeed have worked things so
that only Adam himself fell and so that no others would have ruined them¬
selves in his person. But he did not wish to do so. If someone asks why
the evil has spread out abroad, is it not because God wished it so? We
must hei-e x-estrain ourselves as though bridled or imprisoned, and receive
the teaching just as St. Paul has pronounced it.'^
b. The propagation of Adam* s sin
Because God has ordered things so that the condition Adam chose should
be that of the human race thereafter, his sinfulness is transmitted to
us* "There is a universal propagation (propagatio) of sin and damnation
throughout the seed of Adam.'^ 'Adam therefore corrupted himself in such
a manner that the contagion has been communicated from him to all his off-
5
spring.' 'Prom a putrified root therefore, have sprung putrid branches
which have transmitted their putrescence to remoter ramifications. For
the children were so vitiated in their parent that they became contagious
to their descendants; there was in Adam sxich a spring of coi-ruption that
6
it is transfused from parents to children in a perpetual stream.'
1. Ser. on Deut. 24.14-18, CR 28.190ff
2. ibid., 19If. Ser. on Deut. 28.46-51, CR 28.443f
3. Ser. on Gal. 3.21-25, CR 50.548
4. Com. on I Cor. 7.14, CR 49.412
5. II. 1.5, CR 2.179. Com. on I Cor. 15.45, CR 49«558f
6. II. 1.7, CR 2.181f. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.), ch. II, pag. 19, CR l«309f
Calvin has now cut short all attempts at an explanation of the propagation
of Adam's sin and attributed it to the ordination of God. Sin is propagated
because God wished it so. Apart from an understanding of the limited way in
which Calvin here conceives of a secret judgment of God, he would appear to
be involving himself only further in extricable difficulties as he rejects all
logical attempts at a solution. This propagation of sin does not depend on
natural processes and so there is no need to develop elaborate concepts to
explain how sin is transmitted. Calvin's particular reference is to the con¬
cept of the soul's descent ex traduce. by traduction, or transmission from Adam,
rather than its proceeding immediately from God. ^ But the propagation of sin
is not really hereditary, if we speak in the strictest terns. 'Instead of
saying, therefore, that each of us inherits vice and, corruption from his
parents, it would be more correct to say that we are all alike corrupted
in Adam alone, because immediately after his revolt God took away from
p
human nature what he had bestowed upon it.' It is not a natural transmission,
but a divine one. ^ However, we may traditionally speak of the propagation
of sin as being 'hereditary,'^" but we must know that sin is transmitted
not by natural processes, but because God had made Adam our father and
representative and appointed him to determine our fate. Nor is it merely
a matter of the imitation of Adam's sin by his descendants. Calvin is
5
combating here the heresy of the Pelagians mad the Celestians. It is
true that we all participate in Adam's sin, but we do not imitate him in the
sense that we enter the world with a nature such as the one with which Adam
5
was created, or from this state degenerate into a sinful condition.
The final and irrevocable argument which demonstrates the universal
propagation of Adam's sin to us is to be found in Jesus Christ. Natural
1. Com. on Gen. 3.6, OR 23.62; on Ps. 51.5, CR 31.513fj II.1.7, CR 2.181f
2. Com. on John 3.6, CR 47.57
3. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.62
4. ibid., Com. on Ps. 51.5, CR 31.515, etc.
5. ibid., Com. on Rom. 5.12, CR 49»95; on Eph. 2.3f, CR 51.l62f
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reason will not provide an explanation for the universal propagation of
Adam's sin, but we learn this fact from the coming of Christ. It is the
work of Christ to reveal the sin that is in mankind. Paul's argument in
Romans 5 left an ineradicable impression on Calvin. The propagation of
sin is explained by a comparison between Adam and Christ. As by one man
sin entered the world, so by the grace of Christ life and righteousness
have been restored to us. If we only understand here that the sin of Adam
was propagated by imitation, we should have also to say that we receive no
other advantage from the righteousness of Christ than the proposal of
an example for imitation. But the righteousness of Christ is ours by
communication, and it is equally evident that sin and death were introduced
by Adam in the same manner in which they were abolished by Christ.
2. Original sin (peccatum originale)
Such is Calvin's understanding of the fall and the divine judgment
underlying it by which sin is propagated to all mankind. We may now proceed
to examine the use that Calvin makes of this as he puts this teaching
into dogmatic form. We see here how such is the nature of this particular
judgment of God that we learn from it certain things about sin yet must
reject other assertions that might seem equally as logical. The principal
doctrine that arises from the Genesis accounts is that of original sin.
This misery in 'which we find ourselves as children of Adam is termed
'original sin.' It has been 'entailed by Adam upon the whole human family.''
•He suffered not alone, but involved all his posterity with him and plunged
them into the same miseries. This is that hereditary corruption which the
fathers call original sin.' (peccatum originale)^ 'Original sin therefore
appears to be a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature, diffused
through all parts of the soul, rendering us obnoxious to the divine wrath,
1. Com. on Rom. 5.12ff, CR 49«95ff; II. 1.6, CR 2.181f; II. 2.12, OR 2. 195*1.
But there are points at which we cannot press this comparison. This is
particularly true in the matter of responsibility, as we later see.
2. Com. on Ps. 51.7, CR 31.515
3. II. 1.5, CR 2.179f. Ser. on Deut. 10.1-8, CR 27.7f
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and producing in us those works which the Scripture calls works of
the flesh.' 'This depravity never ceases in us, but is perpetually
producing new fruits, which we have before described, like the emission
of flame and sparks from a heated furnace, or the stream of water from
a never failing spring.'
a. The universality of sin
The concept of the fall of Adam and of original sin explains and teaches
the universality of sin in the world and demonstrates that all are in
need of redemption. 'The stain of original sin cleaves to the whole human
2
family without exception.' Sin was communicated from the first man to
all his posterity and so every descendant from the impure source is bona
infected with the contagion of sin. 'All without a single exception are
polluted as soon as they exist.' 'Adam was not only the progenitor, but
as it were the root of mankind, and therefore all the race were necessarily
vitiated in him.'In the Psalms (14.2f) it is said that God has looked
and not found one single man who was not corrupt in his wickedness. That
certainly also refers to the virtuous and those who are most highly and
especially esteemed, as well as to the most debauched. It is said that
they have all turned aside and that even to the last individual there is
none found who is not entirely corrupt before God. Holy Scripture is full
of this teaching; and St. Paul shows it plainly enough in the third chapter
of Romans, when he quotes all those passages from the Psalms and the prophets
which say that men are depraved and that their throat is a sepulchre. 7/hen
all that has been said, St. Paul adds that all men are included, without any
exception, until God has changed them and renewed them by his Holy Spirit.'^1"
b. The totality of sin
This concept of the fall of Adam and of original sin explains and
1. II. 1.8, CR 2.182f. Inst, of 1536, ch. IV, pag. 29, GR 1.112f
2. Com. on Ps. 58.3, CR 31.560. II. 1.5, CR 2.179f
3. II. 1.6, CR 2.180f. Inst, of 1536, (et seqq.) ch. II, pag. 19, CR 1.3104. Ser. on Is. 53.4-6, CR 35.632. Com. on Eph. 2.3, CR 51.162
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teaohes the totality of sin in the life of eaoh man and demonstrates that
the whole man is in need of redemption. The dominion of sin not only
extends over the whole race but also exclusively possesses every soul.
Men's 'proper nourishment is sin, and. there is not so much as one drop of
goodness to be found in than, and to be short just as the body draws its
sustenance from meat and drink, so also men have no other substance in them
2
than sin. All is corrupted.' 'We have no adequate idea of the dominion
of sin unless we conceive of it as extending to every part of the soul,
and acknowledge that both the mind and heart of man have become completely
corrupt.'^ 'No part of us is sound, the mind is smitten with blindness
and infected with innumerable errors, vile lusts of other diseases equally
fatal reign there, and all the senses burst forth with many vices.'
'Corruption does not reside in one part only but pervades the whole soul
4
and each of its faculties.'
By the sin of Adam all our faculties are corrupted and faulty, our
reason, intelligence, will, and judgment. They are wholly perverted by
Adam's turning away from God because they were not Adam's except insofar
as he was formed in the image of God and when he was separated from his
creator, who is the fountain of all goodness, he could not but be deprived
5of all the graces God had bestowed upon him. He was stripped of his
righteousness. Now to whatever part of man we turn our eyes, it is im¬
possible to see anything that is not impure, profane, and abominable to
God. The intellect is blinded and always contrary to the wisdom of God;
the will is full of corrupt affections; and the bodily strength tends
g
furiously toward iniquity.
1. II. 2.1, OR 2.185. Com. on Ps. 5.9f, CP, 31.70f
2. Ser. on Job 15.11-16, OR 33.728. Ser. on 2ph. 2.3-6, CR 51.3olff
3. Com. on Ps. 51.5, CP, 31.513. Ser. on Is. 53.4-6, CR 35.632f
4. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.62. Ser. on Eph. 2.1-5, CR 51.349ff
5. Ser. on Deut. 29.1-4, CR 28.488f
6. Instruction in Paith, 1537, sec. 4
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Calvin here resists all efforts to limit or qualify this totality of
the sinfulness of man. While he makes place for a natural ethics and for
natural religion, as we will later see, he so does this as to include both
within the totality of sin. All of the work of man is in the direction of
iniquity. In this Calvin has had to break not only with the philosophical
tradition, but also with most of the ecclesiastical tradition behind him.'~
Not just some but all of the faculties of body and soul move toward sin.
Nor do we think of this sin of man as being only a static condition where
he lacks the original good. Man moves dynamically toward evil. Original
sin is not simply a privation of original righteousness which man ought to
2
possess, but a nature so fertile in all evils that it cannot remain inactive.
'There is neither thought nor affection in us which does not tend to evil;
all is rebellious toward God and the rule of his righteousness.1^
By these two emphases and in the language that is available to him,
Calvin is trying to say that when man - Adam and humanity - sinned, man
estranged himself from God by rejecting the life which God had chosen for
him, and selecting a life of rebellion and independence which God must
unalterably oppose. There is an 'estrangement* (alienatio)^" between God
and man. Mankind in the world today is 'trained in the same school of
original sin' as was Adam. He lives in ihfidelity as Adam did. He like
Adam does not trust in and depend on God's goodness, but turns to his
own strength. Man lives in disobedience as did Adam. He lives in in¬
credulity and unbelief in the fatherhood of God. He lives in self-will,
in love of self, and concupiscence as did Adam. And he lives in ingratitude
as did his father Adam. In this act man has at once brought God over against
him as his judge and alienated his own being from God. God, who was to
1. II.2.3f, CR 2.187ff
2. II. 1.8, CR 2.183. Com. on Ps. 119.37, CR 32.320
3. Ser. on Eph. 2.1-5, CR 51.351
4. Com. on Ps. 33.12, OR 31.331
5. Com. on Gen. 3.12, CR 23.67
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be man's father, is now man* s judge. While he has not given up his
fatherhood, as we shall see again and again throughout this study, yet
nonetheless he must be a judge toward the creature who has set himself
against God. 'All the children of Adam are enemies of God by reason of
the corruption that is in them. It is true that God loves them as his
creatures, but yet he must hate than inasmuch as they are perverse and
1
given to all evil.' And on the other side, by his act of sin man has
irrevocably alienated himself into a situation where his will is not God-
ward but self-ward, it is a will that can only go from alienation to
alienation. All of the human, race is begotten in this situation,
c. God and the corruption of man
This concept of the fall of Adam and the propagation of his sin to
us removes all ground of contention against God and rather teaches us that
God is good in his original intention for us. Mankind may only attribute
his misery to himself. The way in which Galvin can assert this, having
just before developed a concept where sin is transmitted to us by God's
secret ordination, is interesting and indeed baffling to those who would
press him hard for logical explanations. Galvin is not reducing the whole
concept to its logical ends, however, but eliciting doctrine from the
Genesis accounts. It here seems to him - and it is indeed a major truth in
the Genesis narrative - that we are taught that the state of sin is not
one which God intended for man but which man brought on himself. Yforking
in such a way Calvin can immediately turn around and dismiss those who
turn to this ordination of God as an excuse by pointing them not to this
judgnent but to Adam's sin which introduced it.
'When we speak of man and of that which is in him, it is not a
question of the work of God. ?or Adam was created quite other than we are
today. We are fallen from the state in which God set Adam and all mankind
1. Ser. on Deut. 33.1-3, OR 29.115
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1
in his person.' 'We were not created to the end that death should have
dominion over us. That has come upon us through our father Adam inas-
2
much as we are all culpable in him.' 'Now let us dismiss those who
dare to charge God with their corruption, because we say that men are
naturally corrupt. They err in seeking for the work of God in their own
pollution, whereas they should rather seek it in the nature of Mam while
yet innocent and uncorrupted. Our perdition therefore proceeds from the
sinfulness of the flesh, not from God; it being only a consequence of our
degenerating from our primitive condition.' 'Therefore let us remember that
our ruin must be imputed to the corruption of our nature in order that we
may not bring accusation against God himself, the author of nature.'
Our nature was occasioned by sin, it is derived from an extraneous cause,
and it is clear that the misery of man must be ascribed solely to himself,
since he was favored with rectitude by the divine goodness, but has fallen
into servitude through his own folly.^
God made man good, it is accidental^ that he fell. 'We say therefore
that man is corrupted by a natural depravity, but which did not Originate
from nature. We deny that it proceeded from nature to signify that it is
rather an adventitious quality (adventitia qualitas) which is man's by
accident (accido) than a substantial property originally innate.'^ In
the fall story, 'the object is briefly to narrate the corruption of human
nature, to teach us that Adam was not created to those multiplied
miseries under which all his posterity suffer, but that he fell into them
by his own fault. In reflecting on the number and nature of those
evils to which they are obnoxious men will often be unable to restrain
themselves from raging and murmuring against God, whom they rashly
1. Ser. on Job 34.1-4, CR 33.660
2. ibid., 662. Ser. on Job 15.11-16, CR 33.729f
3. II. 1.10, CR 2.184. 1.15.1, CR 2.134?; Com. on Ps. 51.5f, CR 31.513f
4. ibid. Com. on Eph. 2.3, CR 51.162
5. This vital distinction in Calvin is examined in detail in Chaptei- IV.
6. II. 1.11, CR 2. 184?
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censure for the just punishment of their sin.' 'What other reason is there
for this than that they do not refer the miserable and ruined state under
which we languish back to the sin of Adam, as they ought? Sut what is far
worse, they fling back upon God the charge of being the cause of all the
inward vices of the mind, (such as its horrible blindness, contumacy against
God, wicked desires, and violent propensities to evil) as if the whole
perverseness of our disposition had not been accidental,1 (accidentale)
2
But we ought to attribute this to Adam and not throw the fault on God.
Nor, if it is accidental that man fell, may the question of God's
decree be raised, for we consider here the will of God and. his proper
intent in the formation of the world. The mystery of predestination or
of a secret decree has no place here. 'Let no one murmur that God might
have made a better provision for our safety by preventing the fall of
Adam. For such an objection ought to be abominated as too presumptuously
curious by all pious minds.' ^ The fall of man is, it is true, hidden away
in a secret decree"1' and there are some aspects of the problem we cannot
solve without recourse to God's secret judgnents. This is particularly
true in the matter of the transfer of Adam's sin to us all. But in this
matter of God's responsibility for the fall of man we do not emphasize
the secret decree of God. We only turn to the open and unrevealed will of
God and understand that Adam's sin was against the will of God, and that
man must assume full responsibility for it.
Thus it does not lessen for Galvin the heinousness of Adam's sin to
know that it was decreed by God. It does not mean that his sin was pleasing
1. Com. on Gen. 3*1, CR 23.54f
2. Com. on Szek. 11.19f, CR 4G.242f. Ser. on Job 15.11-16, CR 33«729f
3. II. 1. ID, CR 2.184. 1.15.8, CR 2.243
4. 'The first man fell because God thought it was fit. (expedient) Now as to why
he thought it fit we know nothing. Yet it is certain that he has not decided
thus unless because he says that it would advance the g2ory of his name.' 'Man
then falls according as it has been ordained of God, but he falls by his own
vice.' (institution of the Christian Religion. French ed. of 1551, CR 14.379)
Nearly the same passage occurs in III.23.8, CR 2.705; Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.)
Pffif7111' Pag* 251' GR 1#871, Gf* The Secret Providence of God. (S.T. by Cole)
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to God; it does not make Adam any less responsible. 'Mien I say, however,
that Adam did not fall without the ordination and will of God, I do not so
take it as if sin had ever been pleasing to him, or as if he simply wished
that the precept which he had. given should be violated. So far as the
fall of Adam was the subversion of equity and of well-constituted order,
so far as it was contumacy against the divine law-giver, and the transgression
of righteousness, certainly it was against the will of God.'"1" 'Although
by the eternal providence of God man has been created for that state of
misery in which he is, yet notwithstanding he has derived the cause of that
p
misery from himself, and not from God.'
d. Inherited and individual culpability
The concept of the fall of Adam and of original sin does not provide
a wholly logical or adequate answer to the question about the individual
responsibility of man in his sin. Rather we answer this question with a
different emphasis. We have already seen that Calvin is abundantly aware
that we are not able to put the concept of the fall into a logically con¬
sistent fom. The fall was accidental, the nature which man has is his by
3
accident, we are not then able to understand by logic its oxrigin. It is
true at once that there is a secret decree of God by which Adam sinned and
fell, and yet at the same time that in the revealed will of God in his "Jord
we are taught that he does not will, cause, or create sin, that sin is not
pleasing to him.44" The manifest cause of Adam's fall was his own rebellion;
5
the secret decree of God is a hidden cause to which we do not turn.
Again it is true that there is a secret judgment by which Adam's sin¬
ful nature is transferred to all, and yet in his Word we learn that God is
not the author of sin, or of corrupt human nature, therefore our corrupt
1. Com. on Gen. 3*1, CR 23.55. Com. on Gen. 3*7, CR 23.63f
2. Institution of the Christian Religion. Trench ed. of 1551, CS 14*379
3. II. 1.11, CR 2.184; Com. on Gen. 3.1, CR 23.54, etc.
4. ibid.,
5. Reply of Calvin to the Syndics of Geneva in the case of Troillet,
Oct. 6, 1552, CR 14.379f. III. 23.8, CR 2.705
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nature is not to be ascribed to him.^ And such a secret decree is, Calvin
frankly "teaches, incompatible with natural reason, and with the canons of
2
earthly justice. It is repugnant to the processes of natural reason;, we
must believe it, for we are not able to understand it; we must acquiesce
in the judgment of Scripture.^ The manifest ca.use of each man's sin is
his own sinful nature which expresses itself in rebellion and disobedience;
the secret judgment of God by which he is born inclined to sin is a hidden
cause to which we do not turn in the matter of culpability.^-
From this we are to understand that in the matter of responsibility
we are not to ask, By what secret judgment of God did we receive our sin¬
ful nature? In what way is he responsible for our original sin? Rather
v/e ask, With our sinful nature, in what way do we act freely and responsibly?
We do not attempt by God's secret judgment to understand our culpability,
or, when our logic fails, to mitigate our guilt by saying that we have been
loaded with the guilt of another. Calvin's opponents constantly charged
here that if Adam's sin is transferred to the whole world by a divine ordination
or will of this sort, and we are laden with his sin, then we are not rightly to
be held responsible for our having a sinful nature, and from this not respon-
5
sible for the sins that rise from it. 'We perish through the fault of another.'
6
'Men ought to be excused because sin is in them by nature.' Calvin
always countered such objections with what might seem an inappropriate
argument which assumes the point at issue: that man, now that he has a sin¬
ful nature, is guilty for his sin because he now sins not by constraint but
voluntarily and wilfully, doing what he is by nature inclined to do. So,
for instance, Calvin is faced with this objection: 'If men could employ
themselves to the good, and at the same time made no account of it but
1. Ser. on Job 15.11-16, CR 33.730 et al.
2. Ser. on Deut. 24.14-18, CR 28.19If
3. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.62. Ser. on Gal. 3.21-25, CR 50.548
4. Reply in the case of Troillet, CR 14.379f; III.23.8, CR 2.705
5. Com. on Ezek. 18. If, CR 40.424f
6. Ser. on Job 14.1-4, CR 33. 656f
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gave themselves to evil, it is true that they should rightly be held
culpable. But if they can only do evil, why should God judge them?' To
which his answer is: 'They are not constrained by force; they are under
subjection indeed, but it is voluntary.'
This is an important truth and we examine it presently. But such
arguments must have exasperated those opponents who pressed him hard for
logical answers at this point and they may have felt that he had side¬
stepped their charge, for Calvin has not answered the question, How is
it right that we have a sinful nature? but only argued that from within our
sinful nature we are free to sin. Are we really to understand though that
Calvin simply begs the question by arguing at cross purposes, or is
naively inconsistent? Hardly, for we have already seen that he freely
admits and teaches that the way in which we come to have a sinful nature
not only is beyond our comprehension but is repugnant to our logic and
reason. Calvin's meaning is rather that while we look to the concept of
a divine ordination to see a reason for the solidarity of man in sin, yet
when we ask questions about individual responsibility we recognize that the
fall concept is inadequate. We think not of transmitted guilt, but of
personal guilt. We look for a way in which from within this sin man can
O
be given responsibility.
The concept of original sin does explain our universal sinfulness
and alienation from God, but it must be used with the reservation that
what might appear logically from this to be the case in the matter of guilt -
that we perish ultimately because another's guilt is transferred unjustly
to us - is not the case, however illogical it may be to deny it. Certainly
to press the concept of Adam a.s our representative and to develop our
responsibility along these lines would provide an inadequate notion of
1. Ser. on Eph. 2.3-6, CR 51.367
2. Com. on Ezek. 18. If, CR 40.424?; Com. on Rom. 5.17, CR 49.100; Com.
on Ps. 51.3, CR 31.513f; II. 1.8, CR 2.182f
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responsibility. But we do not press this point, for this is not the
teaching of Scripture. This would on the one hand make God the author
of sin, and on the other relieve us of responsibility and make us non¬
chalant or spiteful. 'By Adam's sin we are not condemned through imputation
alone, as though we were punished only for the sin of another; but we
suffer his punishment because we also ourselves are guilty; for as our
nature is vitiated in him, it is regarded by God as having committed sin.'~
Calvin will not develop the concept of the fall so as to qua.lify the
responsibility of man in his sin. It must be limited so as to allow room
for human responsibility in sin. 'Rhen we consider the perishing of the
whole human race, it is said with truth that we perish through another's
fault; but it is added at the same time that everyone perishes through his
2
own iniquity.' To see the responsibility of man in his sin we must add to
any notion of a transfer of Adam's sin to us the fact of our own sin¬
fulness. We do not ask how we got our sinful nature, to do not look to
the fall to see our responsibility - useful and necessary though this
concept may be to depict the universal sinfulness of man - but we look to
our own wilful and malicious sin and see how we are responsible now that
we have a sinful nature. We join with this fact of the fall the fact of
the fault of each individual. 'But now from the time in which we were
corrupted in Adam, we do not bear the punishment of another's offense, but
3
we are guilty by our own fault.'
e. Compulsion and freedom in sin
If we acquiesce in the concept of a secret judgnent of God whereby
Adam's sinful nature is transferred to us, then we may work out with some
logical consistency a way in which man is free and responsible from within
his sinful nature. Though we cannot understand with our logic the question,
1. Com. on Rom. 5.17, CR 49.100; on 5.15, OR 49.98f
2. Com. on Szek. 18.20, CR 40.441
3. Com. on Gen. 3.6, CR 23.62. Com. on Ezek. 18. If, OR 40.424f
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How are we responsible for our having a sinful nature? - for this is bound
up in the secret judgment of God, yet we can answer the question, Now that
we have a sinful nature, how are we responsible for the sins rising from it?
Human nature is alienated and estranged from God by original sin, it is a
nature which in self-will can only go from alienation to alienation, but
this does not mean to say that the alienated and estranged being which is
ours by original sin is a being under compulsion. Man has freedom, but
in his freedom his perverse will means that every thing that he does in
X
his self-will talces him away from God. 'We shall reply in vain, I
cannot help what I do, my nature was corrupted in this way in Adam, and
I was there made destitute of all power to aspire to the good. When we
have well argued our cause, it is certain that we will remain in our
condemnation. Why? Because the evil comes from us. Is it not enough for
a man to be his own witness without others drawing up a process against him,
or bearing testimony against him? When a men enters into himself, although
he is a slave of sin, and is wholly steeped in iniquity, and is not able
to aspire to the good in any way, yet it is of his own movement and of
his free will, as they say, that he is always drawn toward the evil. He
is not at all forced to it. It is true that it is not possible for him
to do good, yet nevertheless the sin which he commits proceeds from nowhere
2else than of his own inclination. He wished it so.' Men do have a will.
It is not a constrained will but a will which acts from inner necessity.
There is in this no compulsion or constraint. 'Man, having been
corrupted by his fall, sins voluntarily, not with reluctance or constraint;
1. 'If compulsion (coactio) is opposed to freedom, I confess that the will
(arbitrium) is free; I will constantly affirm it and regard as a heretic
anyone who thinks otherwise. If, I say, it is called free in this sense;
that it is not constrained or violently compelled by an external impulse,
but spontaneously moves itself, then I will no longer dispute.' (Responsio
contra Pighium de Libero Arbitrio, CR $. 279
2. Ser. on Deut. 29.1-4, CR 28.489ff* Re Scandalis, CR 8.37ff; Contra
Pighium. CR 9.303
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(coactus) with the strongest propensity of depravity, not with violent
coercion; (coactio) with the bias of his own passions, and not with
external compulsion; (coactio) yet such is the depravity of his nature
that he cannot be excited and biased to anything but what is evil. If
this is true, there is no impropriety in affirming that he is under a
1
necessity of sinning.' We may illustrate here by the example of God,
who is on the other hand under a necessity dictated by his own character
p
of doing good, yet does it voluntarily.
We here sin from within our sinful nature in such a way as to participate
in Adam's sinfulness. In this way man is responsible though he may not
have started from a position of Adamic sinlessness. He proves even from
within his sinful nature that he wills to sin. He repeats and makes him¬
self an accomplice to the sin of Adam, though he does not have a sinless
nature at the start. Man ignores and in his ignorance rejects the clear
light of God in nature, law, and gospel spread forth for his benefit and by
the love of God for all men. Wherever and whenever God breaks through in
gifts to bless man, to hold his life suspended from utter anarchy and
annihilation, to save him and restore him to life eternal, man in his
sin and irresponsibility twists, distorts, and inverts the grace of God.
This whole concept we will develop throughout the thesis and especially
in the second part. But here in the matter of the fall we note (l) that
Calvin does not employ the concept of the fall of Adam as our representative
to understand our responsibility, rather he denies that we may press it to
a logical conclusion and speak only or in the main of transferred guilt, and
(2) that Calvin feels that though we are not born in Adam's state, yet within
our state of sin we are given responsibility.
1. II.3.5, CH 2.214. Reply in the case of Troillet, CR 14.379f. Calvin
does not like the language of necessity, but his critics compel him to
use it when he would rather state his case in different language.
2. ibid.
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We have tried here to view Calvin's understanding of the fall
and of the propagation of Adam's sin as sympathetically as possible, under¬
standing what he attempts to teach without becoming disturbed by controversial
elements in his thought. The key to what are otherwise insurmountable
problems in his concept of a divine ordination whereby all are made sinners
in Adam is to be found in his clear recognition that we are here accepting
what cannot be put into logical form and that we cannot draw from it the
conclusions which apparently follow. In this hidden judgment God does not
reveal himself as the author of sin nor does he deprive man of responsibility.
Calvin labors to show that in this way he leaves with the deep wisdom of
God what is otherwise without explanation. Apart from a recognition of this
much of what Calvin has to say will seem to be contradictory and even
meaningless to those who press Calvin on points he does not choose to develop.
Because many who have read Calvin in the past have not taken seriously his
warnings that those who would follow his concepts must acquiesce in this judg¬
ment of God despite the logical difficulties they have stumbled over his teach¬
ing and not been able to appreciate what he has had to say. Only when Calvin
is read with the awareness that he does not feel it possible to be logical at
all points can we listen to the positive side of his thought.
Calvin is to be credited with recognizing that all logical and natural
theories of the transmission of sin lead only to unnecessary complexities
and incorrect notions of what sin is. 1e must depict this propagation in
spiritual terms. In this his insight was greater than those who preceded
him or who followed him with explanations of a philosophical, metaphysical,
or pseudo-scientific type. The propagation of sin to all mankind, the
universality and totality of sin is a fact which can only be established
from within the Christian faith and it cannot even there be established
without by-passing and in a certain sense perhaps offending our human ability
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to reason, through the subject. The fact that every man comes into the world
with a sinful nature which is his at birth is a fact that is at once thrust
upon us and yet enigmatic in every attempt at analysis. It is this fact
which Calvin attempts to embrace in his concept of a divine ordination by
which sin is propagated to all.
Having said this?however, we may seriously question whether Calvin's
attempt to rest the matter in a secret ordination of God is one which modern
theology ought to follow. These difficulties are doubled an Calvin includes
the notion of God's will, wish, desire, or even decree into this ordination.
Though Calvin may be read and appreciated, as we have attempted to do, are
his patterns of thought here to be recommended for our presentation of the
problem of sin? Is his concept one demanded in the way that Calvin states it
by the Biblical narratives? Surely Calvin's larger truths about man's total
and universal alienation from G-od are to be retained and we ought to see this
as a spiritual rather than a natural thing, yet nonetheless his specific con¬
cept of sin as propagated by divine ordination becomes so unwieldy as to
raise more problems than it answers and offend more than it explains. An
ordination of God whereby all men are made sinners at birth because of Adam's
sin, will always produce a sense of frustration in the struggle with a sinful
nature. It will prejudice the seriousness with which we regard man's culpability.
Theology will do better to search for other more Biblical concepts to understand
the propagation of sin, incorporating Calvin's insight that the whole thing
cannot be put into logical form, and yet stopping short of his notion of a divine
desire, will, or ordination by which sin is spread, abroad. Here it may be poss¬
ible to interpret and adjust this ordination or judgment of 'God so as to remove
from it the notions of God's will which are usually associated with it. We
may indeed recognize that even the transmission of sin must be not without the
deep counsel of God and that there is in same way represented by man 's miserable
estate a judgment of God on all the race, yet our knowledge must be here suspended
rather than attributing to God the order or wish which propagates sin.
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III. The Character and Effect of Sin
The whole concept of order as established by God's grace is very
important in Calvin; on it is carried much of his thought and from this
standpoint much of his theology may be worked out. We here interpret the
manner in which evil maintains itself in creation against this background.
Calvin chooses this notion to analyse how sin exists as an inversion of
the good, rather than as a lack of the good or as an entity with its own
separate existence. This explains how evil is able to gain existence and
perpetuate itself in a world where all things are created good. Prom the
compact assertion: 'He (Adam) ruined his posterity by his defection, which
has perverted the whole order of nature in heaven and earth,'^ we expand
now the way in which God's order is inverted by this root defection.
Following his procedure outlined in the chapter on the source of the know¬
ledge of sin, we see how Calvin begins with the character of the good
existence at creation and from this develops his concept of sin and evil.
A. The order of creation (creationis ordo)
The will or purpose of God was incorporated into the universe at
creation. All things are ordered not only according to divine intention,
but aecording to the movement of God's grace in creation and purpose in
2
redemption. 'He has arranged things in a most exquisite order.' This
includes the universe, the creature, and especially man. This Calvin
3
calls the order of creation (creationis ordo) or the pure order of nature.
(naturae ordo) an order which gives to the creature and particularly to
man his destiny and his reason for existence. In this order man lives in
rectitude (rectitudo, rectitude, droiture) or integrity, (integritas)^" The
meaning and character of existence is cast into these terms of order.
1. II. 1.5, CR 2.179
2. Com. on Horn. 1.21, CR 49« 24
3. Com. on Gen. 1-8, passim, CR 23.13ff; on Rom. 1-2, CR 49.7ff- et al.
4. Com. on Ps. 8.5, CR 31.92f
1
Men ought to follow 'the law of their creation' (creationis suae lex) and
2
live in the 'genuine order.'
This is the pure order of nature. A confusing point here is that after
the inversion of order in sin, there remains printed wholly within the sin¬
ful order an image or a relic of the pure order, a moral, social, economic,
and physical order which in some outward respects resembles this primal order.
God yet extends to man some blessings; the sun, moon, stars, and seasons
follow their course, the earth brings forth fruit with its thorns, and God
holds society in check sufficiently to prevent its 3clf-annihilation. Men
live in a society ordered in some degree and have notions of justice and
equity. This too Calvin calls the order of nature and appropriately so,
for it reflects and is derived from the pure and original order of creation.
Yet it is wrought out entirely within a fallen world and a perverted order.
This relationship we work out in a later chapter on sin and ethics. Here
we note that there are two ways in which Calvin can use the term order of
nature: first, to describe the primal order of creation which God now
wills to maintain but which is only maintained in part in his church; and
secondly, to describe the existing physical, moral, and social order in part
now followed the world over (though men often depart from this too).
Calvin can distinguish between the order of nature and the course (cursus) of
nature, a distinction which reflects this difference.^
IVhat was the nature of this primal order and rectitude? lhat does
Calvin mean by integrity? It is important here to get back into the
thought of Calvin because much of the wealth of this concept has been
neglected by those who followed after Calvin. 7/here the concept of
order has been used, it has been in the main construed as an order of
1. 1.3.3, CR 2.38. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.) ch. I, pag. 4f, CR 1.286
2. II. 6.1, CR 2.247. Ser. on Sph. 5.11-34, CR 51.695; on Deut. 5.21, CR 26.378
3. 1.5.7, CR 2.46; Inst.of 1539 (et seqq.) ch. I, pag. 6f, CR 1.287f;
Com. on Jer. 5.25, CR 37.636
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justice and righteousness, an order based on divine law. Man would have
fulfilled God's order had he abided by Cod's law, but he has broken God's
order in unlawful disobedience. Calvin certainly does not overlook this
important way of thinking of order, yet he subordinates it to the larger
concept of an order of grace. Existence in such an ordered creation
involves a twofold relationship between God and man.
1. God's grace toward man
On the one side God has given and continues to will to give to man
a good world. 'In the very order of creation the paternal solicitude of
God for man is conspicuous, because he furnished the world with all things
needful, and even with an immense profusion of wealth before he formed
man. Thus man was rich before he was born.'^ God is to be a father to
man. All the creation is for man's benefit and designed to bring him to
felicity. 'Generally the whole order (ordo) of this world is arranged and
established for the purpose of conducing to the comfort of men.' But * the
integrity of order (ordinis integritas) which God had established in the
pworld at the beginning is now thrown into confusion.' The earth and all
things were given to mankind that they might use them and by them recognize
God as their father. Unless this is done the whole order of nature is
inverted.These bounteous gifts were of two kinds: natural gifts, man's
mental and physical faculties, the comforts of life, good, shelter, an
ordered society, etc., and supernatural or spiritual gifts, faith and right¬
eousness to lead man to eternal felicity.^" Theywere given in the order of
nature as man received the blessing of God and was led by it up to know him.
We are not to think of this as a static creation, but now as in the
beginning it is given its existence by the 'continual action' (continuus
1. Com. on Gen. 1.26, CR 23.27. Ser. on II Tim. 2.25-26, CR 54.2152. Com. on Ps. 8.6, CR 31.94. Com. on Ps. 96.10, CR 32.413. Com. on Ps. 115.17, CR 32.192. Ser. on Job 3.2-10, CR 33.3444. II. 2. 12, CR 2.196
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actus) of God. God ' inspires all creatures with life,' and they live
by 1 continued inspiration. 1 Creation 'subsists only by a secret virtue
2
derived from God.' This is especially true of man. 'God must continually
be our father.'' If our souls live, this virtue is not of their own nature
but is a borrowed property and only as it pleases God to maintain our souls
by his power do they have a being and subsist. We hold our life from God
and everything else as well is given us by his pure grace.^ 'Communication
with 'God sustained the life of Adam.'^ »7e are preserved by God's continual
'visitation' of his life and grace. We must then understand the mode of
existence, or the being of the creature, and especially of man, as a form
of dynamic existence grounded in God's continual communication of his own
graciousness. Man 'can claim, nothing for himself.' 'Man lives not by
his own power, but by the kindness of God alone; and that life is not, as
they commonly speak, an intrinsic good but proceeds from God.' ^
2. Man's acknowledgment toward God
The second aspect of this twofold process of life in integrity is
man's response. Inserted into this environment of free gifts from God, man
is expected to respond in fidelity to depend on God alone, in obedience to
him, in belief in his goodness and solicitude, in a motion away from self
and toward God, and in gratitude. Pie faithfully, obediently, and thankfully
acknowledges the gifts and so returns glory to the God who so graciously
maintains his existence. 'At first man was formed in the image and resem¬
blance of 'God in order that man might admire his author in the adornments
with which he had been nobly vested by God and honor him with proper
1. Gam. on Rom. 4.21, CR 49.85; on Gen. 2.2, OR 23.331*
2. Com. on Ps. 104.29, OR 32.95f. Oom. on John 1.1-13, CR 47. Iff
3. Ser. on Job 3D.7-15, CR 33,483f; on Job 35.3-11, GR 35.229ff
4. Ser. on I Tim. 1.17-19, CR 53.92; on 6.15-16, GR 53.621ff; Com
5. Com. on Gen. 3»22, GR 23.79. Communicatio cum Deo Adae vivifica erat.
6. Ser. on Job 3D.7-15, CR 33.483f
7. Com. on Gen. 2.9, GR 23.38f. Com. on Acts 17.28, CR 48.4l6f; on Rom.
11.36, GR 49.232; Ser. 011 I Tim. 6.15-16, GR 53.623J?
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gratitude.' ~ The Latin gratitudo here is an interesting change in Calvin's
own translation of the French of 1537 in the Instruction in Faith, which
read recognoissance, acknowledgment. Man is to honor God with proper
acknowledgment, that is, proper gratitude.
'If we do not begin with this point: calling upon our God, it is to
pervert all order. So then let us learn that the principal exercise and
study that the faithful ought to have in this world is to run to their God
and, while acknowledging that he is the fountain of all blessings, seek
it in him.' Our expression of gratitude in which we confess that for all
things we are bound to him is what God requires of us. ^ This insures
the lawful use of his gifts. ^ We pay homage to him as every minute we
make acknowledgment to him for the blessings we have received. 'This is
the way we are to regulate our life, that is, in the first place to
recognize that it is of God, and then that we understand that for all
the blessings that we have we are bound to him. 'According as God
continues to bless vis, ought there not for this reason to be a
correspondence from our side (correspondence de nostre coste) so that we
with perseverance pay homage to him for all his blessings.' Man is co¬
respondent to God. From year to year, month to month, day to day, and
hour to hour, we must be careful to acknowledge his graces and affirm that
we are wholly his, that we hold all from him, and that it is impossible for
us to discharge our duty. For he makes us partakers of his grace on con-
6
dition that we acknowledge that all proceeds from him. 'God, in bestowing
all good things upon us, reserves nothing for himself, except an. expression
of gratitude for them.'^ 'When God has of his own accord conferred upon
1. Instruction in Faith, 1538, sec. 4, Com. on II Cor. 4.15, CR 50*57
2. Ser. on Job 22.23-30, CR 34.328f. Ser. on Deut. 22.9-11, CR 28.35ff
3. Com. on Ps. 104*31, CR 32.98. Com. on John 5.13, CR 47*108
4. Ser. on Eph. 6.10-12, CR 51*822
5. Ser. on Sph. 5*18-21, CR 51*727
6. Ser. on Eph. 1.19-23, CR 51.344. Com. on Zech. 3*14f, CR 44*69
7. Com. on Ps. 115.16, OR 32.190. Com. on I Tim. 4*3, CR 52.296
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us his favor, he immediately requires from us reciprocal gratitude.1
Adam* s obedience to God was wrought out as he participated in God.
Life consists in a *participation of God,' effected on man's part as he
2
acknowledges God, to whose beneficence he is to be thankful. 'Adam
was admonished that he could claim nothing for himself as if it were his
own, in order that he might depend wholly on the Son of God, and might
not seek life anywhere but in him.' 'He at the time when he possessed
his life in safety had it only as deposited in the Ford of God, and could
not otherwise retain it than by acknowledging that it v/as received from
him.'^ This is the proper order of creation, of integrity, and rectitude,
that God continuously and graciously gives and man replies and acknow¬
ledges this existence to set forth the glory of God by continual fidelity,
obedience, belief, love of God, and gratitude. 'We are created to this
end: to love our God. Why are we in the world? Why does God keep us
here? Is not the reason that he would have some homage of us, and that
inasmuch as we are his creatures, we ought to look toward him and he
ought to be the scope of our life? If it is not so, what order (ordre)
will there be?' 'It is an extreme confusion and reversal of all order
if men do not worship their God nor submit themselves to him.' ^ If we
do not ' consider how God has always governed and how he has shov/n himself
father to us, are we not guilty of having perverted the whole order of
nature?'^
We must point out, in interpreting Calvin here, the concentration and
stress on the grace of God involved in this notion of order. The part
given to man is one reflexive of God* s grace. His responsibility, as we
will later bring out more thoroughly, is wrought out in response to God's
grace. Already then Calvin has departed from the concept of God's order as
1. Com. on II Cor. 7.1, CR 50.83. Com. on John 1.4, CR 47.5
2. II. 2.1, CR 2.186; 1.3.3, CR 2.38
3. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39
4. Ser. on Deut. 30.15-20, CR 28.586f
5. Ser. on Deut. 32.5-7, CR 28.682
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primarily a moral or legal order where man must present himself just or
righteous before a God of justice, and placed such an order under the
higher order of grace. To be sure, God is just requiring righteousness,
and sin is a breach of his law, but what is paramount is that God is
gracious and requires acknowledgment of his grace, and sin is man's
refusal to do this. It is this concept of sin, which is more fundamental
even than sin as unrighteousness, to which we now turn, for it is here that
Calvin's insights are greatest.
B. The inverted order of creation (eversus creationis ordo)
Into this pattern of proper existence we must now inject the root
defection of man and see what form the pattern takes. Calvin's whole
understanding here centers in the inverted order of creation, (inversus,
or eversus creationis ordo) Sin has disordered the divine order of
grace. Men ought to live for no other purpose than glorifying God. 'The
whole order of nature would be preposterously everted unless the God who
1
is the beginning of all things is the end also.' Yet this has happened.
2
'The whole order of nature was inverted by the sin of man.' All the
evil in our world, "whatever its form or manifestation, 'has its origin in
the defection of the first man, by which the whole order of creation was
everted.'J
We ought to see testimonies of God's wonderful wisdom and power in
this world, for he has placed us here to contemplate these things. But
when we do not understand we pervert all. 'It is an extreme confusion ana
reversal of all order (ordre) if men do not worship their God nor submit
themselves to him. ' .That more monstrous disorder can be conceived of
than exists where the Creator himself is not acknowledged?'^ Particularly
1. Com. on Rom. 11.36, CR 27.232. Com. on Jer. 4«23ff, CR 37*596
2. Com. on Gen. 3.19, CR 23.75. Ser. on Eph. 5.11-14, CR 51.695
3. Com. on Gen. 8.21, CR 23.141. Com. on Is. 24.5, CR 36.431
4. Ser. on Deut. 30.15-20, CR 28.568f. Com. on Acts 14.17, CR 48.327?
5. Com. on Ps. 96.30, CR 32.41. Com. on I Cor. 15.28, GR 49.549; Ser.
on Bph. 6.5-9, CR 51.798; II. 1.5, CR 2.179
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the order of grace is broken when men do not receive the whole of their
felicity as a gift of grace, but ascribe it in any part to some endeavor
of their own.^ 'The order that he instituted at the creation of the world
2
is troubled when he does not deal with us as a father.' "That is involved
from the side of God end from the side of man in this inversion of order?
1. God's unchanged will for grace toward man.
We consider first what takes place from the side of God when man
reverses the order which was established by him. It is Calvin's funda¬
mental position here that sin does not change God. God's eternal purpose,
as determined by his will, is the same regardless of the antion of man.
'The celestial creator himself, however corrupted man may be, still keeps
in view the end of his original creation.' Let us remember that 'although
we have for a time annihilated as much as is in us the graces of God, yet
all the while he on his side (de son coste) does not wish that they should
perish but he wishes to make them prosper.'^" 'Because the Lord will not
loose in us that which is his own, he yet discovers something that his
goodness may love. For notwithstanding that we are sinners through our
own fault, yet we are still his creatures; notwithstanding that we have
5
brought death upon ourselves, yet he had created us for life.' God beholds
his image in man, he sees his own work and he then can take no pleasure
in defacing his own glory.^ This is a basic position. Only so long as
God maintains his original purpose can we still say that man is perverse,
a. The natural gifts from the side of God
We see this in the natural blessings given now in part to all, and
through the eyes of faith, perceivable as present to confront us in the
1. Com. on Jer. 17.5f, CR 38.265
2. Ser. on Job 5.17-18, CR 33.259
3. Com. on Gen. 9« 8, CR 23.147* Deinde ipsum coelestem fictorem, utcunaue
corruptus sit homo, finem tamen primae creationis habere ante oculos.
4. 3er. on Gal. 3.3-5, CR 50.475f
5. 11.16.3, CR 2.369
6. Ser. on Job 30.7-15, CR 33.481
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same degree as ever. God continues to give man his existence. 'He con¬
descends to preserve those who spite him and those who behave as mad beasts
and run away from him and will in no way be subject to his protection.'
God not only maintains and preserves but he blesses all men. The paternal
love of God breaks through to those who unworthily restrict it. 'The
universal race of mankind is a testimony, particularly, that the benefits
2
of God never cease, in which he shows himself to be our father.' Further,
if it were not for the barrier of sin, God's original goodness would
yet be showered upon us. The creation as given from the side of God yet
remains perfect. 'Although the blessing of God is never seen pure and
transparent as it appeared to man in his innocence, yet if what remains
behind be considered in itself, David truly and properly exclaims, The
whole earth is full of the mercy of the Lord.The evils in it only
arise as sin inverts the God-given order.
In the order of nature God manifests himself to set before men his
glory and gives according to his infinite goodness more than men require.
But if men hunger or mourn, 'I answer that this happens contrary to the
order of nature; namely when the lord on account of the sins of men
closes his hand. Fox- the liberality of God would constantly flow to us
4
of its own accord,' 'except that the obstacles of our sins shut it off.'
God from his side would maintain the order of creation in its entirety, he
does not will to alter it, but by our sins we exclude ourselves from it
5
in major part. His paternal solicitude in the order of creation is con¬
spicuous. 'Yet that he frequently keeps his hand as if closed is to be
imputed to our sins.'° If from our side we see the hand of God closed,
1. Ser. on I Tim. 4.9-11, OR 53.400. Com. on Ps. 104.29, CR 32.95f
2. Com. on Acts 34.17, CR 48.329. Ser. on Gal. 1.3-5, CR 50.287
3. Com. on Gen. 3.17, CR 23.73- 1.14*3, CR 2.119
4. Com. on Acts 14.17, CR 48.329- Com. on Ps. 145.16, CR 32.117
5. Ser. on Job 11.7-3.2, CR 33»5hOt. Com. on Is. 24.5, CR 36.401
6. Com. on Gen. 1.26, CR 23.27. Ser. on Deut. 32.5-7^ CR 28.675x"
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this is to be ascribed not to a change in him or to any alteration on his
part of the order of creation, but it is caused by our sins.
To ascribe any infelicity among men to sin and not to the order God
would maintain does not mean, on the other hand, that God is not am
active agent in sending natural evils upon man - storms, famines, wars,
pests, sickness - to punish them for their sins. But though God punishes
and curses, these things happen contrary to the order of nature that he
for his part would have to exist as he is obliged to transform himself to
2
expostulate with the ingratitude of man. These are 'accidental evils'
brought on as God is constrained to punish man's subversion of his order.
'These two things are then both true: that God is not without a testimony
as to his beneficence, for he gives rain, he gives suitable seasons, he
renders the earth fruitful so as to supply us with food; and also that
heaven and earth are often in great disorder, that many things happen un¬
seasonably, as though God had no care for us, because we provoke him by
our sins, and thus confound and subvert the order of nature. These two
things then ought to be viewed as connected together, fox* in the ordinary
course of nature we may see the inconceivable bounty of God toward mankind,
but as to accidental evils, the cause ought to be recognized, even this:
because we do not allow God to govern the world in a regular and consistent
order.'^
b. The spiritual gifts from the side of God
In addition, to the natural gifts there were bestowed upon Adam
spiritual gifts which were sufficient for eternal felicity. These
spiritual gifts were given as God gave himself and the knowledge of him¬
self to man in this order. 'The legitimate order was assuredly this:
that man by contemplating the -wisdom of God in his works, by the light of
the understanding furnished him by nature, might arrive at an acquaintance
1. Com. on Amos 3.3f, CR 43.42ff; Com. on Ezek. 14. 14iT, OR 40.3l6ff
2. Ser. on Deut. 5.8-10, GR 26.268; Com. on Hag. 1.10f, CR 44.93
3. Com. on Jer. 5.25, GR 37.636
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1
with him.' It is Calvin's assertion that these spiritual gifts have been
entirely removed from fallen man, yet this statement is to be seen in its
larger context as far as the concept of order is concerned. Prom the side
of God Calvin emphasizes that no change has occurred in the revelation in
the sun, stars, and objective order of nature in and through which these
gifts were to be given. It is then owing to man's perversity and not to
God's revocation of his primal order that these gifts are no longer com¬
municated to man.
God's glories are still conspicuous on every side. Coming to know
God in nature was the right order, but more, Calvin notes that it would
still today be the preferable order were it possible. 'We certainly ought
to be taught by the wonderful wisdom of God apparent in the heights and
2
depths of the world.' The original order remains. Nothing of God's
self-communication, or his gift of himself in nature has been rescinded.
'Fe must seek and consider God in his works.' 'Certainly all these should
abundantly teach us all of such a God as it is necessary to know, if we
in our coarseness were not blind to such a great light.'J Today as in the
beginning an objective knowledge of God in creation invites us to acknow¬
ledge him and to confidence in him.^" In all his creatures he points us
heavenward and causes us to taste his fatherly love that we may know he
has reserved a better heritage for us as his children. 'He wishes to
certify how great is his care for us in order that we learn to entrust
5
ourselves wholly to him and. to rest there.' 'God has ordered his
created things for our service, these ought to be a help to guide us to
him so that we should be the more incited to love him because he shows him¬
self a good and loving father to us. ' 'It is as though he should set up
1. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CP. 49*326
2. Ser. on Is. 53*1-4, CP 35.630. 1.5*1, OR 2.41
3. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 3* Com. on Ps. 19. Iff, CR 31*194ff
4. 1.14* 21f, CR 2.132fj Com. on Ps. 65.30, CR 31*609
5. Ser. on Gal. 3* 15-18, CR 50.530. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49*326
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1
a ladder for us, or make stairs to come up on.' God from his side and
on his part maintains the original order and gives to man all the aids
which should be necessary for the inheritance of the good life.
Calvin's emphasis on the completeness and potential adequacy of this
self-declaration of God written in the heavens presents problems in the
matter of the atonement. This knowledge was all Adam needed, but more
could we perceive it, it is all we would need to know. Aside from the
question of past sin and apart from the necessity of atonement, this
declaration of his goodness, if perceived, would be as adequate for us as
for Adam. But Calvin does not stop here. ¥e could learn about 'his
mercy which endures our iniquities with such a great kindliness in order
2
to amendment.' 'Displayed both in heaven and earth' are 'clemency,
goodness, mercy, justice, judgment, and truth.' Psalm 145 'contains such
an accurate summary of all his perfections that nothing seems to be omitted.
And. yet it contains nothing but what may be known from a contemplation of
the creatures;' specifically it teaches us of his 'mex'C.y, in which alone
consists all our salvation.' ^ 'As regards the ungodly, although God shows
them his long suffering patience, they are incapable of perceiving pardon.'^
But God does show them his forbearance.
How can mercy and pardon be written from all time in the representation
of God in the heavens when there has been no atonement, for it is impossible
5that God should have mercy on us until Christ has borne our sins.
Presumably (l) in a way similar to that in which forgiveness is promised
in the Old Testament. Here mercy is given proleptically on the basis of
gatonement later to come. Gould we see the fatherhood of God we would be
led to all that a father does - that a father would give his son for the
1. Ser. on Deut. A. 19-24, OR 26.162. Ser. on Deut. 50.5-7, OR 28.675??
2. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 3
3. 1.10.2, OR 2.72f
4. Com. on Ps. 145.8, GR 32.415
5. Ser. on Is. 53.4-6, CR 35.624f
6. II.7.16, GR 2.264
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salvation of the world. Or; (2) there is a further and very interesting
line of solution that Calvin suggests but does not develop. Atonement
takes place not to enable God to forgive, but to enable man seriously
to recognize the forgiveness which God stood ready to impart apart from
atonement. ^ It is necessary to do it this way because of our ignorance.
On account of our blindness to him in the heavens 'he has changed his
p
method' and sent his Son to become a curse for us. If God pardoned us
apart from Christ's intercession we should think nothing of it. But when
we see the atonement we come to our senses.^ 'God might have redeemed us
by a single word or by a mere act of his will if he had not thought it
better to do otherwise for our own benefit,' and so he worked atonement
'not sparing his own well-beloved Son' to impress us with his love.^
Only in this way is man re-created to be a child of God. But in the case
of man's full perception of the forgiveness of God written in the heavens
that re-creation for which Ghrist is sent would have already happened. God
5
would have redeemed us in another way, perhaps by divine fiat.
It is only our perversity and unbelief here, as is constantly the case,
which cuts off our inheritance of the eternal life and all the blessings
which God would impart to us. 'Unbelief blocks God from approaching us,
and keeps as it were his hand shut.' 'Hot that the power of God is bound
by the inclination of man, but because, as far as is in them, the obstacle
of their malice shuts off that power, and they are unworthy that it should
be laid open to them.' 'As often as he withdraws his hand so as not to
assist unbelievers, this is done for this reason: that they, shut up within
the narrow limits of their infidelity, do not allow it to enter.' ° ' God
deals very bountifully with the unbelieving, but they are blind, and
1. Com. on I John A.10, CR 55«353f
2. Ser. on Is. 53.1-4, CR 35.6lOf
3. Ser. on Is. 53.4-6, CR 35.625f
4. Com. on John 15.13, CR 47»344f
5. Ser. on Gal. 1.3-5, CR 50.293
6. Com. on John 11.40, CR 47.268. Com. on Jer. 5.25, CR 37.645f
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therefore he pours forth his grace without any benefit, as though he
rained on flint or on arid rocks. However bountifully then God bestows
his grace on the unbelieving, they yet render his favor useless, for they
are like stones.'""" 'For since God is by nature disposed to acts of kind¬
ness, nothing but our ingratitude and enmity hinders us from receiving
that goodness which he freely offers to all.1^
A troublesome point here is that Calvin can also employ the Augustinian
notion of God's withdrawing the spiritual gifts after the fall, and
can so state it as to question whether God 3till wishes or wills to
give to man the grace he has forfeited. 'Man since his fall has been
x
deprived of the gifts of grace on which salvation depends.' To punish
man, God takes away the hope of salvation. But taken in the larger context
of his thought it is clear that this withdrawal of man's spiritual gifts
does not mean for Calvin that God on his part no longer wills to be gracious
to man in the order he once established. God has been obliged to punish
man, yet this is not what God. wants for man; creation objectively is still
so ordered as to lead men to God and impart them eternal life. God has
not removed his gifts so much as man has on account of his sin cut himself
off from them. God withdraws his gifts because men shut up in their infidelity
do not allow him to enter. Yet the whole apparatus through which these
gifts were to be administered, the revelation in nature, remains in its
entirety and continues to invite man to a knowledge of God's fatherly
care; it always points ham heavenward. The gifts may be said to remain
in this objective sense, though they never reach subjectivity in sinful
men. In this sense God continues still to give himself to man in nature
and so to impart the spiritual gifts. They may projjerly be said to be
withdrawn only in the sense that they no longer are subjectively realised.
1. Com. on Zech. 12.20, CR 4!f. 335
2. Com. on Is. 1.19, CR 3o.46f. Com. on Ps. 202.10, CR 32.65
3. II.5.19, CR 2.247- II. 1.12, CR 2.195
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c. God's renewed gifts in special revelation
That God has not deserted his order fox* man's life becomes again
clear as he redeems man and re-establishes him in the original order of
grace. This redemptive movement from the side of God begins right at the
curse in the garden of Eden. ^ His grace superabounds to establish the
covenant of grace, he sends his Son to die for all men. Here we have
the decisive revelation that God still wills that men should live in the
love of God, as was the order of man's life in the beginning. 'For God,
viewed in himself, loved us before the creation of the world, and redeemed
2
us, and for no other reason than because he continually loved us.'
'Although he saw that we were so wretched, that we on account of sin were
a race lost and damned, yet nevertheless he had pity on the human race,
and did not wish that it utterly perish. Thus you see how God loved us
still when we became fallen in the person of Adam, and when we became
totally corrupted.' 'He never ceased to have some regard for us, and to
extend his pity so far that he would not have us to abide in our des¬
truction; he was not even content to declare this by word of mouth, but
also he has given us a visible pledge, that is, his own Son has answered
for it.'Christ brought life because the heavenly Father loves the
4
human race and wishes that it should not perish.'
The redemption reveals that God has always willed to be gracious,
and still wills to be gracious and that he is not finally going to let
sin stand, in his way. Here we see again why we limit the extent to which
we think of the spiritual gifts of God to man as having been withdrawn.
Calvin does not have in mind a permanent revocation of man's spiritual
gifts so much as a temporary suspension, effected by the agency of God,
but because man's sin has shut off communication in nature. When God can
1. Com. on Gen. 3.19, CR 23.76
2. Com. on II Cor. 13.14, CR 30.154
3. Ser. on Gal. 1.3-5, CR 50.292
4. Com. on John 3.16, CR 47.64
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no longer give eternal life to man there, God does not break the order but
re-affirms it a new way as he enters history in his redemptive covenant
wrought for all mankind. '"Thereas the Lord invites us to himself* by means
of the creatures with no effect,1 ' he has added, as was necessary, a new
remedy or rather a new aid to assist our inept capacity.'^ 'As the whole
world gained nothing in instruction from the fact that God had exhibited
his wisdom in the creatures, he then resorted to another method for
2
instructing man.'
The broadest significance of God's refusal to let go his original
plan for man's existence is that God would have all men re-established in
the life which he has set out for them, and so would have all men to be
saved. God has created man to be gracious to him, he then wills that all
men return from their sin and receive his grace. Sut when Calvin has
worked out his concept of order to this point he canes into conflict with
his own ideas of predestination and this presents one of the most serious
problems in his thought. We have reserved an analysis of the methods
he uses to harmonize these conflicting notions "to the following chapter.
Here we only note that from the point of view of his concept of order,
Calvin must assert that God's will is for all men to be saved. 'He is
affected with fatherly love toward the whole human race since he created
and formed it, for if a workman loves his work because he recognizes in
it the fruits of his industry, so when God has manifested his power and
goodness in the formation of men he must certainly embrace them with
affection.' Our salvation must be precious in his sight. 'All souls
are mine, he says. I have formed all, and am the creator of all, and so
I am affected with fatherly love toward all, and they shall rather feel
my clemency, from the least to the greatest, than experience too much
rigor and severity.'^
1. Arg. to Com. on Gen. 23.10
2. Ser. on Is. 53.1-4, OR 35.610
3. Com. on Ezek. 18.If, GR 40.424. Ser. on Job 10.7-15, OR 33.479ff
-206-
2. Man's failure to acknowledge God and inversion of order
When man sins God does not from his side will to alter his order. Yet
man's ingratitude - his infidelity, his disobedience, his unbelief, his
concupiscence - so alters this order as to invert it. What does Calvin
mean by this? We have just seen that sin does not alter God's half of
the existence relationship insofar as his will and fatherly actiori toward
us is concerned. Yet when man breaks his complementary response, there
occurs the inversion of the order of creation. God must at once confront
man with his gifts and cut them off on account of his sins. God who was
to be and remains from his side man's father is in point of fact and from
the side of man brought over against man as judge.
'Though all God's benefits ought to raise us up to heaven, serving as
kinds of vehicles, they are carried off through our* wickedness to a
contrary end, and are made intervening obstacles between us and God.' God's
blessings become impediments 'through accident* (per accidens) as we turn
them to an end contrary to what he has designed. Our Lord despoils us
of his benefits because 'we corrupt then by our abuse. We know indeed that
whatever God has put into our hands is desirable, we see the usefulness of
it; but at the same time instead of using it devoutly with thanksgiving,
every man wishes to make it serve his own lust. Now when God sees that
his blessing is so turned to our harm, and that to employ it for quite
the opposite purpose from what he had intended, he deprives us of i"t.'
o
'He will not have his graces so to be scorned and disdained.'"" Here the
character of sin is thought of as such that while God continues to confront
man with the gifts of grace and stands ready to bestow them, yet in sin
these gifts are cut off, and in the part which does break through to man
inverted or turned into their opposite so that what is given as good at
the hand of God proves evil in the hand of man, and thus effectively closes
1. Gom. on Micah 5»30f, GR 43»380f
2. Ser. on Deut. 16.18-19, GR 27.411. Gom. on Lam. 1.7, GR 39.515
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the hand of God to us. As it appears in creation, sin is essentially
inverted good. God's gifts do not change, but man changes them.
The blessings turn into curses, Calvin frequently says, by which he means
that the gift, which was given as an aid to righteousness, that man might
set himself to doing good, becomes at the hand of man an aid to evil as he
takes these gifts to further his unrighteousness, as he sins by employing
the gifts of God. As man refuses to acknowledge in response to God the gifts
of grace, but rather arrogates than to his own use, they are transmuted to
evil. 'We disguise God's truth and convert it into a lie, or else so paint
it over that it is put quite out of its own nature.' 'All the graces that
were bestowed on us become as many records to make us guilty before God,
and so long as we continue in our nature, we do but abuse the benefits which
we have received and apply them to evil. And so you see that always our
confusion increases by all the gifts which God has bestowed upon us.'1 Our
perversity turns upside down all the heavenly truth which otherwise shines
so clearly in God's works. Ever since Adam sinned good has been turned into
2
evil, God's blessing is turned into the occasion or instrument of our
destruction. 'All those things which have a native tendency to produce
3
our happiness are cursed and so become so many causes of our destruction.'
This means first that God at times transforms the rejected ox1 abused
gift into a physical evil. So the order of nature goes awry, the sun which
ought to bring only pleasing warmth for growth brings parched lands and
deserts, the gentle rain becomes a storm, fertile land becomes barren, the
law becomes a task-master of death, or Christ as a rock of refuge and safety
is changed into a rock where men dash themselves to bits as they grow
full in iniquity.^ But it means further that men take the gifts of God and
1. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, CR 35.41ff. Com. on I Tim. 4.5, CR 52.297
2. Ser. on Job 1.2-5, OR 33»39» Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 3
3. Com. onPs. 69.22, CR 31.647. Oom. on Rom. 11.9, CR 49.217
4. Com. on Acts 9.5, CR 48.201; Com. on I Pet. 2.8f, CR 55 . 238f; Ser. on
Bph. 2.19-22, OR 51.436f; Ser. on Deut. 2.8-23, CR 26.27
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convert them into spiritual evil. Man from his side manufactures sin out
of these gifts which God breaks through to him. Evil is thus produced from
good by the work of man. Sin is wrought as good is transformed into evil,
then God must resist in man what he gave to him as a good gift. In his
Commentary on Bzekiel. Calvin elaborates on this way in which man transforms
good into evil to bring sin into the world. The figurative 'beauty' of
the Hebrew nation is pertinent to all God's gifts of grace to man. 'This
passage then is worthy of observation, where God reproves his ancient
people for trusting in their beauty; because the figure signifies that they
drew their material for pride from the gifts which ought rather to lead
them to piety; for the gifts which we receive from God's hand ought to
be invitations to gratitude, but we are puffed up by pride and luirury, so
that we profane God's gifts in which his glory ought to shine forth.'
'God gives all things abundantly and upbraids not, as James says (l.5)>
that is, if we acknowledge that we owe all things to him, and thus devote
and consecrate ourselves in obedience to his glory with the blessings which
he has bestowed upon us. But when God sees us impiously burying and
profaning his gifts, and through trusting in them growing insolent, it is
not surprising if he reproves us beyond what is customary.
'Therefore we see that God assumes as it were another character wnen
he expostulates with us concerning our ingratitude, because he willingly
acknowledges his gifts in us, and receives than as if they were our own, as
we call that break,ours by which he nourishes us, alttough it is compelled
to change its nature as far as we are concerned. It always remains the same
in itself, but I speak of its external form. God therefore as it were trans¬
figures himself, so as to l-eprove his own gifts, conferred for the purpose
of glorying in him only.'^ And what is 'declared about the kingdom of
1. Com. on Ezek. 16.15, CR 40.348. Com. on Eos, 12.2f, GR 42.472
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Israel applies also to the whole world. By their ingratitude men prevent
all the goodness which the Lord has bestowed on them from reaching maturity,
1
for we abuse his blessings and corrupt them by our perversity.' If man seeks
to prostitute God's gifts for his selfish ends, they turn to sin and evil for
him. God will not suffer contempt of his order but as long as man spurns his
offered grace or takes it to employ it fox" evil, then by this action this
grace is converted into evil. 'If we derive no advantage from God's benefits,
he employs this method of punishing our carelessness: that we are made worse
by them.' ' We bring it about that those things which of their own nature and
from the ordination of God ought to be salutary are changed into things with-
2
out profit.'
This is true of the natural gifts. Sin inverts God's bounteous
shower of natural blessings upon man so that in large part they are cut off,
though his liberality stands ever ready to break through to man. Yet in
part the gifts continue to break through and be communicated to man. Here
however with each gift man sins and thus each gift becomes a curse to him.
God sheds his temporal benefits upon unbelievers. Yet 'the blessings turn
to their harm because they are foul and unclean and defile God's benefits
in handling thou. It is necessary then that the order of nature be perverted
this way. For inasmuch as the wicked are full of filth.and uncleanness,
they can touch nothing of God's benefits without perverting them and cor¬
rupting them; they must necessarily turn to their condemnation.'^ 'Let us
enter into this general confession: that since we are so sinful as to per¬
vert all good, we ought to detest the sin which dwells in us, which indeed
reigns in us until our Lord has changed us. For if we are left in our
first nature how will it be with us? Not only will we be wholly contrary
to the will and righteousness of God, but also we must convert and turn into
1. Com. on Is. 28.4, GER 36.464. Ser. on Gal. 6.2-5, CR 51.73
2. Com. on I Cor. 11.17, CR 49.480. Com. on Rom. 13.3, OR 49.250
3. Ser. on Deut. 7.11-15, OR 26.5431'. Ser. on Sph. 3.2-4.2, GR 51.504; on
Job 1.2-5, CR 33.39; on Deut. 24.1-6, CR 28.159
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an obstacle and a hindrance whatever is in itself good, holy, and honorable,
and which has been instituted for our welfare.
Sin inverts God's invitation in the order of creation, and man sins
as he understands it in a perverse sense, or understands it not at all. ' God
has ordered his creatures for our service, and these ought to be a help to
guide lis to him so that ire should be more incited to love him because he shows
himself a good and loving father to us, yet we take occasion at this to
stumble. It is as though he should set up a ladder for us, or make stairs
to come up on, and we happen to hurt ourselves bumping against it. Stairs
are made to help us, but if a man happens to fling himself against the stairs,
he may happen to break his leg and hurt himself, and he shall rather be
hindered than helped by them. So it is with us. God wishes to draw us to
him by his creatures, and we happen to fling ourselves against them rashly
2
and as it were in spite.' 'In all things and by every means he causes us
now to taste his fatherly love with the intent that we might be confirmed
in that which he declares to us in the gospel, to know that he has reserved
a better heritage for us, as for children whom he has adopted. All the
creatures then ought to point us heavenward. Yet in fact we put everything
in reverse, because we apply the creatures of God to our own lust in such
a way that we are held down here below. In short, as many helps as God has
given us to draw us to himself, these are to us so many hindrances to hold
us back in this world.'^
So also God's gift to us of himself in law or gospel, if received only
in sin, is converted by us into an occasion of further sin and so to our
destruction. Regardless of how God declares himself to man and thus
endeavors to grant man the spiritual benefits which he bos ordained from
the beginning, still man makes from all God's approaches to him yet
greater sin, and so brings only condemnation upon himself. The law is
1. Ser. on Deut. 24.1-6, OR 28.159?. Ser. on I Tim. 4.1-5, CR 53.362
2. ^er. on Beut. 4.19-24, CR 26.162. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 33. .Kier. on Gal. 3.15-18, OR 50.530. Corn, on Luke 17.19, GR 45.424
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inverted by sin from life to death. 'The commandment which was ordained
to life is found to be death. ' 'By our wickedness the law is turned to our
destruction, and that is contrary to its own nature.' Sin 'converts the
goodness of the law, inverting it to our destruction.'J" Through our malice
2
the law decays into our ruin. Here sin is fabricated out of the good¬
ness of the lav/-.
Hinally the grace of God at its very zenith in the gospel, if man resists
it, is taken by him and made into an occasion for the greatest sin of all.
Sin here converts the ultimate blessing of God into the ultimate of evil
acts, and so out of the gospel arises the final sin which destroys man.
The-gospel is inverted to destruction. 'The reprobate must perish...because
by their own malice they turn to their own destruction all that is offered .
them, however salutary it may be. * ^ 'The reprobate through their own fault
turn life to death. The gospel would be to all the power of God to salvation,
but as many persons no sooner hear it than their impiety openly breaks out
and provokes against them more and more the wrath of God, to such persons
4
xts savor must be deadly.' They 'turn the only medicine of salvation into
5 6
a venom.'The ingratitude of man causes it to turn into death for than.'
This is more than a simple rejection of the gospel that saves. It is an
inversion of it, taking this opportunity for obtaining righteousness and
making it into the greatest sin. So men's desperate 'wickedness not only
extinguishes the precious gifts of God, and turns them to their destruction,
but makes it to have been better for them that they had never tasted the
goodness of God."'' The supreme gift becomes, by the function of man's sin,
O
his final death. 'The gospel is unto them the savor of death unto death.'u
1. Oom. on Rom. 7-13, CR 49. 127
2. Com. on I Cor. 3*7, CR 50*42. Calvin's understanding here is examined in
detail ,in the discussion of the law.
3. Com. on Matt. 15-13, CR 45-452. Com. on John 20.23, OR 47-442
4- Com. on Matt. 16.19, CR 45.475. Com. on Rom. 9-32f, CR 49-194
5. Com. on Matt. 12.31, CR 45-341- Com. on II Cor. 3-7, CR 50.41f
6. Com. on John 3.17, CR 47.66. Ser. on Luke 2.34, CR 46.391ff
7. Com. on Matt. 26.24, CR 45.703- Com. 011 II Cor. 2D.8, CR 50.118
8. Com. on Rom. 11.9, CR 49-217. Com. on Luke 2.34, OR 45-92ff
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We have here attempted in some detail to set forth and interpret
Calvin's concept of order and the disorder introduced by sin because it
stands in contrast to the notion often prevalent in Reformed theology
and is a position which theology would do well to consider. In the
chapters which have gone before we have seen how Calvin keeps in con¬
stant" focus the grace of God ss he expounds sin. Y,Te can see now in
larger detail the fundamental reason for this. It is because the order
God wills is an order of grace that we must always see sin as man's dis¬
gracing himself and dis-ordering the divine order of grace.
This is clearest by contrast with the position over against which
Calvin here establishes himself, a position which has been characteristic
of the Reformed faith. The original order is conceived as a moral order
of justice and righteousness. It is God's law by which all things are
ordered. As man kept the lav/ of God he would have been just and righteous
and the universe would have been ordered. This moral order is broken by
sin, which is thought of primarily as unrighteousness, rebellion, disobedience,
and immorality. God in his holiness and justice requires punishment because
his moral order has been transgressed and there is an alienation between
God and man. Into this enmity enters Christ as the Son of God who recon¬
ciles God and man by satisfying the old order of justice and who introduces
a new order of grace. Thus there are two orders - a primal order of justice
which determines the scheme of things and a subsequent order of grace which
has been added consequently to the sin of nan. This order of grace was not
then the original order but is God's new way of dealing with sinners. Uor
is it an order which pertains to all mankind, but only to those whom God
has chosen for eternal life. This position is admirably reflected in the
concept of two covenants, which we sketched in the introductory chapter. A
covenant of works is founded on the concept of God's order as an order of
-In¬
justice and righteousness. 'Then man in his sin breaks this moral order,
God at once in his justice requires punishment from man and in his mercy
redeems him by founding a new covenant of grace, fulfilled in Christ who
graciously sheds his blood to satisfy God's justice and introduces the
new order. Order is then conceived of in two ways; an order of justice,
which must ever be satisfied, followed by an order of grace, where God
himself through his Son satisfies his justice by his grace.
It would be radically wrong to pretend that Calvin stands opposite this
position at every point, for such is his breadth of thought that he includes
perhaps the most of these ideas. And indeed to be true to Scripture he
could not overlook these ways of thought. Certainly the concept of a
just and moral God requiring righteousness is a major one with Calvin.
And Christ does indeed satisfy God's justice as he dies for us. Yet none¬
theless Calvin's position must be frequently and fundamentally contrasted
with the position sketched above. Calvin has seen that the governing
Biblical way of thought is that it is from the very beginning an order of
grace. The law is to be sure that of a moral order but a moral order
contained within a universe where the governing motion is that of God's
dynamic outpouring of his blessing and grace. Man is moral in love and
gratitude because God is gracious. Sin is infidelity to depend on this
grace; it is distrust and ingratitude; only from this and subsequently is
it immorality and unlawful unrighteousness. There is a state of alienation
between God and man, as God in his justice and holiness opposes sin, but
this is set within the larger and governing framework where God still
moves continuously to be gracious to man and to invite man heavenward in
nature, law, and gospel. This fundamental order remains unchanged; God
still wills to be gracious over and above the alienation between God and
man, but man in his infidelity, distrust, and ingratitude alienated himself
from God. God offers all men pardon and forgiveness out of his grace
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written in the very revelation in nature, but man is incapable of receiving
it. We have seen that Calvin even says that God who always stood ready to
forgive might have redeemed us another way by an act of his will, but thought
it better for our ignorance to send, his Son. Nor is there for one moment any
hint of a new type of covenant necessary when God redeems us. No moral covenant
of works need be followed by a covenant of grace, for grace has from the be¬
ginning been the prevailing characteristic of order. There is no order of
grace wrought for a few while the many are damned in an order of justice, but
a universal redemption wrought for all mankind, as God moves to re-establish
the first order with superabounding grace. This is not a new covenant required
by sin but the old covenant breaking through the sin of man in a new way.
It may thus be seen how it is vital to return to Calvin's concept of
sin as the disorder of this divine order of grace. Behind the concept of
sin as immorality or disobedience to the law, as a moral breach of the
covenant of works, must be set the concept of sin as that reality which
interrupts God's grace to man and which gains its existence by inverting and
corrupting the good. Sin is not the static state of unrighteousness but the
dynamic perversion of grace. It is not the absence of the good, the lack of
law and order, but a corrupting of the good which is parasitic upon it.
Missing the concept of order as an order of grace, the disciples of Galvin
have missed much of the significance of this way of interpreting the
character and effect of sin. A primal order of grace has not been the
reigning principle for the interpretation of evil. But sin is to be seen
as an erroneous or aberrant use of the gift of grace in Calvin's thought.
It is then only an accidental or adventitious reality. It maintains its
reality and existence by the fact that such is the grace of God that upon
the defection of man the grace continues to confront man and in part break
through to him, but every good gift of God is turned into a curse and made
evil. Along such lines as these theology must again interpret the sin of man.
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IV. Sin and the Providence of God
We turn now to the relation between the existence of sin and divine
providence, for a serious problem rises out of Calvin's concepts here.
Calvin emphasizes God's providential care as well as this gracious order
which he has established and which he from his side yet wills to maintain
but which contrary to his will men reverse and shut off. How do we under¬
stand the existence of sin in a world where 'he perpetually and regularly
, 1
prosecutes what he has forseen, approved, and decreed from eternity'? The
problem is twofold. On the one hand, in the providence of God, how do we
avoid ascribing part of the blame to him, and on the other, how do we make
roan for human responsibility and guilt? It is unfortunate that Calvin's
controversial thought on predestination obscures many of his better insights
about sin and grace, yet in the minds of many his views on reprobation have
written a large looming question mark over all that he has to say about
divine grace or the seriousness of sin. And we shall now find that the shadow
of double predestination does indeed fall across his thought so that Calvin
himself cannot always be true to his most Scriptural insights. Calvin's
Biblical scholarship is betrayed by his logical and polemic theology.
Nonetheless there are in Calvin concepts that serve to correct the
apparent and real inconsistencies involved. Without entering into his whole
concept of providence, we must attempt to show that despite a rather serious
tendency to do so his thought here is not intended to qualify - at least for
the understanding of sin and grace - the truths that God -wills the salvation
of all men and that it is the fault of men ana not of God that men do ruin
themselves in sin. Calvin uses a series of four ideas to embody these truths
by providing an explanation which in any final logical analysis is not an
explanation at all but an admission that we cannot think the matter out to
its end. These concepts are: the twofold will of God, the hidden and mani-
1. 1.17.3, CR 2.166
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fest causes of sin, the intrinsic and accidental effects of grace, and the
degrees of God's election. Refonned thought since Calvin has largely neg¬
lected the importance in Calvin of these concepts because they were in part
obscured, being buried in little read portions of his sexmons and commentaries,
because Calvin himself pressed in debate could undermine the seriousness of
his own concepts, or simply because later theologians put the doctrine of
predestination into a hardened logical form and so could not employ these
less logical distinctions. ITor will it be wise for theology today to follow
him at all points. But for us to appreciate Calvin's attitude toward man's
sin in God's providence it is necessary for us to see again the constant
way in which these concepts recur in his Biblical exegesis (though they are
not absent from his systematic Institutes) and the way in which Calvin
attempts a solution along these lines.
A. Sin as adverse to the will of God
1. God's will (voluntas) and secret counsel (arcanum consilium)
Calvin makes a distinction between the will (voluntas) of God and his
secret counsel (arcanum consilium), a distinction which for all its short¬
comings he does use to protect for the understanding of sin the fact that
God wills a life in grace for sinners, and labors to restore them to it.
God wills that all men cease their sins and be saved, but this is not his
secret counsel. The counsel of God, as far as we can perceive it, is not
the same as his will. The will of God is to be appraised or formulated by
the external act of his revelation in his Word, and this will is that all
men be saved. But there is also a hidden counsel which pre.destinates some
to damnation. God assumes an mithropomorphic character to make himself
known in two wills, yet this reflects but one will at the heart of God.
Calvin explains this in his comment on Bzekiel 18.23-31- The prophet
affirms that 'God does not will the death of a sinner,' yet he 'does not
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he.re speak of God's secret counsel*' 'If anyone objects again, This is
making God act with duplicity, (duplex) the answer is ready, that God
always 7/ishes the same things though by different ways and in a manner
inscrutable to us. Although therefore God's will is simple (simplex) yet
great variety is involved in it as far as our senses are concerned. * ' We
cannot certainly judge how God wishes all men to be saved, and yet has
devoted all the reprobate to eternal destruction and wishes them to perish.'
'But we must note that God does put on a twofold character, (duplicis persona)
for he here wishes to be taken at his Word. Now what are the contents of
this Word? The law, the prop)hets, and the gospel. Here all are called to
repentance, and the hope of salvation is promised them when they repent.'
But 'meanwhile this will (voluntas) of God which he sets forth in his Word
does not prevent him from decreeing (decerno) what he would do with every
individual.'
The major part of a sermon on I Timothy is devoted to an exposition of
this concept. 'The Scripture does speak to us doubly (doublement) of the
will of God. How so? Since God is not double, since there is no dissimul¬
ation at all in him, why is it that there is a double fashion of speaking
about his will? It is because of our rudeness. Tor we know that God must
transfigure himself in order to condescend to us.' Because we cannot com¬
prehend his invisible majesty 'Scripture speaks to us of the will of God in
two sorts, (la volonte de Dieu en deux sortes) not at all because this will
is double but because he must accoiTodate himself to our weakness.' ' When
the Scripture tells us that God has chosen such as it pleased him before
the creation of the world, this is a secret counsel (conaeil estroit) into
which we cannot enter.' 'But there is besides that the will of God which
is as it were open to us, such a will as he declares to us nevertheless just
as often as his Word is preached to us.' 'from this we may judge that it
1. Com. on -^zek. 18.23, OR 40.445f. Com. on II Pet. 3.9, CP 55.475f-Com. on Jonah 3.10, CR 43.261 '
-118-
is the will of God that 8-11 men should be saved.' ' ¥e see it as a matter
quite out of all doubt that the will of God ought to be considered doubly,
viewed according to our' reach, not that it is double of itself...but because
our infirmity requires God to condescend to us in this as well as in all the
1
rest.' In his Institutes Calvin writes: 'The will of God is neither
repugnant to itself, nor subject to change, nor chargeable with pretending
to dislike what it approves; but while it is uniform and simple, it wears
to us the appearance of variety because the weakness of our understanding
does not comprehend how the same thing may be in different respects both
agreeable to his will and contrary to it.' 'In a wonderful and ineffable
2
manner that is not done without his will which is yet contrary to his will.'
It is then the will of God that no sin be committed in his creation,
that all cease from their sin and return to him, for all are his creatures and
he is affected with paternal solicitude for all.^ In this way God's will is
that his purpose in creation be re-established. Consequently we pray for
the salvation of all men and labor accordingly.^" And God's will has not
been kept by man. He has thwarted God's order and government, and wrought
confusion in the world. But there is as well the secret counsel of. God.
Prom this viewpoint there is no disorder in the world but all things are
governed perfectly by his providence. 'God has indeed ever governed the
world by his secret providence, ah he still does govern it.' There are
many events where God's will is in complete harmony with his decree. This
is the case, for instance, in the forming of the covenant, the Enodus, the
coming of Christ, or in the election and regeneration of sinners. There are
many events - 'shipwrecks, famines, banishments, diseases, and disasters in
1. Ser. on I Tim. 2.3-5, CR 53*151-5, passim. Com. on Rom. 11.34, CR 49*231;
Com. on Matt. 6.ID, CR 45*197f; on Matt. 23*27, CR 45*641?
2. 1.18.3, CR 2.170f. III.20.43, CR 2.667f; III.24.15, CR 2.725; III.24.17,
CR 2.727f; Ser. on Bph. 1.7-10, CR 51.29UF; on 3*9-12, CR 51*464?
3. Com. on Jonah 4*30f, CR 43*287; on Is. 29*23, CR 36*503
4* Ser. on Bph. 6.18-19, CR 51*842; on Deut. 9*13-34, CR 26.683; on 2.24-27,
CR 26.39; Com. on Jer. 15.If, CR 38.205f; on Ps. 28.4, CR 31*283
5* Ser. on Bph. 5*15-18, CR 51*716, etc.
6. Com. on Micah 4*3, CR 43.34^. I.l6.2ff, CR 2.145ff; 1.17*13, CR 2.166
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war' or other chance vicissitudes - where the harmony is not so readily
seen, yet there is not necessarily any incompatibility. Nor is it difficult
to see how God, while yet willing the welfare of man, may be constrained to
send punishments on man to chastise and to prove him. ^ In these things the
will and the counsel of God need not be seriously differentiated.
In the case of the sinful thoughts and actions of man, however, the
problem becomes more acute. Calvin says that the sinful deeds of men are
decreed by God. God is ' the author' of events including robbery and murder.
Further, God governs as well the 1 designs and affections' of the impious,
the 'deliberations and volitions of men.* 'Men can effect nothing but by
the secret will of God and can. deliberate on nothing but what he has
previously decreed (decerno) and determines by his own secret direction. '^
An example worthy of note is that of the new kingdom under Jeroboam. 'The
same thing was done and was not done by the Lord, but in a different way.
God here expressly denies that Jeroboam was created king by him, on the
other hand, by referring to sacred history it appears that Jeroboam was
created king not by the suffrages of the people but by the command of 'God.'/+
'God, while he hates perfidy, yet righteously and with a different design
5
decrees the defection.' A less drastic explanation for the inconsistency
is simply that we have here reflected variant traditions. But the example
is significant in showing how Calvin freely admits a logical breakdown.
Finally, the difference between God's will and decree is most marked
as we affirm that the reprobate are damned by the counsel of God.. The 'ruin
of the wicked is ordained by his counsel.' 'The wicked themselves have been
created for this very end, that they may perish.' ° So Calvin explains in
the Commentary on Romans, recognizing elsewhere that this is not a pleasant
1. Com. on Ps. 107, arg., CR 32.135. I.16.Iff, CR 2.144ff, CR 2.153ff
2. 1.18.4, OR 2.l67f
3. 1.18.1 and 4, OR 2.167 and 171; 1.16.8, CR 2.181
4. Com. on Eos. 8.4, CR 42.336f.
5. 1.18.4, OR 2.172
6. Com. on Rom. 9. IS, CR 49.184. 1.18.2, CR 2.170; III. 21.5, OR 2.683
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thought. 'To the common sense of mankind, the thought of such severity
is horrifying.' But we are now standing in direct opposition to v/hat
Calvin has previously asserted in the same commentary to be the end of man.
'All men are born to this end: that they should worship him in righteous-
2
ness and holiness.' Or more clearly elsewhere: 'God does not create men
3
in vain, it is then no wonder that he wishes them to be saved.' We have
here then to recognise that in the matter of the sin of man, and of his
reprobation and ruin, there is a secret decree of God which is, as far as
we can see, incompatible with his revealed will. The will of God does
in the case of the sinful thoughts and actions of man wear to us the
appearance of variety.
There are various ways we qualify this secret counsel to deny that
Cod is chargeable with being the author of sin and yet make him the
ultimate author of the deeds of the reprobate. Calvin has entitled a
chapter in the Institutes; 'God uses the agency of the impious and inclines
their minds to execute his judgments, yet without the least stain of his
4
perfect purity.' But though there are ways we attempt to see this, we
can in the last analysis only recognise an apparent double will in God.
There is as far as our capacity to comprehend is concerned, a logical
breakdown so that what he decrees is not in accord with what he wills.
Calvin can express this difference in several ways - usually, the difference
between God's will and his secret counsel, frequently, in an apparent double
will or manifold will, of the will of God in two sorts, or occasionally
in the difference between his will and his precep>t,5 and this terminology
is not rigidly adhered to - yet the distinction remains. Calvin is not
willing to abandon either the fact that the providence of 'God extends to
the sin of man, or the fact that his will is for righteousness and not for
1. Com. on Ps. 109.13, CR 32.15 If
2. Cora, on Rom. 2.23, CR 49.42
3. Cora, on Jonah 4.30f, CR 43.278. Com. on Ps. 89.47, CR 31.828
4" £*18,t^tle,1°R, 2*167' 8ee The Secret Providence of God. and The
5 £><3, written to defend thiTiheTu.~•4, CR 2.171; The Secret Providence of God. ("H.m > okj.
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sin. At times 'God intends that to be done, the doing of which he forbids.'
We cannot understand this, we have only to recognize the limitations of our
capacity. This seams to be Calvin's ultimate position.
We must notice^,however that Calvin can prejudice the seriousness with
which he regards his own concept here. The difference between Calvin's
handling of key texts here in exegesis, i.e. in his commentaries and sermons,
and in controversy, i.e. in his polemic treatises, is rather marked. Without
fail in exegesis he frankly admits and teaches that in this matter we must
make the double distinction between God's will and his counsel, and that it
is logically impossible for us to understand how the two can go together,
although we do hold that these two reflect in an inexplicable way a single
2
will in God. It is on these exegetical writings that we have depended most
heavily in this presentation, though he is perhaps equally as willing to
admit the logical breakdown in the Institutes.^ But pressed by his adver¬
saries and in the heat of controver'sy Calvin erases the distinction and
tries to find one will in God behind the apparent two, attempting to
present a single will in a logical form. The distinction so paramount in
his exegesis of Ezek. 18.23, Ezek. 18.32, II Pet. 3.9, or I Tim. 2.A is
totally absent from his discussion of these same texts in The Secret Pro-
4 5videnee of God. It does appear here and there across the book but Calvin
makes every attempt to erase it. This 'appearance of difference' exists
only 'to ignorant and inexperienced persons at first sight.'"' Has Calvin
not here allowed his logic to outstrip his own better Biblical insights?
Is he not, in attempting to put the whole thing into logical form, trying
to do what he has elsewhere admitted is impossible? Interestingly, the
passages clearest on the point in the Institutes (esp. 1.18.3, and 11.24.17)
1. 1.18.3, CR 2.171
2. Com. on Ezek. 18.23 and 32, CR 40.445f and 458f; Com. on II Pet. 3.9,
CR 55.495?; Ser. on I Tun. 2.3-5, CR 53.151?; Com. on I Tim. 2.4?, CR 52.268
3. 1.18.3?, CR 2.170f; III. 24.17, CR 2.727f, etc.
4. 275ff 5.254, 255, 287, 290, 306ff 6. 306f
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are without exception absent from all editions prior to 1559, and the per¬
tinent exegetical writings tend to be late also. He died before he finished
the Commentary on Ezekiel (published in 1563)• The Sermons on I_ Timothy
date from 1555* The earliest clear passage is in the Commentary on II
Peter in 1551* But if Calvin saw more clearly in his later years that an
ultimate reconciliation is impossible, this did not affect his attempt to
do so in The Secret Providence of God, published in 1553.
nonetheless, Calvin's frankest answer to the problam seems to be that
we cannot avoid setting side by side the two Scriptural truths, that God's
will is not for sin but for salvation, and secondly that he governs all
events including men's sin, choosing one and rejecting another.
2. Responsibility for sin in the light of God's will and counsel
It should already be fairly clear in which direction Calvin's thought
develops in the matter of culpability for sin. But it remains for us to
see in more detail how Calvin makes room for human responsibility and denies
that God is the responsible author of sin. In the matter of God's desire
for the welfare of his children and of their sin against him, we must turn
not to the maze of his hidden counsel, but to his Wbrd. Calvin explains
this in his detailed comment on the passage in Deut. 5«29, where 'God say3
with a sigh, 'Oh that they had such a mind as this always to fear me and
keep my commandments.' God says, 'I surely wish that it might be so.' But
it is in God's power and not in man's to bring this to pass. 'Why then does
he seem to wish it in this passage?' 'God is showing here that he sends
us his Word to the end that he might be joined with us, that we might be
as well united with him, to the end that we might be his children and that
he may show himself our father.* 'Now it is true...that this is not within
our ability. God must give us the grace and he does not give it to all men.
But it is not a question here of inquiring into the secret counsel of 'God
as to why it is that he reforms some by his Holy Spirit and pemits the
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rest to err in accord with their corruption without at all drawing them
back. We must not enter into that labyrinth.' 'Here however we must con¬
sider God's will as it is set before us in his Word, not as it is hidden
2
in himself.' 'It must suffice us that God wishes to render men inexcusable
when he says, I surely wish that it might be so. It is as if he should say
that after we have been taught by his Word we have no more excuse. God is
3
not to be blamed if we are not saved.'
Again in Psalm 81.13, God exclaims, 'Oh that my people would listen to
me, that Israel would walk in my ways!' But God could bring this to pass.
'Wow what hinders God from bending and framing the hearts of all men equally
in submission to him? Eere modesty and sobriety must be observed that
instead of presuming to intrude into his secret .judgments, we may rest con¬
tented with the revelation, he has made of his mil in his Word.' We there,
learn that 'the grace of God would have continued to flow in an unbroken and
uniform course had it not been interrupted by the perverseness and wickedness
of the people.'^1" 'It is therefore true that it is a special gift of God when
a man aims at what is good, but it is equally true that it is their own wicked¬
ness that hinders the reprobate from applying their mind to it, and consequently
5that the whole blame of their obstinacy rests with themselves.'
As men who resist God are to turn to his will to see their guilt, so men
in their sinful deeds are to regard his will in his Word and not his hidden pro¬
vidence. 'Therefore in our actions we ought to regard the will of God which is
declared in his Word. God only requires of us conformity to his precepts. If
we do anything contrary to them, it is not obedience but contumacy and trans-
c
gression.' 'When the Lord reveals his will in the law, I must not ascend to
his secret counsel which he intended should not be known to me, but must yield
implicit obedience.'7
1. Ser. on Deut. 5.28-33, OR 26.1fl8tt. Ser. on Deut. 3D.1-8, OR 27.3D
2. Com. on Deut. 5.28, CR 24.208
3. Ser. on Deut., ibid.
4. Gom. on Ps. 81.13ff, CR 31.765ff. Ser. on I Tim. 2.3-5, OR 51.157
5. Oom. on Is. 1.19, OR 36.47. Gom. on Zeoh. 3.6, CR 3,4.566. 1.17.5, CR 2.157f. Com. on Is. 6. 3D, OR %. 136ft; on 48.18, OR 37.185f7. Com. on Is. 3D. 7, OR 36.216
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•Let us now see how God commands what is wrongly and foolishly done
by men. Surely he does not command the ungodly to do what is 'wicked, for
he would thus render them excusable. For where God's authority interposes,
there can be no blame. But God is said to command whatever he has decreed
according to his secret counsel. There are then two kinds of commands;
one belongs to doctrine, and the other to the hidden .judgments of God. The
command of doctrine, so to speak, is an evident approbation which acquits
men; for when one obeys God, it is enough that he has God as his authority,
though he might be condemned by a hundred worlds. Let us then learn to be
attentive to the commands of doctrine, by which we ought to regulate our
life, for they make up the only true rule from which it is not right to
depart. But God is said to command according to his secret decrees what he
does not approve as far as men are concerned. So Shimei had a command to
curse, and yet he was not exempt from blame; for it was not his purpose to
obey God. Rather he thought that he had offended 'God no less than David.
(II Sam. 16.5f) Then this distinction ought to be understood, that some
things are commanded by God not that men may have it as a rule of action
qbut when. God executes his secret .judgments by ways unknown to us.'
The supreme example of this is the crucifixion. While this was an evil
deed, it is not done without the secret counsel of God. 'Many would reply,
Why if that is so we would have to say that God is the cause of evil, and
that the wicked should be excused.* But we must regard in the matter of guilt
2
not his counsel but his will set forth in his Word. So the crucifixion of
Christ was, as far as those who crucified him were concerned, against the
will of God and they may not turn to his counsel for excuse. Yet all the
while believers celebrate the wonderful counsel of God who had. predetermined
the death of Christ. We have here as in all the sins of men to say that the
3will of God 'wears to us the appearance of variety.'
1. Com. on Lam. 3.37f, CK 39.588ff
2. Ser. on Acts 2.22-24, CR 48.660f. Com. on Acts 2.23. CR 48.38ff3. 1.18.3, CR 2.170f
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B. Sin as manifestly caused by man
1. The hidden (abscondita) and the manifest (evidens) causes
A second concept which Calvin uses in his understanding of the relation
between the sin of man and the providence of God is that of the distinguish¬
able difference in causes. In our salvation there is 'the chief cause or
origin,' (summa causa vel origo): the love of God which redeems us.~ But
in reprobation the chief cause is 'the evident cause (evidens) of condemnation,
which is nearer (propinquior) to us in the corrupt nature of mankind.' In
seeking 'the origin (origo) of their damnation,' man ought to select 'the
corruption of nature, which is its true wellspring.' The 'ground (materia)
of reprobation is man's sin and perversity.^ There is a cause open and
4
manifest in the sin of man. The proximate or nearer cause, the most obvious
cause of sin and of reprobation is our own sinfulness.
Also in our salvation there is in addition to the chief cause: the
love of God, a second and lesser though nearer cause: our faith. 'We see
that the love of God holds first place as the chief cause or origin, and
that faith in Christ follows as the second and nearer cause.' ° But the
emphasis is to remain on the first cause. Also in reprobation there is
'a hidden (abscondita) and altogether incomprehensible cause in the pre¬
destination of God.«i expressly state that there are two causes (deux
causes): the one hidden in the eternal counsel of God, and the other mani-
gfest in the sin of man.' Thus in the case of sin, and therefore in the
damnation of a sinner, there are two perceivable causes. There is the evident
1. II. 17.2, CR 2.387. Ser. on Eph. 1.13-14, CR 51.295f
2. 111.23.8, CR 2.705
3. III.23.9, OR 2.706
4. Reply of Calvin to the Syndics of Geneva in the case of Troilet, Oct.
6, 1552, CR 14.379f
5. Com. on Rom. 9.11, CR 49.178
6. 11.17.2, CR 2.387. cf. III.14.17, CR 2.575f; III. 14.21, CR 2.573f
7. III.23.8, CR 2.705
8. Reply in the case of Troillet, CR 14.380
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cause or the nearer cause: man's sin, disobedience, and unbelief.
But there is in addition the hidden cause of sin and reprobation: God's
counsel. By contrast we have seen that a similar situation exists with
regard to the believer; this time the manifest cause is God's election,
and the bidden or second cause is man's faith. God is the evident cause in
the matter of life and salvation, but man is the evident cause in the matter
of sin and death.
2. Responsibility for sin and the hidden and manifest causes
As Calvin employs this concept to understand culpability in sin,
the fact that the causes have been reversed assumes significance. There
is here an imbalance which is not logical, but which is necessary if we are
to be true to Scripture. In our salvation we emphasise the part of God,
but when we contemplate the cause of our sinful actions we are to regard
sin as manifestly and evidently caused by ourselves; we are not to pass
over this and enter into a hidden cause in the secret decree of God. Calvin
is quite unambiguous about this is his Reply in the case of Troillet: 'I
teach that a man ought rather to search for the cause of his condemnation
in his corrupt nature than in the predestination of God.' 'I expressly
state that there are two causes: the one hidden in the eternal counsel of
God, and the other manifest in the sin of man.' 'Here then, messieurs, is
the very core of the whole question: I say that all the reprobate will be
convicted of guilt by their own consciences and that thus their condemn¬
ation is righteous, and that they err in neglecting that which is quite
evident to enter instead into the secret counsel of God which to us is
inaccessible. At the same time the Scripture does indeed show us that God
has predestined men to such ends as he chose them to reach. But as to
why or how this is done we must remain ignorant, because it has not been
revealed to us.' 'I say that it is perverse to pry into the secrets of God
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to which we are unable to attain in order to search for the origin and
condemnation of mankind, while passing over the corruption of their own
nature from which it manifestly proceeds. '
2
Calvin also issues a similar warning in The Secret Providence of God.
Throughout the treatise, however, the question may be raised whether
Calvin does not so elaborate on the first cause as to do just what he says
not to do - pass over the sin of man to search for the origin of condemn¬
ation in God.^ Calvin claims not when the point is raised, and seems to
hold that there is an extent to which developing this hidden cause is
necessary.^ Nonetheless, the principle is stated; we are to emphasize
man's part in his sin and not the hidden providence of God. '"/hen he
blinds the reprobate, it is sufficient for us to know thai he has just
causes for doing so, and it is groundless for men to murmur and to dispute
with him, as if they sinned only by his impulse. Although the causes why
they are blinded sometimes lie hidden in the secret counsel of God, yet
there is not a man who is not reproved by his own conscience. And it is
our duty to adore and admire the high mysteries of God which surpass our
understanding. It is justly said that God's judgments are a profound abyss.
(Ps. 36.6) It would certainly be highly perverse to involve God in a part
of the guilt of the wicked, whenever he executes his judgments upon them.'5
'Therefore let us rather contemplate the evident (evidens) cause of
condemnation, which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of mankind, than
search after a hidden (abscondita) and altogether incomprehensible one in
r
the predestination of God.'0 Whatever we may say about the hidden cause of
man's sin and consequent damnation, we are to remember that if we live in
1. Reply in the case of Troillet, CE 14»3S0f. Con. on Is. 6.3D, CR 36.138
2. (E.T) 251
3. 246ff, 266, etc.
4. 254. Com. on Rom. 11.7, CR 49.216
5. Com. on Ps. 69.27, CR 31.649
6. III.23.8, CR 2.705. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.), ch. Till, pag. 252, CR 1.874
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sin this is not to bs originated in God. It is true that he is 'the first
cause' of hardening, 'but as that counsel is hidden from us, we must not too
eagerly search into it... but we ought to consider the cause which lies open
before our eyes.' ^ '7fe maintain that they act preposterously who, in seeking
for the origin of their condemnation, direct their views to the secret
recesses of the divine counsel and overlook the corruption of nature which
is its true wellspring. The testimony God gives to his creation prevents
their imputing it to him. For, although by the eternal providence of God
man was created to that misery to which he is subject, yet the ground of
it he has derived from himself, not from God; since he is rained for no
other reason than because he degenerated from the pure creation of God to
2
vicious and impure depravity.'
If men are damned by God, 'their perdition depends on the divine pre¬
destination in such a manner that the cause and ground of it are found in
themselves.''It is clear that the ruin of man must be ascribed only to
himself, since he was favored with rectitude by the divine goodness, but
has fallen into vanity through his own folly.Whatever this does to the
logic of the argument, and regardless of the fact that Galvin may not always
be true to his own better insight and may be guilty of putting aside the
evident and obvious cause to elaborate on the hidden cause, it is clear
that Calvin does not want to qualify man's culpability with the assertion
that God plays any causal part in his sin. If man sins and continues in
sin this must be ascribed to man as a contrary action against the will of
God. Despite what we may have to say about a hidden cause in God's secret
counsel, we have only to look to our sin as evidently and manifestly caused
by our malicious nature and evidently and manifestly causing our damnation.
1. Com. on Is. 6.10, CR 36.138
2. III. 23.9, OR 2.706
3. III.23.8, CR 2.705
4. II. 1.10, CR 2.184
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0. Sin as accidental in God's order
1. The proper (proprius) and accidental (accidentalis) effects of grace
Calvin makes it clear that Cod's will is always the will for sal¬
vation through his notion of a proper or essential (proprius) and an acci¬
dental (accidentalis) or adventitious (adventitius) effect of God's grace.
The important way in which Calvin takes over this scholastic distinction
and works it into his thought is often overlooked. In gospel, law, or
nature, God's intent is to bless man, if man should be damned by these helps
it does not come from than, but is accidental and canes from somewhere else.
God ever moves toward man with grace, even when that is not the actual
effect. Calvin constantly reminds us of this particularly in his commen¬
taries and sermons on the gospels and New Testament books.
It is the purpose of God in sending his gospel to redeem the world
from sin. 'The gospel is preached for salvation; this is what is proper
(proprium) to it.'"'' 'That we are reconciled to God is proper to the gospel.'
' It is properly (proprie) the power of God to salvation to all who believe.'
'The doctrine of the gospel has of its own nature power for edification,
not for destruction. ' God sent his Son because he loved the human race
and does not wish that it should perish. 'It was not in vain that God sent
his ovm Son to us. He came not to destroy; and therefore it follows that
it is the peculiar office of the Son of God that all who believe may obtain
4
salvation by him.' God is unwilling that we should die and so has appointed
his Son to be our salvation. God's Word of itself is always 'the savor of
life.1 This is ' the nature of his Word,' and fox- this ' end' the gospel is
preached.^ »As often then as we come to hear- God's Word, let us always have
this befoi-e our eyes; that he wishes to bring us back to himself.'^
1. Com. on II Cor. 2.15, CR 50.34. Com. on Matt. 16.19, OR 45.475
2. Com. on John 3.17, OR 47.66. Com. on John 2D. 23, OR 47.44-2
3. Com. on II Cor. ID. 9, CR 50.118f. Com. on Jer. 1.9f, OR 37.48If
4. Com. on John 3«l6f, GR 47»65f. Com. on John 9»39, CR 47.233
5. Ser. on Deut. 2.24-29, CR 26.35ff. Com. on Is. 6.3D, CR 32.137f
6. Ser. on Deut. 4.3-6, GR 26.118
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It is as well God's proper intention in his la?/ to draw us to himself,
though the law alone can never reach this end. 7fe must, however .remember
that considered in itself and from the side of God the law was for man's
benefit. Properly it should aid man. 'The law then because of us brings
only wrath and death, but in itself, if we consider the teaching which is
contained in it, certainly it brings a blessing. For if we were such as
we ought to be, that is to say, if we had such an integrity in us that we
were disposed to serve God, as our father Adam was created before the fall,
the law would bring its blessing.'-*- 'The law is in itself (per se) not
2
deadly.' And again it is the proper intention of God's self-declaration
in nature to make himself known and to lead man to felicity. This fact,
which we have seen already, we here cast into the language of a proper and
an accidental effect. The proper purpose of God in his self-communication
in nature is our welfare. 'God has ordered his creatures for our service,
these ought to be a help to guide us to him.' 'God wishes to draw us to
7.
him by his creatures.'-^ 'The legitimate order was assuredly this, that man
contemplating the wisdom of God in his works, by the light of the understanding
furnished him by nature, might arrive at an acquaintance with him.' ^
Yet the gospel does not always accomplish its true purpose, it may
have an accidental effect. The gospel is appointed for loosing our bonds,
but, as there are many who are guilty of rejecting the deliverance offered
to them, the authority to bind is like1,vise granted to ministers of the gospel.
'It must be observed| however,that this does not belong to the nature of the
gospel, but is accidental.' (acciaentale)^ 'We must always therefore dis¬
tinguish between the proper office of the gospel and the accidental, so to
r
speak, which is to be imputed to the depravity of mankind.' 'That we
1. Ser. on Deut. 11.26-32, CR 27.137ff
2. Com. on Rom. 7.11, CR 49.127
3. Ser. on Deut. 4.19-24, CR 26.162. Ser. on Gal. 3.15-18, CR 50.530
4. Can. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49.326
5. Com. on Matt. 16.19, CR 45.475. Ser. on Bph. 2.16-19, CR 51.421
6. Com. on II Cor. 2.15, CR 50.34. Com. on Micah 2.7, CR 43.305f
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are reconciled to God is proper to the gospel; that unbelievers are brought
eternal death is certainly accidental.' 'It is proper to the gospel that
all are invited to salvation, but it is adventitious (adventitiuin) if it
1
brings destruction to some.' 'When Christ says that he is come to judg¬
ment, when he is called a stone of offense, when he is said to be set for
the ruin of many, this is accidental, or may be said to be adventitious,
for they who reject the grace offered in him deserve to find him the judge
and punisher of such unworthy and base contempt. A clear instance of this
is to be seen in the gospel. For though it is properly the power of God to
salvation to all who believe, yet the ingratitude of many causes it to turn
2
into death for them.' 'Since Christ is by his own nature the light of the
world, it is accidental that his coming should make some blind.' 'The
doctrine of the gospel has of its own nature power for edification, not
for destruction. But if it destroys, this is from somewhere else (aliunde)
i.e. out of the guilt of mankind in that they stumble at the stone which
is ordained for them as a foundation.'^1" 'But we must certainly note that
this does not belong to Christ properly and in himself, but rather it is
accidental out of the malice of men.' -1 'The gospel is in its own nature
the power of 'God to salvation and an odor of life to life, but it is through
accident an odor of death.1
The same is true of the law. 'It is accidental that the law as well
as the gospel brings damnation to man.1''' This Accidental property of the
law is perpetual and. inseparable, the lav/' has no other effect is not illum¬
inated by the grace of Christ, but this does not negate the fact that the
proper nature of the law is salutary. 'The law is in itself not deadly,'
1. Com. on John 20.23, CR 47*442. Com. on Jer. 1.9f, OR 37»4-83i'
2. Com. on John 3*17, OR Lfl.GG, Com. on Is. 8.15, CR $6,179
3. Com. on John 9.39, OR 47.233* Ser. on Luke 2.34, OR 46.39Iff
4. Can. on II Cor. 30.8, CR 50.118f. De Soandalis, CR 8.30f
5. Com. on Rom. 9.32, CR 49.194. Com. on I Pet. 2.8, CR 55»238f
6. Com. on II Cor. 13.10, CR 50.153. Gom. on Luke 2.34, OR 45»92f; on
Matt. 13.11, OR 45.257f; on 15.13, OR 45.452; on Acts 19.9, OR 48.444
7. Com. on II Cor. 3.7, CR 50.42
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but this happens from somewhere else and is as if adventitious.' It is
accidental that the law wounds us fatally, as when an incurable disease is
2exacerbated the more by a healing remedy.' And this distinction must be
held with the self-communication of God in nature. 'God has ordered his
creatures for our service, these ought to be a help to guide us to him.'
'Yet we take occasion at this to stumble.' 'God. wishes to draw us to him
by his creatures, and we happen to fling ourselves against them rashly
3
and as it were in spite.' The evils in nature are 'accidental evils'
brought 'because we provoke him by our sins, and thus confound and subvert
the order of nature.' ^ 'Through accident,' and 'through our wickedness and
5
abuse we turn God's benefits to an end clean contrary to what he has designed.' ,
2. Responsibility and the proper and accidental effects of grace
It is obvious how this distinction is employed in Calvin's under¬
standing of the roles of man and of God in sin. lie are not to say th&t God
is the cause of man's sin and of his ruin, because in everything that God
does for man, in his blessings in the gospel and in the lav/, or in his gifts
in nature, God proper intent is to aid man and secure his welfare. Fe
must then say that man's sin is his own fault in that man has through acci¬
dent turned God's grace to him into a harmful and noxious thing. 'The Ford
of God, as it brings life and salvation to man, is in its own nature
gracious, and it cannot be either bitter, or hard, or grievous to the pious
and good, for God unfolds in it the riches of his goodness.' 'God declares
that he is gentle and kind, and that the character of his Ford is the same
provided that men are tractable, and do not through their perverseness
extort fran him anything else than what he of himself wishes.' But we
by accident as it were turn the iford to our condemnation so that it becomes
1. Com. on Rom. 7« 11, CR 49*127. Com. on Gal. 3.19, CR 50.215
2. Com. on Rom. 7«10, CR 49.126. 'The Use of the Law' in Com. on Harm,
of Pent., CR 24.725ff; Com. on I Cor. 15.56, GEL 49*563
3. Ser. on Deut. 4.19-24, CR 26.162. Ser. on Gal. 3.15-18, CR 50.530
4. Com. on Jer. 5.25, OR 37.636
5. Com. on Hicah 5.10f, CR 43.380
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to us what God did not intend for it to be. 'The fault is in us and ought
to be imputed to us if the 77brd of God is not delightful to us.' ~ 'For
were it not that the reprobate through their own fault turn life into death,
the gospel would be to all the power of salvation, but as many persons no
sooner hear it than their impiety openly breaks out and provokes against
them more and more the wrath of God, to such persons its savor must be
2
deadly.' If the gospel exercises not its proper but its accidental office,
this 'is to be imputed to the depravity of mankind. It is because of this
that life to them is turned into death.'* 'The ingratitude of many causes
it to turn into death for them.'Such blinding and hardening does not
rise out of the nature of the Word, but is accidental and must be ascribed
exclusively to the depravity of man.' 'Ungodly men have no right to blame
the Word for making them worse after having heard it. The whole blame lies
on themselves in altogether refusing it admission, and we need not wonder
if that which ought to have led them to salvation becomes the cause of
5their destruction.'"
This is as well the case in the law. 'If we consider wha.t we are in
our perverse nature, which we have drawn from the sin of Mam, the law can
only curse us. For when God shows us what our righteousness is, if we come
to examine our life, we shall find that we have offended him in every point.
We shall then despair. Yes, but this is not of the nature of the law,
rather it is caused by the sinfulness which is in us, it is because we are
perverse, all our affections are rebellious toward God, and strive only to
follow our wicked lusts instead of obeying him. The law then because of us
brings only wrath and death, but in itself if we consider the teaching which
is contained in it, certainly it brings a blessing.' 'Our Lord says, Come
to me and I will satisfy you with blessings, and we draw completely away
1. Com. on Kicah 2.7, OR 43.309?. Com. on Jer. 23.24, CR 38.450f
2. Com. on Matt. 16.19, CR 45.475. Com. on Jer. 29.10, 'OR 38.59If
3. Com. on II Cor. 2.15, CR 50.34. Ser. on Deut. 30.15-20, CR 28.5954. Oo^ on John 3.17, 0E 47. fifi. De SoenaaHe. CR 8. lof" °n ,10> a' 35-137. Ser. on Deut. 11.26-32, CS 27.1352
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from him. It does not then come from his teaching. Where does it come
from? From us. -There is the fault to be found? Is it in the lav/? No,
but in our own selves.'
Calvin at times, when influenced by his concept of God* s immutable
decree, can state this in such a way as to empty the distinction of much
of its meaning and value. 'In the external preaching of the 7/ord God in¬
vites all indiscriminately to come to him,' but to some 'he intends it as
2
a savor of death and an occasion of heavier condemnation.' When God sends
his Word through Ezekiel, 'God signifies that he has some other object in
view than the salvation of men, namely the removal of all pretext for error,
and the stripping off of every disguise of impiety.' 'We see the purpose of
his sending his prophet: the people were then on the brink of complete
destruction, but God wished to plunge them deeper into the lowest abyss.' ^
But these harsh statements need to be taken in the larger context of his
thought and Calvin is not unaware that here the proper use of God's Word has
fallen into the background. We 'touch only one side of the teaching and omit
the chief point' for 'why were the prophets called forth unless to collect
the people for God?' 'God regards nothing as more important than uniting
miserable men in the hope of eternal life. This is the chief end of the law
and the gospel: that men being reconciled to God may worship him as a father.''r
So if we think more flexibly it remains accidental to God's purpose to curse.
Perhaps the best index of the seriousness with which Calvin does
regard this accidental concept is the constant introduction of it into
his exegesis, as we have already pointed out. Despite the influence on it
of the concept of God's unchanging decree, Calvin would make it clear in
this way that God's will is for salvation and not for sin and that it comes
from man and not from God when his gifts do turn to curses.
1. Ser. on Deut. 11.26-32, CP 27.135ff
2. III.24.8, OR 2.718f
3. Com. on Ezek. 2.3ff, CR 40.62ff. Com. on Num. 21.21, CR 25.258
4. Com. on Ezek. 3.18, CR 40.9Iff
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D. Sin. as an obstacle to the grace of God
A final concept by which Calvin understands responsibility for sin is
that of the love of God shed on all but which falls on different men in
different degrees. Men are elected by God or engrafted into the hope of
eternal life in different ways. Except for those upon whom God bestows his
Spirit the love of God is rejected, yet in each case the grace of God has
been sufficient on the one hand to prohibit God's being charged with having
deserted or failed his creatures, and 011 the other hand to render men charge¬
able with having so rejected an adequate love of God as to be without excuse.
Because of the shadow of his concept of providence it has not always been
recognized that Calvin does not strictly teach that grace is irresistible.
On the contrary men do resist, hinder, and obstruct the blessing God. would
give them. It is then important to see here that Calvin constantly teaches
that within the providence of God men do resist God's grace. God's election
is annihilated by mail.
1. The degrees (degrez) of the love of God
'We see three degrees (trois degrez) of the love which God has shown
in our lord Jesus Christ. The first is with regard to the redemption which
was purchased for us in the person of him who gave himself to death for us,
who became accursed to reconcile us to God his Father.' This first degree
of love extends to all men because Christ has engrafted himself into all
humanity. He died for all men. 'But there is a special love for those to
whom the gospel is preached. This is that God testifies to them that he will
make them partakers of the benefit that was purchased for them by the death
and passion of his Son.' This second degree of love is a double bond,
and an election that he has made of us. We must come to account if we reject
it."'" This is ' the first degree of election.' (la premiere election en degre)
It is a free election of God that we have his "sford and sacraments. ^
1. Ser. on Deut. 4.36-38, CR 26.216
2. Ser. on .Deut. 7.7-10, CR 26.522f
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This first election of God arises from the relation between Abraham's
sons in spirit and the unfaithful sons of the covenant. Calvin variously
terms them the circumcised sons who broke covenant, 'Abraham's children in
respect of the flesh' but ' not his children in spirit,'~ the sons of Esau or
Ishmael, the unfaithful posterity of Jacob,^ or the children of Israel who
were not of the remnant. ^ These sons of Abraham were participants in God's
general election, for he received his -whole seed into covenant. But they were
not all regenerated. 'This general election was then not efficacious in all.
Now while we recognize that the Spirit made the covenant efficacious in 3ome,
yet it is also true that God loved the others and invited them to him, and
that their ingratitude rejected his grace. 'Others were elected in this way,
that is, God offered to them the covenant of salvation, but yet through their
5
ingratitude they caused God to reject them, and to disown them as children.'
With the coming of the gospel, the generally elect become the baptized,
in parallel to the circumcised, or those to whom the gospel is preached and
the sacraments offered., in parallel to the offering of the covenant of
grace,0 or all children of believers for a thousand generations, in parallel
to the promise being given to the seed of Abraham, or more loosely the
'Gentiles as a whole engrafted into the stock of Jesse and adopted into
the covenant, in parallel to the election of the Jewish race. ' The general
election of God is now spread as far as the Gbrd and the sacraments. The
children of the faithful and all those upon whom the seed of the gospel has
been sown 'have been grafted into the hope of life through God's election,'
O
but these branches are 'cut off if they are ungrateful and reject the Word.
1. Ser. on Deut. ID. 15-17, ® 27.46. Com. on Ezek. 16.21, GR 40.352
2. ibid., Com. on Rom. 9.6, CR 49.175; on Hos. 12.3f, CER 42.454
3. ibid.
4. Com. on Hos. 12.3f, CR 42.454
5. ibid.
6. Ser. on Deut. 10.15-17, CR 27.47; on Deut. 4.36-38, CR 26.216
7. Com. on Ezek. 16.21, CR 40.354;,on Is. 66.20, OR 37.451
8. Com. on Rom. 11.22, CR 49.224
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This general adoption testifies that God wills that all men be saved.
While his secret election renders the covenant efficacious only in some,
yet there is a real way in which we must speak of all to whom the Word is ad¬
dressed as being his people - 'the secret election of 'God did not flourish
in them, yet they were God's people' - and of man's leaving the covenant
through his own sin. Of those elected by God to the covenant of salvation
'the greater part is without the covenant through their own unbelief.' It is,
to borrow from the previous concept, accidental that God's election is not
always efficacious. 'God by his singular kindness honored those miserable
ones by opening a way of approach for them to the hope of life and salvation
by the outward testimonies of adoption. Then as to their being at the same
time strangers, that was by accident (accido) through their own guilt.' ^
2
'God's election is as it were annihilated by us.' 'God forsakes us because
we are perfidious and are covenant-breakers.' (foedifragi)^
The third love that God shows us is that we receive the gift of his
Spirit to reform us in his image. From the point of view of the double
election of God 'there is a second election, (seconde election) This is
when each one of us recognizes that 'God has illuminated him by his Holy
Spirit and that he has made us so to taste his Word that we by faith adhere
to it, when he engrafts us into the body of Jesus Christ so that we are
taken and kept as his members.'^" These are engrafted into the hope of
eternal life and are never cut off.
laid in addition God declares his love to us in his self-declaration in
nature. This assumes importance in the question of the responsibility of God
and of man for sin. If God chooses to reveal himself to some in Scripture,
he yet manifests himself to all in heaven and earth. ' He has ordered the
world to be as a theatre in which we ought to contemplate his goodness,
1. Com. on Ezek. 16.21, CR 40.354
2. Ser. on Deut. 7.7-10, CR 26.254
3. Com. on Is. 63.8, CR 37.398
4. Ser. on Deut. 4.36-38, CR 26.216. Com. on Rom. 11.22, CR 49* 224;
on Roin. 9.6, CR 49.175
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righteousness, power, and wisdom.1~ 'In the very order of creation the
- • O
paternal solicitude of God for man is conspicuous.' Here he has shed his
love on all men.
2. Responsibility for sin in the light of the love of God toward all
Against the concex>t of God's love which in some way reaches to all, man
is to assume culpability fox- his sin and misery because he has cut off the love
which God has shed upon him. It is man's fault and not the fault of God. This
is true of all men. ^ It is true first among those to whom God has addressed
his covenant and promised his grace. These include now all the G-entiles to
whom he causes the Word to be preached and. the sacraments offered, all those
of the first degree of election. It is true in a lessex- but parallel way
among those to whom God would reveal himself in nature.
Within the covenant and according to the will that he sets before us
in his Word, God would love us and bless us. But in as many ways as Calvin
can sxxeak of the primal sin of man, he can say that our sin has cut off God's
goodness. Our infidelity and distrust, our unbelief, our ingratitude, our
rebellion, our application of his goodness to oux- own lusts, has hindered him
from exercising his love and liberality toward us. 'God would always be ready
to relieve us by his goodness, or rather it would flow down upon us as from a
never failing fountain, if our own ingratitude did not prevent or cut off its
course.' ' 'Our lusts...ohstruct God's access to us so that his beneficence
5
does not reach us.' 'Whenever -we ax-e deprived of the sense of God's favor,
the way has been closed up through our own fa.ult. I'or God would ever be disposed
willingly to show kindness, excepxt that oux- contumacy and hardness stands in the
way.'^ 'As then the moisture of rain does not penetrate into stones, so the grace
of God is spent in vain (frustra) and without advantage on the unbelieving.' '
1. Ser. on Eph. 3.9-12, OR 51«459ff
2. Com. on Gen. 1.26, CR 23.37* Com. on Is. 24.20, CR %.L\0S?
3. Com. on Is. 59.2, CR 37.337
4. Com. on Ps. 40.11, CR 31.414. on Ps. 48.9, CR 31.478; on Ps. 65.3, CR 31.604
5. Com. on Jer. 5.25, CR 37-635f. Com. on Is. 27.5, OR 36.45If
_. Com. on Bos. 2. 34, OR 42.243. Ser. on Deut. 33.12-17, CR 29.158fcm. on Bos. 6.4, CR 42.326. Com. on Ps. 138.8, CR 32.376
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Such is Calvin's concept of an omnipotent God that students of his
thought have not given serious attention to his concept of sin as obstructing
God's power. And it does seem to be true that Calvin expounds this more
often in his sermons and commentaries tban in his systematic Institutes. Perhaps
the bias of systematic treatment suppresses the wider range of his thought.
Yet the concept is so frequent in his exegesis as to be a real emphasis.
Interestingly enough it finds fullest expression in his Old Testament com¬
mentaries, and virtually dominates the Commentary on the Psalms,. In a very
real way God only performs toward us that which we expect or will rightly use.
He is both hindered by our limited expectations and unwilling to bless us lest
his blessing corrupt us all the more. 'The hand of Cod is indeed always open,
but we are straitened and limited in our desires so that our own infidelity is
no small hindrance to his liberality. And also, because our corrupt nature
would immediately break forth into excess, God deals with us more sparingly;
lest he might corrupt us by too great indulgence, he trains us to frugality
by bestowing with a sparing hand what he was ready otherwise to lavish upon
us in full abundance.'^
Men have contracted desires which obstruct his beneficence. The blame
is entirely ours because our capacity is not large enough to receive his
blessings and our unbelief rejects the blessings which would spontaneously
flow to us. 'From this it follows that the reason why God's blessings drop
upon us in a sparing and slender manner is because our mouth is too narrow;
and the reason why others are empty and famished is because they keep their
mouth completely shut. The majority of mankind, either from distrust, or pride,
or madness, refuse all the blessings which are offered them from heaven. Others,
although they do not altogether reject them, yet with difficulty take in only a.
few small drops, because their faith is so straitened as to prevent their
receiving an abundant supply.' T7e 'exclude God from obtaining access to us, and
1. Com. on Ps. 37.19, OR 31.373
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refuse to give him a hearing when he is ready to enter into covenant with us.'
All this does not mean that Cod bestows the same grace on all men, for we
began with the realization that God does for reasons unknown to us shed his
love in different degrees. Yet it does mean nonetheless that we must think of
man in sin as rejecting whatever grace God has bestowed upon him.
The movement of God's Spirit by which some accept God's gra.ce is part
of his secret counsel and not to be a. source of excuse. We have seen
this already. There is a way, however, in which we learn in God's Word
that he is ready to bestow his Spirit on all 'who will receive him. We must
presuppose this as 'Moses presupposes that God will shed out his Holy
o
Spirit upon the people if they do not shut the door against him.' ^ God
has promised: 'I shall pour out my Spirit upon all flesh.' This is ful¬
filled in Christ. '. evertheless all do not receive him.' 'We resist him
3
by our ingratitude and malice.' 'So then we see that if men do not enjoy
the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which God here declares that he will send upon
his men-servants and maid-servants, it is not because he has changed his
purpose, but we will not allow him to do us good, for when he draws near we
draw away. He is not, then, the cause v/hy we do not receive all his gifts,
for the prophet says, God will pour out his Holy Spirit upon all flesh.
It is that 'we shut the door to his goodness, and in a manner of speaking
•will not permit him to use his natural disposition.' - Our ingratitude turns
away the course of his goodness as if a man should obstruct the flowing of
a river. J In our sin we are not then to blame God's providence, for we are
taught' in his Word that we continually resist the grace he would bestow on
us* 'All our miseries proceed from this one source; that by our sins we
prevent the divine blessing from flowing down in a uniform course upon us.'1
1. Com. on Ps. 81.10f, OR 31.763f. Com. on Ps. 80.16, CH 31.758
2. Ser. on Deut. 32.44-47, CE 29.86. Com. on Ps. 115.12, CR 32.189
3. Ser. on Acts 2.1.3-17, CE 43.611
4. Ser. on Acts 2.18-21, CE 48.645ff
5. Ser. on Deut. 28.59-64, CE 28.468
6. Ser. on Deut. 31.17-21, CE 28.641
7. Com. on Ps. 25.13, CE 31.258
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God's election of some might seem to mean that he is unconcerned for
the rest. Here Calvin employs the concept of God's common love, shed on
all men, as an affirmation of the fact that God for his part has not failed
his creatures and does wish that they be saved. The revelation in nature
is a demonstration of this love and God here maintains an order to draw us
to him. Though he covenants with Israel, he does not cease to desire the
welfare of others. Calvin discusses this at length in a semon on Ephesians:
It does seem strange that God chooses to manifest his gospel to particular
individuals rather than after the fall call all the world without exception.
We recognize here a 'mystery.' 'If it is demanded why God delayed it for
so long a time, men advance too far with such curiosity.' We do recall
however that 'God's wisdom is as it were of varied sorts' and that another
facet of his manifold wisdom is that it was to be 'the wisdom of man to in¬
quire after the works of God.' 'This is also why he has ordered the world
to be as a theatre in which we ought to contexpiate his goodness, righteous¬
ness, power, and wisdom.' God provides for man here. Considering God's
works in general we learn that 'if God declared himself, he did not allow,
2
as much as in him lay, the world to perish.' God is not to blame, for he
has -wished to teach us in nature, but we are to blame for not listening.
Thus within God's providence man is culpable for having violated the
order God would have and for shutting off God's grace. '"tie obstruct 'God's
access to us so that his beneficence does not reach us. We throw heaven
and earth into confusion by our sins. Tor were we in right order as to our
obedience to God., doubtless all the elements would be conformable, and we
should thus observe in the world an angelic harmony.' But 'we provoke
him by our sins, and thus confound and subvert the order of nature.' 'We
do not allow God to govern the world in a regular and consistent order,
but as far as we can we disturb and confound his providence.' (providentia)3
1. Ser. on Eph. 3.9-12, CR 51.463* and Ser. on Sph. 2.1-6, CR 51.442*
2. Com. on Acts 34.17, CR48.327f. 1.5.1, GR 2.41; 1.5.15, OR 2.52
3. Com. on Jer. 5.25, CR 37.655- Ser. on Deut. 29.1-4, OR 28.494
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Calvin then understands that the problem of the relation between sin and
God's providence is not one which can be worked out in a logically consistent
form throughout, but one that must be developed around the antinomy of two
principles each of which is correctly drawn from Scripture: that God's
control extends both to man's good and bad deeds, and that man and not God
is culpable in sin. It has been our thesis here that those who have follow¬
ed after Calvin have developed his concept of providence and predestination
without giving equal emphasis to Calvin's balancing concepts which portray
a dynamic relationship between God and man. To appreciate his wider
thought we must portray alongside the overriding providence of God, sin as
adverse to God's will, as evidently caused by man, as accidental in God's
order and plan, and as a hindrance to the grace of God. At the same time
we have had often to notice that Calvin questions his own position. Where
we can trace variations in Calvin's thought he seems to have biased his
Biblical exegesis under pressure due to polemic debate or rigid systematic
treatment. The dynamic concepts of sin as accidentally turning God's
grace to a curse, or as hindering and cutting off God's blessing are more
freely developed in his sermons and commentaries than in his Institutes,
and he is in his controversial treatises less inclined to admit the logical
breakdown forced upon us in the matter of God's will toward sin.
It is then perhaps these concepts which Calvin used so constantly in
his preaching and teaching that will prove helpful as theology searches
for a solution to the question of sin and God's providential care.
Calvin's concept of sin as a hindrance to God's grace is one which we
have encountered in our study of the wa.y sin is to be understood as that
which disorders the divine order of grace. In terms of the present problem
this means that we must develop our understanding around the antinomy that:
on the one hand it is God's grace to which we ascribe the whole of our
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salvation, including the acceptance from our side of this grace, and the
whole of our deeds of righteousness. His providential care and not our
strength is the cause of this. And on the other; it is our fault and sin
if we refuse God's grace, reject his salvation, and live in ■unrighteous¬
ness. He is always responsible for our proper behavior but we are always
responsible for our evil deeds. In this we must follow Calvin to admit
that the grace of God can be resisted by man, though the assertion which
stands in tension with this is equally true: that it is God and not man
who must overcome this resistance. God's grace brings us to him, yet it is
never a lack of this grace which keeps us away; it is our hindrance of it.
This concept when applied to the doctrine of election is a useful one and
theology may do well to develop Calvin's concept of a double election of
God in further terms than did Calvin. God elects all men to whom this "ford
is directed, for he bestows his redeeming and electing grace upon them,
yet some cut themselves off from this election through their ingratitude and
infidelity.
»7e will also find it useful in the twentieth century to employ Calvin's
concept of an intrinsic and accidental effect of God's grace. If this is
not Biblical but scholastic language, it nonetheless helpfully reflects the
truth that God always moves toward man in grace but that this grace through
accident and by sin can become a curse to man. In God's providence he ordains
for man's blessing in nature, law, and gospel, but we confound and disturb
his providence. ¥e have immediately made it clear that there is no ultimate
logical explanation for this; it is an accident; it happens; we take
occasion to stumble over the rock ordained as chief cornerstone in our
salvation. And we have clearly asserted that it is never God's intent to
harm but his will is always the will for grace and salvation. This or a
similar concept worked out in more Biblical language will at once insure that
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God's constant grace toward man is affirmed and man's dis-gracing sin
confessed, and allow for our admission that we cannot think through the
profound abyss of sin or of God's judgment on it. It may perhaps be useful
also for theologians to heed Calvin's warning that God's part in sin is
hidden in his secret judgments into which it is presumptuous and. curious to
inquire. Scripture directs our attention to the evident and manifest causes
of sin in our own nature and assures us that such is God's predestination
that when we sin the ground of it is derived from ourselves.
But if these concepts are useful to contemporary theology, it must be
questioned whether theology is to retain Calvin's concept of a distinction
between God's will and his secret counsel. Surely we can appreciate the
tension between the Biblical truths that God's will is the will for the
salvation of all men, and yet that all are not saved as he chooses one and
not another. And it is by a recognition that we can neither forgo one
truth nor minimize one to fit the other that we must approach the problem.
To this extent Calvin's insight is useful and may be retained. Yet will it
not be wiser to deal with the problem in a different way, or to suspend our
judgment, rather than to put into serious doctx-inal form such a frustrating
and troublesome concept as a twofold will of God? This concept invites
confusion and uncertainty and would ever tempt us to make Calvin's mistake
of trying to present the two aspects in one logical form. Above all we must
reject Calvin's teaching about a double predestination of God by which some
are created to eternal damnation by the decree and hidden providence of God.
This can, as history since the Reformation has proved, only continually
prejudice both the grace of God and the seriousness of sin.
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V. Sin and the Erath (Judgment and Vengeance) of God
It has been our thesis that Calvin's concept of sin must be understood
within the framework of God's order of grace. This means that when we see
sin against the background of God's order of law, justice, and righteous¬
ness, it is to be done in such a way as to bring this valuable and vital
concept under the larger concept of an order of grace. But traditional
Reformed theology, as influenced by the duality of covenants, has only been
able to foHot/ the first order of law and justice with a second order of
grace, thus at best setting the two side by side. By God's justice and by
the first order and covenant we have merited God's wrath, but by God's grace
and by the second order and covenant we have received his love. There has
then been a tension between God's righteousness and his grace. But our
examination of Calvin's concept of the wrath of God will further show how
everything is to be brought under the order of gra.ce, for in Calvin's
thought even God's wrath and judgment is an act of his grace, the obverse
of God's single redemptive movement. We must see here how Calvin so conceives
of God's justice and judgnent as to incorporate these into his concept of
sin as man's disordering the divine order of grace.
The way in which God meets, resists, ana prosecutes the creature who
sets himself in opposition to God is dealt with by Calvin under the concept
of the wrath of God, as by way of contrast God's relationship to those who
trust him is one of love. 'What does he (Eosea) mean by the fury of God's
1
wrath? Even the relation between his nature and our innate or natural sins.'
God, who was a father to man, now assumes the character of a judge. What
is it that introduces this change in God? What is objectively behind the
subjective change in God? For an answer we look to the judgment of God and
see how God moves against the life of sin. Man senses God's resistance and
perceives that God is angry. We may, following Calvin, separate the notion
1. Com. on Bos. 11.8f, CR 42.443
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of the 'wrath of God into two further concepts. TTe mean (l) the judgnent
of God, or (2) the vengeance of God. Usually the wrath of God has reference
to judgment, ^ although in more particular contexts it has a narrower reference
2
to vengeance.
A. The judgment (iudiciurm) of God
We may use the word judgment in its common usage referring to the con¬
demnation of the guilty, yet a whole notion of judgment must be extended and.
built around a larger work of God. There are two meanings; (l) the re-ordering
of the world, and (2) condemnation and the distribution of just punishment."'
1. Judgment as a. part of the restorarion (restauration) of order
In Calvin's thought judgment must be seen as one of the two sides of
God's restoration of the order set in the beginning. Here at the start Calvin
relates God's judgnent to his act of grace. 'It is the glory of our faith
that God, the creator of the world, does not disregard or abandon the order
which he himself at first established.'^4" On the one side God resists those who
have broken order. But the other side is a. re-creation of man to the ordered
life of grace. 'Adam by his fall had perverted and corrupted all order so that
there was nothing but confusion in heaven and earth until everything was again
5
repaired by Jesus Christ.' Thus God's restoration of order involves on the
one side judgment on man's inversion of God's appointed order, and. on the other
redemption as God re-establishes man in Christ into life in grace. Taking
judgment as part of this larger work of God, we are not to separate it from
its obverse, for God suspends his judgment to make room for the equally
important restoration of his primal gracious order of creation.
Within this restoration of order, God must forever be the enemy of sin.
While he does not hate his creatures - and we shall abundantly see that he
1. Com. on I Thes. 2.16, CR 52.153; on Rom. 4.15, CH 49.73; on 12.19, CR 49.246;
on Matt. 3.7, CR 45.117; on Eph. 2.3, CR 51.162; on Rom. 3.5, CR 49.50
2. Com. on Rom. 1.18, CR 2j-9.23; on I Thes. 2.16, CR 52.153; on 5.9, OR 52.170
3. Com. on John 16.11, OS 47.3&)f; on John 12.31, CR 47.213
4. Com. on Ps. 11.4, CR 31.123f
5. Ser. on Eph. 2.9-12, CR 51.1+66
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has not given up his paternal solicitude for them - yet he must abhor those
who practice wickedness. 'God hates none without cause, nay, so far as men
are the workmanship of God he embraces them with his fatherly love. But as
nothing is more opposed to his nature than sin, he proclaims irreconcilable
war with the wicked.' ~ As this war nears conclusion, God restores order in
the judgment of wickedness. ' When he stretches forth his hand to execute
the office of a judge, God restores all the troubles and confusions of the
2
world.' 'God knows how to bring all things into order and into a state of
perfection, for it is said that at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, when
he shall appear to judge the world, there will be the restoration of all
3
things.' Calvin takes his widest notion of judgment in this first sense
from an exegesis of the Hebrew,VOW, mishpat. 'r This concept is not only
basic to Old Testament ideas of judgment, but it lies as well behind the New
E
/
Testament Greek, K^>i cr(J5 , so that its meaning is unintelligible otherwise.
The judgment of God means that he sets himself against the disorder intro¬
duced. by sin and restores it to 'rectitude.'
Oalvin also takes over' the Greek word for disorder and employs it fre¬
quently in expounding what we mean by judgment. 'Judgment therefore is con¬
trasted with what is confused and disordered, or to express it more concisely
the antithesis is Trjs Iocs (disorder), or we might call it rectitude,
(rectitudo) a sense which it often assumes in Scripture.'0 We hope for 'the
well regulated state of things which will be seen when God by his judgment
will restore to order those things which are now embroiled and confused.'"^
He will rectify 'the present £ I ©< V .' 'For if God is the just judge
of all the world, those things that are now confused must of necessity be
restored to order. 'God will one day ascend the judgment seat that he may
1. Com. on Ps. 92.9, CR 31.24. Com. on Matt. 12.18, CR 45.33If
2. Con. on Ps. 10.15, CR 31.118. Com. on Ps. 96.10, GR 32.41
3. Ser. on Job 21.22-34, CR 34.259. Com. on John 12.51, GR 47«293f
4. Com. on Is. 42.1, GR 37.59f; on Ps. 17.15, CR 31. 3.67f; on 96.20, GR 32.41
5. Com. on Matt. 12.18, OR 45«331f; Com. on John, passim, GR 47
6. Com. on John 16.11, GR 47.360f. Com. on Matt. 6.10, CR 45.197f
7. Com. on Ps. 17.3.5, GR 31. Ib7. Com. on Ex. 23.4, GR 24.431
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remedy the state of matters in the world, so as to bring them into a
better condition.' 'It is God's work to judge the world, that is, to
rectify it by his righteousness, and to reduce to the best order whatever
there is in it out of order.'2
But another side of this restoration of order inseparable from the
judgment by which God defeats wickedness is man's re-creation. So integrally
are both related that Calvin calls this redemptive side also judgment.
Judgnent may refer particularly to God's vindication of his order as he ad¬
ministers justice and punishment to the wicked, but more broadly it includes
the vindication of his order as he restores us to the life from which we
fell. 'The word judgment cannot be understood simply to mean the punish¬
ment which is inflicted on unbelievers and on those who despise God, for it
is made to include the grace of illumination.'J 'There will be a blessed
restoration of the world' to 'the order which was at the beginning, before
man's apostasy produced the unhappy and melancholy change under which we
J ' L
grorn,' before 'the 5 i o<S -which has sprung from the sin of man.'
'The word judge denotes government, a very important part of which is that
Christ imparts to us the gifts which he received from the gather, that he
may live in us, and that we may live in him.'-
We here recall what the order on earth ought to be, the divine order
established by God in creation. Hot ' calling upon our God' or ' acknowledging
6
that he is the fountain of all blessing' 'is to pervert all order.' If
men do not 'recognise 'God as their father,' 'the whole order of nature is
inverted. * ^ Life in the legitimate order was to be for man a dynamic
existence grounded in God's continual outpouring of his own graciousness; and
man in integrity and rectitude with a complementary response was to 'admire
Z Corn. Zn II Thes. 1.5, CR 52.189. Com. on Ps. 75.2, CR 31.702
2. Com. on Rom. 3*6, CR 49*50. Gom. on Ps. 75* 6, CR 31* 703f
3* Com. on John 9*39, CR 47*233
4* Com. on Is. 11.6, CR 36.241
5* Com. on Is. 11.4, CR %. 238. Of. Com. onMicah4*3, CR 43.3440?
6. Ser. on Job 22.23-30, CR 34*323f
7. Com. on Ps. 115,17, ^ 32.192. Com. on Ps. 304*31, CR 32.96
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God and to honor him with proper gratitude.' But in ingratitude -
unfaithful, disobedient, incredulous of the order set by God, and self-
willed in his revolt from it - man inverted the order and departed from it
into deformity and chaos. 'This truly is : not considering
for what purpose we were made and regulating our life with a view to that
end, for in this is life precisely ordered, when we live according to the
prescription of God. Apart from this order there is nothing but confusion
2
in human life.'
If then the restoration of order requires judgment toward the wicked,
it also requires the re-creation of the wicked. And this is what God has
done. There is a 'renewal'which was made when God restored those things
which had fallen and were dissipated by the sin of Adam.' 'The office of
Christ was to gather all those things which were previously scattered. For
Adam by his fall had perverted and corrupted all order so that there was
nothing but confusion in heaven and earth until everything was repaired by
Jesus Christ. How then the restoration that has been made by our Lord
Jesus Christ may well be referred to as a second crea-tion, as though God
in his coming had set the world which had been crazed into its former
state.'^ 'God cannot acknowledge us for his children until his image is
repaired in us. This is what is done by this new creation. For as Adam
ruined us all and plunged us into the abyss of death, so we are created
anew by God in the person of our Lord Jesus Christ.'^" 'Such an
(gathering together) as might bring us back to regular order has been made
in Christ.'5
A problem here rises for Calvin. 7/i 11 this order where all recognize
God as their father and acknowledge him as the fountain of all blessing
ever be fully restored? Ho, for some are not saved and remain disobedient.
1. Instruction in Faith, 1538, sec. 3
2. Com. on II Thes. 3.6, CR 52.211. Com. on I John 2.16, CR 55.319
3. Ser. Oil Eph. 3.9-12, OR 51.466** Ser. on Eph. 1.7-10, CR 51.294f
4. Ser. on Eph. 4.23-26, CR 51. 621* on Eph 2.8-10, CR 51.380ff
5. Com. on Eph. 1.10, CR 51.151
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Do we then say that God will not or is unable to complete his restoration
of order? Or must we say that God has never really intended to restore the
order where all live in his grace, and that he does not desire that all
become obedient to him? Calvin's solution here is born out of his twofold
distinction between the will of God and his secret counsel. As we must
speak of ' the will of God in two sorts,' the will revealed in his Tiford where
he wills the salvation of all, and the incomprehensible will hidden in him¬
self where he chooses some and rejects others, so 'the Scripture speaks of
God's kingdom in two respects.' (bifariam) There is one way, following
from the will of God revealed in his Word, in which restoration requires
the willing obedience of all. This in point of fact happens only in the
church. 'The peculiar government of God is that of his church only, where
he by his Word and Spirit bends the hearts of men to obedience so that they
follow him voluntarily and willingly.' As we pray and labor for the salvation
2
of all, so we pray for the coming of God's kingdom and order in this way.
But there is another way, following from the secret counsel of God,
in which a restoration of order need not involve the willing obedience of
all, for it is not the counsel of God that things be this way. Indeed it
is scarcely possible to speak of any restoration here, for there has never
been any confusion. 'God has indeed ever governed the world by his secret
providence, as he still does govern it.' There is to be, however, a final
outworking of what God has in himself decreed, and this involves the des¬
truction of the wicked. As we hold that the apparent double will in God
reflects in an incomprehensible way a single will at the heart of God, so
the kingdom of God ordered as we see it in two respects reflects a single
order in God. But the limitations of our human capability will permit us
3to resolve the problem no further.
1. Ser. on I Tim. 2.3-5, CR 53«154ff, etc.
2. Com. on Micah 4.3, CR 43• 344f
3. ibid.
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2. Judgment as condemnation (damnatio)
From this point we may understand judgment as condemnation. If
judgment in its widest sense is God's reaffirmation of proper order on earth,
if God declares that he will have all men gathered, together and united to
him, this can only be an unqualified no toward the life which man has chosen,
and as such condemnation. Here in this more restricted sense Calvin equates
judgment with condemnation, (damnatio)''' There is a real sense in which con¬
demnation as the reciprocal event of redemption is a necessary part of
judgment. But there is no tension here between God's judgment and his
mercy because this judgment which condemns man springs from God's act of
grace in restoring order. That God should condemn is proper for salvation,
but, as we see now and will see more thoroughly in the discussion of
vengeance, that God should have to execute and implement this judgment, at
least in any final or irrevocable way, is neither his intention nor his will.
The judgment of God, Calvin often reminds us, is not to be severed from
his love. The fact that we are not what God wants us to be necessitates his
displeasure in what we are, that is, he can only be angry with those he
loves. 'God does not indeed hate in us his own workmanship, that is, that
he has made us men, but he hates our uncleanness, which has extinguished
2
the light of his image.' He has to condemn us because we are different
from what he made us. 'How then should he not love mankind - those whom
he has formed in his image and who approach nearest of all creatures to him
and to his nature? Then inasmuch as God has created us, he receives us and
avows us for his own. But insomuch as we are become corrupted and our nature
is sinful, this is the cause of the hate of God, and the reason why we are
enemies with him so that there is between him and us as it were a mortal
combat.' But 'even when he hated us, he loved us. He hated us, as being
different from what he had made us, but as our iniquity had not entirely
1. Com. on John 3.17, CR 47.66; on 12.31, CR 47.293; on 12.47, CR 47.303
2. Com. on Rom. 3.25, CR 49.62
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destroyed his work in us, he could at the same time hate what we had done,
and love that which he had made.' He loves us as his creatures whom he has
made for grace, and because he loves us he is angry in judgment at our
disorder.
Passing a judgment of condemnation in this positive sense is only the
obverse of salvation. If God comes as Savior, this is judgment on the human
situation. The offer of grace, as we have seen in the chapter on the
source of our knowledge of sin, carries with it the condemnation of all
men. 'It is said (in John 16.8) that the .Spirit shall judge the world. In
that place our Lord is discoursing upon the gospel, to show to what end it
is to be reached. I will, he says, send forth my doctrine. And to what
end? To judge the world. But the gospel is a message of grace and of
fatherly loving kindness. God in it gives us his heart, and declares to us
that he asks nothing but to bring us to salvation. "Thy then does he speak
of condemnation? Because it is impossible for him to bring us to salvation
2
unless we are first condemned.' In this way salvation on its shadow side
is judgpient. To preach the gospel is to pass judgment on the world. 'Christ
says that the world hates him because he testifies of it that its works are
evil. He means that it is not possible for the gospel rightly to be preached
but that the whole world is summoned to the judgment seat of God, that
flesh and blood may be so crushed and reduced to nothing.' 'If we agree with
the judgnent of Christ it will be necessary to acknowledge that the whole
nature of man is sinful and wicked so that nothing right, or sincere, or
good can come from it.'
Equally as significant as the fact that God wills the salvation of-all
is the fact that this salvation is no compromise affair, but an unqualified
return to the rectitude for which men were created. 'The way must be
1. Ser. on Gal. 1.5-5, CR 50.290ff. Ser. on Eph. 1.7-10, OR 51.283; on
2.5-6, OR 51.364; Com. on Ps. 92.9, OR 31.14; Ser. on Job 10.7-15, CK 33.480ff
2. Ser. on Deut. 31.22-30, CP 28.651
3. Com. on John 7.7, OR 47.1&&
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noticed in which God wishes all men to be saved, namely when they turn them¬
selves from their ways. God thus does not so wish all men to be saved as to
renounce the difference between good and evil; but repentance, as we have
said, must precede pardon. Hoy/ then does God wish all men to be saved? By
1
the Spirit's condemning the world of sin, of righteousness, and of .judgment. '
God's judgment means that his salvation is one where the difference between
good and evil, between grace and sin, has in no way been renounced.
But if condemnation is necessary, it is necessary precisely because God
does not wish that man abide in his condemnation. God condemns the "world to
save it. 'What the Scripture contains on repentance and the judgment of God
ought wholly to be applied for this purpose: to induce us to return into
p
favor with him.' 'God executes the office of a judge toward us, and although
he condemns us as often as he punishes us, yet this is not a condemnation to
the death, but he summons us before him to draw up a new process. This is a
point which v/e ought to note well. ".Then we feel any evil or grief, let us
understand that v/e have offended God., but let us think at the same time that
God still does not wish to execute a final sentence upon us, when he recalls
us to him. Then to what end is it? Is it to condemn us without mercy ? Ho,
but he gives us this grace that v/e might be our own judges. He summons us to
the end that each one should pass sentence on himself and of his own will,
and thereupon ask forgiveness of God, that we should have refuge in his mercy.''
'Whenever God condemns us by his Word, let us know that he will be propitious
to us, if touched with true repentance we flee to his raei'cy ; for to effect
this is the design of all his reproofs and threatenings.It may thus be
seen how Calvin has brought the judgment of God under the love of God, for
God judges as he presses toward the restoration of order and as he provides for
the re-creation of man.
1. Com. on Bzek. 18.23, CR 40.445f
2. Com. on Jonah 3« 10, GR 43.259
3. Ser. on Deut. 28.15-24, OR 28.591
4. Com. on Zeph. 2. If, CR 44.29
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3. Judgjnent and the righteousness (or justice) (iustitia) of God
It is important for us now to see how the righteousness of God is
made part of this grace of God in the light of which we interpret sin.
Working frora his governing viewpoint of God's restoration of his primal
order of grace, Calvin does not have the problems of a conflict between
righteousness and grace in which later thedogians found themselves precisely
because God is righteous as he makes right - or rectifies, to use Calvin's
word - his original order, that is, he is righteous as he destroys sin and
as he imparts his grace. The righteousness of God has then two sides, as
his restoration of order has two sides, God's resistance of those who
reject his grace and his restoration of those who have fallen from grace.
'Cod then declares his righteousness in that he has reserved a judgnent in
which all things will be brought again to order and proper condition.' Man's
punishment is the outworking of the justice of God. Calvin's Latin and
French both contain but one word, iustitia or justice, where the English
alternates between righteousness and justice. But if the order in the
beginning was one where 'God was gracious to man., then God is also and none¬
theless righteous as he imparts his grace.
The righteousness of God does demand a return to order, and from this
condemnation on man and sin; but it does demand a return to an order of
grace, and from this it is by his righteousness that God redeems and is
gracious. 'The righteousness of God does not mean that by which he renders
to every man his own, but the faithfulness which he observes toward his own
people, when he cherishes, defends, and delivers them. From this there is
an inestimable consolation which arises from learning that our salvation is
so inseparably linked with the righteousness of God as to have the same
stability which this does.' 'The Psalmist (in Ps. 7l) connects this sal¬
vation with righteousness as the effect to the cause; for his confident
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persuasion of obtaining salvation proceeds solely from reflecting that 'Sod
is righteous (or just) and that he cannot deny himself.'^
Calvin is then able on the one side, as theology before him and since
him, to formulate a concept of God as punishing sin because hs is righteous.
He takes this vital concept and employs it to the fullest. If he had been
asked to give a brief answer to the question, Why must sin be punished? the
answer certainly would have been, Because God is the fountain of all right¬
eousness. 'God is in himself the fountain of all righteousness and he must
necessarily hate all iniquity, unless we could suppose that he should deny
himself.' 'God must hate us. We know that he is the fountain of all right¬
eousness and that there is no agreement between him and iniquity.'-"' 'We hold
it as a settled principle that the nature of God is righteous and that it is
no more possible for him to turn aside from right and equity than it is for
4
him to say that he will renounce his being and no longer be God.' 'It is God's
work to judge the world, that is, to rectify it by his own righteousness.'
'Since then he is by nature judge, it must be that he is just, for he cannot
5
deny himself.'"
But it is also God's righteousness by which he saves and redeems us, by
which he re-creates us to life in grace. If Reformed theology followed
Calvin to think of God as in his righteousness punishing sin, it has strangely
lost Calvin's balancing concept, which follows from the other side of God's
rectifying his order: that God is righteous as he restores man to grace.
'It is because the righteousness of the lord approaches to us that we on our
part ought to draw near to him. The lord calls himself righteous and declares
that this is his righteousness, not because he keeps it shut up in himself,
but because he pours it out on men.' 'By God's righteousness is to be understood
...his grace toward the faithful.' 'He designs to give an evidence of his
1. Com. on Ps. 71.15, CR 31.658. Com. on Ps. 91.7, CR 32.4
2. Com. on Ps. 97. ID, OR 32.46. Com. on Ps. 1.5, CR 31.41
3. Ser. on Job 33.18-25, OR 35.89. Can. on Jer. 9.23, CR 3S.52f
4. Ser. on Job 8.1-6, CR 33.372. III. 12.If, CR 2.553f
5. Com. on Rom. 3.6, CR 49.50
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righteousness in delivering us.' 'God has promised that our salvation will
be the object of his care: from this he appears righteous whenever he delivers
us from our troubles.' 'In a word, the righteousness and faithfulness of God
mean the same tiling.' ^
We here recall that God in his righteousness and judgment restores the
order which was in the beginning. This was an order of pure grace. This means
here that God is noW once again no less righteous than before if his grace and
righteousness superabound to pour forth righteousness and rectitude upon men
so to restoi-e him to the original life in grace. It is true that man has sin¬
ned and rejected God's grace. He in no way deserves God's righteousness,
but neither would Adam in his integrity have deserved it. (We see this more
thoroughly in the chapter'on responsibility and the life in grace.) It is true
that God's righteousness must press forward upon iniquity and annihilate it.
God must and does punish man precisely because he is the fountain of all justice.
But all this does not remove the fact that God is righteous as he defends the
order he set, constantly protecting those creatures whom he created to lean upon
him and trust in him for all good things, those with whom he covenants in
Abraham and to whom he extends his blessings in Christ.
Calvin is very clear about this, particularly in the Old Testament
commentaries where the context gives him ample place to develop his thought.
It is a constantly recurring theme in the commentaries on the Psalms and
prophets. 'By the righteousness of God, which he (the Psalmist) engages
to celebrate, we are to understand his goodness, fox" this ascription as
usually applied to God in the Scriptures does not so much denote the strict¬
ness with which he exacts vengeance as his faithfulness in fulfilling the
promises and extending help to all who seek him in the hour of need.' 'He
is then called righteous...because he deals faithfully with his saints in
1. Gom. on Micah 7*9, OR 43*415f* Com. on Ps. 5*8f, GR 31*69; on Ps. 7*17,
GR 31*87; on Ps. 143*2, GR 32.400; Com. on Micah 6.5, GR 43*390
2. Gom. on Ps. 51*14, GR 31.521
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spreading the hand of his protection over them.'~ God is •gracious because
he is so ready to render assistance. Prom this source springs that right-
2
eousness which he displays for the protection of his people.' 'From the
communication of this righteousness we obtain salvation and life, and there¬
fore wherever the righteousness of God is, it must be followed by praises
and thanksgiving.1
It is then quite as proper to say that it is the righteousness of 'God
which saves us, as it is to say that we are saved by grace. 'The right¬
eousness of God, which is the source of salvation, does not consist in his
recompensing men according to their works, but is the illustration of his
mercy, grace, and faithfulness.' Salvation is...properly speaking the effect
of righteousness.''"1" 'There is as it were an inseparable knot between God's
5
righteousness and our salvation.' Calvin has perhaps seen this more
clearly in his exegesis - and this may explain why it has been overlooked
by later scholars - but the concept is present in the Institutes. We re¬
joice when we think of his righteousness. We preserve 'serene tranquility
with regard to the divine judgment. We see how frequently and solicitously
the Scripture exhorts us to render ascriptions of praise to God alone when
it treats of righteousness. And indeed the Apostle (Paul) assures us
that the design of the Lord in conferring righteousness upon us .in Christ
is to manifest his own righteousness. The nature of that manifestation
he immediately subjoins: it is that he might be righteous (or just) and the
justifier of him who believes in Jesus. (Rom. 3*26) The righteousness of
God, we see, is not sufficiently illustrious unless he alone is esteemed
righteous and communicates the gra.ce of righteousness to the unworthy.'
'He has bestowed his grace on us in order to declare his righteousness.'
1. Com. on Ps. 3D3.17, OR 32.82. Com. on Is. 51.5, OR 37.229
2. Com. on Ps. 116.5, CR 32.193f
3. Com. on Is. 24.16, CR 36.406
4. Com. on Ps. 98.1, CR 32.48
5. Ser. on Job 23.13-17, OR 34.362
6. III. 13. If. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.) ch. 71, pag. 195, CR 1.752
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This means that we are not to place the mercy of God over against
his righteousness of judgment so that God does by his mercy what he could
not by justice. There is a sense in which this is true, thinking of
but the punitive side of righteousness. 'His goodness surmounts the rigor
of his judgment, which is due us for our sins.'"'" 'He could destroy all
p
the human race by his rignteousness, but he has had pity on us.' 'The
judgment of condemnation is suspended over the whole world and nothing but
mercy can bring relief. ' 'Mercy itself in a manner triumphs, and alone
reigns when the severity of judgment gives way. ' 'The wrath of God in a
manner yields to his mercy so that being relieved by the latter, they
(the faithful) are not overwhelmed by the former.'^
But as it is by his righteousness that he restores order and redeems
us so more broadly there is perfect harmony between his mercy and his right¬
eousness. 'The righteousness of God is not to be taken according to what
is commonly understood by it, and they speak incorrectly who represent God's
righteousness as in opposition to his mercy. From this comes the common
proverb, I appeal from justice (righteousness) to mercy, But the Scripture
speaks otherwise, for righteousness is to be taken for that faithful pro¬
tection of God by which he defends and preserves his own people.' 'V/hen
God declares that he does righteousness, he supplies us with a reason for
confidence, for he thus promises to be the guardian of our salvation.
Because, as I have said, his righteousness is not to render to everyone
his just reward, but is to be extended further, and is to be taken for
his faithfulness. As then God never forsakes his own people, but aids
them in due time and restrains the wicked, he is on this account called
righteous.' r So Calvin denies that 'it is opposed to God's justice to
pardon sinners when they repent.'^
1. Ser. on Job 10.18-22, CR 33.514
2. Ser. on Deut. 4.36-38, CR 26.215
3. Com. on James 2.13, CR 55«402f
4. Com. 'on Jer. 9.23, CR 38.52f
5. Com. on Deut. 32.35, CR 25.373
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4. Suspended judgment (indicium suspension)
To insure that time be given for redemptive restoration, to make
it possible for judgment to be properly redemptive, God suspends his
judgment.' God ' is long patient and does not quickly take vengeance. Though
men are worthy to perish yet the Lord suspends his judgments.' (iudicia
suspendo)" The lord tolerates (tolero) and strives with (discepto cum,
2 7
certo cum) man. This is the patience of God. Here is perhaps the place
in which God's judgment and mercy are set against one another. Judgment is
passed but not yet executed, and the reason for the delay is that God
desires to give man 'time to repent' or 'space for repentance.'^* If God
were to let fall his hand in judgment, as the order to which he has bound
himself and to which he now moves in restoration would seem to necessitate
that he do, if God were to withdraw the existence that he gave on condition
of man's fidelity, then man would be immediately and completely annihilated
because man has been unfaithful and ungrateful. But God does not for a time
fully resist or prosecute, with the result that God continues to sustain in
existence a being whom he has declared is not by all proper standards of judg¬
ment fit to remain in existence. God may punish, but only partly and in token
5
of what is to come. There takes place 'the temporary suspension of vengeance.'
Dealing with sinners God 'mitigates their punishment.' 'For if he were
to deal strictly with their folly, they would fall down in complete con¬
fusion. He therefore gives space for repentance..♦that they may willingly
acknowledge their faults. ' For instance, before the flood for many years
God 'suspended the punishment' in hope of repentance, but finally the world.'s
iniquity reached a point where God was 'wearied out' - the point where the
1. Gam. on Amos 1.3f, CR 43*8. Gam. on Amos 7. If, CR 43* U8f
2. Com. on Hos. 12.10, GR 42.468; on II Pet. 2.9, CR 55.464; on C^n. 6.3, GR 23. llj
3. Com. on Ezek. 12.21, CR 40.268
4. Com. on II Pet. 3-9, GR 55.475; Ser, on Deut. 4.27-31, GR 26.189
5. Com. on Hos. 11.8f, CR 42.446
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world was beyond all hope of cure. 'As long as the lord suspends punish¬
ment, he in a certain sense strives with men, especially if either by threats
or by examples of gentle chastisement, he invites them to repentance.' 'But
now as if wearied out, he declares that he has no mind to contend any longer.
For after God by inviting the unbelievers to repentance had long striven
with them, the deluge put an end to all controversy.'~ In the case of
2
Sodom and Gomorrah God had for a long time suspended punishment. This
idea is again contained in Calvin's comment on the Uoachian covenant.
God says, 'I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake, for
the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth.' Calvin explains
that God seems to contradict (pugno) himself by declaring that the world
ought to be destroyed and yet willing that there should be some society of
men to inhabit the earth. He so moderates his judgment to hold nature in
its course and so give space for repentance. - '
God has committed himself as it were to a twofold policy. He gives
his word of judgment, yet at the same time he gives his promise of maintain¬
ing the external world, including man and his society, and in this to a
certain extent seems to contradict himself. In maintaining his initial purpose
of a gracious order of creation God is able to strive with man, to permeate
the barrier of sin in a dual relation whereby is doubly reflected his initial
purpose: on the one hand in a vrord of judgment, foreshadowed by partial
punishment in that man no longer lives in a paradise, and on the other in a
vrord of hope, for the fact that punishment is not yet total indicates that
his grace intends to re-establish man within the original order. With a
view toward drawing the sinner to return, God suspends his judgment to
give space for repentance by maintaining man in his existence, by breaking
through with natural blessings in part, by leaving a print of order even
within the wreckage of sin.
1. Com. on Gen. 6.3, CR 23.113
2. Com. on Gen. 13.21, CR 23.260; Com. on Gen. 13.13, CR 23.192fCom. on Gen. 8.21, CR 23. Hf!
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B. The vengeance (vindicta) of C-od
Calvin can now interpret 'Cod's vengeance as the negative and. accidental
side of God's re-ordering the world, although we shall have to notice that
again predestination biases his thought. Apart from revenge or reparation,
God executes judgment to vindicate his order. He presses upon the wicked;
the sinner is given spa.ce to repent, but if he does not he will be slain in
the very movement of God which repudiates chaos and deformity. Vengeance
will be worked. Keeping in mind God's larger purpose, however, we see that
while the sinner will from his side and in fact be judged retributively,
yet the action of God which judges him is redemptive. Thus judgment may in
point of fact and issue be retributive, but from the side of God it rises
out of 'God's maintaining all rectitude.
1. Vengeance as adverse to the will of God
It is useful in interpreting Calvin to follow his use of the same
series of concepts which he uses with regard to sin and the providence of
God. As it is God's will that all be saved, so we assert that it is not
God's will to execute vengeance. Jeremiah, speaking of 'God's own nature,'
says, 'that he does not cherish vengeance. ' (vindicta) 'nothing is more con¬
trary to the nature of Cod.' x 'God appears as unwilling to proceed to extreme
rigor in punishing his people. AlasJ I will now avenge myself on my enemies,
he says by Isaiah.* 'AlasI I must take vengeance on my adversaries. I would,
however, willingly spare them were it possible. God is not indeed subject
to grief or repentance, but his ineffable goodness cannot be otherwise ex¬
pressed to us but by such mode of speaking.' 'It is like the conduct of an
offended father who intends to punish his son, and yet desires to moderate
his displeasure and to blend some indulgence with rigor.' 'We know that
nothing is more pleasing to God than to treat us kindly, but being perverse
we do not permit him to folio?/ the inclination of his nature. He is there-
1. Com. on Jer. 3.5, OR 37«550f
2. Com. on Jer. 6.8, CR 37* 64-8f
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fore constrained to put on as it were a new character.'
'He takes no pleasure in tormenting his -poor creatures. We know it is
his nature to make us feel his goodness. He sees, however, that we are not
able to receive it, and so there is good reason that he change and in a manner
of speaking transform himself, in order to conform himself to that which he
2
sees suitable for us.' 'So you see that the true nature of God is such that
he seeks nothing but to draw men to him by all manner of gentleness and to use
his goodness toward then. When he punishes them, it is as you would say,
against his nature. I-Tot that it is not proper for God to punish as well as
to show mercy, but that he wishes to show us that his goodness is far the
greater, and, to be short, that he is not rigorous, but that his only desire
is to spread out his love to us if we would permit him.'2 When Calvin is
free from the bias imposed by systematic treatment, as he is throughout the
sermons and commentaries, he elaborates at length on God's extreme reluctance
to punish, literally filling pages on end with preaching and teaching such as
this. Only when the question of predestination arises does he modify this thought
Nor is this simply the case with God's covenant people. 'God strives
with men at the time of the flood; he expostulates with the Amorites for
4
four hundred years; and in the history of Sodom and Gomorrah, a 'chief and
5
lively image of vengeance' as significant here as the Exodus is for his love,
God executes punishment only after exhausting all efforts to bring man to
repentance. 'God waits patiently as he has done at all times, and does not
wish to execute his rigor until he has shown that the wicked are completely
incorrigible.'u That God does not wish to proceed to vengeance is clear in
Calvin's comment on Lamentations 3*33: 'He does not willingly afflict or
grieve the sons of men.' Calvin admits 'that this doctrine may be taken
1. Com. on Hos. 6.5, OR 42.327- Ser. on Deut. 32.20-22, CR 29.15f
2. Ser. on Job 33.18-25, CR 35.83f. Ser. on Job 5.17-18, CR 33.257f
3. Ser. on Deut. 5.8-20, CR 26.268
4. Com. on Gen. 6.5, CR 23.112f; Ser. on Deut. 7.1-4, OH 26.498f
5. Corn, on II Pet. 2.6, CR 55.463; on Ps. 11.6, CR 31.124?; on Jude 7, OR
53.492; on Eaek. 16.50, CR 40.382f; on Gen. 18.21, CR 23.260f6. Ser. on Deut. 7.1-4, CR 26.493f
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generally. * 'He does not delight in the miseries of men, for if a father
desires to benefit his own children, and deals kindly with them, what ought
we to think of our heavenly Father?' ' 'As then parents are not willingly
angry with their children and do not handle them roughly, there is no doubt
but that God never punishes men except when he is constrained.' 'God derives
no pleasure from the miseries of men, as profane men say, who utter such
blasphemies as these: that we are like balls with which God plays, and that
we are exposed to many evils because God wishes to have as it were a pleasant
and delectable spectacle in looking on the innumerable afflictions, and at
length on the death of men.
'That such thoughts might not tempt us to unbelief, the prophet here
puts a check on us, and declares that God does not afflict from his heart,
that is, willingly, as though he delighted in the evils of men. It is like
this: A judge, when he ascends his throne and condemns the guilty to death,
does not do this from his hear*^ because he wishes all to be innocent and thus
to have a reason for acquitting them. Yet he willingly condemns the guilty,
because this is his duty. So also when God adopts severity toward men, he
indeed does so willingly, hecause he is judge of the world, but he does not
do so from the heart, because he wishes all to be innocent. Far away from
him is all fierceness and cruelty, and as he regards men with paternal dove,
so also he would have them to be saved, if they did not as it were by force
drive him to rigor.' 'Because of this he employs a particle expressive of
grief (in Is. 1.24) and exclaims, Alas, as a father who wishes his son to be
1
innocent and yet is compelled to be severe with him.'
In the vengeance of God we do not understand that God's inner character
is changed. He does not will the death of a sinner. He weeps over those who
2
are on the way to eternal punishment. This means that we must remove from
the vengeance of God any notion of vindictive anger. There is no wrath in God;
1. Com. on Lam. 3*33, CR 39»584f
2. Com. on Ezek. 18.23, CR 40.445f; Cora, on Matt. 23.27, CR43.69I?
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rather the emotional aspect arises as we find that we cannot go our own way
in sin with no resistance from him, that sin is not allowed to go unpunished.
'The word wrath (ira) in the custom of Scripture, speaking ^vQ^>utjo-ttoiQuS
(anthropopathically) is put for the vengeance of God, because God in punishing
has according to our opinion the appearance of one in wrath. It signifies
therefore no such emotion on God, but has a reference to the perception and
feeling of the sinner who is punished.'^
We have based -what we have said so far on God's will as it is revealed
to us in his Word. From this it is Calvin's basic position that it is God's
2
nature to love, that 'he tabes no pleasure in tormenting his poor creatures,'
'that he does not cherish vengeance,' and that 'nothing is more contrary to the
nature of God.'^ But Calvin thinks as well of a secret counsel of God which
may seem in contradiction with his will revealed in his Word. We must here
recognise that the strength of Calvin's concept of predestination, which from
the beginning, radically and on an eternal and irrevocable basis, divides all
men into two .groups, elect and reprobate, has colored the concexxt of judgment
with the result that on some occasions Calvin has difficulty in thinking of
judgment ac primarily a positive call to rcpentanoe, and as condemnation cxeoutod
on the sinner only against the will of God. Here under the pressure of a
rather rigid and static division of men into God's chosen children and strangers,
Calvin also hardens his concept of God's preliminary tokens of vengeance,
or of his suspension of punishment, and is not able to say that God
would rather the strangers also repent. He but 'executes the judgment which
has been already as it wex-e decreed.And if he for a time suspends judgnent,
it is only that he might double his wrath as man's sins mount higher.
Thinking with this rigidity, Calvin writes that by God's chastisements,
'the children of this world while they sleep on quietly and securely in their
1. Com. on Horn. 1.18, CR 49• 23. on Hab. 3» 2, CR 43• 3°7f; on Is. 47*6, Gil l65f
2. Ser. on Job 33*18-25, CR 35»83f, supra
3. Cam. on Jer. 3.5, CR 37.550f, supra
4. Com. on Hos. 11.8f, CR 42.442
-165-
delights are fattened up like hogs for the day of slaughter.' 'This privilege
that by punishments they are called back from destruction belongs to believers
1
exclusively.' 'When the reprobate are lashed by the scourges of God in this
world, they begin already to suffer in some measure his judgment, and though
they will not escape with impunity for having disregarded such indications of
the divine wrath, yet they are not uunished that they may be brought back to
a better disposition, but only that by their great misery God may be experienced
a judge and avenger. On the other hand sons are harassed with pricks not that
they may pay God the penalty of their crimes, but that they may advance to
2
recovery of their senses.' 'We must observe the difference that exists be¬
tween the children of God and the reprobate, for the Lord chastises both,
but in different ways - the children of God that they may be purified and
7
preserved, and the reprobate that they may be cast down headlong and destroyed.'"'
' '.Then he takes vengeance on the reprobate, he gives loose reins to his anger,
because he has no other object in view than to destroy them, for they are
vessels of wrath appointed to destruction.''1' Rigidly and irrevocably we
observe this distinction: The reprobate are punished 'for vengeance,' (ad
vindictam) but the elect are punished 'for correction. ' (ad emendationem)^
Here Calvin's thought is so rigid as to suggest that God is not interested in
calling back to repentance all those upon whom he passes judgment and fore¬
shadows fulfilment of this with punishments on earth.
These statements, however, should be taken in the larger context of his
thought, and Calvin is not unaware that even here the distinction is summary
and needs closer statement. He is conscious of both the more flexible and
the more rigid points of view as he discusses the matter in the light of
Job 5.17: 'Happy is the man whom God reproves.' This is true because when
God punishes his children he summons them to repentance. 'He wishes to
1. Com. on I Cor. 11.3^, CR 45.495. on Hos. 11.8f, CR 42.4*5f
2. 11.4.33, CR 2.484?. Com. on Zech. 13.9, CR 2.4-357; on Mai. 12ff, CR 44.399f
3. Com. on Is. 30.28, CR 36.528, Com. on Jer. 10.24, OR 38.92
4. Com. on Is. 27.7, CR 36.453
5. III.4.33, CR 2,485, Ser. on Job 36.15-19, CR 35.280
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bring us back as often as he afflicts us.' But is this generally true,
for the reprobate are scourged as well? 'There yet remains one difficulty,
for we see at the same time that afflictions are common to all. God chastises
those to whom he wishes to show mercy, but we see also that he chastises the
reprobate, and yet this turns to their greater condemnation.' Are we to say
that the chastisement of the reprobate who is later fully to be afflicted with
vengeance is in no way a call to repentance? Calvin is aware that this is not
quite right.
Certainly these chastisements did not profit the reprobate but turned
to their condemnation. But the fact that a turning is involved does reean-
if we do not for the moment raise the question of God's touching some with
his Spirit and giving them the grace to return - that there is a way in which
we can say that these chastisements were an invitation to repentance. 'Let
us note how God works toward the reprobate. It is true that he exhorts all
men to repentance when he chastises them.' 'It is just as if he should wake
them up and say, Know your faults, and continue no longer in them. Return
to me, and I am ready to show you mercy.'"" So Calvin has to confess, even
iii a context where the distinction between elect and reprobate has been
rigidly drawn, that it still ought to be said that God calls even the rep¬
robate to repentance with his scourges. 'God indeed invites us and even
urges us by external means to repent, for what is the design of punishment
but to lead us to repentance ?' 'yet God indeed calls all men by punish¬
ment to repentance, so that even the reprobate are rendered inexcusable when
they harden their hearts, and profit not under the rod. But punishment is
peculiarly useful to the faithful, for God not only scourges them but also
2
by his Spirit bends their minds to docility.' As the Word is always a
blessing, so judgment is always a blessing, but it can turn to condemnation.
1. Ser. on Job 5.17-18, CR 33.255ff
2. Com. on Jer. 31.18, CR 38.670
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2. Vengeance as accidental to God's purpose
We have seen how Calvin thinks of Goo's lord, of salvation as turning
through man's resistance and by accident to condemnation. Here in the
matter of God's vengeance, Calvin returns to this concept. God's judgment
only through accident is condemnation. There is a way in which this is
not true, thinking broadly of judgment as part of God's restoration of
order. But thinking specifically of judgment as damnation, then vengeance
is accidental to God. If Christ was set for the ruin of many in Israel,
this is not a proper end of his work, rather it happens when unbelievers
turn the judgnent of God, set to turn them to their salvation, set for the
resurrection of many in Israel, into their own ruin. 'Let it also be
taken into account that the former is accidental, while the latter is
properly his office.'"'" To execute vengeance is accidental. Christ says,
'I did not come to judge the world, but to save the world.' 'The word
judge is to be taken for condemn, and this is obvious from its opposite,
save. The latter ought to be understood as a reference to the proper a.nd
genuine office of Christ. For that unbelievers should be more severely
2
condemned by reason of the gospel is accidental and not of its nature.'
'It was not in vain that God sent his own Son to us. He came not to
destroy and therefore it follows that it is the proper office of'the Son
of God that all who believe may obtain salvation by him.' '"Then he declares
that he did not come to condemn the world, he thus points out the proper
design of his coming.' 'God is unwilling that we should be overwhelmed with
everlasting destruction, because he has appointed his Son to be the sal¬
vation of the world. In other passages, when Christ says that he is come
to judgment, when he is called a stone of offense, when he is said to be
set for the destruction of many, this is accidental or adventitious. so
to speak, for they who reject the grace offered in him deserve to find him
1. Com. on Luke 2.34, OR 45«92f. Com. on Acts 3.20, CR 48.71
2. Com. on John 12.47, OR 47.303. Com. on Matt. 16.19, CR 45.475
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the judge ana avenger of contempt so unworthy and base.' 'Since the
gospel invites all to partake of salvation without any difference, it is
rightly called the doctrine of salvation, for Christ is there offered, whose
peculiar office is to save those who are lost, but those who refuse to be
2
saved by him shall find him a judge.' 'We will not be overwhelmed if we
)
take him for our father. But if we will not be children to him and if we
remain incorrigible, he will lay aside the person of a father and show him¬
self to be our judge.'Although therefore God's Word by itself is
naturally greatly to be desii'ed, yet when God answers as a judge and takes
away all hope of pardon and pity then no taste of his favor can be per¬
ceived.' But if it so 'only ends in destruction, this is accidental.''r
In a very real way the whole concept of the judging work of Christ,
together with the last judgment of God in Christ, must be held as accidental
and not properly within the divine purpose. A passage in the Commentary
on Joel makes this clear. The wrath of God is brought with the coming of
Christ. In part this has already come, but finally It awaits the second
coming. 'The judge will come at last from heaven, not only to clothe the
sun and moon in darkness but to turn life into death.' Men 'must all at
last stand before the tribunal of the celestial Judge; for the day of
Jehovah,, great and terrible, will come.' But we have ever to note that
God's proper work is salvation. In the coming of the kingdom of Christ
'an access' is opered to both Jew and Gentile, 'the doctrine of salvation
is common to all,' as we learn from the Pauline witness to Joel's testimony.
'Now if anyone asks, Why by the coming of Christ was God's wrath more
stirred up against men? - for this may seem to be without reason, to this
I answer that it was as it were accidental. For if Christ had been received
as he ought to have been, if all embraced him with due reverence, he would
certainly have been the giver not only of spiritual grace but also of
1. Com. on John 3.17, OR 47.66
2. Com. on Rom. 1.16, OR 49.20. Ser. on Deut. 11.26-32, OR 27. 3_39f
3. Ser. on Deut. 4.23-26, OR 26.184
4. Com. on Ezek. 14.4, CR 40.302
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earthly happiness. The felicity of all then would have in every respect
been made complete by the coming of Christ, had not their wickedness and
ingratitude kindled up anew the wrath of God; and we see what a flood
of evils burst forth immediately after the preaching of the gospel.' In the
last day, 'the world will be full of drakness after the appearance of Christ,
who is the sun of righteousness, and who has shone upon us with his sal¬
vation, but it will be as it were through accident (per accidens) that God
will exhibit himself with so much severity to the world when it is the ac¬
ceptable time, when it is the day of salvation and good will.' So 'these
two things are joined together; that 'God will be the judge of the world,
who will not spare the wickedness of men, but will execute dreadful ven¬
geance, and yet that salvation will be given to all who call on the name of
the Lord.'" God is 'by nature merciful and ready to forgive,' and 'if he is
2at any time rigorous and severe, this is as it were accidental to him.'
3. Vengeance as provoked by sin
Calvin says this again, in the language of constraint and provocation,
as he says that God is provoked to vengeance. He is constrained or compelled.
This is an emphasis in Calvin's thought parallel to that of sin as a hindrance
to the goodness of God, and developed particularly in the Old Testament
commentaries. Our sins not only shut off his grace, but they provoke him
to wrath. God puts off his fatherhood and assumes the character of a judge.
'Scripture represents God to us in various ways. Sometimes it exhibits him
as burning with indignation and having a terrible aspect, and sometimes as
showing nothing but gentleness and mercy. The reason for this diversity is
that we are not all capable of enjoying his goodness. Thus he is constrained
(cogo) to be perverse toward the perverse and holy toward the holy.' 'He
shows himself to us what we permit him to be, fox* by our rebelliousness we
drive him to severity. Men are obstinate and. their wickedness constrains
1. Com. on Joel, 2.30-32, passim, CR 42.572ff
2. Com. on Ps. 86.13, CR 31.797
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him in sane measure to change his disposition toward thera.'
Calvin has an interesting comment on Deut. 28.63: 'As the Lord took
delight in doing you good and multiplying you, so the Lord will take delight
in bringing ruin upon you and destroying you.' 'We see that God is as it
were vexed, we see that God not only deprives us of his blessing, but he is
also provoked with us, and we feel in brief, only rigor from him. But what
is the cause of this? It is that we shut the door to his goodness, and in
a manner of speaking will not permit him to use his natural disposition.'
•For it is certain that he mil take pleasure in doing us good, but also
we have to note on the other side that he must take pleasure in doing us
harm. '.Thy is this? Because he is just. It is true that if we permitted
God to use his own desires toward us, he would bestow infinite blessings
upon us, and we should be already in this world in a living paradise.' Yet
' also it is said that God will rejoice and be glad when he has punished the
wicked, when he has maintained his majesty against them.'
•But it is nonetheless true that he says by his prophet Isaiah that
he does it with regret. Alas, says he, must I revenge myself on my enemies?
God cries there with an alas, as if he were in sorrow and anguish for it.
It is necessary, says he, that I ease myself of my enemies.' 'He shows that
it is with regret that he must strike men down with many blows, and yet he
cannot do otherwise.' 'Tie are to note that he wishes to declare that it is
on account of our incorrigible malice that he must follow the way we have
2
spoken of here, that he should take pleasure in doing harm.* Passages
like these are found continually throughout many of Calvin's conentaries,
where Calvin is not influenced by the concept of predestination. The whole
concept of vengeance is cast in dynamic terms. 'God does not contend with
us as if he wishes to pursue our offenses to the utmost. For if vre sincerely
turn to him, he will immediately return to favor with us,' 'For since God
1. Com. on Is. 27.4, CK 36.50. Can. on Ps. 2.9, OR 31»48f
2. Ser. on Beut. 28.59-64, OR 28.468f. Com. on Jer. 23.34, OR 33.450f
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is by nature disposed to acts of kindness, nothing but our ingratitude and
enmity hinders us from receiving that goodness which he freely offers to all.
But on the other hand, he adds a sharp and heavy threatening that it is in
his power to take revenge, lest they should imagine that they who despise
God will escape without punishment.' ± 'And yet, in order to show that he
is unwillingly as it were constrained to inflict punishment on his people,
God utters his threatening with a kind of groan. For as nothing is more
agreeable to his nature than to do good, so whenever he is angry with us and
treats us harshly, it is certain that our wickedness has compelled him to do
so, because we do not allow his goodness to take its free course. More
especially he is disposed to treat his own people with gentleness, and when
he sees that there is no longer any room for his forbearance, he takes
2
measure xn sorrow for inflicting punishment.'
In Exodus .34.6 we meet with a remarkable description of God. He is
called mei€i€ul, ready to forgive, and longsuffering. 'He is said to be
abundant in mercy and truth, by which I understand that his beneficence
is continually exercised, and that he is always true. He is indeed no less
worthy to be praised on account of his rigor than on account of his mercy;
but as it is our- wilful obstinacy alone which makes him severe, compelling
him, as it were, to punish us, the Scriptures in representing him as by
nature merciful and ready to forgive teach us that if he is at any time
rigorous and severe this is as it were accidental to him. I am speaking,
it is true, roughly and with impropriety, but still these ascriptions by
which the nature of God is described amount to this: that God is by nature
so gracious and ready to forgive that he seems to connive at our sins, he
delays the infliction of punishment, and he never proceeds to execute
3
vengeance unless compelled by our obstinate wickedness.'
1. Gom. on Is. 1.19, CR 36.46f. Ser. on Deut. 4*27-31, CE 26.195f; Com.
on Jer. 23*36f, CR 38.452f; on Jer. 30.14, CR 38. o26f
2. Com. on Is. 1.24, CR 36.52
3. Com. on Ps. 86.15, OR 31.797
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Calvin must be credited with so conceiving of the justice and
judgment of God as to subordinate these under the love and grace of God.
God's wrath and vengeance on sin has to be interpreted within the framework
of his mercy. We have attempted to see this against the background of
God's restoration of order, for this is the governing motion and the larger
work of God from which springs his judgment. In this way Calvin is able
to make God's judgment an act of love, for here God vindicates his order
of grace. Calvin's insights into the Biblical concept of the righteous¬
ness of God should be peculiarly helpful to modern theology, because he
has seen that God by his righteousness makes right or rectifies his order.
Thus we must develop God's righteousness not only as punishing sin but as
restoring the order of grace, thus avoiding conflict between his righteous¬
ness and his grace.
It is then both tragic and ironic that Calvin is popularly conceived
as portraying a just and awful God whose wrath equals if not surpasses his
love, for Calvin's real position is just the opposite, nonetheless there
is in Calvin a weakness which accounts for this misconception, for although
Calvin was able to relate God's wrath to his love, he was not able to
combine his thought about reprobation with his notion of judgment. Pre¬
destination does at times overshadow and hard.en his thought about God's
condemnation and vengeance. We have had to recognize that Calvin's thought
about divine wrath can degenerate, and he does portray God as creating some
for damnation and as consequently visiting ruin upon them, apparently with
no serious interest in their salvation. But if this is Calvin's mistake,
he provides his own answers as we include Calvin's full teaching about
judgment where God patiently strives with man and judges him unwillingly
when all hope of repentance is vain. We must also take seriously Calvin's
statement that it is accidental to God to judge in vengeance. God takes
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vengeance only when constrained, and provoked to do so against his own nature
and desires. These themes occur constantly in his sermons and commentaries
and ought to he developed - as later Reformed theology has not always
done - to see Calvin's larger concept of vengeance.
Calvin's concepts of God's justice and judgment are to be contrasted
with the notions which characterized later Reformed theology, particularly
the theology of the covenants. Here justice and judgment were not effectively
brought under God's love but stood in antithesis to it. But Calvin is able
to incorporate his notion of God's wrath into that of God's love because he
conceives of but one order, an order of grace. Adam's righteousness and
rectitude consisted in continually acknowledging God's grace. By contrast
federal theology saw an order of justice or a covenant of works as the primal
order followed by an order of grace superadded later. It thought of an
order where Adam had to present to God some merit of his own and to live
by working his own intrinsic righteousness, standing up to the justice of
God. Adam failed to fulfil the conditions of life and deserved to be
punished by God's righteousness. 77ith the second covenant, theology con¬
ceived God's grace as intervening to give man what he by his own sin had
lost and in the light of God's justice did not deserve. There is created
a tension between God's righteousness and his grace. This tension could
only be resolved in the atonement.
Calvin does not have these problems because he does not think of
man's original relationship to God. in this way. It is tine that there is
always this popular way of opposing mercy to justice and Calvin does at
times incorporate it into his thought. But he is nonetheless aware that
there is fundamentally the most perfect harmony. Adam was not to live by
his own righteousness of works, but his life even in integrity was to be a
life where God's righteousness and rectitude were continually poured out
upon him. In a confident belief in God's goodness, in trust, in a glad
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and willing obedience, in love of God, and in gratitude he reflected God's
grace back to him; this, as we see later, was his responsibility. And Adam's
sin was that he did claim something for his o?m and strive to be righteous
apart from God.
It is certainly true that God in his righteousness could at this
point have removed man's existence, for man had broken God's order and was
unworthy of life. God would have been righteous had he done this, as indeed
he is righteous no?/ as he presses upon iniquity to destroy it. But it is
also true that God is equally righteous as his grace superabounds to
redeem man and replace him in grace. It is vital to see here that Calvin
has immediately and from the very start avoided any ultimate conflict
between God's righteousness and his mercy. Because God restores and
rectifies his order of .grace, he must be gracious to be righteous. His
righteousness, says Calvin, is the source of our salvation.
It is then important to see Calvin's concept of sin in the light of
such a concept of the wrath of God. As sin is man's disordering of the
divine order of grace, so 'God's judgment on it is the restoration of this
order. God says no_ to man's sin; this is his judgment. But he says no
in such a way as to say yes with x-egard to his primal order of grace.
He is angry with sin because it has broken his government of law and
justice - as later Reformed theology has portrayed it - but for Calvin-
there is even more. He is angry with sin because it has cut off his grace
to man. God's judgment is then the sure sign that he still cares for man
and has not forsaken him. The whole concept of divine wrath and judgment
as developed in contemporary theology must be enlarged to include these
more basic principles of Calvin's thought.
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71. Sin, Ethics, and the Law
If, as we have insisted throughout the thesis, Calvin's understanding
of sin and responsibility has to be understood in the light of divine grace,
then man's moral works in nature and under the law have to be interpreted
so as to be brought under this governing concept. Man's immorality is
part of his dis-ordering the divine order of grace. We must here see how
this virtue found among the Jews and Gentiles is set aside by the light of
Christ as being wholly sinful. While in Calvin's thought we must make full
room for moral works, yet there is never any question of these being
righteous, simply and basically because in nature and under law these are
never done by wa.y of gratitude and in acknowledgment for grace. The qual¬
itative distinction is clear cut. And the characteristic teaching of later
Reformed theology followed Calvin to think of these virtues in ethics and
under law as wholly sinful.
Yet the ultimate reason whyy'las been obscured because the federal
theology did not begin with an order of grace, as did Calvin. Conceiving
of man's duty from the start in the moral terms of a covenant of works,
such moral and virtuous works were precisely what man ought to have had but
had failed to provide. The moral works of man in nature and under lav/ were
sinful because they were insufficient or imperfect. Jews and Gentiles 'were
guilty because they had not really or fully kept the moral law. In Calvin's
thought, however, they are wrong not only in degree but in kind. Subordinat¬
ing moral works to man's principal duty of being grateful, trusting in God's
grace and acknowledging it, Calvin holds that even the perfect observance
of the law done in strong self will would be as sinful as ever. Eot more
perfect moral works, but a new kind is what is needed. If man is virtuous
in order to insure his felicity, he is trusting in himself and wrong even
though he is perfectly moral, because he is depending on his works. Only
that virtue done in glad response to grace is real virtue. We here enter into
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Calvin's concept of sin, ethics, and the law, to clarify these distinctions.
A. Sin and ethics
Calvin's understanding of the ethical and. religious activity of the
Gentiles is best seen in the light of his notion of order. The concept of
a reversed order which Calvin has used, to describe sin is radical and not
suggestive of compromise. At the same time, however, Calvin can assert that
there is something left. In terns of order, Calvin says that the order is
not totally obliterated, but that within the world of sin some print of the
right order remains. 'The order which God has established...can never be
violated by the malice of men so that it is completely effaced but there
/ v 1will always remain some remnant (resi&u; of it.' Recasting the question
into the figure of light - and it is sometimes as easy to follow this aspect
of his thought in terms of light as it is in terms of order - Calvin asserts
that sin has totally blinded man and yet says that within the darkness of sin
there are some sparks of light which remain. 'In the perverse and degenerate
nature of man sparks continue to shine.'~ Again in terms of the image of God,
Calvin asserts that the image was obliterated, and yet thinks in terms of a
relic which survives.^ In these apparent contradictions Calvin couches his
notion of the religious and ethical actions of the natural man. And by press¬
ing him on these points we can see how moral 'Works are related to divine grace.
1. The shadow (umbra) of virtue
We must begin by examining the way in which Calvin does recognise virtue
in the natural man. It is quite possible for fallen man to enunciate an
ethical standard of good and evil. 'The Gentiles...by their deeds declared
themselves to have sane rule of righteousness, (nonulla iustitiae regula) for
there is no people so lost to humanity that they do not keep themselves
within seme laws. Inasmuch therefore as all peoples voluntarily and without
a monitor are inclined to malce laws unto themselves, it is established beyond
1. Ser*."on I Tim. X1-2, CR 53-150.~"on I Tim. 2.12-11," CR 53.211, "etcH
2. II. 2.12, CR 2.196, Com. on Eph. 4.17, CR 51.203f, etc.
3. Ser. on Deut. 29.1-4, CS 28.489; on 24.19-22, CR 28.205, etc.
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question that there are naturally engrafted in the minds of men certain
conceptions of justice and rectitude, which the Greeks call 77^30A ~*j ^ 6 C 5 •'
'They are not altogether void of the knowledge of right and equity, for
otherwise they could not discern between vice and virtue, the first of which
they restrain by punishment, the other of which they commend and manifest
their approval by honoring it with rewards.' 'The G-entiles are illuminated
by a natural light of justice.' 'They testify that there is engraven on
their hearts a certain discretion and judgment by which they distinguish
between what is right and wrong, what is honest and dishonest.' ""
We are not here dealing with what is really right and wrong, with what
is really righteous or just, with something that is in some way not
totally corrupt, but at the same time we are dealing with a real attempt of
the natural man to discriminate between good and bad.^ Calvin includes an
ability to discern right and wrong partly among the natural or non-spiritual
3
gifts. He means that ethics overlaps into both the spiritual and the
natural divisions of life. Natural here assumes the sense of non-revealed.
There is a Christian ethics and then again there is a natural ethics; both
in part at least pertain to the same moral sphere of the life of man. We
may then speak of two ethical orders, one formulated by the natural man,
the other by the light of gospel and law. The first we call, in the
language of Calvin, 'the shadow (ombrage, umbra) of virtue'^1" or 'the image
(imago) of virtue,'^ and the other real or true virtue. The first is the
law of nature as man perceives it, the second is real obedience to God.
2. The divine basis of natural ethics
This natural ethical system is the work of God. Calvin can say this in
such a way that superficially it might seem as if there is no fundamental
distinction between ethical virtue and Christian virtue. Calvin affirms
1. Com. on dom. £ ILff CR 49.37f. "".14.2, CR 2.565: Inst.Tf 1539
(et seqq), ch. VI, pag. 198, CR 1.775; II. 2.12, OR 2.195?
2. Ser. on Sph. 1.17-18, CR 51.323?
3. II. 2.13, CR 2.196f; II. 2. 22, OR 2.203f
4. Ser. 011 Gal. 5.22-26, CR 51.53; Com. on I Cor. 3.20, CR 49.3&), etc.
5. III. 34.2, CR 2.565, etc.
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that God has established even this natural and false ethical order. If
a right action is taken, it is so taken in the strength of God. The ' images
of virtues...are the gifts of God.' 'Tnatever excellences appear in un¬
believers are the gifts of God.' This distinction is engraven ' by the Lord*
and is 'frequently confirmed by his providental dispensations.' ^ These
2
virtues 'are instruments used by God for the preservation of society.' We
are here involved in an aspect of the way God is able to suspend the punish¬
ment of man. God bridles man to hold his selfishness back from this anarchy
3
and ruin to which it would otherwise lead him. 'Amid this corruption of
nature there is some room for divine grace, not to purify it, but internally
4
to restrain its operation.' Here then the grace of God breaks through the
obstacle of man's sin.' Though it never purifies man's actions, yet it
sets up a natural ethical system which orders the society of ail men and
preserves the race of man 'internally' or within the sphere of man's con-
5
cupascence. This is a phase of the larger work of the 'Spirit of holiness'
by which 'he animates and supports us by that general power which is dis-
6 7
played in mankind.' 'Natural perspicacity is a gift of God. '
further, God bases the natural ethical order on his ultimate ethical
order. It is an 'image of virtue,' of the real and ultimate virtue which
stands approved before God. Calvin says that 'so great is the difference
between the just and unjust that it is visible even in the lifeless image
g
of it.'" The divine distinction between the just and unjust shines through
as it were the veil of sin, and while never purifying the area on this side
of the veil, yet stamps within the natural world an ethical order woven into
sinful fabric on a relative or analogical scale. Yet this reflects absolute
1. III. 14.2, OR 2,565. Com. on Phil. 3.8, CR 52.47
2. III. 14.3, GR 2.565
3. Ser. on I Tim. 2.12-14, CR 53.210f. Ser. on Deut. 23.12-17, CR 28.109f
4. II.3.3, OR 2.211
5. II. 3.4, CR 2.212f
6. III. 1.2, CR 2.394
7. Com. on I Cor. 3.I9, CR 49.359. Com. on Mark 10.21, CR 54.510
8. III. 14.2, CR 2.565
-179-
distinctions of righteousness and unrighteousness, and is to that extent
'a lifeless image,' wrought out in the natural and sinful world, of that
which is really right and wrong. .Real virtue casts its shadow into the
world, though it does not appear itself. In that we have to do with the
shadow and image of real virtue, we may say that it is of God.
3. The likeness (conformite) to righteousness
The fact that God reflects absolute right And wrong in this natural
ethical system, the fact that it is created as real ethics casts its shadow
means - as an image resembles a reality without being composed of that
reality, or a shadow outlines an illuminated object without being light at
all but only darkness - that there is a type of analogical likeness between
real and false ethics and yet no identity. 'There is a likeness (con¬
formite = likeness, or analogy) between the lav/ of God and the order of
nature which is engraven in all men.' There is a certain formal resemblance
between the two, such that externally it might be a question at times of
whether some real righteousness is involved. There is 'a conduct among men
2
v/hich has some appearance of sanctity.' There is about it an 'external
resemblance of virtue.' (externa virtutis imago)^ It is 'counterfeit
righteousness.A specific act of the natural man may look like righteous¬
ness, it images it, and in objective behavior it may at times be identical
with true righteousness. 'An act performed by them is externally and
5
apparently good.' They 'commonly deceive mankind by their affinity and
6
similitude to virtues.' Nor is this simply a formal thing, for heathen
'poets require both a clean heart and pure hands, when they speak with a
sober and well regulated mind of the worship of God. ' 1 'As to the philoso¬
phers, they have always held this principle: that no sacrifice is rightly
1^ Ser. on Tim. p.4-5, OR 53.456
2. III. 34.1, CR 2.564
3. III. 24.2, GR 2.565. Com. on Acts 17.28, CR 48.417
4. 11.7.6, CR 2.257
5. III. 14.3, CR 2.565. Com. on II Fet. 1.4, CR 55.446f
6. ibid. Com. on Col. 2.25, CR 52.115
7. Com. on C-en. 4.4, CR 25.85. 1.5.3, CR 2.38
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offered to God except the mind be right and pure.1
Take, for instance, the paternal duties of a father over his house¬
hold and relations. Christians affirm it as a Scriptural teaching and a
Christian duty: 'If anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially
for those of his own family, he has disowned the faith.' (i Tim. 5«8) But
should we not have Scripture, we would still know this from the natural
ethical code. '",7e need not have any written laws, we need no long sermons
to show us that a father ought to govern his children and that he ought to
guide them into maturity in a proper fashion. God does not need, I say, to
reveal himself from heaven for this. Why so? We have this engraved on us
by nature. Let someone go and ask the heathen and every one can give him
2
this teaching, it is not necessary to go to school for it.' So it is
with many points. The moral teachings on adultery or marriage,^ on honesty
or parental respect^" may be very nearly the same. Frequently 'our judgpient
5does indeed agree with the lav/ of 'God in regard to mere outward actions.'
Laws formulated by magistrates may agree with those required by the kingdom
of God.6
But there are further likenesses. In that this natural ethics is
created out of a shadow or print of God's true morality by which he would
restrain society from destroying itself, and in that there is this partial
identity in objective behavior, there is a duty laid upon by God to
abide by its commands and to order his life in accord with it. To this
shadow of virtue in the sphere of concupiscence God holds him bound. God
'is said to love the political virtues' of the Gentiles - 'justice, upright¬
ness, moderation, prudence, fidelity, and temperance' - 'not that they are
meritorious of salvation or grace, but that they have reference to an end
1. Com. on Hag. 2. llf, OR 44* 11. Ser. on John 1.1-5, CR 47»475ff
2. Ser. on I Tim. 5.7-12, GR 53.468. Ser. on Deut. 21.15-17, OR 27.671f
3. Ser. on Bph. 5.28-30, OR 51«759ffj Ser. on Deut. 5.18, OR 26.338
4. Ser. on Bph. 6.1-4, OR 51.783ff; Ser. on I Tim. 5.7-12, OR 53.468
5. Gom. on Eph. 4.17, OR 51.205
6. Ser. on I Tim. 2.1-2, OR 53.137f. II. 8.1, OR 2.267
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1
of which he approves,' 'the preservation of the human race.' 'In
following the natural order to which each one of us ought to be inclined
even if we had neither Scripture nor law, besides the fact that such
honesty is laudable and worthy to be esteemed among men, we ought still to
p
be moved the more because God accepts and approves such a service.'
There is credit due those who fulfil these moral obligations. Though
3such performance 'is of no avail to justification! and in no way purifies
the corruption in man, yet it is blessed of God insofar as it is morally
correct and objectively parallel to true righteousness. 'We see how he
confers many blessings of the present life on those who practice virtue
among men. Not that this external resemblance of virtue merits the least
favor from him, but he is pleased to discover his great esteem of true
righteousness by not permitting that which is external and hypocritical
to remain without a temporal reward.'^ Natural ethics, as approved by God
5
though not for merit and righteousness, is yet in some respects 'laudable.'
'God is sometimes said to Hove those whom he does not approve or justify.'
'In this sense under various points of view, God loved Aristides and
Fabricius and also hated them. For insofar as he bestowed on them outward
righteousness and that for the general advantage, he loved his own work in
them, but as their heart was impure, the outward semblance of righteousness
was of no avail for obtaining righteousness.' 'It is not inconsistent that
the good seed, which God has implanted in some natures, is loved by him,
and yet that he rejects their persons and works on account of corruption.'
So it was with Titus and Trajan, or Scipio and Cato. ^
Thus Galvin makes full place for the existence of natural and moral
virtue. 'In all ages there have been some persons who from the mere
1. Com. on Mark 10.21, CS 45*540
2. Ser. on I Tim. 5*4-5, OR 53*45of
3* III. 14.4, OR 2.566
4. III. 14. 2, OR 2.565
5. ibid.
6. Com. on Mark 10.21, OR 45.540
7. III.14.2f, OR 2.564f
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dictates of nature have devoted their whole lives to the pursuit of virtue.
And although many errors might perhaps be discovered in their conduct, yet
by their pursuit of virtue they afforded a proof that there was some degree
of purity in their nature.' 'These examples seem to teach us that we should
not consider human nature to be corrupted since from its instinctive bias
seme men have not only been eminent for noble actions, but have uniformly
conducted themselves in a most virtuous manner through the whole course
1
of their lives.' It might seem as if the print of order, or the spark
of light, or the relic of the image of God, which remains is really qual¬
itatively indistinguishable from the real order, light, or image; and -
even if perhaps on a very limited scale - a small but qualitative portion
of the true righteousness, seme real virtue, does exist in man. In this
case we could no longer consistently affirm that the light has been totally
put out, or the order totally reversed.
4. Total depravity and natural ethics
In all that we have said so far Calvin does not clearly differ from
the concept of ethical virtue which obtained in the deformed theology
which followed him. But these natural actions remain different in kind
and not just in degree, and now we see the clear qualitative distinction
Calvin draws in the light of his concept of sin as man's self-willed
refusal to live in dependence on the grace of God. In latex1 Reformed
theology these works were set aside because they were not sufficient or
perfect enough to meet the demands of the covenant of works and divine moral
law, and the emphasis was thus laid on man's transgression of or want of
conformity to the law of God. But Calvin sets them aside because they were
done in self-love and self-trust and not in response to the grace of God. As
man depends on his works, he is not faithful to the order of dependence on
grace. Calvin thus deals with the question of ethical value not only at
1. II.3.3, CP. 2.211
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the level of divine moral law, but also and more fundamentally in the
light of God*s grace. But we must trace this thought through Calvin, for
his concepts require closer inspection to see just how and where he says it.
Calvin says that the difference between this apparent virtue and real
virtue is internal or in the end. These externally correct actions are done
not out of real obedience as with a willing and glad servant, but in con¬
cupiscence, for reasons of self-interest and selfishness, and so totally
corrupted. But it is rather important to see what he includes under
selfishness here, for this is not a crass but an enlightened form of
selfishness, which the natural man never thought to be wrong. Calvin cites
as examples of virtues in which selfishness may lie: 'the exercise of
justice, continence, friendship, temperance, fortitude, prudence,' ' also
2
•uprightness' and 1 fidelity' Pagan virtues moreover may include honesty
and chastity,^ obedience to parents or husband,^" even love and charity toward
5
our neighbors. The vices in question are those the entire world had been
deceived into thinking were virtues. The wrong lies in the fact that these
acts were done for the self-satisfaction involved, to further self-respect,
out of enlightened self-interest for the self or race, or in the theological
terms of natural religion, for self-justification. A truly virtuous act would
be done out of gratitude and in willing service to God. 'The end of what
is right is always to serve God, whatever is directed to any other end can
have no claim to that appellation. Therefore since they do not regard the
end prescribed bjr divine wisdom, though an act performed by them is externally
and apparently good, yet being directed to a wrong end it becomes sin.'1
The natural ethical system never'* detects and removes concupiscence,
which is man's primal sin. Here it is important to recall what concupiscence
can include in its sublimated forms, as we saw in our* examination of the root
1. III. 14.3, OR. 2.565
2. Gom. on Mark 10.21, OS 45*540
3. Ser. on I Tim. 5*7-12, CP. 53*468
4. Com. on I Pet. 2.19, CR 55*248
5. Ser. on Gal. 6.9-11, CP 51*l6Df
6. III.14*3, CR 2.565. Com. on Jonah 1.16, CR 43*23If
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defection. ¥e do riot mean crass lusts, for even natural men know these
are wrong, but we mean man's self-willed desire to depend on himself and riot
on God. As a matter of fact natural ethics recognizes concupiscence, but
sees nothing wrong with it. This whole understanding of two ethical spheres
is seen clearly in Calvin's discussion of Paul's assertion: 'I knew not sin
but by the law.' (Pom. 7»7) This cannot be a denial of natural ability to
judge right from wrong. On the contrary, 'men are never so destitute of
judgment as not to retain the distinction between ertei*nal works. ' But
when Pa.ul says, 'I knew not sin but by the law,' he is speaking not of this
but of the knowledge of 'one kind (una species) of sin' which is radically
different. Here 'Paul mounts higher than the common capacity of men is
able to reach,' he passes the more acute insights of the philosophers.
The difference is this: that natural ethical judgment does not perceive
concupiscence to be wrong. 'That ignorance of sin to which he referred
consisted in this: that he did not notice his concupiscence.' Paul was
in effect no wiser than a Gentile. This fault is not known in natural
ethics. 'The fault of concupiscence is more hidden and lies deeper, there¬
fore it never oomes into account so long as men judge according to their
sense.' Indeed, natural man sees nothing inherently wrong in concupiscence
and does not think it incompatible with righteousness. Paul 'thought that
righteousness could not be hindered by concupiscence.' In human judgment,
this is not counted as a vice.'^
And it is generally Calvin's statement that moral works are sinful
because they are done in concupiscence. 'In the universal observations of
the law the censure of concupiscence wholly escapes our notice. Tor the
natural man cannot be brought to acknowledge the disorder of his inward
affections. The light of nature is smothered before it approaches the
2
first entrance of this abyss.' 'The evils of concupiscence are concealed
1. Com. on Rom. 7*7, CR 49.123f
II. 2.24, CR 2.205. Inst.of 1539 (et seqq.) oh. II, pag. 33, CR I.332
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in such deep) and intricate recesses as easily to elude the view of man.'
'Our judgnent does indeed agree with the law of God in regard to the mere
outward actions; but concupiscence, which is the source of everything evil,
2
escapes our notice.' But just how did concupiscence manifest itself in
Paul? He had formally and sincerely so he thought kept the law and was
I 1
irreproachable before men. Paul was concupiscent, Calvin tells us, as
'being puffed up with confidence (confidentia) in his righteousness, he
3
expected sa.lvation by his works.' This is Calvin's analysis of the sin
4
of Paul in several contents.
The difficulty is that the moral order, although objectively and for¬
mally resembling the will of God, is inextricably and totally permeated with
man's primal sin of attempting to depend on himself in self love rather than
depending on grace. It is quite possible to have a good moral life and have
not removed concupiscence. 'For it may happen that a man may fully discharge
his duty to all men with respect to external actions, and at the same tine
5be very far from discharging it in the right way.' Ethics is concupiscent
if it moves as all other sin away from God and his grace in the direction of
self-interest, self-satisfaction, self-adulation, or self-justification.
'However praiseworthy in appearance the life of scsne may be, because their
concupiscence does not break out in the sight of men, there is nothing pure or
holy which does not proceed from the fountain of ail purity.'^ Only following
the eradication of self-love fran the inmost recesses of the heart will
apparent virtue be real virtue.
It is important to see here that even man's effort to provide works
from his side and his hope thereby to gain salvation is in itself part of
this concupiscence. Here Calvin has departed from the concept of federal
1. II. 7. 6, OR 2.257f
2. Com. on Bph. 4.17, CR 51.205. Com. on I Thes. 4.3, CR 52.161
3. Com. on x. 20.17, CR 24.719
4. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.436; Com. on Ps. 119.36, CR 32.230
5. Ser. on Deut. 5.21, CR 26.371ff
5. III. 7.1, CR 2.511
6. Com. on Bph. 2.3, CS 51.162. III.7.4, CR 2.509
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theology, for in the works covenant man was supposed to do this. In this
covenant his felicity was to depend on his works, and he is guilty because
he broke the moral law and did not provide such works. But in Calvin man
is guilty more fundamentally because he trusted in his works and not in God.
These virtues are sinful because they were done in self-trust. Aristides
and the Greeks of legendary virtue, though they professed to serve God,
actually trusted in themselves. 'Those men, with all the excellence of their
virtues, were either filled with ambition or inflated with pride which made
them trust (confido) more in themselves thai in God.' 'Such persons, relying
on their own strength and virtue, despised the grace of 'God with all the
superciliousness of impiety. Making an idol of their own virtue, they dis¬
dained to lift up their eyes to him.' They were not faithful, they did not
1
trust him, and it is 'trust (fiducia) in 'God which is the mother of piety.'
The essential drive that lies behind all this ethical activity, even
when it has the appearance of sanctity, is one of self-trust. Here the
Gentile has seized the order which God allows to remain and wields it for
his own purpose. He concludes that if he can fulfil the requirements of
the natural moral order this will merit salvation. 'Pagans have always
wished to be acceptable to God by their own virtues.' 'The heathens fully
believed that they would be rewarded by 'God if they lived in an honest and
2unblameable fashion among men.' To say 'that God owes us recompense as
3
wages when we have served him' is ' to argue according to philosophy.' A
salvation by works is uncharacteristic in some form of every heathen
4
nation.' ' 'If a man asks the philosophers, they will always say that God
loves those who are worthy, that inasmuch as virtue pleases him he selects
those who are devoted to it, and holds them for his people.' 'The
pagans, bringing their own free will, thought themselves bound to God for
ll Com. on Fs. 86.2, GR 31.792. II. 7.2, CR 2.506
2. Ser. on Gal. 3*11-34, GR 50.498f
3. Ser. on Gal. 2.24-16, GR 50*409f
4. Ser. on Gal. 2.20-21, GR 50.453* Gom. on Ps. 32.1, Git 31*3I4f
5* Ser. on Eph. 1.3-4, GR 51.260
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nothing except their own good fortune, as they called it, for they believed
that they had everything through their own virtue (virtu - strength) and
industry.' They thought they came to God 'of their own movement.' Such a
concept as this: of man's virtue being wrong because he tried to save him¬
self by it, was of necessity obscured as the later covenant of works suggested
that man originally did have his salvation based on his works, and thei"e-
fore, though he might be morally imperfect and unsuccessful, he could not
be wrong in principle as he attempted to Justify himself.
But in Calvin it is as natural man serves God not in gratitude, nor
in belief in his goodness, nor in fidelity to depend on his strength alone,
but in order to merit salvation and for fear lest in no other way he arrive
at felicity, that he sins. Calvin works this out in his discussion of the
opening chapters of Romans. We turn to those Gentiles (as well as Jews)
who were 'saintlings,' (sanctulos) with no 'grosser vices' and who lived
outwardly in 'innocence, temperance, and all virtue.' They 'daasle the
eyes of men by displays of outward sanctity, and even think themselves to
be accepted before Cod, as though they had given him full satisfaction. '
But it is precisely this which is their central sin: that they had hoped
to save themselves by it, rather than to rely on the grace of God. We
'charge them with inward purity' which natural man cannot detect. But this
is more than an inner insincerity; it is a concupiscent self-reliance. 'Men
of this class will with astonishing security trust in themselves,' they
'are commonly transported with prosperity as though they had merited the
Lord's kindness by their good deeds.' 'They think they can really gain
something,' 'that God will take an account of their disguised righteousness.'
But in this 'they have rejected the fatherly invitation of God. And
though all the gifts of God are so many evidences of his paternal goodness,
yet. ..the ungodly absurdly congratulate themselves on their prosperity, as
1. Ser. on Bph. 1.15-18, CR 51,312
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though they were dear to him, while he kindly and bountifully supports them.
Por the lord by his kindness shows that it is he to whom we ought to turn if
we desire to secure our well-being, and at the same time he strengthens our
confidence in expecting mercy. If we use not God's bounty for this end, we
abuse it.'
So, Calvin concludes this discussion in Romans, they too have dis¬
graced themselves in the divine order of grace. They too have turned the
gifts of Cod into a curse, as they applied God-given virtue toward their
own self-reliance. 'This is a remarkable passage: we may from this learn...
that the gifts of God which they continually enjoy shall increase their
condemnation, for an account of them will be required, and then it will be
found that it is justly imputed to them as extreme wickedness that they have
been made worse through God's bounty, by which surely they ought to hove
1
been improved.'" The Gentile saintlings are to be condemned because they
have trusted in their own virtue rather than the grace of God, and have in
this inverted his gifts. So even in man's perceiving God and endeavoring to
worship him, even in his demand for purity and sincerity, even in his formally
correct ethical practice - in all these things of his religion which bear
some outward appearance of righteousness - in that he moves in than away
from God to self-independence, he yet stands totally sinful. The more the
philosophers thought they were approaching God, the further away they were
2
straying." 'All the virtues of the philosophers, as they call them, that is,
which men think they possess through free will, are mere smoke. Indeed, they
are the illusions of the devil by which he bewitches the minds of men so that
they do not approach God, but rather precipitate themselves into the lowest
depth, when they seek to exalt themselves beyond measure.
"Then the light shines in the darkness of sin, even though sinful man
does perceive something ethically and religiously, this illumination is such
1. Com. on Rom. 2.1-5, passim, CE 49«3;2ff
2. Ser. on John 1.1-5, GR 47-475; Ser. on Eph. 4,17-19. GR 51.5955. Com. on Hab. 2.4, GR 43.531. 1.5.2, GR 2.50; II. 2.18, CE 2.200
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that it does not really light the way at all, as fax- as any true know¬
ledge or real righteousness is concerned; whatever nan may accomplish by it
bears not the slightest trace of the substance of truth and righteousness.
There is nothing of the quality of righteousness in it. But Calvin affirms
that there may be a likeness between what v/e see and what is righteousness.
Some things the natural man does may look like righteousness. Calvin's
Biblical figure of light and darkness to a certain extent breaks down here.
Light shines in the darkness in such a way that though man has seme virtue,
yet it is still darkness. Man's sin 'darkens the light which still dwells
in him.'" Light is in him, but the light that is in him is darkness. It
is a false appearance of light. The light in him is not really light at
all, if we mean by that a light that enables him to see and pursue any part
of true righteousness, to respond to God in the only real way, the way of
gratitude and selfless obedience. In this sense the human mind remains in-
total darkness. 'The whole course of human life is dark, because no man
proposes for himself a proper object. I confess indeed that men naturally
possess reason to distinguish between vices and virtues, but I say that it
2
is so corrupted that it fails at every step.' 'Out of Christ there is not
even a spark of true light. There may be some appearance of brightness, but
it resembles lightning, which only dazzles the eyes.''
The concept of order also must be pressed. The order of grace has been
wholly reversed as man attempts to depend on his own works. All is disordered.
Yet nonetheless within this totally reversed order there is a print or
remnant of the original order as men outwardly conform to virtues parallel
to those original and true virtues. The Tightness or wrongness of these is
not measured by whether they are similar to Christian ethical directives. It
is measured by whether they rise from dependence on grace, or from man's
self-trust and sinful attempt to raise himself up apart from the Lord.
1. Com. on John 1.5, CR 47«7» Com. on Ezek. 11. 19f, CR 40 • 245f
2. Com. on Matt. 6.22, CR 45.207
3. Com. on John 8.12, CR 47.192
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B. Sin and lav/
It is now necessary to enter into Calvin's thought about the
relationship between sin and man's works under the law. Calvin, we have
noted from the beginning, interprets sin most basically and fundamentally
in the light of divine grace. The concept of sin as transgression of the
law is vital in Calvin's thought and he makes wide use of it. But beyond
this we have seen and now see again that sin is much more than this, it is
man's rejection of God's grace as he moves in self-independence. We now
examine first how sin is indeed known in the light of the law, and then
secondly how sin must be further known by grace, for the law is not enough
to teach us our sins. Some men attempt to live by the law and in so doing
suppress its power to reveal sin. The law is dead to them. It is here
that Calvin reveals most significantly that it is not enough to keep the
law, for even the perfect obedience of the man who would live by the law is
to be set aside because it is done in self-willed concupiscence and not in
acknowledgment of divine grace and gratitude for it.
Calvin's position here has once again to be contrasted with the character¬
istic teaching of later Reformed theology, particularly as influenced by
federal theology. In the first divine covenant of works, what was required
of man was moral works done in obedience to the divine law, performed as man
applied his will and ability toward righteousness. When this law is revealed
again to man in the Old Testament, man comes to know his sin as his moral
imperfection and his inability to keep and perform the law. Sin is seen
more in the light of the law than in the light of grace. Federal theology
could not interpret sin as a disordering of the divine order of grace because it
did not begin with an order of grace. But Calvin can at once keep the principle:
that we interpret our sins in the light of the law, making full use of it, and
at the same time bring it under the larger truth: that we must further
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interpret our sins in contrast to God's grace. Even in the case that men
should fully and perfectly keep the law they would remain totally sinful -
if they kept it in their own strength and not in dependence on God's grace.
Men may sin as they break the law, but they would sin in a more fundamental
way even if they kept the whole law and trusted not in grace.
1. The one covenant of grace and the pedagogy of the law
Calvin's concepts here can only be understood when seen against the
relationship between the law and the covenant. There has been and there
can be but one covenant. With Adam in the garden of Eden, with Abraham in
Ur, with Moses on 3ina.i, or with us today in Christ, God has bound himself
to be gracious to man and requires of him in response an acknowledgnent in
gratitude and obedience. 'All those persons from the beginning of the
world whom God has adopted into the society of his people have been in
covenant (foederatus) bound to him by the same law and doctrine which are
in force among us. 'In substance God makes no other covenant with us
2
today than he made of old. with the Jews.' 'It is indeed certain that never
has there been but one means by which men could come to salvation.' 'God must
work it of his infinite goodness, for all other helps are frivolous and useless.'
'Therefore it must be that the ancient fathers were saved by the pure grace of
God, just as today we hope in the same thing.' 'In sum, it must be that there
is but one salvation for all the faithful who are today, and for those who have
lived since the beginning of the world; it must be that God receive us with
3
one accord, that we by the grace of our lord Jesus Christ be reconciled to him.'
We can then speak of man as being 'tinder law' only subjectively. Only from the
side of man's experience does law exist apart from grace.
The covenant of grace is however,,made 'under shadows' in the Old Testa-
. r
ment. f A difference in ' administration'5 centers in the law, given by God
1. II. 30.1, OR 2.313. Com. on Acts 15.9, OR 48.345f
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because the covenant of grace though present in substance is yet under shadow.
It follows the gracious covenant and depends on it . It does not set aside the
Abrahamic covenant but points back to it, and forward to the fulfilment of this
covenant in Christ." Here Calvin uses the Biblical metaphor of a schoolmaster
to indicate its pedagogic and transient function. 'The law was a schoolmaster
(paedagogus) to bring them to Christ.'" 'The Jews were conducted to Christ by
the pedagogy of the law.' (legis paedagogium)J The several pedagogic functions
of the law which Calvin delineates are reduced to two at the simplest.^
a. The teaching of the law for men 'under grace'
The 'principal' use or 'proper end' of the law is to show us the
appropriate way of life to return to Cod in gratitude for his mercy.-' 'His
beneficient work' will 'convict us of ingratitude if we do not obey his
6 7voice.' The law is 'connected with the covenant of gratuitous adoption,'
as 'an excellent instrument to give them from day to day a better and more
certain understanding of the divine will to which they aspire, and to con-
g
firm them in the knowledge of it.' But this 'use of the law, which is the
principal one and which is more nearly connected with the proper end of it,
relates to the faithful in whose hearts the Spirit of God already lives and
9
reigns.' Such believers, immature in grace, are not really under law but
under grace. They have the law in their hearts, or on their hearts. They
comprehend the grace of God enough to know that salvation does not depend
on their performance, but is already assured in the covenant of grace. They
obey 'excited and animated by the direction of the Spirit,' out of 'desire
to obey God,' and out of an ' inward promptitude to obedience.'10 The law
T. Ser. on Sph." 2.19-22, CR 51.423f
2. II. 7.11, CR 2.261. Gf. Gal. 3.24
3. II. 11.5, CR 2.333
4. Genevan Catechism, French, 1541, 33 Sunday, GR 6.79ff
5. II. 7.12, CR 2.261
6. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 8
7. II.7.2, CR 2.254
8. II.7.12, CR 2.261?
9. II. 7.1, CR. 252
ID. II.7.12, CR 2.262
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' no longer exercises toward us the part of a rigorous exactor only to be
satisfied by the performance of every injunction; but in this perfection
to which it exhorts us it shows us a goal, to aim at which during the
whole course of our lives would be equally conducive to our interest and
consistent with our duty.'^
b. The teaching of the law for men 'under law'
But there is a second use of the law for those who do not yet comprehend
the meaning of grace. God promises that he will grant salvation upon con¬
dition of fulfilment of the law. ' God promises to those who shall have
fulfilled the law not only the grand blessings of the present life...but
2
also the recompense of eternal life.' This is what Calvin calls a ' legal
promise,' as distinct from an 'evangelical one.' 'Such promises...proclaim
that a reward is ready to be bestowed on condition that we perform what is
commanded.Eere is the only place in Calvin's thought where we have any¬
thing suggestive of the covenant of works, such as later federal theology
was to assert that God made with Adam. As in the covenant of works God
covenanted with Adam to provide salvation on the basis of his works, so here
•God promises salvation to those who fulfil the law. But Calvin is here
abundantly aware that Gods does this not because man is supposed to earn
felicity in this way, but because God is striving with man's sinful nature.
God as it were condescends to the nature of man. to permit him to work
in a limited way to help himself as he is wont by nature to do. Men 'have
always deluded themselves with vainglory and presumption that they could
purchase salvation. Therefore God has to say to them, Go to, if you are
such able men as you think show it. As for me, I will let you have my
law, and so that you will not think youselves ill dealt with for your
serving me, your salary is all ready for you if you perform it. There it is;
eternal life is definitely assured to you. But now let vis see a little
1. II. 7.13, CR 2.262. Ser. on Gal. 2.3-5, CR 50.367
2. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. ID. III.17.1, OR 2.590
3. 111.17.6, CR 2.594. Ser. on Deut. 11.22-25, CR 27.133'
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1
what you can do. Busy yourselves to your work.' ' Such promises are given
2
to those who will not 'perform. spontaneously, as if it were not a duty,'
but only perform hoping for reward. 'For since the eyes of our mind are
too dim to be attracted with the mere beauty of virtue, our most merciful
Father has been graciously pleased to allure us to the love and worship of
himself by the sweetness of his rewards. He announces therefore that he
has reserved rewards for virtue, and that the person who obeys his command¬
ment shall not labor in vain.' ^
But in pioint of fact it is impossible for man ever to fulfil the law
and it is God's intent to teach us our sins and lead us to grace by it.
The law becomes man's goal. As he is by nature attracted to this opportunity
to rest on. his own merit, he strives to earn his righteousness. He fails
and sees his own iniquity and then looks again to see the covenant of grace
which he had not seen before, ''.'/hen men have strained everything that is
in them to do, it is certain that they will recognize their weakness which
4
was hidden before.' 'The law gives commands in order that, endeavoring to
perform them and being wearied through our infirmity under the lav;, we may
5
learn to pray for the assistance of grace.'
2. Works of the law and merit
It is highly significant to note here that this legal promise can be
given only on the basis of the covenant of grace. Through a misunderstanding
on this point sin is able to usurp the law. The law allows man to work in
a limited way toward his own salvation. But further - and we must not
obscure this point - it is an act of pure grace even for God to promise
such salvation. A perfect performance of the law would be rewarded with
salvation, but a perfect performance would not earn or merit salvation in¬
trinsically but rather by the covenant. 'Works are not meritorious by in-
1. Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20, CR 50.538. Com. on Rom. 8.4, OR 49.138
2. II.8.4, CR 2.270
3. ibid., CR 2.2o9f
4. Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20, CR 50.538
5« II.7.8f, GR 2.259f, in part quoting Augustine. 'The Use of the Law' in
Com. on Harm, of the Pent., CR 24.725ff
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trinsic worth, but become meritorious by covenant, (e:: pactoj The reward of
works depends on the voluntary promise of the law. ' ~ Thus man can.work in this
limited way within the covenant for his own salvation, but only after God. in
a movement of grace has established a law and declared that he might so labor.
2
Thus 'from his side it is a wage which he gratituously gives us.'
We make this clear because it is the primary assertion of the sinner
that he can merit God's favor in his own independently gained work's right¬
eousness. But while God allows man to attempt to perform the law, this has
been preceded by 'God's gracious permission for him so to attempt and premise
to pay should he succeed. God, apart from his promise, would owe nothing.
Calvin returns again and again to the little parable of the unprofitable
servants in Luke 1?.7f• 'The Scripture shows us...what would be merited by
the perfect performance of the law if this could anywhere be found, when it
directs us: We are unprofitable servants, because we shall not have conferred
any favor on God, but only have performed the duties incumbent on us.'"' If
God were to sjjeak in the most strict terms, we ought not to say that perfect
obedience would be righteousness. 'God enters into covenant with us and
brings himself so to speak under obligation to recompense our obedience.'
But 'he promises to his servants a reward, which in point ofjustice he does
l
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not owe to them. 1 ' Righteousness and rectitude consists for mail in a grateful
response in obedience, any works performed to earn salvation •would by this
fact not be pure righteousness. Perfect obedience is righteousness, not
properly but by divine promise. Calvin says that the Lord has 'honored' the
observance of the law with the title of righteousness.'He recedes from
the strictness of his claims, when he proposes a reward to our obedience.
which is not performed spontaneously, as if it were not a duty.'° Such
Com. on Horn. 3.20, CR 49*56. Com. on Luke 17.7, CR 45.434*
2. Ser. on Gen. 15.6-7, CR 23.728. Com. on Ezek. 20.11, CR 40.48 Iff
3. III.15.3, CR 2.58Cf. III.34.4, CR 2.573f; Com. on Luke 17.7, CR 45.4I3f;
Com. on I Cor. 9.18, OR 49.446; on Ezek. 18.20, 'CR 40.443
4. Com. on Ps. 19.11, CR 31.303. Ser. on Job 4.1-6, CR 33.185f
5. III. 17.7, CR 2.595. Ser. on Job 4.7-U, CR 33.186f
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righteousness, even if it could be found anywhere, is not proper right¬
eousness, but more righteousness by definition, or by divine condescension,
or by divine honor and free grace. 'It is owing therefore to the divine
favor that they are accounted worthy both of the title and reward of right¬
eousness. *~ 'Were there- indeed anyone found who strictly kept God's law,
2
he could not be counted righteous, except by virtue of the promise.'
'Although we had an angelic perfection, yet that could not obligate
God to us at all, if it were not that he of his -own good will had given this
promise in his law: He that does these things shall live by them. Then if
we attempt to acquire grace from God by our own works, we must not argue as
does philosophy that God owes us wages or recompense for the service that we
have done him. For we are his and we cannot bind him by anything that we
could do. How then is it that our works could be recompensed as though
they were meritorious before God? Because he has promised so to do. It is
the covenant which he has made with us, saying: He that does these things
shall live by them. So then, if we could perform the law in its perfection.
surely we should be righteous before God and merit salvation; not for any
worthiness that should be in ourselves however, but by reason of the covenant
that God has made with us. For we see that all the desert which could be
3
alleged from the side of man depends wholly upon this promise.'
The whole point here is that man has not been created to work independently
or semi-independently of God to effect his own felicity and. salvation, as is
suggested by the covenant of works. This - as we have seen and will see again -
is his sin. He is made to move in 'God, to reflect him, to receive by grace
all he needs and acknowledge in grateful obedience what he receives. All
this talk about man's justifying his own existence in a self-".filled obedience
is just so much questioning after a fancied mode of existence which was never
his even in his innocence and primal perfection. There can be no question
1. III. 11.20, CP, 2.549f. Ser. on Gal. 3.11-34, CR. 50.5$1
2. Com. on Hab. 2.4, CR 43.932. Ser. on Gal. 2.15-16, CR 50.415
3. Ser. on Gal. 2.14-16, OR 43.439. Ser. on Gal. 3.11-34, OR 50.495ff
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of man's really or intrinsically being righteous and deserving, even if in
some impossible way he had perfectly kept the law of God. 'Though we were
as pure as the angels, yet we should not be able to stand but by the grace
of God and insofar as he upholds us as his creatures.'~
3. The life of the law and the death of the sinner
We are now in a position to see against this background of Calvin's con¬
cept of the law within the covenant of grace how sin is related to the works
of the law. Calvin takes as key here the Pauline assertion: 'The strength
of sin is the law.' (I Cor. 13.56) We 'speak of the law as the strength or
p
power of sin because it executes upon us the judgment of God.' 'The law is
3the strength of sin; it sharpens sin so that we are mortally wounded by it.'
There are two related but rather different ways in which the law renders us
more liable to judgment. The first way sin converts the law into a curse
Calvin calls 'the life of the law. This is the way Calvin sees sin in the
light of the divine law, and we must notice here that he can include in his
thought the whole breadth of the concept of sin which obtained in later Reformed
theology. Sin is indeed the breaking of God's law and we interpret it this way.
Here the sinner, brought to an awareness of his previously unnoticed sin,
is slain by the judgment of God. 'As soon as the law begins to live in us,
5xt inflicts a fatal wound by which we die.' This is the experience we
have already outlined where man attempts to gain salvation, only to res-Use
6
his sin and inability. 'The law is like a mirror' to show us our sin.
'3ach of us lies stagnant in his filth and sleeps there, so that without the
law we are not touched to the quick, our consciences are numbed; in short
each exempts himself and gives himself license to do evil. But when the law
steps forward then sin is recognized and each must bow before God despite what
1. Ser. on Job 9.29-35, CR 33.46If. Com. on Rom. 11.35, CR 49.251?
2. Com. on I Cor. 15.56, CR 49*564. Com. on Rom. 8.2, GR 49.137
3. Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20, CR 50.543. Ser. on Beut. 30.6-10, CR 28.561
4. Com. on Gal. 2.19, CR 50.197f. Com. on 3x. 20.17, CR 24.717f
5. ibid.
6. II. 7.7, CR 2.258
he would5 or else gnash his teeth at him as a rebel.1 It is as if a person,
with a dirty face is suddenly brought face to face with a mirror. In this
way we may say that the law increases sin, in that it increases the knowledge
of sin and therefore lays the sinner open to the wrath of God. 'For iniquity
undoubtedly increases more and more in proportion to the clearness of that
sense of sin which strikes the conscience, because to transgression of the law
2there is then added contumacy against the law-giver.' So on account of their
having the law 'the Jews were more damnable than other men,* being 'doubly
3
guilty' when compared with Gentiles.'
Calvin's thought about the revelation of sin by the law encounters the
somewhat problematic fact that seen from a larger point of view and from the
side of God this increased awareness of sin may be beneficial, if man is
driven to repent. But seen, on the other hand, from a more narrow ox-
temporary point of view and from the side of man, God's law has only served
to render man doubly liable to judgment and therefore has been harmful. Calvin
turns to employ the accidental ox- adventitious distinction. But here it must
be developed somewhat differently. Even though Calvin holds that 'God's x^eal
purpose in the law is so to reduce man to grace, yet Calvin thinks of man's
sense of condemnation, which is inevitably involved in this process, as a ■
4
'contrary effect of'the law,' ox" 'an inseparable and perpetual accident.'
Thus we affirm from one point of view that God purposed it; from another that
it is an accidental effect - which ought to imply that it was not God's pur¬
pose. It is always 'an inseparable and perpetual accident that the law, by
demonstrating to man his sin, cuts off the hope of salvation. By itself be¬
cause it teaches what righteousness is, it is the my to salvation; but our
depravity and corruption, obstruct so that in this way it does not profit us
1. Ser. on Gal. 3.19-20, CR 50.535f. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.434?
2. II.7.7, CR 2.258. Com. on Rom. 4.5, CR 49.79; Inst, of 1536, ch. I, pag.
4off, CR 1.29f; Com. on II Cor. 3.7, OR 50.41ff
3. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-13, OR 50.429f
4. Com. on Rom. 3»20, OR 49.57. Com. on Gen. 2.16, CR 23.45
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anything. ' Yet this condemnation is in the divine plan. '".Then God gave his
lav/, it was not to the end that we seek oat/ righteousness and salvation there,
as though his grace did not suffice or was weak, but there is another intent
p
quite different, namely that it bring men to know themselves to be sinners.'
Calvin does, not appear to deal with this problem any further.
4. The life of the sinner and the death of the law
The second way in which sin employs the law to e::ert its strength, to
work its curse and make men more liable to punishment, is what Calvin calls
' the death of the lav/.' ^ It is here that we see that the law is not enough
to reveal sin, for sin is more than the failure to conform to the law. Some
men, who are of the opinion that sin involves only this transgression of the
lav/, think that if they can successfully perform all the law they will merit
salvation at God's hand. But these men are sinners in an even more serious
way than before because they have depended on themselves and not on God's
grace. Their sin has really increased as they have in concupiscent self-
reliance and self-trust depended on their own legal works. Perfect legal
works of this type would still be sin. It is here obvious that Calvin sees
sin as something more fundamental than the moral imperfection of man under
the law, or even than man's rebellion from divine lav/. Calvin is able to
interpret the relationship between sin and legal works in the light of God's
grace. But later Reformed thought of necessity obscured this further and
more basic concept of Calvin's as it suggested through the covenant of works
that perfect legal observance was what was really needed.
Here man believes himself to have life in the law, he lives to the lav/.
Such a person believes that he has done his duty and has merited salvation
for his performance. '"/Then men believe that they have life, that is to say,
when they persuade themselves that they are righteous and that God is propitious
and favorable to them, it is a sign that the law is dead to them, that is,
lT ibid., Com. on Rom. 4.15, CR 49.78; on 7.U, OR 49.127; on 7.13, OR 49.127
2. Ser. on Gal. 3.21-25, CR 50.545
3. Com. on Gal. 2.19, CR 50. 198
-200-
it has not the power and strength to show them what it ought.' 'The law is
then dead, ...as long as we have this foolish fancy about being righteous and.
obtaining paradise by our good works.'~ In this experience Calvin thinks of
the law becoming again the strength of sin because, although sin is not
necessarily revealed to the sinner, yet objective transgression is actually
increased. The law gives to sin 'its deadly power,' 'because it does not
merely discover our guilt but even increases it.' Sin 'is kindled up by the
2
law so as to rage furiously.' Often when Calvin refers to this 'increase'
of sin brought about by the lay/- he has primary reference to its revealing
powers, which to be precise increases guilt rather than actual transgression.
But there may be an increase of actual sin. It may be that 'our lusting'
(cupiditas) - here synonymous with concupiscence - 'is instigated through the
law so that it boils over with greater fury. ' 'The flesh is more sharply
stimulated to concupiscence by the lav/, and by this means more clearly shows
itself.' ' The restraint of the law avails so little to bridle the flesh that
it becomes rather an inducement to sin.' (peccandi incitamentum)
Exactly what does Calvin mean here? Possibly at times a spiteful
and contrary, deliberate breaking of the law just because we are forbidden
to do certain tilings. But this is not his main point. This boiling over
of concupiscence into new fury may be accompanied by reduced transgression
as far as outward actions are concerned. During the time that we are under
the law and it becomes for us 'an inducement to sin,' 'we have in the lav/
nothing but the outward letter, which indeed bridles our external actions
but does not in the least restrain the fury of our concupiscence.How may; '
it be that concupiscence increases while in conformance with the law men
become morally and formally more correct? When Calvin says that concupiscence
is increased while external transgression is reduced, he is thinking of the
1. Ser. oil Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.43f. Com. on Matt. 19.16f, CR 45.53of
2. Com. on I Cor. 15.56, CR 49.56k
5. See e.g. his conscious choice in Com. on Rom. 7.8, CR 49. 125f.
4. Com. on Rom. 7.6, OR 49.123
5. ibid.
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way in. which men take the law, wield it to earn their own salvation, and
thus employ it to the purposes of their own self-will. Men appear to demand
salvation from God as their due. Man's vain confidence, his desire to look
after himself, his concupiscence is nourished so that he now thinks he can
win heaven. The Jews in this external observance of the law 'are deluded
in hypocrisy and believe that they have purchased grace before God in
observing the law. Those then are of the law who hold by the law that they
1
are able to deserve from God the inheritance of heavenly life. '
Of course there is perhaps an extent to which men may lawfully set
out to earn their salvation, and this is something of a problem for Calvin.
Does not God openly encourage it with his legal promises, even if Ms real
motive is other? Have v/e not said that this is just what God invites them
to do, and that - although it is impossible that man should ever arrive at
his goal - this is a sincere promise. But in this case, as Calvin has taken
care to note, such righteousness would be worthy not intrinsically but from
the grace of God. It would have been wrought within the covenantal law which
God freely and graciously gave Israel. At best if he thought he had completed,
the law, man could only come to God humbly to ask the salvation he had been
promised and giving thanks that he had been chosen and allowed so to work for
his own felicity.
Here, however, we have gone far beyond such action as this. Man's self-
confidence has over-inflated itself, his concupiscence and desire to help and
care for himself rather than be helped and cared for by God has boiled over,
he seises on the law, forgets all goodness of God in condescending to him
and in favoring him with the law, and presently with unprecedented arrogance
demands salvation at the hand of God. Let us consider the law in 'the inter¬
pretation with which it has been corrupted by these hypocrites who entei'tain
themselves with some petty trash and wish to do meritorious deeds by it,' by
'those who wish to win righteousness by it.' 'To them it seems that God is
1. Ser. on Gal. 3.7-9, GR 50.485
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obligated to them when they have discharged their duty and think that they have
done it all. They hear this promise: He who does these things shall live.
Thereupon they strain themselves and think that they will succeed in accomplish¬
ing all that God requires and commands. And then, having taken hold of this
promise which is given to then, there it is just as if it were a salary. And
they never think any longer that their salvation is a free gift, but that they
have deserved and earned all this which God promised to them, so that eternal
life is to them a recompense for their merits.1 In the end 'they imagine that
they, are able to satisfy God and by this means win grace from him.'^ In effect
2
'men give themselves to believe that they are their own saviors.' But this is
3
'intolerable ingratitude.'
The rich young ruler was 'dead' to the law, he lived by it and 'vainly
imagined that he was so righteous.' "Intoxicated with foolish confidence he
fearlessly boasts that he has discharged his duty propterly from his childhood.'
The sin of the rich young ruler, Calvin reminds us, is the same as the sin of
Paul in Romans 7, which we have seen to be concupiscence. 'In the very keeping
of the law,' which 'represses all concupiscence,' in his virtues that might seem
outwardly meritorious, the young ruler had been concupiscent. In service both
to man and God he had been motivated by a hope of self-justification to 'vainly
imagine that he was so righteous' that all the while his sin had only increased.
'He dreams of merits on account of which he may receive eternal life as a reward due.
Therefore in the final analysis man* s works under law are seen as sin
not only because they are imperfect and insufficient, but also and more funda¬
mentally because the man who so lives to the law is not motivated by gratitude
and glad and selfless love of God. He is rather motivated by his own attempt
to merit 'God's favor. lie obeys that with strong self-will he might depend
on himself and not on God's grace. His works must be set aside, for he has
in self-trust and self-reliance disordered the divine order of grace.
1. Ser. on Gal. 4.21-23, OR 50.637
2. Ser. on Gal. 5.22-26, CR 51.50
3. Com. on Luke 17.7, OR 54.414. Ser. on G-en. 15.6-7, OR 23.728
4. Com. on Matt. 19.l6ff, on Mark 10.21, CR 45»536ff
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It is Calvin's insight and message for theology that all of the
moral works of men both in nature and under lav/ have to be set aside when
seen in the light of God's grace, because these are done by Jew and
Gentile in such a way as to continue to disorder the divine order of grace.
God reaches through the veil of sin to leave with the Gentiles a print of
his true order wrought out within the sphere of concupiscence. Motivated
by the central sin of mankind, his desire to be independent from God* s
gra.ce and to raise himself up apart from the lord - these Gentiles become
only greater sinners with their self-willed virtue. And like the natural
man the Jew only increases his sin. Although doubly guilty, as God's
requirements were wholly set before him, including a demand in the final
commandment to forgo all concupiscence and self-interest for a willing and
thankful obedience to God, yet in effect this law has been formalised so
that the central sin of mankind is the sin of the Jew a.s well; he hopes
to help himself to righteousness. In this both Jew and Gentile have re¬
jected God's grace by ascribing the ethical and legal virtues God. bestows
upon them to their own strength, thereby turning (God's grace into a curse.
Calvin thus basically interprets sin, ethics, and legal works, in the
light of his larger' concept of sin as that reality which inverts and cuts
off the grace of God to us. If ethical actions are interpreted as good
or bad. by a moral code, and if legal actions are seen as right or wrong
in the light of God's lay/, this must not obscure the fact that they have
also ana finally to be interpreted as righteousness or unrighteousness
according to whether they are ordered in accordance with the divine order
of grace to man and man's grateful acknowledgment of it.
And we have seen that the primary concept in Reformed thought which
has tended to obscure this larger way in which Calvin interprets moral and
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legal works in the light of 'Sod's order of grace is that of the covenant
of works. Here, where man's duty is conceived from the beginning in terras
of moral obedience provided by man with his own strength and will in order
to earn and merit salvation, it is difficult if not impossible to relate
these works of virtue and legal worth to God's grace. Hather the tendency
is to stop short of Calvin's full concept of sin and cast the whole argument
about the total sinfulness of man in nature and law into moral and legal
terras. This has led to confusion and an outlook of pessimism toward the
virtues of both Greek and Jews that does not do justice to the facts of
reality. Theology was unable to make place for the ethical virtues of a
morally depraved natural man. And man's depravity and helplessness under
the law had to be seen in terms of his lack of faculty and will in such a
way that it prejudiced his real guiltiness.
The point here is not that Calvin does not include these ways of
thought, but that he can do it in the awareness that this thought must
be subordinated to man's total depravity as his complete rejection of
God's grace- and his refusal to depend oil God. We have taken care to note
that Calvin makes room for 'Gentile virtues and describes their sin and
culpability in failing to conform to their standards of righteousness.
And in a parallel though much greater way Calvin takes as a principle
the fact that we are unable to perform the law and must interpret sin as
our failure to conform to God's law. But beyond all this and more funda¬
mentally there remains the governing concept that these works must be
examined not by ethical codes, or the moral law, but by the light of grace.
Do they rise from man's acknowledgment in gratitude and so take their place
in God's order .of grace to man, or do they rise from man's self-interest
and attempt to depend on himself in rejection of the grace of God? Theology
must once again recover Calvin's twofold way of interpreting sin in the
light of ethics and law, and then fundamentally in the light of grace.
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"VTI. Responsibility and life in Grace
In the preceding seven chapters we have tried to see how Calvin's con¬
cept of sin is to be interpreted in the light of his thought about a divine
order of grace. We have not as yet pressed the questioh of responsibility,
although we have noted that man's culpability lies in his rejection of the
grace of God, and that in the thought of Calvin he is free to do this, despite
what vre have to say about divine providence. In the last part of this study,
against the background of the sin of man, we now examine Calvin's concept
of responsibility, of what man was supposed to do in the life of grace, and
of how he is guilty for not having done this. We bring out of the concept
of sin, extend, isolate, and develope the points where responsibility is at
issue. It will here be our thesis again that the concept of responsibility
has to be interpreted in the light of the divine order of grace. The relation
between man's responsibility to God and his sin against God must be subordinated
to the grace of God and. worked out hers. In the thought of Calvin man's duty
and his obligation are to be set within this framework of the grace of 'God,
as a duty and an obligation to acknowledge God's grace and be grateful for it.
Man is responsible for responding to God's grace in such a way as faithfully
to live in it and depend on it. This is the way he was to live originally and
ideally, and this is the way he is to live now. And we have tried already to
make it clear that man's sin is his failure to respond in this way. Man strove
to raise himself up apart from God, he so dis-graced himself in God's order.
In the introductory analysis of the problems which generate such a
study as this, we saw that there are two positions over against which the
position of Calvin is to be set. Both of these are developments which
followed Calvin and obscured his thought. The first of these is contained
within the Reformed tradition in that concept of responsibility which follows
from the covenant of works. Responsibility is here seen in terms of a moral
duty and obligation to obey the law of God and by so doing to fulfil the terms
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of the covenant, to provide works of righteousness. Man is thus at the
first responsible for justifying his own right to exist. He is supposed
to be rewarded or punished on the basis of his works; he is responsible in
this way. He once had but has now lost both the ability and the will to do
these works. Nor has the covenant of works been abrogated in this respect,
for it yet expresses man's natural relation to God. The fact that man cannot
now fulfil his responsibility and must be saved by a second covenant of grace
does not mean that he is not still held responsible in this way. But here
responsibility has not been worked out in terms of the grace of God at all,
rather it is defined in terns of man's works of righteousness in the divine
order of justice. Responsibility is not interpreted in the light of an order
of grace, but in the light of a semi-autonomous man justifying himself before
divine law and in the moral order. Calvin's concept of responsibility stands
radically opposed to this concept, because man's responsibility is not that
of producing works to justify himself, but that of being grateful for the
gift of life and felicity bestowed upon him. With Calvin it is man's central
sin that he does try to depend on his own works and in so doing despises the
grace of God.
The second concept of responsibility against which Calvin's teaching is
to be set is that which obtains in moral philosophy. This we saw in the
opening chapter to be at once rather different from that of the Reformed
tradition and yet similar to it. It is here assumed that moral responsibility
is always co-relative with the freedom to do or not to do a certain thing. A
man is faced "with a situation out of which he can make good or bad. He is to
be praised as he by the choice of his free will takes one course of action
and makes, good. Or he is to be blamed if he by weakness of will chooses
the wrong. Responsibility is defined relative to man's freedom and ability.
This concept is at once different from that of the Reformed faith, in that theologj
did not continue to posit man's freedom and ability but asserted his bondage
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to sin and his inability, and yet like it, in that both conceive of a man
who by nature is or is supposed to be and originally was responsible on the
basis of his deeds, the choice of his will, and the exercise of his ability.
And here we note again that in moral philosophy responsibility is not defined
in terms of grace but with reference to man's ability and freedom. It is
this view of responsibility so prevalent in modern thought which has obscured
Calvin's notion. We must set ourselves against it in this thesis, as we now
attempt to show how Calvin works out a radically different concept of res¬
ponsibility based on the divine order of grace.
From the outset, this is an arbitrary study in a way that the investi¬
gation of his understanding of sin is not. First, Calvin makes a constant
conscious attempt to formulate a doctrine of sin; he does not in this conscious
way systematize his thought about responsibility. The difference is most
clearly illustrated when we recognize that the word sin occurs on virtually
every page that Calvin wrote, the word responsibility does not occur in the
writings of Calvin. There is no equivalent word in Latin or the French of
Calvin's time. Responsible in its pi-esent usage has developed since. The
idea had then to be expressed in simpler language parallel to our concept.
Neither is it, of course, a word found in the Bible. Secondly, we are setting
Calvin over against a position to which he did not direct himself, a position
which has in the main developed after his time. Here we must then differentiate
responsibility into patterns of thought familiar to him. Each of these con¬
cepts that fall short of a comprehensive notion of responsibility in the modern
sense may be integrated to form an understanding of human responsibility.
The elements of responsibility which are familiar to Calvin are those
of man's response to God, of man's obligation, of man's accountability, and
of man's culpability. It is in this equivalent or parallel language that he
develops his notion of responsibility. First, Calvin thinks of man's response
to God, his answerand acknowledgment to grace. This is perhaps the way in
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which it is most natural to Calvin to develop man's responsibility; man
properly responds to God -with, bis answer of trust and fidelity to depend on
grace, his obedience, and his love and gratitude for this grace. 'Woe be to
those who have the knowledge of the gospel and to whom God has communicated
himself, unless they respond to it (...sinon qu'ils y respondent...) in true
obedience and humility. * ^ When God blesses men, 'their life should answer
accordingly.'^ (...la vie respondist quant et quant.)
The second element in responsibility is obligation or duty. Calvin has
many words that are synonymous with our concept of obligation. 'A bond binds
3
and obliges (obstringo, devincio) us to God.' We have a 'solean obligation'
(obligation) to God.^ By pressing Calvin here we can see the nature of this
obligation of man to God and compare it with ideas of obligation which obtained
in the concepts following Calvin. The third element contained in responsibility
is that of accountability, or answerability. 'Every man must equally give
5
account for himself.' 'The Scripture proclaims that all our thoughts must
6 - 7
come to account.' We are 'accountable' (contable = comptable) to God.
Here we speak too of 'discharging a duty.'® We are here involved in language
which is parallel to that of the covenant of works and can set Calvin more
specifically against this later development, as we press him on the nature
of this account man is supposed to render to God. Here as well we are using
language and concepts like those of moral philosophy and can point up the
differences between Calvin and the philosophical tradition. In this way we
hope to make it clear that man's culpability, the last aspect of responsibility,
lies not in his failure to produce works of merit so much as it does in his
continual rejection of God's grace.
1. Ser. on Deut. 26.16-19, OR 28.293
2. Ser. on Deut. 4.1-2, CR 26.301
3. Com. on Luke 17*7, OR 45.414
4. Ser. on Deut. 29.9-18, CR 29.513
5. Com. on Luke 11.13, CR 45.568
6. Ser. on Sph. 5.H-14, OR 51.698
7. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, CR 35.49
8. Com. on Rom. 1.13, CR 49.22
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A. The response of the sons of God
As it was necessary to expound Calvin's concept of sin in the light of
the divine ordering of man's life, so we must understand responsibility against
the same background. God's order, which Calvin refers to as the order of
creation, consists of grace to man from the side of God and an appropriate
acknowledgment to God from man. 'At first man was formed in the image and
resemblance of God in order that man might admire his author in the adornments
with which he had been nobly vested by God and honor him with proper acknow¬
ledgment. ' It is this acknowledgment which concerns us here, for it stands
opposite man's share in the covenant of works depicted in later theology,
arid opposite the deeds of virtue by which man is to enter into the full and
good life depicted in philosophy. But we find that from the very start
Calvin defines this acknowleagpient not in terms of works but in terns of a
number of concepts that revolve about an answer of man to 'God's grace and
man's resulting life in this grace. In that we have already seen what is
man's sin, his chief act of irresponsibility, we examine this response as it
stands in antithesis to man's unbelief, infidelity, disobedience, concupiscence,
and ingratitude. 'Although the duties we owe to God are innumerable, yet they
may not improperly be classed under four general heads, adoration, a necessary
branch of which is the spiritual obedience of the conscience; trust; invocation;
2
and thanksgiving.' Man's primal duty is (l) to trust in God's goodness, (2)
to be faithful to him, (3) to obey him, (4) to love him, (5) to be grateful to him.
1. Paith (fides) as trust
This response man was in the beginning and is now to give to God is a
response of faith or trust in God's goodness. 'Confidence (fiducia = trust)
Z
proceeds from faith, (fides) as an effect from its cause,' and it is 'con-
4
f idence in God which is the mother of piety.' We must develop our confidence
in God's goodness, Calvin notes in the second of three parts of man's duty.
1. Instruction in Paith, 1537, sec. 3
2. II.8.16, CR 2.77
3. Com. on Is. 12.2, OR 36.252. Ser. on Sph. 3.9-12, CR 51.472
4. Com. on Ps. 86.2, OR 31.792
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'The sum of heavenly wisdom consists in this: (l) that men, having their hearts
fixed on God by a true and unfeigned faith, invoke him, and (2) that for the
purpose of maintaining and. cherishing their confidence in him, they exercise
themselves in meditating in good earnest upon his benefits, and (3) that then
they yield him an unfeigned and devoted obedience. We may learn from tills
that the true service of God begins with faith.1"'" 'Faith therefore is the
root of true piety. It teaches us to trust in and expect every blessing
from God, and it frames us to yield obedience to him, while all those who
p
distrust him must necessarily be ever murmuring and rebelling against him.'
And on the other side we recall that only when a belief in God's goodness
failed did the sin of Adam occur, that 'all evils arise from unbelief (in-
credulitas) and distrust.• (diffidentia)^
2. Faith as fidelity
The second way we regard man's proper response, or the life for which
he is responsible is that it is to be an acknowledgnent in fidelity to him
alone. Here we only shift emphasis from trust to fidelity, from belief to
faithfulness. Believing in God's goodness with the certainty of faith as
trust, we are faithful to him by turning nowhere else for our felicity.
We are to be faithful as we invoke God alone. Man's whole life is a larger
life of prayer, he is faithful, he has faith an he looks to God for his every
A.
need. This fidelity to invoke him alone Calvin designates as the first part
of 'the sum of heavenly wisdom,' which we just noted. The first of the three
parts of man's duty is this: 'that men, having their hearts fixed on God by
5
a true and unfeigned faith, invoke him.' Our duty is that 'we adore only
one God, that we depend 011 him for all blessings, that we confess ourselves
indebted to him, that we fly to him for all refuge, that we endeavor to
c
dedicate our whole life to him.' Here we recall Calvin's thought about
1. Com. on Ps. 78.7, GR 31*724. The numbers are added.
2. Oom. on Ps. 78.21, OR 31.729?
3. Oom. on Is. 57.13, OR 37.315
4. 3rd Ser. on Job 1.2-5, CP 33.51. Ser. on Job 22.23-31, OR 34.329
5. Com. on Ps. 78.7, OR 31.724, supra.
6. Ser. on Bph. 1.15-16, GR 51.312
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infidelity as the root sin. 'Infidelity was the root of the defection, just
as faith alone unites us to God.' So Adam was not faithful 'to claim nothing
for his own1 and 'depend wholly upon the Son of God' and not seek life anywhere
but iii him,' rather he attempted to 'rely on his own prudence.'
Calvin sums up these two principal facets of our duty to God in the
following typical statements: 'The principal thing' about the service of God
is 'that we put our whole trust in him, that we acknowledge that all our
blessings come from him, that we invoke him because of this trust, and that
2
, we render him the praise for all that which he bestows upon us.' 'The way
to honor God aright' 'is to put our whole trust in him, to study to serve
him in obeying his will, to invoke him in our necessities, seeking our sal¬
vation and all good things at his hand, and finally to acknowledge both with
heart and mouth that he is the lively fountain of all goodness.'^ Man's duty
and response to God is here clearly set forth in terms of a response to the
grace of God and a life in dependence on it.
It is important to realize here that Calvin is speaking of the duty of
man both fundamentally and in the abstract, that is, apart from considerations
of sin and redemption. Later Sefoimed theology would have been able to state
the duty of redeemed man in this way. Sut these statements are equally as
applicable to Adam in his innocence. Adam's responsibility was to be faithful
to God, as by contrast his sin was infidelity; his responsibility was to trust
in and depend on God's grace, as his sin was his distrust. Calvin sets this
forth in the definitive statement of man's response to the knowledge of God
4
in the opening section of the Institutes. Here already the concept of a
covenant of works is conspicuous by its absence. This duty of man in the
beginning is not separately stated in terms of an obligation to produce works
which stand before the justice of God. Eor is it defined as a duty to choose
the good by his own will and be praised or blamed on this basis. But Calvin
1. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39
2. Ser. on Deut. 6.13-15, CR 26.459
3. Genevan Catechism, French, 1541, 2 Sunday, GR 6.9f
4. 1.2. If, CR 2.34ff
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is beginning with man's duty both in his innocence and now in his redemption
as the duty to depend on God's grace and relate his life to it.
3. Obedience (obedientia)
Mail's response is to be an answer of obedience. 'Let us recognize that
the principal thing which we must pursue is to conform and to devote ourselves
to the obedience of faith, that is, that our life be entirely regulated by the
p 2
Word of God.' The tree in the garden was a 'test of obedience,' 1 that Adam
might not in attempting one thing or another rely upon his own prudence, but
that cleaving to God alone, he might became wise only by his obedience.' ^
'This truly is the only rule of living well and rationally: that men should
exercise themselves in obeying God.' 'Our life will then be rightly ordered
if we obey God and if his will is the regulator of our affections.'^1" 'The
chief good consists in the practice of righteousness, in obedience to the
5
commands of God.' Statements like these could be collected from the entirety
of the writings of Calvin. And again we recognize in this response of obedience
the counter motion of sin. 'As nothing is more acceptable to God than, obedience,
so nothing is more intolerable than when men, having spurned his commandments,
c
obey Satan and their own lust.' As disobedience is the wellspring by which all
sin has entered the world, so obedience is 'the mother and guardian' or 'the
origin of all virtues.'"'7
Having begun with man's response to God as that of fidelity and trust
Calvin here makes an important place for man's duty as obedience. Calvin is
then able to work out the whale concept of man's responsibility as that of
obeying the divine law, and it has been this concept that later Reformed theology
took over. Man is responsible as he obeys God's law. But it is important to
see that in Calvin this is an obedience which rises from the trust in and
fidelity to depend on God's grace that we have just examined; it takes its
lT Ser. on I Tim. 1.34-15, CR 53.86
2. II. 1.4, CR 2.178
3. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39
4. Com. on Gen. 2.16, GR 23.44f
5. II. 1.4, GR 2.179
6. Com. on Gen. 3.11, CR 23.67
"7 TT S3 C rto O r>~jr\ a T mu T II Tir rm c -z O!
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place alongside these ways of thought where God's original grace to man
governs. There is no sense of man's being obedient, in order to produce
works sufficient to justify his own existence, as the concept of duty under
the covenant of works suggests. But this obedience, as we see presently
in the discussion of obligation, comes from man's gratitude to God,
4. Self denial (sui abnegatio) and love of God (Dei amor)
The fourth way we regard the response of man is that it is to be a
response of love of 'God in denial of self. ¥e yield up our whole affection
to God. 'The whole perfection of life is often said to consist in the love
of God.' 'Our life will not be regulated aright till the love of God fill
all our senses. Let us therefore learn that the commencement of godliness is
the love of God because God disdains the fox-ced services of men and chooses
2to be worshiped freely and willingly.' Love is the chief- virtue and others
are nothing without it. Emphasis is here on the fact that man's affection
must be one away from self and toward God. In that it is a motion away from
self, it is self-denial; in that it is toward God, it is in love and adoration
3of God, This is man's acknowledgment as seen in antithesis to his concupi¬
scence and self-love. The 'carnal mind.' by nature corrupt in 'concupiscence,'
is 'so perverse that with all its affections it entertains a secret hatred
4
against God,' But we must love God, our affection and desire must be to
follow his will. 'He (Feter) sets forth the way of ceasing from sin, that
renouncing the concupiscence of men, we should study to form our life according
to the will of God.' 'Moreover Peter defines here what is the rule of right
living, even when man depends on the will of God. Fran this it follows that
nothing is right and well ordered in man's life as soon as he wanders fron this
rule. We ought further to notice the contrast between God's will and the con-
5
cupiscence of men.'
It is to real love we turn when we abandon self-love and concupiscence,
1. Com. on I John 2.9, OR 55.315
2. Com. on Matt. 22.37, CR 45.611
3. III.7.4, CR 2.508; Ser. on Sph. 6.5-9, OR 51.802
4. II. 3.1, OR 2.209. III.7.2, CR 2.506
R . nr, T P.4- I. O CO CK 071
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when we follow God's will. For God's will is that we love him. The law, which
'represses all concupiscences, * and designs 'to bring men to self-denial*
requires on the positive side the free and voluntary love of God. ^ 'Love...
truly is the rule of our whole life and of all our actions so that everything
that is not regulated according to it i3 faulty whatever attractiveness it may
otherwise possess.' ' The principal service that God demands is that we love
him... as he declares in the summary of his law: Thou shalt love the lord thy
God.' This makes us desire to follow his will and law. 'When we love him,
service is to that extent pleasant for us.' 'Instead of our concupiscences
which draw us here and there we are to have this affection which overrules,
namely, that we take more pleasure in giving ourselves to him and that we are
3
governed by his Holy Spirit to conform to his righteousness.'
That Adaia could not have been bound to God by any sort of covenant of
works is here obvious as we realize that Calvin is talking about man's primal
relationship to God when he says we must be bound by a love and willing
desire to serve him, and as we recall that man's attempt to depend on his
own works is included by Calvin as a secret form of concupiscence. Paul was
concupiscent because 'being puffed up with confidence in his righteousness,
4
he expected salvation by his works.' And the rich young ruler i3 concupiscent
because ' he dreams of merits' on account of which he may receive eternal
life as a reward due.Rather Calvin has here set man's basic duty to God
from the very start as that of a glad and loving response to his bounty.
5. Gratitude (gratitudo)
The most all embracing way we view the response of man is that it is
to be a response of gratitude. 'At first man was formed in the image and
resemblance of God in order that man might admire his author in the adornments
with which he had been nobly vested by God and honor him with proper gratitude.'
L Com. on I John 2.5, CR. 55*312. Com. on Matt. 19.20, CR 45*539f
2. Com. on Col. 3*14, OR 54.123* Com. on Ps. 18.1, CR 31*170f
3. Ser. on Gen. 22.9-14, CR 23.774?* Com. on I John 2.15ff, CR 55*318f
4. Com. on Ex. 20.17, CR 24.719
5. Com. on Matt. 19.16ff, on Mark 10.21, CR 45-53°ff
6. Instruction in Faith, 1538, sec. 4. of. French edition of 1537*
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This is the oontent of the acknowledgment man was and is to make. It is
finally obvious that Calvin does not see man's relation to God even in his
innocence as that of producing works of righteousness by which he justified
his own existence. Man has simply to be grateful to God. Here above all we
see that Calvin's starting point about man's responsibility is the grace of
God, and that he works out man's responsibility within this framework. This
is the 'thanksgiving' in Galvin's 'four general heads' of our duty to God.
We 'acknowledge that all our blessings come from him,' and 'we render him the
praise for all that which he bestows upon us.' We are 'finally to acknowledge
2
both with heart and mouths that he is the lively fountain of all goodness.'
We must 'pay homage to him for all the things that we hold of his mere goodness.'^
'As often as God helps us in our need let us understand that he requires of us
an expression of thanksgiving.'
And we recall that through his ingratitude man brought ignominy upon
himself. His primal sin was and is ingratitude. 'On account of his ingrat-
4itude man has been hurled from the summit of glory to the abyss of ignominy.'
5•Adam through his ingratitude became corrupted.' Now the nature of man
contains the seed of all evilsj sins rise out of the ignorance of God and
this ingratitude of which all men are guilty. ^
It is in these ways that Calvin develops the responsibility of man to
God. If it has here seerned strange to talk about man's duty and responsibility
to God in terms of faith, trust, fidelity, love and gratitude, rather than in
terms of what he ought to have done with his freedom and power in his primal
state, of virtues he ought to have provided, or of righteous choices he ought
to have made, this is only an index of the way in which we must get behind
these later notions of responsibility and begin at Calvin's starting point of
the grace of God. But a study of any of Calvin's statements of man's response
1. Ser. on Deut. 6.13-15, CR 26.459
2. Genevan Catechism, 1541, 2 Sunday, CR 6.9f
3. Ser. on Eph. 2.8-ID, CR 51.376
4. II. 2.1, CR 2.186
5. Ser. on Job 3.2-ID, CR 33. 344
6. Com. on I Cor. 6.11, CR 49.394
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to God reveals these same hey ideas. They are clearly integrated in the
1 2
definitive statement in the Institutes and in the Catechism. The federal
and philosophical ideas are alien to him.
B. The obligation of the sons of God
Responsibility involves a notion of obligation. We have a duty to
behave as sons of God by rendering this acknowledgment we have examined, a
response in confident belief, in fidelity, in obedience, in love of God,
and in gratitude. We turn now to the nature of this obligation. We have
seen that in all the ways Calvin thinks of man's response to God he keeps
in constant focus the grace of God. Here we note how the concept of obliga¬
tion is brought under the governing concept of the grace of 'God. Calvin
begins with the concept of our obligation to our Lord and master, and we
do not minimize this way of thought. From here we could develop the concept
of obligation in formal and legal terms. We could say that man discharged
his duty as he did certain things. Reformed theology did from here develop
the concept of God as our master and maker who judged our works and who
obligated us to serve him with deeds of virtue and works of merit. But
Calvin brings these notions under our obligation as sons to our father. And
we see in contrast to the notions of moral philosophy how the concept of
obligation is extended from formal service demanded by a divine imperative
to the glad and willing response of a son to a father. Man is not created
into a situation where he is bound rightly to use his freedom and will in
order to maintain the moral order, but he is bound to God by a glad and,
selfless love and desires nothing more than to do his will.
1. Creator and creature
There are several ways we are bound to God. To begin with, we are
obligated as creatures to our creator. In the consideration of why we worship
and serve him, 'we must here proceed by degrees, (aegrez) First, we must
understand that since God has honored us by making us his creatures, we are
i: i.2. i-2," GR 2.34ff» also I. lit-. 22, OR 2.133^ '
2. Catechism, ad loc. cit., Ser. on Eph. 3.34-19, C3R 51.494
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]_
already bound to him, though there were no other reason.' 'As soon as he
begins to exist, he is already by right of creation so much indebted to his
2
maker that he has nothing of his own.1 It is then our duty to give our¬
selves to God because he lias given us life. 'God, as he is our creator,
justly sustains toward us the character of a father and of a Lord; and on
this account we owe to him glory and reverence, love and fear. Moreover,
we are not at liberty to follow everything to which the violence of our
passions may excite us, but we ought to be attentive to his will and to
practice nothing but what is pleasing to him.' 'Righteousness and rectitude
are a delight, but iniquity and abomination to him, and therefore unless we
will with impious ingratitude rebel against our maker, we must necessarily
spend the whole of our lives in the practice of righteousness.' 'Whatever
he requires of us...we are under a natural obligation to obey.
2. Master and servant
",7e are obligated to God as servants to our master. The figure here is
changed from a creature and creator relationship to that of a servant and master,
but.this second idea is implicit in the first as we say that God is the Lord.
God is our ruler and king. Calvin recognizes these two separately, but
usually incorporates the two into one. God is our maker and Lord. This is
the first consideration why we obey him. This stands preliminary to the
second consideration: that he is our father. God 'justly sustains toward
us the character of a father and of a Lord: and on this account we owe to
4 5him glory and reverence, love and fear.' There are 'two considerations'
involved in the reason we must obey him. We think of a debt of money, or
the debt of a slave to his master. 'Since we with all that belongs to us
are indebted to his majesty, whatever he requires of us, he most justly
T, Ser. on Job 35.8-11, CR 35.240
2. Com. on Rom. 11.35, CR 49.231f. 1.2.2, CR 2.7M
3. II. 8.2, CR 2.267, CR 2.276
4. ibid.
5. II. 8.24, CR 2.276
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demands as the payment of a debt. • ^ This is the language of accountability,
which we examine presently. Or, we recall the parable of the unprofitable
servants. 'A bond of servitude no less rigorous binds and obliges us to serve
2
God.1 There is a real way in which we are bound to God like this.
But we are not to think of a Christian's obligation principally in these
terms. We must go beyond this. As a manner of fact, the x-esponse of obedience
3which issues from this type of obligation only is not acceptable to God.
Fully to be acceptable obligation is to be pitched not on a plane of mere
forced service to God - this is only to 'serve God halfway' - but for real
obedience there must be obligation on a plane of glad, free, willing love to
God. 'The principal service that God demands is that we love him, for servile
fear when we tremble before his majesty and do unwillingly that which he com¬
mands is nothing. God will reject all this. True, sometimes he seams to accept
a forced obedience, but this is not what he approves. This is done by way of
(outward) example, but at the same time he rejects persons when they do not
have a will sincere and free.
'The principal thing in our life is to love God, as he declares in the
summary of his law: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, he says. He could have
used the word fear but this would not have been enough, because as I have
already said we would serve God only halfway, if we were motivated by the author¬
ity which he has over us. That would be only smoke. But when we love him,
4
service is to that extent pleasant for us.' 'This servile fear is full of
5
perverseness. ' God lias to 'recede from the strictness of his claims' to accept
c
•obedience which is not performed spontaneously as if it were not a duty.'
3. Father and son
The second consideration in our obligation to God is found in our
1. II.8.4, OR 2.268. Ser. on Deut. 6.4-9, OR 26.436ff
2. Gom. on Luke 17.7, OR 45.414
3. Com. on Ps. 1. If, GR 31.39; Ser. on Job 1.1, OS 33«33f
4. Ser. on Gem 22.5-14, GR 23.774^. Ser. on Deut. 8.3-9, OR 26.609
5. Com. on Jonah 1.16, GR 43*230. Ser. on Deut. 6.4-7, CR 26.439ff; on Deut.
19.8-13, GR 27.558f; on Bph. 6.5-9, CR 51.8026. II. 3.4, GR 2.268
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relationship as sons to our father. Beyond our giving him service because
of his right and authority, service must be rendered in love and gratitude.
If we are to serve him all the way and not just halfway, we are bound to
serve him not only by necessity, but as sons. God always goes beyond re¬
quiring obedience on the plane of the servant. 'After having shown that he
has a right to command and that obedience is his just due, that he may not
appear to constrain us by necessity alone, he sweetly allures us by pronounc¬
ing himself the Cod of the church.' It is a matter of 'the mutual relation
which is contained in that promise, I will be their God and they shall be my
1
people.' This notion added to that God as lord and maker is the second of
2
our 'degrees' of obligation. 'As we see that God is never weary of showing
himself liberal toward us, and that this fountain always flows in so many
streams as to satisfy us in all things, we can only show continuously how we
3
are bound and indebted to a father so good and kindhearted.' God says, I
dealt kindly with you for this very purpose: that you might be mine, for he
who has been redeemed by another's kindness is no longer his own. God had re¬
deemed that people, and redemption brought with it an obligation, (obligatio) by
which the people were bound willingly to submit to God as their ruler and king.
It is of the highest significance that obligation as a servant is given
in subordination to obligation as a son, and is of itself not enough. 'Ee
says by his prophets, (Hal. 1.16) If I am your father, where is the love that
you should bear me? Especially does he attribute this tern love to a father.
Now he puts also in its turn the word master, but above all he names a father,
and not without cause. For if we know God only as our superior, it is certain
that we will be motivated to serve him, but as I have already said, this will
only be a servile fear. Now the principal thing is that we hold him for our
father, and that we be as it were delighted to conform ourselves to his will,
1. II.8.14, OH 2.27S. Ser. on Deut. 5.4-7, OS 2o.252ff
2. Ser. on Job 35.8-11, OR 35.240f. Ser. on Deut. 8.1-4, OR 26.584ff
3. Ser. on.Eph. 5.18-21, CR 51.728
4. Gom. on Jer. 2.20, Gil 37.519
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since he has been pleased to adopt us fox- his children. It is from this that
voluntary reverence proceeds.' 'Thus we note well that for our life to be
approved of God, and for it to be well regulated, it is not only necessary
that we do that which he commands, but that we desire also to do it.
Thus there is a twofold way in which sanction is given to what God
requires of us; God's sheer authority over us as our master and makex-, and
our love to him for his fatherly relationship to us. According to the'pre¬
face' to his law, 'God supports the authority of his law in two ways. For
first, it ought to be a powerful excitement to the worship of God when we
are fully convinced that we worship the actual creator of heaven and earth,'
'and secondly, because it is a pleasing inducement to love him when he freely
2
adopts us as his people.' 'He exhibits a premise of grace, to allure than by
its charms to the pursuit of holiness. He reminds the Israelites of his favox-,
to convict them of ingratitude if they do not conduct themselves in a manner
corresponding to his goodness.' ^
It is important to notice that we are not only talking about the obliga¬
tion of redeemed sinners, but also the primal obligation of man. This is the
way Adam was bound to God. While God does threaten punishment, yet this is not
his deepest basis of obligation. 'The kind commemoration of the gifts of God'
'was to retain in his duty' this first son of God. 'To the end that Adam might
4
the more willingly comply, God commends his own liberality.' A true child of
God, Calvin notes, 'even though there were no hell, would shudder and the
thought of offending him.
4. Discharged obligation?
There can be no question here of the type of obligation where man enters
into felicity as he discharges his obligation. If we think of obligation in
this way we come face to face again with the fact that God has given man all
1. Ser. on Sen. 22.9-14, OR 23.774f. Can. on MaL 1.6f, OR 44.439f
2. Com. on Matt. 22.37, OR 45.611. Com. on Ex. 20. Iff, CR 24.209ff
3. II.8.13, CR 2.275f. II.8.15, CR 2.276; Inst, of 1536, ch. I, pag 5If,
CR 1.31f; Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 8.
4. Com. on Sen. 2.16, OR 23.44f
5. 1.2.2, CR 2.35
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that he is, has, and does. So any fulfilling of our obligation which would in
turn obligate God to us is absurd. 'All the zeal that may be manifested by us
in discharging our duty does not obligate him to us by a.ny sort of merit, for
as we are his property so he on his part can owe us nothing.' ^ Any promise in
the law is a free one where God obligates himself to us upon the condition that
we discharge our obligation to him. But it is not God's intent that we come to
felicity this way, indeed is impossible. Even if it should happen, we -would
2
still be saved by grace. This is obligation under law from which we have been
3
released.
It is true that only as man responds does he retain eternal life and the
gifts of God. We have a 'debt of gratitudelaid on us at birth. But even if
we were innocent we could not think of these gifts as coming because man has
discharged his obligation.^ Rather life and felicity is given us, we have only
to acknowledge it. This is not to discharge an obligation and justify the
blessings having been given us. Bar from God's grace being any sort of reward
as we discharge our duty, it only renews our obligation. 'The kindness and
liberality which God exercises toward us are so far from giving us a right to
swell with foolish confidence that we are only laid under deeper obligation to
him. Whenever we meet with the word reward, or whenever it occurs to our re¬
collection, let us look upon this as the crowning act of the goodness of God to
us, that though we are completely in his debt, he condescends to enter into a
bargain with us.'b And this bargain is that we discharge our duty precisely
as we confess that we cannot discharge our duty. ' We are not cognizant enough
toward God if from year to year, month to month, day to day, hour to hour, we
are not careful to acknowledge his graces and render to him the sacrifice he
requires of us, that is, that we affirm that we are wholly his, that we hold
all from him, and that it is impossible for us to discharge the hundredth part
1. Com. on Luke 17.7, OR 45.413f. Ser. on Deut. 6.4-9, CR 26.432ff
2. ibid.; Ser. on Sph. 6.1-4, CR 51.795 and see earlier on the law.
5. III.19.2, GR 2.6l3f
4. Com. on Ps. 50.14f, CR 31.501. Gom. on Rom. 1.18, OR 49*22
5. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, GR 35.48
6. Com. on Luke 17.7, GR 45*414. Com. on Mai. 2.4, CR 44«431ff
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of our duty.' 'It is an inestimable goodness to us that he discharges us of all
that we owe to him in return for our affirming that we are bound end obligated
2
to him and that we cannot discharge ourselves of it.'
5. Obligation and gratitude
The most advanced kind of obligation in the life of a believer - a type
without which obligation is fulfilled only halfway - appears as he meditates
on the goodness of God. There must be an obligation characterized by wil¬
lingness and freedom. Where obligation is not pleasant, where man's inclination
differs from his obligation, we are not yet operating with a truly redeemed
notion of responsibility. 'We know that the more favor God shows to us, the
more we ought to be incited to love and fear him. God has shown himself bene¬
ficial to us, now ought this not draw us the more to him? Yes. For if we
bind a mortal man to us by our well doing, he will be thought ungrateful if he
does not acknowledge the good that we have done him. And how much less are we
to be excused if we do not so to the giving God?' 'Consider what you have from
him, think of all the benefits which he has bestowed upon you to this hour. Let
every man examine himself to see how much he is bound to God that we may be the
more inflamed to love him.* He has created us, redeemed us, drawn us to him,
and daily blesses us. 'Seeing then that our Lord does not cease to confirm us
daily in his grace, let us on our side see that we take occasion in this to
serve him more earnestly. ' ^
Man's truest obligation is not in terms of a life dominated by rules
that command obedience that we may earn God's favor, a life of merit or
reward, of censure or blame. It is not this way in the Christian faith
and it was not this way in the beginning. This responsibility under sin or
law can only lead to bondage and idolatry. We have been set at liberty to
'a higher principle,' restored to a right and primal relation to God as sons
to a father. We must free ourselves from responsibility as a duty we have to
1. Ser. on Sph. 5.18-21, OR 51*727. Ser. on Deut. 6.10-13, 0R 26.449f
2. Ser. on Sph. 5.18-21, OR 51.732. Ser. on Deut. 32.11-15, OR 28.702f
3. Ser. on Deut. 4.44-5.3, CR 26.239- Com. on I Thes. 2.12f, CR 52.150f
Com. on Ps. 23.5, CR 34241; on Deut. 10.14f, CR 24.221 et al.
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be pleasing to God that he may be favorable to us. This is a sub-Ghristian
plane of obligation. We live in a Christian 'liberty' which leads to 'a will-
1
ing obedience to righteousness.' 'Ho other worship is pleasing to him than
what is voluntary.' 'God disdains the forced services of men and chooses to be
2
worshipped freely and willingly.' 'Everyone who has tasted of God's goodness
3
so orders himself as to obey God.' Men are to observe a 'continual Sabbath all
their life long,' where they rest from their works and efforts, put aside concup¬
iscence and self-will, and quietly and peacefully serve 'God and depend on his
goodness.
In his notion of obligation for the man in Christ Calvin re-asserts his
concept of the responsibility of primal man. Man is placed again - this time
by redemption in Christ - on a position of blessedness. He freely receives
all in the grace of God. He no longer needs to obey as under sin or law in
discharging a duty, in self-justification, or to earn salvation. G-race and
mercy stimulate a desire for obedience. 'A godly heart is formed to the
obedience of God not so much by any precepts nor by sanctions, but rather by
the serious meditating upon the goodness of God toward him.' 'Men can never
seriously worship God, nor be sufficiently stimulated to his reverence and
obedience until they know how much they are indebted to his mercy.' 'That
he might obligate us to God not with a servile fear but with a voluntary and
cheerful love, Paul persuades us with the sweetness of his grace, which con¬
tains our salvation.' We are to be 'charged with ingratitude, unless having
experienced such a bountiful and liberal father, we endeavor in our turn to
5
dedicate ourselves wholly, to him.' 'There is no sacrifice which he values
i
more than when we are bound fast to him by the chain of a free and spontaneous
love.' ' In Calvin's thought the whole concept of man's obligation to God must
1. Com. on II Pet. 2.19, CR 55-469f. III. 19.4, OR 2.615?
2. Com. on Matt. 22.37, CR 45.611. Ser. on Hph. 6.5-9, CR 51.802
3. Com. on Hos. 3.2, GR 42.265
4. Com. on Rem. 12.1, CR 49.233. Ser. on Deut. 4.1-6, . CR 33.185f
5. Com. on Rom. 12.1, CR 49.233. Ser. on Deut. 4.44-5.3, CR 26.239ff
6. Con. on Ps. 18.1, CR 31.170
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be brought under God's grace and man* s response to it.
0. The accountability of the Sons of God
Responsibility involves a notion of accountability. Man is responsible,
he will be called to account by God. Each will stand or fall according to
whether he is accounted righteous. We are here using a language that is common
to both later Refomed theology in the idea of a covenant of works, and to
moral philosophy. In these, man is called to account for his works. If he has
rightly employed his abilities and chosen the good, he ought to be rewarded.
If he has failed to do so, he is to be censured. Though the theologians and
philosophers differed as to man's ability and freedom, yet the concept of
man's basic accountability is similar. But we now see that Calvin does not
discuss accountability in these terms. There is absolutely no case where man
is to be rewarded for his deeds even in theory, for man is not to live by his
works, but by grace. All of his goodness even in his innocence and rectitude
comes immediately from God; it is not man's responsibility to render account
and be rewarded for his actions, it is for man to be responsible as he acknow¬
ledges God's grace, depends on it, and is grateful for* it. And where man fails
and is to be censured, he is not punished so much for his lack of independently
effected good works, as he is for having cut off God's grace to him and despised
it. Thus Calvin brings the whole notion of accountability under the governing
principle of God's grace to man and man's response to it.
1. An account of merit and ability?
We must begin with the recognition that it is not the place of man to
live by his own righteousness. The sons of God are not to present an account
of what they have accomplished with the gifts of God and look for felicity on
the grounds of the profit, fruition, or increase of these gifts. We do not
effectuate our felicity but receive it from God. This is true with man in
integrity as well as with those redeemed from guilt. 'God has made man
upright.' 'He was favored with rectitude by the divine goodness.' ^ He had
1. II. 1.10, CR 2.184
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only to receive his inheritance of eternal life as he gave it proper acknow¬
ledgment. Only in this secondary sense of being accountable for retaining
it can. we say that men are accountable for their eternal life. This we
examine presently. But initially man is not put on his own account, he is
not by fulfilling the law of God in skill, dexterity, or strength of will
to provide the credit with which to effect his own felicity.
It may not be objected - as federal theology has indicated - that believers
do receive free grace in this way, that when man proved himself not able to
render account, God's grace superabounded to give what he had before required,
but that in the beginning Adam was placed on account that he might be rewarded
eternal life on the basis of his deeds. The Adamic relationship to God was
not this way. 'At that time when man was exalted to the most lienorable
eminence, the Scripture attributes nothing to him but that he was created
after the image of God, which certainly implies that his happiness consisted
1
not in any goodness of his own, but in a participation of God. * 'Let us
put the case that we were in the integrity in which our father Adam was at
the first. Should we then presume it was of ourselves under the illusion
that God had ennobled us in this way? Low we hold everything from him. '
' ITould we have it through our own dexterity? Would we have got it by our
own strength? (vertu) ITo.' But we would have it because God had given it
2
to us through his own free goodness. ' Adam's righteousness was as much the
gift of God as ours, he did good only insofar as God continued to empower him.
'Adam had need of being gifted with that fortitude and constancy with which
the elect of God are gifted whom God wills to keep safe and sound from falling.' ^
'Let us recognize then that the praise is due to him that we may not defraud
him of that which belongs to him. For if we should live as perfectly as angels
and yet have the foolish idea that this came from our own free will and of our
movement, then we would miss the principal thing. To what end serve all our good
1. II. 2.1, GR 2.186. Com. on Gen. 2.9, GR 25.39
2. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, OR 35.48
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works lest it be that God in them is glorified? But if we thiol; ourselves
the author of them, we see that they are corrupted in so doing, and are converted
into vices, so that they are nothing more than ambition.'"*"
This is the notion of accountability that man assumes for himself, as
he moves in sin to take care of himself, to be wise in his own strength, to
judge, select, and obtain good and evil for himself and thus attend to his
own needs. We think 'we can co-operate so that when it comes to the
2
reckoning (conte = compte) the principal part will always be found in us.'
'Having trusted such a great excellence of his nature and having forgotten
from whom it had come and by whom it subsisted, man strove to raise himself
3
up apart from the Lord.' Adam's sin was that he thought he was able to do
this and that with his own wisdom, free will, and virtue.^ This particular
aspect of rendering account most easily conceived by us is the very type
which is not at all permissible. 7Te are prone by nature to think of our
rendering such an account as by our good or bad deeds to gain for ourselves
reward or censure. 'Such is the wicked ambition that belongs to our nature
that when the question related to the origin of our salvation, we quickly
5form diabolical imaginations about our own merits.' But this is the type
of accountability into which we fell and from which we have been released,
which we served while we were under sin and law. We may in no way assume
responsibility for any merit, even a meritorious proper acknowledgment and
gratitude which renders efficacious the grace of God. 'Two errors must be
avoided: the legitimate use of the grace first bestowed must not be said to
be rewarded with subsequent degrees of grace, as though man by his own
industry rendered the grace of God efficacious, nor must it be accounted a
remuneration in such a sense as to cease to be esteemed the free favor of God.'°
1. Ser. on Eph. 1.4-6, CR 51.274
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¥e speak of God's keeping an account of the deeds of man to bless him
for them only in the loosest way, in such a way that his free grace permeates
and overrides all. Though we can really bring nothing to him worthy of account,
yet 'God receives the thing at our hand which is worth nothing, and puts our
items of work as it were into his books of account,' but in spite of that,
'they are acceptable to him through his own goodness,' and 'we see then
1
how gracious he does show himself to us.'
2. An account of acknowledgment
Rather Adam was given only a dependent and subordinate accountability.
His duty was to acknowledge the felicity and inheritance of eternal life he
had been given by returning to God his gratitude and obedience. 'At first man
was formed in the image of God in order that he might admire his author in the
adornments with which he had been nobly vested by God and honor him with
2
proper gratitude.' In this he is held accountable, dn the basis of this he
retains ox- forfeits eternal life. 'He at the time when he possessed his life
in safety, had it only as deposited in the Word of God, and could not otherwise
retain it, than by acknowledging that it was received from him.'^ This is a
very real accountability, but it is a very different one from being held initial¬
ly responsible for coming to felicity, or for making efficacious the gifts of God.
As it is to a similar thankful acknowledgment of God's life and blessing
that the sons of God are today held responsible, when he restox-es us to the
life in grace, we examine the nature of this account more thoroughly in the
general terms of man's acknowledgment to God. 'The principal sacrifice that
God requires is that men acknowledge his benefits, that they pay homage to
him, and that then these should excite men to do their duty. ' 'For why are
we fed by his gpodxxess, why oh short does; he asitwere put out our eyes with the
great number of benefits that he bestows upon us, unless it is to the end. that we
1. Ser. on Job 35*1-7, OR 35.229. Gom. on Rom. 2.6, GR 49* 34; on Ps. 62.12,
CR 31.592JP; on Mai. 3.I7, OR 4U482ff
2. Instruction in Faith, 1538, sec. 3
3. Gom. on Gen. 2.9, GR 23.397. Gom. on John 1.4, GR 47.5
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should 3d.eld seme acknowledgeat (recognoissance) of them to him? For,
as it is said in the Psalm, we can from our side (de nostre coste) bring no
profit to him, rather he requires in exchange nothing other than this act of
thanksgiving, as it is said in Psalm 116: What shall I render to the Lord
for all the benefits which I have received from him, unless I take the cup
of salvation at his hand and call upon his name? This then is what we have
1
to bring to God: that we .confess ourselves bound to him for all things.1
2
This is the 'solemn record' we have to yield to him.
gratitude in yielding to .God the praise which is his due is regarded
by him as a singular recompense.' ^ 'For seeing that we can bring no recompense
to God, at least we can pay homage to him for the things that we hold of his
mere goodness, and when he sees us so humbled, he is content with such a pure
and simple confession as this. But if there is such an ingratitude in us to
usurp the thing that is properly his, certainly it is a just punishment for
him to reject us entirely.'^" 'Inasmuch as we can bring God neither profit
nor loss, he is content if we praise his name. For even if we should employ
all our ability, what is in us with which God might be enriched or given some
advantage? For he gives all things and needs nothing. It is an inestimable
goodness to us that he discharges us of all that we owe to him in return for
our affinning that we are bound and obligated to hirri and that, we cannot dis¬
charge ourselves of it. Then if we come in all humility to him to confess
the obligation that we have to God this and nothing more is the payment
(payement) that he requires of us.
'Our Lord calls us gently to him, he wishes to win us by such kindness,
and therefore if we do not deign to come to him that which we receive at
his hand will cost us right dearly. It is true that God asks no payment
1. Ser. on Bph. 1.1-3, CR 51.252. Ser. 011 Deut. 32.11-15, CR 28.702f
2. Ser. on Job 22.23-30, OR 34.330. Com. on Hbs. 14. If, OR 42.500f
3. Com. on Ps. 204.31, CR 32.96. Com. on Ps. Il6.12f, GR 32.197**
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(payement) from us, for we can bring him nothing. But yet as our duty he would
have us render an expression of thanksgiving to him. If we do not do this,
the sacrilege must be laid to our charge that we have ravaged the blessings
of God, for being in no way his children. For what right do we have to enjoy
them unless it is that he is our father.? ' 'What remains but that our lord
enter into account (entrer en conte) with us, if we on our part (de nostre
part) do not desire to serve him, and if the ease and rest which he has given
us is not applied to the end that we truly show that we hold him for our father,
inasmuch as he treats us as his children. If, I say, we do not acknowledge
1
this, then our ingratitude will not go unpunished.* 'How according sis God
has extended himself toward us, so must we extend our hearts to serve him,
that we may be fully devoted to his love. For by all the blessings which we
receive at his hand we ought to be inflamed to come to him. We have in them
a taste of his goodness to draw us to him. If then we do not make worthy the
graces of God, to love him, and be as it were delighted in him, it is certain
2
that we must render a dreadful account for it.' It is this accountability
for acknowledgment and gratitude that is given to sons of God.
3. Accountability and free will
We must now ask ourselves, in the light of what we have said to be man's
responsibility, how Galvin conceives of man's power and will in the beginning,
to see this in contrast to the notions of moral philosophy. There is a sense
in which Calvin may ascribe a free will to Adam in the beginning. Adam was
free either to remain in rectitude or to sin.' ^ 'It was possible for him not
to sin.' (posse non peccare)^1" Galvin seems, at least in controversy, to grant
to man in integrity a type of choice. It is possible to isolate a few passages
in Galvin where his language might suggest the concept of responsibility later
to be found in the covenant of works or developed in moral philosophy. Faced
1. Ser. on Deut. 6.30-13, CR 26.450f. Ser. on Tit. 1.15-16, CR 54.A8 3
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with a passage from Ecclesiasticus, he concedes the point that man at his
creation had some choice, but maintains that he now has lost it. 'The writer
(of Ecclesiasticus) says that man, as soon as he was created, was left in the
power of his own determination (in manu consilii sui); that precepts were
given to him, which if he kept, he should also be kept by then; that he had
life and death, 'rood and evil set before him; and that whatever he desired
would be given him. Let it be granted that man at his creation was endowed
with the faculty of choosing (facultas adipiscendae) life or death.' But
1 we reply that he has lost it.' ^ In the fall Adam exercised his free will to
precipitate his descendants into a state where free will was lost. Tie are
not free to live in rectitude or to sin.
But as we press the question, it is clear that Galvin does not mean that
man in integrity was supposed to have independent power or free will. Adam
was not to live by the exercise of his will as he close the good and not the
evil. Interestingly, Galvin is uneasy about what is taught by this passage
in Lcclesiasticus. Calvin replies not only to his opponents 'but also to
Ecclesiasticus himself, whoever he may be: If you design to teach man to
seek within himself a power (facultas) to attain salvation, your authority
is not so great in our estimation as to obtain even the smallest degree of
2
credit in opposition to the undoubted Word of God.' While man in integrity
was given to will, he was not given an autocratic power to determine
intrinsically and apart from God. He was given to will only in confrontation
with and in answer to the grace of God, in such a way that in his answer he
ascribed nothing to himself, but rested wholly on the objective necessity of
God's presence and strength. Man could only act in response and corresponding
to the grace presented to him. He himself was not to create by his own will
some higher good out of the gifts with which God had endowed him. He was not
put on his own account. As man can know only according and corresponding to
1. II.5.18, CR 2.245
2. ibid.
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the object that is presented to him - his rational faculties have no creative
power to create certain forms out of something formless - so man can will
only according and corresponding to the necessity that arises out of a
confrontation with the objective reality. His faculty to will does not have
and is not supposed to have a power to create good. Calvin is clear here
that man not only does not have a free will and choice in the sense demanded
by moral philosophy but that he was not supposed to have it so. His will
was always to be allied with and supported by divine grace. It was not sup¬
posed to be free and autonomous but to be determined by God's grace. And
likewise man's power and ability was always to be that of God's grace
within him, he was not supposed to have power, virtue, or ability of his
own. Where moral philosophy defined responsibility with reference to man's
freedom and ability, Calvin relates it to the grace of God.
Calvin teaches in fact that it 7/as when Adam first attempted to exercise
free will like this to choose for himself seme good, to determine some good,
to create good by his own choice, that he fell. The 'tree of the knowledge
of good and evil' is 'free will' (voluntatis arbitrium = choice of the will)
and when Adam reached for it, he sinned. Calvin teaches that independence
of this sort to be able to do good is what man desires in sin. 'The devil
has never ceased since the beginning of the world to inflate men with some
foolish opinion about their own wisdom and about their virtue, (vertu = 1 strength)
'For he cast down the human race by this cunning and now he yet endeavors to
make us believe that we are able to do this and that. Paul then had to strip
men of this false and cursed idea about their free will (franc-arbitre) and
about their own virtue, and show them that they are bound to the Holy Spirit
2 fifor all.' Por if we should live as perfectly as angels and yet have the
foolish idea that this came frcrn our own free will and of our own movement,
then we would miss the principal thing.' If God is not glorified by our good
1. II. 2.9, CR 2.193
2. Ser. on Eph. 1.13-15, CK 51.305. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, OR 35.48
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works, 'if we think ourselves the author of them, we see that they are cor¬
rupted in so doing, and are converted into vices, so that they are nothing
more than ambition. ' ^ 'He who attributes seme free will to himself and who
presumes that he has seme means and faculty (faculte) to do good of himself"
2
certainly wishes to step into the place of God and show himself to be creator.'
Calvin follows here the Augustinian distinction between arbitrium (will
or choice) and voluntas, (will) Man has a faculty of willing, (voluntas)
but it is only when this will is turned by the grace (gratia) of God toward
the good that man makes a choice (arbitrium) of the good. This is the case
with man in his integrity, with fallen man, or with redeemed man. But this
happens in the thought of Calvin (who differs here slightly from Augustine)
in such a Yra.y that the responsibility for this choice (arbitrium) rests
entirely upon grace and not upon man's will, (voluntas)^1" We do not ascribe even to
man in integrity, or to redeemed man, much less to fallen man, a free choice or
will," (liberum abritrium)
_ For, as we have seen, it was when Adam in his in¬
tegrity did ascribe to himself this free will (liberum arbitrium = franc-
arbitre) that he fell. Man does not 'turn himself hither or thither at
the free choice of his own will. ' (liberum voluntatis suae arbitrium;^ If we
forsake the grace (gratia) of God - which we do as soon as we ascribe the
smallest credit to man himself - the choice (arbitrium) of the 'will (voluntas)
brings death. The will turns on itself and becomes concupiscent, or self-
g
willed. Thus man is not responsible as he is free and able, as moral
philosophy would have it, but he is responsible only as he responds to grace,
as he is ennabled and has his actions determined by it.
'If a man should live devoutly, and if he were a mirror of holiness
and of all virtue, it might be said, He has done this and that. And in fact
we are not as tree trunks, and so we do do good. But we must recognize that
1. Ser. on Eph. 1.4-6, CR 51.274. II. 2.10, CR 2.194
2. Ser. on Eph. 2.8-ID, CR 51.380f
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thia comes from somewhere else and not of ourselves. This is the gist of the
case. Then when it is asked, Can men do good? Yes, but not of themselves
and not their own movement or of their own nature, but only Inasmuch as they
are led to it by the Spirit of 'Sod. If someone asks, Oan men do evil? They are
wholly addicted to it, it is their common path. So men do evil of themselves,
the root of it resides in them, and the guilt for it as well is rightly im¬
puted to them.' 'Whoever has done evil will always abide in his condemnation,
but let us well consider that God works in us when we do good, and the praise
for it ought rightly to be attributed to him.' 'There is nothing in us and on
our side (de nostre coste) when we serve God.' 'We must take care that the
grace of God is not darkened as we think ourselves to have done this or that.
2
It is then necessary that man attribute nothing at all to themselves.'
Men may be responsible for their evil, as they indeed are when they resist
the grace of God, but on the other hand they may not be responsible for their
good, for neither in the beginning in a state of integrity, nor as a sinner,
nor now as redeemed has man been given the faculty to do any sort of gpod. We
may not maintain 'that men by the exercise of their own will, are free to
choose either good or evil. When God charges men with obstinacy, we must not
on that account believe that he describes the nature or extent of their ability.'
Yet we do ascribe to him doing evil when he thwarts or inverts the grace of God.
'It is therefore true that it is a special gift of God when a man aims at what
is good, but it is equally true that it is their own wickedness that hinders
the reprobate from applying their mind to it, and consequently that the whole
blame of their obstinacy rests with themselves.' God would give to all men -
including the reprobate - that special gift of God by which a man aims at what
is good, but their own wickedness hinders the reprobate from applying it. 'For
since God is by nature disposed to acts of kindness, nothing but our ingratitude
and enmity hinders us from receiving that goodness which he freely offers to all.'^
1. Ser. on Hph. 6. 10-12, OR 51.835
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We may now integrate these notions of man's response, of his obligation
and of his accountability, draw from this Calvin's understanding of man's
responsibility, and restate it in modern language, bearing in mind the
positions which are to be contrasted with Calvin. We must take into full
recognition the fact that man is put into a father and son relationship.
1
' tThiie we are his creatures, yet we are his children as well.' This means
immediately that man is not independently responsible, but is given responsibility
only within this sonship. Both sides of this fact are important. To begin
with, we recognize that God has taken upon himself a certain responsibility
for man, it is his will and intent to be a father to man. In his own free¬
dom and with great grace God chose to create man, to place him in an earthly
paradise, to give him the hope and inheritance of eternal life, to promise
and guarantee ever to care for man by sustaining him and providing for his
needs. Man was rich before his birth.
And even after man in irresponsibility forfeited his riches God did not
forsake this responsibility toward man. He might have, but rather he chose
to extend his obligation, his grace has superabounded and assumed the new
responsibility to provide fox* man's redemption and restoration to grace.
Thus from the very start right through the whole of the history of mankind
God has proved himself more than responsible, he has been a father to man in
ways unprecedented in earthly fatherhood. And now man is called once again
in a way not essentially different from, though far greater than that of the
first creation to let God be a father to him. Man remains positioned in
creation so that he is supposed to find life as he receives it from the hand
of another, as a free gift from one who is his lord, his master, but above
all his father. We have thus from the vex-y start put responsibility in the
framework of divine grace, which, stands opposite the starting points of moral
1. Ser. on Deut. 4.1-2, CR 26.10If
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philosophy ana of federal theology. While God's role in these other concepts
of responsibility is primarily that of creator, Lord, master, and judge,
with Calvin he is first our father.
On the other side is the fact that man is to be a son. 'Just as it has
pleased him to give himself to us, so we on our side should be wholly his mid
render him the duty which children owe to their father.' This implies the
essential relationship of dependence which is given to man and written into
his order of existence. It defines him as one who does not stand, alone, but
as one who leans upon, who draws strength and security from another. Man is
not given existence as a free agent by a lord who then leaves hini on his own,
but he is given existence in sonship. This means that he is given a limited
responsibility worked out within this larger relationship of dependence upon
another's being responsible for him. He is not ultimately responsible for
taking care of himself, but only dependently responsible for properly living
as a child of God. Lor does he some day grow up to became of age so that he
no longer needs a father and can look out for himself. By contrast moral
philosophy thinks in terms of a man who is independent, a free agent deter¬
mining good for himself and depending on his choice to bring him to the good
life. And federal theology thinks of a man who was at first to live by his works.
Sons, however, do have a real responsibility. There is nothing that we
need do for ourselves. He is a perfect father to us. But this very care for
us gives rise to something we must do. We are to acknowledge the gifts of God
to us. We are to express our gratitude. Adam is given to 'retain' the life
2he possessed in safety by 'acknowledging that it was received from him.'
Man's responsibility is to be found in this way in which he answers God by
accepting his gifts to him, in this acceptance and in this appreciation he
acts responsibly. 'As our duty he would have us render an expression of
thanksgiving to him. '3 'This and nothing more is the payment that he requires
X. Ser. on Deut. 1.1-3, OR 25.612
2. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.29, supra
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-236-
of us.'1
As sons of God we are responsible to him. But vie are not given, a direct
and immediate responsibility for ourselves. We are not to assume full res¬
ponsibility for our well being. This is what man tried to do in his sin —.
2
he 'strove to raise himself up apart from the Lord,' and demonstrated him¬
self unable to do so. Adam in his innocence was not able to be wise enough
in his own right to care for himself. Nor has man since then proved himself
able to work out his own happiness. Men are given an indirect and derived
responsibility. They are given the privilege of accepting God's care for us
by acknowledging it, or on the other hand, of rejecting God's care for us by
refusing to acknowledge it. His duty, his responsibility to God is to accept
the felicity he provides for us with full trust in his goodness, in fidelity
to invoke him alone in his every need, in obedience to his command, in glad
and willing love of God, and in gratitude for his benefits to us. In doing
this man would suet responsibly. Thus man is permitted to have a part in the
fact of his own existence, he is in this way given a responsibility. He is
made responsible in this real and dependent way so that he may be held com¬
pletely accountable for the loss or retention of his life. Adam might have
remained faithful to the existence God gave him and so been responsible. We
today may answer God's call to accept his gospel and show ourselves such
children as he has been a father to us. We are given from our side to accept
his Son - though this need not mean that God does not work in his Spirit
from the side of man to awaken us to our responsibility and give us the
strength to answer.
Or we may be irresponsible. Adam chose to reject and forfeit God's
goodness and not to let God be his father. In point of fact man has been
irresponsible, he has rejected this mediate responsibility of allowing
another to be responsible for him as he in infidelity, in disobedience, in
unbelief, in concupiscence and love of self, and in ingratitude moved to
1. Ser. on Eph. 5.18-21, CS 51.732, supra
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assume immediate responsibility for himself. God has been faithful,
however, and once again offers to be our father. We are again given the
right to be responsible or irresponsible.
Thus man is given such a responsibility that on the one hand he may
be responsible for the loss of his felicity by rejecting the grace of God,
but on the other hand he may not claim responsibility for having gained
it. We here recall the arguments that run through so much of Calvin's
writings where he asserts that men may be liable for having lost this
eternal life by their deeds of sin, but they may under no circumstances
lay claim to having gained it in any part by their deeds of righteousness.
This would be true even in the case of a man who retained integrity. There
might seem to be undue imbalance here. It is not just that men have empirically
never been observed to win happiness in this way. The truth lies deeper.
We do not admit this even as a possibility, even if men were perfect and
in angelic purity, this could not be the case, for men even in the be¬
ginning were not given this kind of responsibility so as to be directly and
independently responsible for their own salvation. We say that he is res¬
ponsible for eternal life; this means that if he sins he will be held res¬
ponsible for having lost the life that was given him, but it does not mean,
if he lives in rectitude or accepts the grace of God, that he is responsible
for his own eternal life. It means that he may be responsible for not having
lost it, if in this he lays no claim to credit due himself.
The one thing that Adam was not to do was to assert that 'his happiness
consisted in some goodness of his own.'"'" 'Adam was admonished that he could
claim nothing for himself as if it were his own, in order that he might
2
depend wholly on the Son of God, and might not seek life anwhere but in him.'
To claim credit even for proper acknowledgment, to make even gratitude a
virtue worthy of merit, to say that somehow man by his proper response renders
1. Of. II. 2.1, CR 2.186
2. Com. on Gen. 2.9, GR 23.39
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efficacious the grace of God, is to assume too much responsibility for the
part of man. Even this ability for proper acknowledgment is not our own but
is of man. Even this ability for proper acknowledgment is not our own but
is of God. Such is the concept of human responsibility that lies behind
Calvin's unrelenting denial of any possibilitycfintrinsic human merit or
credit. Man has been so given existence as to live, move, and have being
entirely in God. This is true of man in the very nature which he was given
at the start, and from this it is true of man in the nature to which he has
been restored in Christ. He not only does not and cannot, but he is not in
any way supposed to amass credits on his own account by which to render
himself pleasing and acceptable to God.
Thus the concept of human responsibility that is demanded by and
rises out of Calvin's concept of man and his duty to God is that of a son
who has an answer to give to God for his paternal care. In this relation¬
ship of acknowledging and accepting the free and gracious benefits of God
is contained his responsibility. By his actions hex-e, by his positive
acceptance or negative rejection of God's felicity fox- him he demonstrates
himself to be responsible or irresponsible - yet in such a way that if he is
responsible he may not then ascribe credit or goodness to himself, for so
soon as he does this in the least he has looked elsewhere for his strength,
he has looked away from God and toward himself, and in doing so he has become
irresponsible.
¥e now see how Calvin differs from the concept of responsibility in
latex* Reformed theology or moral philosophy. To say that God. places man in
a state of responsibility does not mean that man will be rewarded heaven or
hell on the basis of the merits of his own good or bad deeds. It does not
mean that he is placed under obligation to work out his own salvation, to
1. Of. II. 2.1, CR 2.186
2. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39
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purchase felicity of God with an amassed treasure of good deeds, to be an
independent, self-reliant creature - even one who might recognize God as his
creator - who is responsible for himself, whose destiny depends immediately
on the positive action of his own autonomous will, a will free to choose
between right and wrong and to create good and evil. Responsibility is not
ultimately defined with respect to man's individual and autonomous free
will or free choice, where man's destiny is rested on his own initiative and
self-will to do the right. It does not begin where from the very start man
has an equal or nearly equal choice bet-ween alternatives, and man on the
ground of his proper choice is to be held accountable and is to be punished
or rewarded.
Rather to say that God places man in a position of responsibility
means that man is held answerable for God's free gifts of grace. Man is
given happiness, salvation, the good life. God faces us, puts us in a
relation to himself in which we have an answer to give to him and this
answer to God is exactly the reverse of any effort or striving to effect
our own salvation. It is a real and significant answer, yet it is a passive
and permissive answer which in no way may claim for itself any virtue, which
does not demonstrate any goodness on the part of man for his having given it.
It is not the exercise of the will, but the surrender of the will, not the
free choice of the good in the face of the equally strong challenge of the
evil, not our selection of what is best for us, but only the grateful
acceptance and acknowledgment of life in paradise prepared for us.
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VIII. Responsibility and life in Sin
In our study of Calvin's doctrine of sin we have seen that man rejects
the dependent relationship to God for which he was created. In distrust in
God's goodness, in infidelity to call on him alone, in disobedience, in
concupiscence and self-love, and in ingratitude for God's benefits, man
has turned to himself for strength and independence, he 'strove' to raise
himself up apart from the Lord.' ^ He assumes responsibility for himself.
Man's culpability lies in his rejection of the grace of God. His self-
will has prevented God's grace from flowing to him. This concept of culpa¬
bility and responsibility we have worked out for the most part in the two
cases of man in integrity and. of redeemed man, these two being similar. In
the beginning and again in the gospel God confronts man to offer life and
felicity if man will be thankful and acknowledge it. We like primal man
are truly responsible as we are grateful to God and depend on his grace.
We like primal man are culpable as we are ungrateful and seek to obtain
our happiness independently.
We now concern ourselves with the third case of man who is neither in
integrity nor confronted with God's offer in the gospel, with the natural
man in sin. It has not been difficult to realise man's culpability in re¬
fusing God's grace offered to him at the first or offered again in the gospel
because it is clear (even if predestination occasionally prejudices the
matter) that God does indeed offer his grace to man for his every need. But the
problem becomes more difficult in the case of the natural man who lives in
blindness and who has brought God over against him as judge, who - as it is
put in the classical theological language - no longer has the faculty and will
to know God. We must now interpret Galvin's thought about the responsibility
and culpability of natural man, and see his attempt to bring this thought under
his governing concept: that responsibility and culpability must always be seen
in the light of God's grace.
1. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 4
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Calvin says that nan is here culpable because he has ignored God's
self-declaration in the heavens. God does not cease objectively and from
his side to manifest his goodness and offer his care and strength, even to
the point of continuing the gift of himself to man. But subjectively and
from the side of man two things happen. Man cuts off and inverts the proper
functioning of this order where he is to know God and receive his blessing.
First man becomes blind to see and comprehend this order, he cuts off his
knowledge of God, and secondly he takes the gifts of God that still confront
him and in part break through to him and inverts them to make blessings into
curses. 'We must seek and consider God in his works.' Properly done this
'generates, nourishes, and confirms in us a true and solid piety.' 'Yet
here we sin not only by blindness, for our perversity is such that when it
estimates the works of God there is nothing that it does not understand in
an evil and perverse sense, so that it turns upside down all the heavenly
wisdom which otherwise shines so clearly in those works.'We see now the
responsibility and culpability of man in sin against this double background.
We see first the ultimate responsibility of man in his blindness, the way
in which he stands in responsible ignorance, in what Calvin calls 'culpable
p
ignorance,' when he does not render to God that proper acknowledgment he
ought to have rendered. And secondly, within his reversed and darkened
understanding, we establish a further way in which he is responsible, on
the basis of the light of nature which breaks through to him.
Calvin's position here is not unlike the concept of natural man.' s
culpability which continued in federal theology. Here too man was both
culpably ignorant as he ignored God's light to him and responsible as he
sinned against the light he did perceive. Yet here the distinction between
these double ways man is held responsible was in part obscured. Federal
theology saw man's sin and guilt in his failure to live up to the law of nature.
1. ibid., sec 3
2. Arg. to Com. on Gen. CR 23.7
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Because it conceived of nan's prinal responsibility as that of producing
works of the law with his own will and ability, it concerned itself chiefly
with man's culpability here. Man's culpable ignorance was ignorance of this
divine law and command, and his conscious sin was breaking the divine law
that did break through to him. But with Calvin, these notions have to be
brought under the larger notion of responsibility and grace. Man's culpable
ignorance lies more in his rejection of God's offered goodness and care in
nature than it does in ignorance of divine law. And man's moral failure in
nature becomes with Calvin a lesser and secondary means of holding man responsible.
Later Reformed theology felt it necessary to assert here that man in
nature had not the ability or freedom to know God in nature, and yet assert
man's culpability. In this they formally followed Calvin. This proved
objectionable to more liberal theology and philosophy, where responsibility
was defined with reference to nan's freedom and ability. If man were not free
and able he could not be held responsible. But the argument here moved away
from the concept of Calvin where man is not supposed to be independently free
and able to cone to God, but is bound to divine grace and enabled by it. Fe
must work out Calvin's larger thought here again. While it is true that
Calvin's speaks of man's loss of the faculty and will to come to know God
in nature, federal theology took over Calvin's concept of man's ability
and inclination without retaining them in subordination to divine grace.
Interpreting man's ability and will in the light of a covenant of works
where man was supposed to move in a semi-autonomous way, federal theology
did indeed lay itself open to the criticisms of moral philosophy. By
regaining Calvin's understanding of man's will and ability as dynamically
related to divine grace, we can more effectively answer this objection.
In two ways we view responsibility for sin: man's ultimate responsibility
on the basis of what he does not perceive, and a further responsibility on
the basis of what he does perceive .
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A. Responsibility on the basis of what man does not perceive
It is not unreasonable in the thought of Calvin that a man should be
held responsible for something that he consciously knows nothing about. A
man may so completely ignore something obvious that he forms no impression
of it in the slightest, and yet he may have been, responsible for seeing it.
Upon his default and ignorance, he may be held liable and blameworthy.
1. The continuing self-manifestation of God in nature
Responsibility here rests on the fact that the knowledge of God is
immediately and obviously available to all men. As we have had occasion to
see, God declares himself in nature. This is the way it was to be in the
beginning and ideally."" Objectively and from the side of God this is the
2
way it could be nor/. 1 We certainly ought to be taught by the wonderful
wisdom of God apparent in the heights and depths of the world. But we have
been heedless.' ^ This representation of God in his works lacks nothing.
It is, to begin with, so clear and obvious that any man with a grain of sense
could not possibly miss it. 'The celestial bodies...afford a testimony of
the deity too evident to escape the observation of the most ignorant people
in the world. God's works are a 'mirror' of his 'paternal care' for us.
Calvin's writings are scattered with this teaching. He cannot overstate
the objective clarity and obviousness of this self-declaration of God, even
to the point of prejudicing what he has to say about its subjectivity. 'His
majesty shines forth in his works and in his creatures everywhere; men ought
in these to acknowledge him, for they clearly set forth their maker.' 5 Taking
this emphasis in all seriousness, we need not think of any process needed to
search God out. Calvin can 3peak like that, e.g. of 'the exercise of wisdom,'
of the mind's attaining 'a knowledge of God by its own resources,'^ but this
1. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, OR 49.326
2. Ser. on 'Gal. 4.8-11, OR 50.598. Com. on Ps. 19. Iff, CR 31.194ff
3. Instruction in Faith, 1537, sec. 3 Ser. on Is. 53.1-4, CR 35.630
4. 1.5.1, OR 2.41f. Inst, of 1539 (et seqq.) ch. I, pag. 6f, CR 1.286ff
5. Com. on Jer. 5.24, CR 37.634
6. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49.326
7. Com. on I Cor. 2.30, CR 49*341
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is not to take the form of an inductive or deductive logic, but of bursting
forth in acknowledgment. This representation is far too clear to need any
keen intellect or contemplative mind. 'The glory of God is not written in
small or obscure letters, but richly engraven in large and bright characters
which all men may read, and. read with the greatest ease.' - 'The wisdom and
power of God are as conspicuous in the fabric of the heavens as if God should
2
assert them with an audible voice.' Indeed not even eyes or ears are needed.
Any man who can feel can find him within arm's reach. He practically in-
3
gratiates himself upon us. 'The rudest ought to perceive it.' 'God mani¬
fests himself to the simple and even to children.
The knowledge of God which confronts us in the heavens is complete.
If this knowledge were to come to perception in man, we would recognize
his grace calling us to let him care for us, to trust and depend on him,
to be faithful, and properly to acknowledge him in gratitude for his bene¬
fits to us. This we have seen already in the chapter on order. 'God wishes
to draw us up to him by his creatures.'-' The whole of the perfections of God
are outlined there. 'Displayed both in heaven and earth' are: 'clemency,
goodness, merc3^, justice, judgment, and truth. ' T7e might learn enough there
to know that God is willing to receive sinners to forgiveness, about his •
c
'mercy, in which alone consists all our salvation,' 'which endures our
iniquities with such a great kindliness in order to amendment. 'We must
seek and consider God in his works.' 'Certainly all these should abundantly
teach us all of such a God a.s it is necessary to know, if we in our coarse¬
ness were not blind to such a great light.'^
2. The culpable igixrance (maligna ignorantia) of man
But in point of fact we have seen that this obvious and complete know¬
ledge of God written in the heavens does not x-each subjectivity in man.
~T. Gem. on Ps. 19.4, CR 31.197- Gem. on Acts 17.27, OH 43.415
2. Com. on Ps. 97.6, OR 32.44. Ser. on Job. 37.1-7, CP 35.315ff
3. 1.5.3, CR 2.4-2f; Com. on Acts 17.27, CR 48.415
4. Com. on Jer. ID.7, GR 38.67f
5. Ser. on Deut. 4.19-20, CR 26.162
6. 1.10.2, CR 2.72f
7. Instruction in Fhith, 1537, sec. 3
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What happens is that man, looking always to himself and never to God, com¬
pletely fails to see in any real way that which is so obvious he could never
have missed it had he turned toward God rather than himself. He ignores it.
•As his majesty shines forth in his works and in his creatures everywhere,
men ought in these to acknowledge him.1"'' But they did not. Paul 'condemns
all mankind from the beginning of the world- for ingratitude because they
2
did not recognize the workman ih his extraordinary work.' Notice that
this is not an ingratitude 7/hich involves any conscious perception of the
perfections of God outlined in heaven or earth. It is a more gross ingrati¬
tude that in the face of these perfections so eminently displayed so completely
ignores them as to know nothing at all about them and to reveal unconsciously
the perversity of man. They do not recognize these tilings but remain
ignorant of them. Ignorance and ingratitude are constantly related in Calvin's
thought.^ With men it is 'blind ingratitude, or rather voluntary careless¬
ness that hinders them from perceiving it.' Calvin's concern to establish
the obviousness of the knowledge of God written in the heavens occasionally
leads to language that suggests that some conscious real knowledge of God
is ungratefully rejected. The problem is complicated by the fact that men
do come to an unreal knowledge of God which is not knowledge at all, for it
knows not his goodness and does not tend or lead men in the right direction.
Probably the most serious passage of this sort is found in a short
pivotal chapter in the Institutes. Calvin in an effort to corner his adver¬
saries and make his case for responsibility goes too far. He attributes to
heathen consciousness not the false, vain, darkened knowledge of God which he
generally ascribes to the Gentiles, and on which he does in an auxiliary way
base responsibility, (see later) but a knowledge of God which is real. As
far as the kind of knowledge of God is concerned we are here told that 'the
heathen philosophers themselves were not ignorant' of the fact that 'the end
1. Com. to Horn. 1.20, OR 49.24. Com. on Ps. 004. Iff, CR 32.84Pf
2. Arg. to Com. on Rom. CTR 49. If. Com. on Ps. 19. Iff, OR 31.194ff
3. Com. on I Cor 6.11, OR 49.324; on Ps. 65. ID, OR 31.609, on 89.1, CR 31.816
4. Com. on Is. 26. lOf, CR 36.434f
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for which all men are born and live is to know God,' and Galvin admits
that when 'the knowledge of God has reached this point' it is not anymore
'uncertain and vain;' on the contrary we can only conclude that it is a
genuine knowledge in part at least. We are informed as an example that
1
Plato knew something about the imago Dei.
Had he consciously tried, Calvin could not have more flatly denied this
than he does in the less polemical context of a sermon on I Timothy: 'The
philosophers who had keen and excellent intellects never knew what the
heavenly life meant. It is true that God made them speak to the world to
be a witness to take away all excuse of ignorance from it and they did pro¬
nounce seme good sentences - that men have not been created to live only
here for a little while, for we see that each one of us only whiles away
the time on earth. But what? This was not a certain knowledge, they did
not understand that men were created to the image of God, that by this they
are immortal, and that 'God has provided for them an inheritance in heaven.
2
Never could all the wise men in the world have alleged this doctrine. *
Nor is this an isolated statement. Generally throughout his writings Calvin
denies that any real knowledge of God - which must include some awareness
of his paternal goodness and benevolence - is ever acquired.^ The difficulty
might have been avoided, with all credit still due to Plato, had Calvin more
carefully recognized here, as he does elsewhere,^ that some awareness that
men ought to serve God and image him need not for all the apparent similarities
cease to be a wholly inverted and perverted knowledge, and on this account
uncertain and vain - if it is motivated and employed by man in his sin in an
endeavor to win salvation from God in his own strength, if it thus reverses and
inverts the order of complete dependence on God's goodness.
Men then stand in ignorance of all true knowledge of God, they learn nothing
1. 1.3.3, CR 2.38. The passage is nearly the same in Inst.of 1539, ® 1.285£
2. Ser. 011 I Tim. 6.15-16, GR 53.623
3. Com. on Jer. 9.3, OR 38.28; on 9.23, OR 38.5If; on Eph. 4.17, OR 51.204;
on Heb, 11.6, CR 55.148; on Rom. 1.21, OR 49.24; on I Pet. 1.14, OR 55.222, etc,4. Com. on II Pet. 1.4, CR 55.2,46?
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at all to evoke the proper response and lead than to gratitude. But this is
responsible ignorance. 'To enjoy everything in nature without acknowledging
the author of the benefit is the basest ingratitude.' They 'will one day
feel the force of the expression of Paul, related by lake, that God has not
left himself oysTyooy, (without witness, Acts 14*17) Por they shall
not be permitted to escape with impunity because they have been deaf and
insensible to testimonies so illustrious. In truth it is the part of
culpable ignorance (maligna ignorantia) never to see God who everywhere
gives signs of his presence.' 'They were ignorant of God only because they
were "voluntarily and culpably (maltiose = maliciously) blinded.' The Latin
malignus in these contents is spiteful or malicious. But it is apparently
not here a conscious malice in the sense of malicious, as insensible ignor¬
ance which actively and wilfully delights in doing wrong is somewhat in¬
congruous. Therefore: culpable ignorance. It is ignorance and ingratitude
2
in the midst of 'brutish insensibility.' 'Malice ana ignorance are there¬
fore closely connected, but the connection is of such a nature that ignorance
3
proceeds from a sinful disposition of the mind. ' Calvin can also say,
'God has exhibited this world as a mirror to men that by heholding it they
may acknowledge his majesty,' but 'men sin more through insolence and pride
than through ignorance, for they despise God who manifests himself openly
and speaks plainly.'^" Yet he does not so mean this as to say that men do
not remain in ignorance of God and of the fact that he is solicitous for them.
'(God renders his glory conspicuous everywhere so that it ought to en¬
gage and occupy the thoughts of all men. And it would do so were they not
led away by their own vanity. ' 'There are those who at first seem to be
excusable for their error, as they have not been taught and never understood
who the true God is, but yet there is in them the blame as well of malice
1. Arg. to Com. on Gen. 23*7ff« Com. on Ps. 77*14, CR 31*718
2. Can. on Ps. 89*15, CR 31*816
3. Com. on Is. 27.11, OR 36.458
4. Can. on Is. 40.21, CR 37*21
-2ZJ.8-
(pialitia) as of neglect, (negligentia) for they freely neglect or slight
the true God.' Calvin works this out extensively in the passages in
Acts and Romans which give him opportunity to develop it. Men make 'a
pretext of ignorance;' 'they fly to this fortress: that no guilt ought
to be imputed to them, but rather God was without feeling who did not even
condescend to give so much as a hoot (sibilus = hiss) to call back those
that he saw were perishing. ' But ' 'God was hidden in such a way that he all
the while bore witness to himself and to his deity. ' 'In the order of
2
nature there is a certain and evident manifestation of God. * Tet 'men have
not recognized these attributes in God,' 'their foolish mind, being involved
in darkness, could understand nothing aright, but was carried away headlong
3
in various ways into error and delusions. ' This is man's ingratitude.
Men have ignored the fact that in this 'the paternal love of God still breaks
through to the unworthy,' it has never occurred to them that this is ' the
goodness of God.' 'God has set man upon earth...to exercise himself in
praising the liberality of God, while he enjoys the riches of heaven and
earth. And now is it not a more than shocking depravity not to be moved by
so great a goodness of God in the manifold abundance of things?'
Men are guilty of 'culpable (maligna = malicious) and barbarous in¬
gratitude, by which they have betrayed their impudence.God from his side,
or 'as much as in him lay, '5 has not left men to perish but constantly and
completely invites them to corae to him, to rest on his goodness, and accept
the felicity he has prepared for them. This extends, we are elsewhere told,
c
to an invitation to accept his mercy on which depends our salvation. But
of all this men remain heedless. 'Surely nothing is more absurd than that
men should ignore their author who are endued with understanding principally
1. Com. on Jer. 10.7, CR 38.67
2. Com. on Acts 14.17, CR 47* 327f
3. Com. on Rom. 1.21, CR 2|-9.24f. Arg. to Com. on Rom., OR 49* If
4. Com. on Acts, ibid.; Com. on Ps. 29.9, CR 31*290; on op. 10, CR 31*609
5. Com. on Acts. 14*27, CR 48*327f
6. Instruction in Faith, 3537, sec. 3; 1.10.2., CR 2.72, etc.
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for this use. And we must especially note the goodness of God in that he so
familiarly thrusts himself upon us that even the blind may grope after him.
For this reason the blindness of men is more shameful and less tolerable,
who in so manifest and evident a manifestation are touched with no feeling
of God's presence. Wherever they cast their eyes upward or downward they
must necessarily see lively and also innumerable images of divine power,
wisdom, and goodness. For God has not darkly shadowed his glory in the
creation of the world, but he has everywhere engraven such manifest marks
that even blind men may know them by groping. From this we conclude that
men are not only blind but stupid as well, when being helped by such
excellent testimonies, they make no progress.'
Being void of right judgment they pass over (praetereo) without under¬
standing all such signs of God's glory as appear manifestly both in heaven
and earth.\ 'They are inexcusable when they are blind in such clear light,
as he (Paul) says in the first chapter to the Romans. Therefore though
men's senses fail them in seeking out God, yet they have 110 pretext to cover
their guilt, because though he offers himself to be handled and groped, they
continue all the same in bewilderment. '~ 'How it is certain that although
we are poor blind men, although because of Adam's sin we are deprived of
judgnent, of reason, and intelligence, yet there is malice in us still so
that we desire only to ignore that which our lord would have us to know.
Therefore when men make a cloak of their ignorance, they will always be
convicted in that they have not wished to know that which might have been
plainly known to than, if they had applied themselves to this study. And this
is why Gt. Jude, speaking in his epistle of these profane persons who spite
God, who are heavy and dull and completely ignorant, says: They do not know
the things which they ought to know because they do not wish to know than.
Then it is a cursed pretext whenever men do not profit from God's works, but
1. Com. on Acts 17.27, CR 48.415f. Com. on John 1, ID, OR 47.9f: Com. on Ps.
19. Iff, CR 31. 194ff
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apply them contrary to his intention.'
5. The ability (facultas) and inclination (voluntas) of man
Basing the ultimate responsibility of man on his ignoring of the clear
self-declaration of God in nature is complicated by a distinction between
the ability and the inclination or will of man. If we hold man culpable
for a lack of inclination to see God, must we not be prepared to say that
he does have the ability, and so, if he had as well the inclination he
could come to know God? Here Calvin apparently disturbs the reasonableness
of his thought by his assertion that fallen man does not have the ability
to see God in nature. Federal theology followed Calvin here, and it has
been this to which liberal theology and philosophy have objected. How do
we hold man responsible for that which he did not have the ability to do?
It will be our assertion here that later Reformed theology conceived of this
ability in such a static way as to be open to this criticism. And there are
tendencies in Calvin's thought that point this way also. But when we inter¬
pret this ability in terms of Calvin's larger thought about man's responsibility
as that of a response to grace in dependence and acknowledgement many of these
problems disappear.
a. The distinction between ability and inclination.
We begin with the fact that Calvin does recognize this distinction and
can think in these terms, fie notes that 'we are deficient in natural ability,
(naturali facultate deficimur) which prevents us from attaining the pure and
2
clear knowledge of God' in the heavens. 'For this matter we lack not merely
5
inclination, but ability.' 'St. Paul says that the natural man is not able
to understand the things of the Spirit. He does not say that men are so
froward that they will not understand, but he says that they cannot under¬
stand at all; the faculty (faculte) and the power (vertu) is not in us.
Why? Because of the corruption which has come to us through the sin of Adam.'
"E SeF. on Deut. 3^23-27,~^~29T38 ~ '
2. 1.5.15, OR 2.52. II. 2.2D, CR 2.202
3. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49*326 ...nec voluntas tantum, sed facultas etiam ad
earn rem nos deficit.
4. Sex-, on Deut. 29.1-4. OR 28.489. Com. on I Com 2.3A. CR LQ.ViL.
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When Calvin argues in these terms he would make it perfectly clear that man
cannot make his way to God, and that even if he were given the inclination
and desire, he could not 'by all the acuteness and sagacity of his own mind
1
penetrate into the kingdom of God.' 'All his sagacity, as far as respects
the knowledge of God, is mere blindness.' Man has not 'the faculty (facultas)
2
of spiritual understanding.' Calvin labors to refute the contention ox his
adversaries that man can with his own strength and ability and despite the
blindness and handicap of sin come to some knowledge of God. Por this
Calvin asserts that men are both unwilling and unable. There is perhaps
here too a way in which - as far as man in nature is concerned - something
of a concept of responsibility similar to that in federa.1 theology or in
moral philosophy casts a shadow across Calvin's thought. Calvin suggests
that there was something man was to do 'with his ability in order that the
3
human intellect might attain 'a knowledge of God by its own resources.'
b. The ability and inclination of man in integrity
Yet Calvin to a certain extent argues the point along the lines set
up by his opponents. To their contention that men have some ability to
discover God, Calvin answers that they do not. It is interesting that
these passages do indeed occur where Calvin is trying to establish himself
over against an opposite position. How it might be gathered from this that
whereas men do not have this ability, they are supposed to, they would have
it had it not been removed in the fall. TThile men do not have the perspicacity
to seek God out, ideally or at the beginning they did have this talent. But
it is a mistake to press the conclusion that man was created to come to God using
some ability of his own. This is correct only in part.
Calvin can talk this way on occasion and is here guilty of lapsing into
a more static view of the nature of man. As he argues with those who contend
for man's freedom, he is inclined to yield -where possible and speak of an
1. Com. on John 1.9, CR 47.8f
2. II. 2.19, CE 2.201
3. Com. on I Cor. 2. ID, CR 49.341
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ability of man in integrity. 'Adam had that ability in his first creation.'
He was 'endued with rectitude of nature and with the faculty of willing and
acting uprightly' before the fall. This is now lost, 'we have need' 'of
Adam's uprightness and of his faculty of both willing and acting uprightly.''"'"
On these terns alone Calvin, as was federal theology, could be justifiably
criticized for prejudicing man's real culpability. Man ought not to be held
responsible for something he was unable to do.
But we do not abandon in such contexts Calvin's thought about the re¬
lationship of correspondance between Adam and God where every talent end
ability that Adam had is wholly and dynamically given him from God. Here
Calvin provides answers to his own problems. Adam was created to the know¬
ledge of God in such a way that everything necessary came to him as the grace
of God. We have seen this already. He was to live in felicity as he depended
wholly on God for his every need. 'His happiness consisted not in any good-
ness of his own, but in a participation of God.' This is primarily true of
the knowledge of God. The one thing he cannot do is claim some ability or
talent for himself. 'Adam was admonished that he could claim nothing for
himself as if it were his own, in order that he might depend wholly on the
3Son of God, and might not seek life anywhere but in him.' 'If -we should
live as perfectly as angels and yet have the foolish idea that this came
from our own free will and of our own movement, then we would miss the
A
principal tiling.' 'He who attributes some free will to himself and who
presumes that he has some means and faculty (faculte) to do good of himself
certainly wishes to step into the place of God and show himself to be
5
creator.' It is our sin that we think we have scane 'free will' or 'virtue'
or 'power' (vertu) of our own. Man has no ability independently of God. ^
It Is clear in this that Adam knew God only as God gave himself to be
1. Com. on Ezek. 11.19f, GR 40.247
2. II. 2.1, OR 2.18f
3. Com. on Gen. 2.9, CR 23.39. II. 2.1, CR 2.18f
4. Ser. on Eph. 1.4-6, GR 51.274. The Secret Providence of God, 281
5. Ser. on Eph. 2.8-ID, CR 51.380f "
6. Ser. on Sph. 1.13-34, CR 51.305
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known. Adam's part was that of a co-participant, but not as one who rendered
efficacious God's communication by bringing to fruition his talents. Rather
he acknowledged and answered -God. He had only to receive God's gift of
himself, together with all his benefits. And in this process, though man's
acknowledgment is necessary for communication, man can in no way claim some
credit, ability, or goodness for his own. Ho part ox' the efficacy of God's
self-communication is to be ascribed to his ability. 'Let us put the case
that we were in the integrity in which our father Adam was at the first.
Should we then presume it was of ourselves under the illusion that God had
ennobled us in this way? Low we hold everything from him.' 'Would we have
got it through our own dexterity? Would we have got it by our own. strength?
(vertu) Hoi But we would have it because God had given it to us through
his own free goodness.'^ Then man does not speak of some ability of his own
by which he makes his way to God and obeys him. Man does not on his own and
in some creditable way seek out God and know him.
c. The inter-relationship of ability and inclination
It is then false permanently to separate the ability and inclination
of man, for there is an inseparable relationship between them. We are here
directing our remarks to the theological and philosophical objection that
man cannot be held responsible unless some ability is postulated for him. To
make his point perfectly clear Calvin does make a distinction. He denies man's
present ability and suggests he had it at creation. On the other hand when
we press Calvin in the way man ideally is supposed to know God, he describes
the ability which man is to have not as some strength of his own with which
he is to seek out God, but as the ability to respond to the self-communication
of God, to receive God's gift of himself to man. It is then not an ability
to discover him, but an ability to acknowledge him. Seen in this way what
we mean by inclination or will and what we mean by ability to see God in
his works are not so much separate talents as facets of the same thing.
1. Ser. on Job 33.1-7, CR 35.48
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Ideally man is able rightly to will only as he is confronted by and receives
the grace of God. When man rejects the grace of God he continues to will,
but his will turns on itself and. he becomes unable because he has rejected
the grace of God which would have enabled him. As man will not he disables
himself. As he is self-willed, he deprives himself.of the ability God would
otherwise give him, Tor God does not reveal himself to self-will.
If man is to claim absolutely nothing for his ability to know God, if
he knows God only as God fulfils the requirements of communication, if the
communication depends in no way on his own strength, on his successful or
deserving use of God-given gifts, then ability is very much the same thing
as inclination. Here all the ability man needs is an inclination to receive
and any inclination he has to respond is immediately sufficient ability as
grace is communicated to him. Ability and inclination are not separated, as
might seem the case when Calvin distinguishes between the two, but they form
a dual entity where man is enabled as man is inclined to accept God's gift of
himself.
A useful parallel here is that of the ability and inclination of man in
the gospel, When man is confronted by the preaching of the gospel and
does not respond, is i"t a 'lack of inclination or of ability? It is both.
And the two cannot be separated. Ability is inclination and inclination
is ability. Now it is quite proper to argue not only that man has not the
inclination to respond, but that he has not the ability. In this way we
can make a distinction between ability and inclination, and the distinction
is a valuable one. It ought to be made very clear that man does not and
cannot accept the gospel on his own strength. He is not able to do this
But on the other hand we should not suppose that whereas man does not have
this ability, yet he should have, that he ought to have some ability of his
ovm with which to receive the gospel and make it efficacious. We might
loosely say this. But we would not mean that man is to claim for himself any
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ability if he does respond, for this ability is given by the Spirit. And.
this ability is not separable from inclination, for God stands ready by
his Spirit to enable those who bre inclined to him. Man is enabled as man
is inclined. He may not claim this ability as his own.
God's Word in nature is as his Word in the gospel. God here speaks
as with an 'audible voice.' ^ '.Then Calvin says that natural man is unable
of himself to come to the knowledge of God in nature, this does not mean
that he is supposed to be able to come on his own strength - any more than
when Galvin says that the man to whom the gospel is preached is unable to
respond to it, this means that he is supposed to be able to come on his own
strength. It is the elusive thing about Calvin's thought that he seems to
leave a place for something that man is to supply. But where there is proper
response, man becomes aware that God has even supplied him with the ability
and the will for the response, in such a way that he can claim nothing for
his own. We are then faced with the antinomy we have before encountered
in the matter of responsibility. If man does properly respond, he knows
it is all the strength ana grace of God, yet nonetheless when man does mot
respond, he must not say that God has failed him, for God stands ever ready
to bestow grace to those who will receive it.
In regard to the Gentile who lives in sin we must say that not only
is he now unable to come to God on his own strength, but that the only
ability which he in an Adamic state would have had is an inclination to
respond, and that this very will could not even then stand alone, but was
constantly and dynamically supported by divine grace. In terms of his
present responsibility this means that all he needs is the willingness to
see and acknowledge God in his works. But such is his inclination to sin
and self-sufficiency that he never looks. The natural man is guilty because
he has resisted the efforts of God to impart grace to him by ignoring God-*s
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self-declaration in the heavens - as a man who audibly hears the Word in
the gospel and yet resists it is guilty.
This finds emphasis in Calvin as he" says that men ignore what is so
very obvious that they are completely inexcusable. God's gift of himself
is so complete and clear that no independent mental ability is needed to
see it. The most ignorant, blind, or deaf in the world could not miss it
if they were inclined, to turn to him. God is so close, he so permeates
all, he so fully and obviously gives himself that men have only to admit
him to know him. 7,re have tried to emphasize this in the opening part of
this chapter. 'Children' and 'the simple' ought to see him." 'The heavens
have a common language to teach all men without distinction, nor is there
anything but their own carelessness (socordia) to hinder even those who are
most foreign to each other and who live in the most distant parts of the
world from profiting as it were at the mouth of the same teacher.' Men
cannot plead lack of ears, eyes, or rational faculties, but their culpability
lies in a perversity which does not will to know God. 'Though the Lord is not
destitute of a testimony concerning himself, while with various and most abundant
benignity he sweetly allures mankind to a knowledge of him, yet they persist
in following their own ways, their pernicious and. fatal errors.' It is a
question of man's being unable to let God come to him because of his perverse
sin which makes him unwilling to turn to God and persistent in seeking him
by his own strength. The works of God 'are so visibly before all that it is
impossible that men could overlook them were it not that their minds are
h.
perverted by their own wickedness., l"
It is our primal sin, a self-mil to seek out God on our own strength
rather than allowing him to come to us, that disables us so that we cannot
receive him in nature. Calvin has an interesting passage on this point in
1. Com. on Jer. 10.7, SR 38.S7f
2. Com. on Ps. 19.3, CR 31.196
3. 1.5.34, CR 2.52
4. Cam on Ps. 108.43, OR 32.145
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his Sermons on Bphesians. God declares himself to us in his works, but we
are dazzled by them, we are not able to understand, we fall into an abyss.
'Someone will ask herhowever, How then can we confess God to be righteous, wise,
and almighty, if we are so dazzled by his works? Por you say that it is the
wisdom of men to inquire after the works of God and to apply all their dili¬
gence to them, and that this is also why he has ordered the world to be as a
theatre in which we ought to contemplate his goodness, righteousness, power,
and wisdom. Therefore there seems to be come contrariety here: that we are
to be diligent and attentive in considering the works of God, and yet at the
same time that our understanding vanishes away when we think upon them.
'But the solution to this is easy: If we should desire with sobriety
to know these things which God wishes to reveal to us, and which are use¬
ful to us, we should have understanding enough; (nous avons assez d'intelligence)
and we should indeed learn that he has no desire at all that we be loot taught
by his works to come to him and put our trust in knowing how to invoke him,
to discern between good and evil, to walk according to his will. We should
then in all the works of God understand all the things that are useful for
our salvation, if we did not give reign to our foolish and disordered lusts,
but behaved as pupils who waited for that which it pleased their master to
show than. This is why it is said in the book of Job (ch, 26) that we
would do well if we should see the fringes of the works of God. We would
be able then to taste the wisdom and righteousness, power and goodness of
God as we considered only the fringes of his works. But if we wish profoundly
to sound them out, we will find this abyss we mentioned before, which is
able to swallow up all our understanding.' ^ If man could confront in sobriety
the self-declaration of God in his works, God would teach him in it. But
his lust and presumptiousness, his self-will and ingratitude render him
unable, for he will not remain to listen and receive at the master's hand
what he would give to him, but he will persist in searching out and knowing
1. Ser. on Sph. 3.9-12, CR 51.459ff
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for himself the works of God. If he were only to receive the movement of
God to him, he has faculty enough, but when - as sin inevitably makes him
do - he tries to search things out on his own, he is unable and guilty in
his ability.
Calvin has thus attempted to show that from within our nature inclined
to sin we do act freely and responsibly. We are responsible for what we
do with our sinful nature, for we resist the grace by which God wishes to
change us. We of our own will ignore God's self-communication to us and we
are free in doing this. It Is our self-will ana nothing else that prohibits
us from receiving God's gift of himself and offer of grace to us.
4. The excuse of the Gentiles
It is hazardous to mention any excuse which man may have before God,
as Calvin is convinced that apart from salvation in Christ all will find
just condemnation in the day of judgment. Yet there is a way in which Calvin
can think of the pagan as finding some partial excuse before God. At least
it is possible to sin more grievously and sustain heavier punishment than
the Gentile does. Commenting on Paul's statement: '".There there is no
law there is no transgression,' Calvin writes: as the knowledge of God's
justice is discovered by the law, the less excuse we have, and therefore
the more grievously we offend against God. for they who despise the known
will of God justly deserve to sustain a heavier punishment than those who
offend, through ignorance.' 'He who is not instructed by the written law,
when he sins, is not guilty of so great a transgression as he who knowingly
breaks and transgresses the law of God.'^
'The poor pagans might have seme defense and excuse (quelque defense
et excuse) that they might not be held so culpable before God' as others,
2
particularly the Jews, who beside them are 'doubly guilty.' This does
not mean that they will not be condemned, but that they have some excuse
1. Com. on Hon. 4.15, CR 49.78f
2. Ser. on Gal. 2.17-18, CR 50.429
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in part. 'Unbelievers will have some excuse in part (quelque excuse a deroi)
though not in whole, for still their sin is not so grievous or so horrible
before God, because they have had no doctrine.'1 Calvin does not say in just
what way their punishment may be mitigated, but the idea is a frequent one in
his writings.
B. Responsibility on the basis of what man does perceive
We consider now a secondary way in which man is responsible. Ultimately
natural man does not know his sin, his concupiscence, and his ingratitude,
and does not come to a knowledge of God. He is responsible for culpable
ignorance of what he does not perceive, and it is this which we have examined
as his primary responsibility. In this man is held accountable for not having
rendered the proper acknowledgaent to God. But there is a way in which a
knowledge of right and wrong and. the divine sanction behind it is given to
him. We do not in this come to know his primary sin or responsibility, yet
he does come to a secondary type of conviction of wrong doing which Calvin
considers sufficient in itself to render him inexcusable. There is a way in
which apart from the light of revelation and apologetically he may come to
see that he has not been responsible. We here examine responsibility not as
it actually and ultimately is, but as it may be argued from the side of man
and in the light which breaks through to him, a partial yet sufficient know¬
ledge of his inexcusability which provides a secondary way he is responsible.
1. The natural man's notion of responsibility
In Calvin's unaerstanding of sin we have seen how with the entrance of
sin into the course of man's life, the whole pattern of his existence has
been inverted, introducing a new notion of responsibility. The whole pattern
of responsibility is inverted as it is comprehended in the mind of the un¬
believer, Instead of God's assuming responsibility for man's well-being, as
he did in the garden, now man in his independence assumes responsibility for
1. Ser. on I Tim. 5.7-12, CR 53.472. Com. on Luke 12.47, CR 45.680f
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1
himself. He continues to strive to raise himself up apart from the lord.
His well-being falls on his own shoulders, as he now sees it from the per¬
spective of sin, and he sets out to redeem himself, which of course only
extends the original self-sufficient notion of sin. This effort of man
issues in a concept of responsibility which arises in sin and asserts that
man is to rely on his own ability. God through this holds man aware of his
culpability. Man in his crusade to insure his own happiness and virtue traces
this perceptible order back to its origin and creates a religion. In point of
fact he gets entangled in a multitude of errors. The chief and ever recurring
error is that man proposes a religion which requires for man to gain some merit
before God and assures him that he is able to do so. It is 'unnecessary to
entertain men with some confidence or trust in their merits, for we are too
much given to this by nature. Ife have seen that it is an error which has
been common in all the world and throughout all time. It is not necessary
that we go to school to persuade ourselves that we are a capable race and
3
that by our virtue we can obligate God to us.'
This occurs as men mistake the fact of the external image of virtue done
in hope of reward by God and man to be true virtue - which ought to spring
from the obedient acknowledgment of grace in expression of gratitude - and
erect on this foundation a religious system designed to reach behind the moral
order to its creator, by which they may take care of themselves, by which they
may come to felicity on their own credit and responsibility. Men 'deceive
themselves with a false notion of righteousness. Some by intense moral
effort come to believe that they have fulfilled the requirements of salvation.
This is to a degree substantiated by the fact that God 'confers many blessings
of the present life on those who practice virtue among men' and that 'he is
1. Instruction in Taith, 1537, sec. 4
2. See earlier, chapters VI and VTI.
3. Ser. on Gal. 3.21-25, OH 50.546. II. 1.2, OH 2.177; Arg. to Com. on Gen.
OR 23.7
4. Arg. to Oom. on Horn., 49.1. Oom. on Horn. 1.17, OH 49.20
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pleased to discover his great esteem of true righteousness by not permitting
that which is external and hypocritical to remain without a reward.' ^ We have
already worked out this way Calvin deals with the ethical virtues of natural
2
man and need not repeat it here. But we must note the concept of respon¬
sibility which is inherent in ethics.
The concept of responsibility in the thought of the man who lives in sin
is that he is an independent, or autonomous and semi-independent creature who
has within himself the capacity and whose duty and responsibility it is to
provide for himself, who is to be accounted worthy on the basis of his merits
as he abides by the regulations and principles he comprehends. He says 'that
3
God owes us wages when we have served him.' He sees heaven or hell as de¬
pending on whether he has demonstrated himself worthy or unworthy, depending
on the course of life he has followed on earth, on the profit, fruition, and
increase of the talents he had at birth, or on some other intrinsic goodness
to be found within himself. He thinks that he can be 'justified by
4
prerogative.* We have noted in the previous chapter the similarity between
this concept and the concepts of responsibility which have obtained in moral
philosophy and in the governing concept of federal theology.
It is this 'opinion with which the world has always been drunken, that is,
of free will. For the pagans knew enough to say that God had indeed created
them in the world, and that he was able to give them good fortune, as they
termed it. But they held that each had it in his hand and in his own choosing
to follow virtue, and walk so that no fault might be found in him. This is
how the pagans divided things between God and themselves: the lesser matter,
that is, putting us here below to crawl about like frogs, they gave to God,
but they said that attaining to heaven was the ability (faculte) of men, and
1. III. 14.2, OR 2.565
2. See chapter VI.
3. Ser. on Gal. 2.14-16, GS 50.409
4. Ser. on Gal. 2.11-14, CR 50.505
I
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that it belonged to them to rule themselves with all virtue.1 They affirm that
'we can co-operate so that when it comes to the reckoning the principal part
will always be found in us.'Sin has radically inverted man's notion of
responsibility and given to it as to the rest of life the sane self-orient¬
ation. He leaves grace aside, centers his confidence in himself, and thinks
that he is and can be responsible for his own salvation.
2. The law of nature and the inexcusability of the Gentiles
Here God uses this sense of duty, radically wrong as it is, to take away
every excuse of man. Although the natural man does not really know what his
duty is, he does not know that he has only to receive God's benefits and
acknowledge them in dependence on him, he ignores all this as it is written
in the heavens, yet we accept his distorted concept of duty, his notion that
he can and must save himself in the moral order, and use this to hold him
responsible.
a. Man's sufficient knowledge (cognoissance suffisante)
While men do not come to a knowledge of God, yet even the inverted or
shadow knowledge which they do gain leaves them inexcusable. 'We are not
however, so blind that we can plead our ignorance as an excuse for our per-
verseness. We conceive that there is a deity, and then that whoever he may
be, he ought to be worshiped, but here our reason fails, because it cannot
2
ascertain who or what sort of being God is.' It is in fact not a real know-
3
ledge of God, 'not a certain knowledge' as it does not know his grace but
fancies human merits. It is a 'confused knowledge,' or a 'vain knowledge.
Yet 'we see so far that we cannot pretend any excuse.'^ This is Galvin's
analysis in the passage in I Gor. 1.21. Tliough we are ' stone-blind' as regards
any real knowledge of grace that might lead us to 'break forth' in acknowledg¬
ment, yet 'we receive a slight perception of his divinity which renders us
1. Ser. on Eph. 1.17-18, CR 51.329f. II. 1.2, CR 2.177
2. Gom. on Rom. 1.20, OR 49*24
3. Ser. on I Tim. 6.15-16, CR 53.623
4. Gom. on Eph. 4.17, CR 51.204; Gom. on Eeb. 11.6, GR 55.1485. Com. on Rom., ibid., Gem. on Eab. 1.16, OR 43.515
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inexcusable. Accordingly when Paul declares here that God. is not known through
means of his creatures, you must understand him to mean that a pure knowledge
of him is not attained. Por that none may have any pretext for ignorance
mankind, make proficiency in the universal school of nature so far as to be
affected with some perception of deity, but what God is they know not, nay
more, they immediately become vain in their imaginations. '
Galvin sometimes so states his case as to leave a problem. He follows
in this passage above with a remark that seems to ascribe responsibility for
ingratitude to man on the basis of what he did perceive. In this way in¬
gratitude as man's primal sin would presuppose some perception, of God's
paternal goodness and solicitude. This is exactly what natural man never
has the slightest idea about; men are here 'blinder than moles.' Consequent¬
ly in other contexts Calvin bases responsibility for such ingratitude
another way, on what man did not perceive, on what he ignored and was cul-
2
pably ignorant of. Their 'ingratitude' rises from a 'brutish insensibility.'
Here perhaps Calvin is thinking not of the real primal sin of ingratitude
but of some of its lesser forms. He then does not mean to assert that men
consciously perceive enough of God's goodness to evoke the proper response
of gratitude - for this would be tantamount to saying they did perceive a
real knowledge of God. Perhaps this responsibility for ingratitude in I Cor.
1.21 is to be referred back to the preceding discussion of what men did ignore,
the fulness of his benefits and self-manifestation. Calvin does there refer
to the ingratitude of men in learning nothing in the manifestation of God in
the heavens.'' Or perhaps Calvin is simply inconsistent here. A similar
difficulty exists in the analysis in the Institutes.^"
At any rate it seems to be Calvin's position that men do not have a
real knowledge of God, for they do not know his goodness, and yet the}*- do
1. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, CR 49-326
2. Com. on Ps. 14-5.9, CR 32.415
3. Com. on I Cor. 1.21, ibid.
4. 1.5.15, CR 2.52
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have a sufficient knowledge, which is an inverted knowledge, in that it
leads them to depend on their own strength to worship him, to despise his
grace unconsciously as they attempt to win salvation at his hand in the
moral order. We have 'a sufficient knowledge (cognoissance suffisante) to
convict us in the last day and prove that we merit condemnation.1 ~ Yor men
'the distinction between good and evil is engraven on their consciences,'
O
and serves 'for taking away every excuse of ignorance.' There are some
'sparks' that do break through to man - not real light but darkened light.
It is only called light by way of concession. ^ Yet even this false appear¬
ance of light is sufficient to give a real responsibility to him.
b. Man's sense of duty to the right and sense of sin
It is this law of nature that men recognize to be divine, even though
they entirely pervert it, on which we may argue the inexcusability of the
natural man. They are formally correct in their supposition that such
obedience ought to be rendered, though the motive of hope of reward and
self-justification perverts any virtue. 'Let us remember that when our Lord
gives us pricks within our hearts that we may sense what our duty and office
is, that is just as if he spoke to us apart from all men and without putting
any Scripture before our eyes. He who rejects such a knowledge extinguishes
the Spirit of God as much as he can, and rebels against it. Let us learn
therefore, when it pleases God to make us sense his will, to be obedient to
4
him and know that it is he who urges us on.' ' Galvin does not mean here that
man really comes to know his duty to God, to acknowledge his benefits, to
depend entirely on God and conform his life to moral obedience in expression
of gratitude. He notes in the context that 'it is true notwithstanding that
for all this,' 'we do not cease to be poor blind men who do not know what
it is to serve God. Nevertheless God holds man responsible to this
1. Ser. on I Tim. 5.7-12, CR 53.469. Ser. on Sph. 4.17-19, CR 31.598
2. Com. on John 1.5, CR 47.6. 1.3.1, CR 2.36f
3. Com. onEph. 4.17, CR 51.206. Com. on John 9.39, CR 47.233f
4. Ser. on I Tim. 5*7-12, CR 53*470. Com. on Mark 10.21, CR 45.540
5. ibid.
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observance on the basis of the law of nature they do perceive.
This does not mean that they are not responsible beyond it on the basis
of what they ignore and do not perceive in the self-declaration of God in
the heavens. It does mean that here as well on the basis of what is per¬
ceived men may be found culpable on their own terms. Putting aside for the
moment the question of ultimate and final responsibility where man's con¬
science is dead in sin and concupiscence, where he is not aware of his in¬
gratitude, we can here sufficiently convict man by his own conscience.
'Because it might appear absurd that the Gentiles should perish without any
previous knowledge, he (Paul) immediately subjoins that their conscience
supplies in the place of a law to them, and is therefore sufficient for
their just condemnation. The end of the law of nature therefore is that
man may be rendered inexcusable. Nor will it be improperly defined in this
manner: that it is a sentiment of the conscience sufficiently discerning
between good and evil to deprive men of the pretext of ignorance, while they
are convicted even by their own testimony. Such is the indulgence of man to
himself that in the perpetration of evil actions he always gladly diverts
his mind as much as he possibly can from all sense of sin. ' (peccati sensus)
'But since the sinner, though he endeavors to evade the knowledge of good and
evil imprinted on his mind, is frequently brought back to it, and so is not
permitted to shut his eyes, but compelled whether he will or not sometimes to
open them, there is no truth in the assertion that he sins only through
ignorance.' Guilt here is a type of ethical guilt where the Gentile is as
yet wholly unaware of his primal sin, but he recognizes that he has not kept
the moral law.
'It is a vain excuse if someone allege, Ho, now I am not a scholar,
For there are things that our lord has engraven in men so that they have
been taught an it were from their mother's womb.' 'We need no abrd of God
to condemn than, they can allege no ignorance of religion, for nature should
1. II. 2. 22, OR 2.203f. Com. on Rom. 7.15, CR 49. 129f
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lead them to it.' 'Ho, well, I was never instructed in the gospel. And were
were you never taught a sufficient doctrine by nature? Did you not know how
to discern between the good and the bad, as Paul puts it? Have we not a suf¬
ficient knowledge to convict us in the last day and prove that we merit
1
condemnation?1
Where it is the case that some men consider themselves to be ethically
flawless and so think they are virtuous and righteous, these men have not
only ignored in their congenital blindness the clear manifestation of God
in the heavens and which never finds perception in man, they have as well
and in addition shut their eyes to that darkened light of nature which com¬
monly does find perception in the consciousness of mankind. Man does 'endeavor
2
to evade the knowledge of good and evil imprinted on his mind.' Born blind
3
to ultimate good, man would in addition 'shut his eyes' to the light of
his own consciencej we would 'bury' the remorse that Sod gives us.'":" 'They
suppress it as much as they can; indeed they even strive to extinguish
(though they cannot) this knowledge and whatever light they have from
heaven.They have in self-deception become 'doubly blind,'^ sharing in
the first instance the common blindness of all mankind to Cod's paternal
goodness and beneficence which calls us to acknowledgjnent and gratitude, to
cast themselves completely on him, and entering into in the second instance
a further blindness not common to all mankind, where they do not correctly
see even the moral order, the law of the Gentiles, which is generally per¬
ceived. Because of transgression, God 'entirely puts out their eyes which
were formerly destitute of true light.' 7 'Paul does not speak mei'ely of
the natural blindness (naturalis caecitas) which we brought with us from
the womb, but refers to a more gross blindness (magis crassa excaecatio)
1. Ser. on I Tim. 5.7-12, CR 53.469
2. II. 2.22, OR 2.203. 1.4.2, OR 2.39; Com. on Rom. 2.14, OR 49.37ff
3. ibid.
4. Ser. on I Tim., ibid.
5. Com. on Hab. 1.16, CR 43.515
6. Com. on John 9.39, CR 47.233^. Jews and Gentiles are treated as one 4ere.
7. ibid.
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by which God punishes former transgression.' Operative even among the
Gentiles is that principle of sin which causes man to shut his eyes to
available truth.
Thus Galvin formulates this secondary and apologetic aspect of iiis
concept of responsibility. We do not learn man's real responsibility this
way. This is ignored in the heavens and comes with the gospel. But God
reaches through with man's perverted sense of duty to hold him responsible.
In this way Oalvin retains two central ideas. First, sin completely blinds
man so that he never knows what sin means, and secondly, no man sins without
being or having been in some way consciously aware that he is doing wrong.
While remaining blind to his real fault, man is given within the limits of
human corruption to know right from wrong and is held culpable on this basis,
as well as on the further basis of his ignorance of ultimate values. 'Where
the knowledge of God is not there darkness, error, vanity, destitution of
light and life prevail. These thingsf however, do not render it impossible that
the ungodly should be conscious of doing wrong when they sin, and know that
2
their judge is in heaven and feel an executioner within them.'
1. Com. on Eph. 4.17, GS 51.205
2. Com. on I Pet. 1.34, OR 55.222
Calvin deals with the responsibility and culpability of the man who
lives in sin and by the light of nature along the same lines as theology
before him and after him. Man's culpability is based on God's self-
manifestation in his creatures. Man ought to have known God apart from
his law and gospel in these wondrous works. Calvin's language and concepts
here are often simply those of traditional theology. But it is important
to see Calvin's arguments here in the light of his larger concepts of sin
and responsibility, concepts which have not customarily been included in
the traditional arguments, and particularly in the understanding of later
Reformed theology. Calvin emphasizes that this sin of man in nature is at
once an ignorance and an ingratitude. Man ignores and slights and is thus
ungrateful for the blessings of God to him. He thus does not burst forth
in that proper acknowledgment which is required of him. God declares him¬
self as with an audible voice, he gives his liford in nature. But man in
his ingratitude remains oblivious and heedless, because of his concern and
self-willed desire to care for himself. Calvin thus includes man's sin in
nature in the central sin of all mankind as ingratitude and the rejection
of the grace of God. Man desires to depend on himself and his own strength
in such a way that as he pursues this goal he completely ignores the offer
of God to receive his blessing and grace and depend on these. As it has
constantly been our thesis that sin in the thought of Calvin is most funda¬
mentally man's breaking off of God's order of grace, so here once again in
nature man constantly thwarts and inverts the grace of God to him.
The tendencies which may obscure this basic analysis of man's sin in
nature grow out of that concept which sees sin primarily as moral trans¬
gression or the breaking of God's law. If it is supposed that man's primary
duty to God was to obey God's law by strength and self-will, and if it is
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supposed that man's sin is most fundamentally his transgression of or want
of conformity unto the moral law of God, then much of the significance of
Calvin's concept of man's culpability in nature will be lost. Oalvin does
indeed make use of man's moral transgression against the law written on his
heart as a means to convict him of his sin, and we have attempted to show
this. But both here and in the chapter on ethics we have further seen that
Galvin subordinates this way of thought to the more fundamental concept:
that man's sin is his failure to acknowledge God in gratitude, to depend on
his grace, and serve him in glad and selfless love. In theology then we
ought not to depict man's sinfulness in nature simply as his failure to live
up in his own strength to the light that he has been given. Certainly this
much is true. But beyond this we must include and even give primary
emphasis to man's self-will which blinds him so that he ignores the fulness
of God's self-manifestation around him.
The value of Calvin's emphasis on man's sin in nature as his ingratitude
and rejection of God's grace becomes more obvious when we enter into the
problems of man's responsibility and his ability in nature. Theology fol¬
lowed Calvin to speak of man's faculty or ability to know 'God in nature.
But if it took over Calvin's terms, it did not take over Calvin's concept
of responsibility. Federal theology rather conceived of some talent which
was or was supposed to be in man by which he could search out God, learn
his will and law as written in the heavens, and then obey it. The Later
Reformed theologians knew of course that man was not able to do this, he
had lost this ability because of his sin. Yet nonetheless such was their
concept of man's responsibility that they portrayed a man who was held
culpable because he had not been able or willing to come to God in nature.
This concept follows from that of a covenant of works of God with man where
man was to provide works of merit and righteousness with which to justify
himself. It is assumed that man is to reach felicity in his integrity by
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employing some talent that he has been given. In thus moving away from Calvin's
thought Reformed theology encountered the problem: How is man to be held res¬
ponsible for something which he did not have the ability to do. When theology
now asserted at once that man was supposed to be able to come to God in
nature and was held culpable for his failure, and at the same time that he
was unable to do this, having lost this ability in sin, it brought the criticism
that such culpability was not real guilt at all.
It is the insight of Calvin in this debate that the whole question
must be seen in the light of God's grace to man and. man's responsibility
as a response of accepting this grace and depending on it. In this dis¬
cussion about man's ability, it is vital to recall Calvin's thought about
man's knowing God only as God enables man to know him. We deal with what
are otherwise insurmountable problems as we recognize that man is not able
and is not supposed to be able to come to God in nature. Rather God was to
come to him, and. did come to him, until shut off by man's ingratitude. In
this way we may reduce inclination and ability to the same thing, and deal
v/ith this objection of philosophy and liberal theology. Man's guilt then
once again lies in his rejection of the grace of God that would have
enabled him to know God in nature. We have tried to show here that even
if Calvin at times hesitates about this in the matter of man's sin in
nature, nevertheless his thought ought to be interpreted in this direction,
bringing the question of ability under the larger and better developed
notion of man's responsibility as that of being grateful for God's grace.
Calvin's consistent emphasis on man's ignorance and ingratitude is here an
index of the way in which he sees man's culpability in nature as that of
the rejection of God's blessing, rather than as the failure to use his
abilities to come to know God or to obejr his moral law. In this way
theology ought to deal with the question of the guilt of the man who lives
in ignorance of God and of his sin.
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PART HI: COBGHJSION
It remains for us in conclusion to stand apart from the close study
of Calvin's ivories and survey his concept of sin and responsibility both
critically and in the light of the theological ana philosophical movements
which followed him and influenced Calvinist thought. ■ We bring together
and integrate the aspects of sin and responsibility we have examined in
the several chapters to state the message of Calvin to present-day theology,
pointing out where we today may put his thought in a more consistent form
than Calvin was able to do, or noting with Galvin where there are factors
which cannot be rationally adjusted or resolved.
The fact that we set ourselves the task of examining Calvin's under¬
standing of sin and responsibility implies from the very start that there
is here a problem or conflict. The subject suggests that there is real
or apparent inconsistency here, that Calvin's concept of sin is so developed
as to prejudice man's responsibility, or that Calvin's thought about man's
freedom and ability to fulfil his responsibility is such that it prejudices
his concept of'sin. There arise doubts as to man's real culpability or
as to the justice of God in holding mari liable and punishing him in his
guilt. We are now in a position to look at these problems we sketched
in the introductory chapter in the light of our exposition of Calvin's
thought and see both where Calvin has been rightly criticized, and where
Calvin's critics may be refuted on the matter by a d.eeper appreciation
of what Calvin taught. Here it proves of the utmost importance to free
Calvin's thought from the influence of federal theology and of moral
philosophy.
The subject of sin and responsibility suggests at once that responsibility
be defined as culpability, that the thesis be limited to the question of
what is man's sin, of how he is guilty fox* it, and how he is consequently
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punished. It has, however, proved necessary to enter into questions of
the nature of man and the nature of God in his relation to man, that is,
to examine man's responsibility in the largest sense, to set forth what
is man's duty, what he is responsible for. When we know wherein consisted
man's responsible behavior toward God in the beginning and wherein it con¬
sists now, then we can define his sin, and consequently examine his cul¬
pability, and the justice of God in punishing man for his sin and guilt.
It must be recognized from the start that both sin and responsibility
have specific theological meanings, particularly in Calvin's thought. Sin,
of course, is a word and concept peculiar to theology, yet it has its
parallel and counterpart in the philosophical concepts of culpability, and
moral failure. Responsibility is a word and concept shared by theology and
philosophy alike. Yet if we are really to understand Calvin's thought we
must not confound the Christian ideas of sin and responsibility with
philosophical ideas of man's responsibility and blameworthiness. Respon¬
sibility and moral failure have meanings in the ethical and philosophical
sense, but responsibility and sin have meanings peculiar to the Christian
faith, which are to be established independently and in distinction from
all other concepts.
Sin is therefore for Calvin a concept which must be used only in a
religious sense. Divine revelation must teach us our sin. Dor Calvin this
means that the essential significance of sin is found in the relation be¬
tween our knowledge of God and our knowledge of sin. We cannot speak of
sin singly in the terms of moral philosophy, of ethical guilt, or of the
transgression of natural and moral law, but sin must be defined in the
religious sphere. But the issue here is not a simple one, for Calvin
follows medieval theology before him to make use of the sense of moral guilt
found in nature. This is to be incorporated into the Christian teaching in
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such a way as to remain, subordinated to the larger Christian concept of sin.
One must be careful in reading Calvin to distinguish between his use of
these ethical concepts and his basic concept of sin. He does not really seen
to be guilty of confounding the two, for we have traced a clear distinction
which remains between sin and ethical wrong, yet the larger distinction
does often fall into the background so that we might think that Calvin's
concept of sin does not differ in essence from the philosophical ideas
about ethical failure before moral obligation. But when we have interpreted
Calvin's concept of sin in the light of Cod's grace as first and most
radically a rejection of this grace, then it becomes clear that this moral
guilt is scarcely a prelude to what we really mean by sin.
It is moreover generally clear in Calvin that because the concept of
sin comes not from philosophy but from revelation we have also to say that
the clearer the eye of faith sees the light of God, the more completely the
essential nature of sin is disclosed. The particular point at issue here
in Calvin is whether we finally know our sins from the law or whether our
knowledge of sin is to be rooted in Christology and the knowledge of grace.
Here again the guiding principle is plain, but the ramifications more couples.
The religious significance of sin is perceived most clearly in the light of
the work of Christ. There is no shortage of passages in Calvin where this
theme is developed. Yet Calvin seems at times to stumble and become
confused in regard to the matter of the knowledge of sin by the law.
Coupling the sense of ethical guilt in nature with the overpowering and
radically greater sense of religious guilt when man stands in unrighteousness
before the divine moral law, Calvin enters into moral denunciations of man
that do not remain in subordination to his larger concept of sin as finally
known in the light of the grace of God. But Calvin outlines here his own
solution to the problem in the Biblical concept of the pedagogy of the law.
The law does teach us our sins because of our hardness of heart, it brings
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us through a crisis to the grace of God. Yet at the same time sin is to be
made known to us by the grace of God.
It is surely a happy inconsistency in Galvin that if he is sometimes
hesitant about asserting that we know our sins in a definitive way from
the knowledge of grace rather than from the law, he is never inclined
to develop the actual content of the doctrine of sin with reference to the
Decalogue in exclusion of the grace of God. If he can neglect the impor¬
tance of grace in the didactic method by which we realize our sins, yet in
his systematic procedure he selects concepts each of which clearly focuses
on sin in its relation to the grace of God. The correct center of reference
is here insured as Galvin defines man's original sin in the light of what
was God's grace to Adam in creation and what was to be man's response to
this grace, and therefore the concept of sin which follows from this por¬
trayal of man's primal state is developed in properly balanced proportions.
In the theology which followed Galvin this hesitancy to define the
ultimate source of our knowledge of sin as the knowledge of grace rather
than the law, and this use of the law written on man's heart to convict
of sin, without careful limitation of its legitimacy, seem to have been
not only passed on but augmented\to become governing concepts. In the
Introductory part of our study, we saw that sin came to be defined as
unrighteous transgression of the moral law. This law was set forth in
an original covenant of God with man which was not a covenant of grace,
but of nature, law, or works. It became generally identified and con¬
fused with the Decalogue and with the law of nature. This meant that
the knowledge of sin rose out of the law of God in whatever form it was
known to man, and made possible the incorporation of the philosophical
concept of moral failure into the doctrine of sin. It was thought possible
to lead man to faith through the preliminary stage of a crisis introduced by
the moral demands of nature, or the revealed law. And the doctrine of sin
r\~lC.-Z]o-
came systematically to be formulated by the light of God's law.
But this is to weaken and enfeeble what the Christian really under¬
stands by sin. We have tried to show here that while there are tendencies
in Calvin's thought which explain the development of the concept of sin in
this direction, Calvin ought rather to be interpreted in terms of his thought
about sin in relation to God's grace, for he does in point of fact develop
his concept of sin this way, and not simply with reference to law. In this
way the knowledge of sin is not a preliminary step toward faith, but a
corollary derived from the knowledge of grace in faith.
It is also necessary for us to emphasise that as sin is known only in
the light of God, so man's responsibility is truly known only when revealed
by Scripture. It is not known in nature. This concept remains more implicit
than explicit in Calvin, as he does not develop a concept of responsibility
in systematic form or in modern terras. It becomes clear not so much at the
beginning as at the end of our study that the natural man does not have the
slightest idea what his duty to God really is, nor where his real culpa¬
bility lies. A philosophical obligation to moral law remains so far short
of man's real duty of responding to 'God's grace that it is actually wrought
out within the sphere of sin and concupiscence.
It should, moreover, be implicitly if not explicitly obvious that man
knows his responsibility to God more clearly in the light of divine grace
than he does in relation to divine law. Calvin, if he were asked to state
this formally, would probably stumble over this to precisely the same extent
that he is confused over the knowledge of sin by grace and the knowledge of
sin by the law. And in the immediate contexts of numerous passages he
elaborates on how the law shows us what our duty is. But this
too could be regarded as the pedagogy of the law. We have tried here to
establish Calvin's real position by pressing him in his development of the
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law. Here he has no doubt about the fact that man's responsibility goes
beyond that of any perfect obedience to the law. Perfect obedience is not
enough to discharge us of our duty, if we in this obedience yet despise the
grace of God. Responsibility is therefore a concept which must be confound¬
ed neither with simple ethical obligation nor with mere perfect obedience
to divine moral law. It is essentially known in its relation to the grace
of 'God.
In determining the nature of what man is responsible for, and what is
his sin, we are thus required to start with the grace of God. The concepts
of sin and responsibility are therefore dependent upon our understanding
of this fundamental relationship of grace between man and God. It might
be thought that this is a radically reversed procedure. It might seem that
man's duty is to obey God's moral law, that'man sins as he breaks the law,
that he is held culpable for this transgression, and that by the justice
of God he is punished. The popular conception of Calvin's thought has
been this way. Thus the grace of God is either omitted altogether or
held in the background. Yet it is rather the case that the grace of God
is the governing principle under which both sin and responsibility have
to be subordinated and interpreted. We have to begin with the fact that
God in his grace has ordered all things for the benefit of man. Calvin
places a great deal of weight on the concept of order. He speaks of an
order of creation and of the pure order of nature. While there are many
ramifications of order, including the moral order, the social order, and
the course of nature, we are essentially to understand an order where 'God
is or intends to be gracious to man, and man in response acknowledges or
ought to acknowledge God's benefits. In this dynamic relationship all things
are ordered. Thus order is conceived as not a static relation but a continual
outpouring of grace to man, and man's participation in God. Prom this
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essential concept Calvin develops his notion of what man is responsible for -
the acknowledgment of grace - and of what is his sin - his disordering the
divine order of grace by his self-willed dependence not on grace, but on
himself.
It is important to see this primal and ideal order in which man's
relation to God is comprehended as an order of grace. Other ways of
viewing this order are not to be omitted. But primary emphasis on any
other principle of order obscures Calvin's thought. The theology which
followed Calvin thought of a moral order, of an order of justice and
righteousness. With Calvin these are included but follow from the
gracious relationship of God to man. The implication of the covenant
of works is that this order was not based so much on God's dynamic and
continual grace to man, and man's acknowledgment, as it was based on
God's righteous lav/ and man's perfect obedience to it. Primarily works
of righteousness were required to maintain all order. And philosophical
emphasis falls on a formal and ethical order.
But for Calvin the inmost character of the Christian conception of
God is that he is a God of grace. This, Calvin never tires of saying,
is the very nature of God. God is our creator, but God is further and
foremost our father. This means that God governs his universe in such
a way that even when he is upholding his holiness, his majesty, and his
righteousness, he does so in such a way that he is nonetheless guided by
his very nature as a God of love. If sin runs counter to his holiness,
his majesty, and his righteousness, it does even more run counter to his
grace and love.
It is then necessary to undergird the whole understanding of sin and
responsibility with the concept of a God who was, is, and continues to will
to be gracious to man. This must be done even throughout man's sin. Calvin
conceives of God as gracious to man in the beginning. Then when man sinned
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God did not loose sight of the destiny for which he had created man, but
his grace superabounded to bring man again into a relationship of grace.
It is here important to see the overarching grace of God behind the
whole of God's relationship to sinful man. God is brought over against
man as judge, yet this does not mean that he ceases to be father. He
assumes the character of judge, as Calvin puts it, but remains in his
heart our father. Even in our sin he continues to be gracious while man
cuts off, thwarts, and inverts the grace of God. And finally God by
his grace defeats the sin of man by sending his Son to filfil the
covenant and restore the order of creation.
But if Calvin never wearies of centering his theology in the grace
of God, and thus subordinating his concepts of sin and responsibility to
this grace, there is also a concept familiar to Calvin which rises again
and again threatening and canceling this very nature of God, and thus pre¬
judicing this development of man's sin and responsibility in relationship
to divine grace. It is seriously to be doubted whether for Calvin God's
providence and predestination are firmly rooted in the grace of God to us
in Christ. It would seem to be the logical conclusion of Calvin's govern¬
ing concept of the grace of God that God wills and labors for the salvation
of all men. If he does not loose sight of the end for which he created man,
then he must wish for all to be united to him in grace and to acknowledge
his benefits in gratitude and love.
But on occasion Calvin is not able to say this, for such is his concept
of reprobation that he sometimes may assert that God has created some that
they might perish. This prejudices at once the sincerity of the grace of
God toward all men, and qualifies in turn the seriousness with which we can
accept Calvin's concepts of sin and responsibility developed in the light of
this grace. There is no problem here with the concept of providence as
manifested in God's election of a chosen people and of the members of his
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church. Here God only expresses and implements his will for grace. But
the problem for Calvin is in asserting at once that God's will is the
will for salvation and yet that all are not saved. In the government of
an omnipotent God sane are reprobated by his decree. God brings them to
a destiny set for them before their creation.
Calvin's attempt to adjust and resolve this problem of the love and
power of God proves for him a major problem. He is forced to say that
there appears to be a double will in God, reflected in God's will which
in this matter seems different from his secret counsel. God wills the
salvation of all men but has not decreed this from all eternity. Calvin
seems to be further guilty of first making this distinction and then
trying to erase it and reducing to a single will this apparent double
will in 'God. In all this is reflected his confusion and his weakness
in refusing to follow out the implications of centering his theology
on the grace of God.
For modern theology it will be wise to accept Calvin's thought only
insofar as it recognises that the love and providence of God cannot be
adjusted or rationally resolved, that the limitations of our ability
prevent a rational solution. This seems to be Calvin's intention. We
recognize that God wills the salvation of all, bestows his grace upon
them, and yet we recognize that all are not saved. This means primarily
a rejection of the idea of reprobation and of double predestination. We
either suspend judgaent at this point, or else so include eternal death
in the counsel of God as to make it clear that this is part of his pro¬
vidence and yet not his will, decree, or intention. Perhaps here Calvin's
concept of a secret counsel could be modified bjr the removal of the
elements of will and decree usually associated with it. God while yet
willing the salvation of all counsels that those who reject him shall
perish. And this counsel must be not only temporal but from all time.
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God formulated his counsel from before the foundation of the world.
Having thus abandoned Calvin's teaching about reprobation, theology
may as well abandon Calvin's twofold distinction of the will of God.
There may be some usefulness in the concept where it recognizes our
rational limitations, yet we may well find even, in Calvin himself con¬
cepts better suited to resolve the conflict. If God's will does wear
to us the appearance of variety, this must not be incorporated into
theology as a systematic presupposition, but must simply be recognized
as the limit of our investigation. Developing the concept will simply
qualify our fundamental principle that God is a God of grace.
Thus we say that for Calvin God is a God of grace and that this
fact must govern our thought about man's sin and his responsibility,
while yet recognizing that Calvin's thought about double predestination
does represent an important qualification of this truth. It may best be
seen, however, that we have not mis-read Calvin's main position as we
consider further and significant concepts Calvin employs to solve the
same problem. The theologians who have followed Calvin in the Reformed
tradition have not always given place to the way in which Calvin thinks
of an accidental or adventitious outcome of God's grace toward man. Man
is never damned by the intent of Ciod, but only as sin by accident turns
God's grace in nature, law, or gospel, to our condemnation. In this way
we are able to maintain that God moves graciously toward man and is not
responsible for his sin. The part of God in sin is hidden, but the part
of man is open and manifest. God gives to all men grace sufficient to
bring them to felicity, but they as far as they can confound and disturb
his providence. By simply putting side by side with Calvin's concept of
the immutable providence of God his frequent teaching that men do dynamically
resist and cut off his grace, we can proceed to develop his thought about
sin and responsibility in the light of God's grace.
-282-
In the main body of this thesis we have had to deal first and more
completely with Calvin's concept of sin and then to bring out of this
Calvin's concept of responsibility. The concept of sin finds explicit
statement in Calvin, but the later concept of responsibility occurs in
Calvin only in parallel and equivalent language and not in any formal
statement. I\Tor has it been possible simply to understand by responsibility
what is included under culpability, for the issues become clouded unless we
keep always in mind what man is actually and ideally responsible for, what
- in Calvin's language - is his duty, his obligation, his response to Cod,
and his accountability. Now, standing apart from Calvin, we can reverse
this procedure and assess first what is man's responsibility, and secondly
what is his sin. In this way also his culpability becomes more obvious.
This procedure is found only loosely in Calvin, in that the doctrine of
man precedes the doctrine of sin. Yet it ought to be followed more ex¬
plicitly in contemporary discussions of sin and responsibility. A
development of the nature of sin ought to follow a clear statement of
what man was responsible for in the beginning and is now held accountable
for. Calvin does not lead us astray here, for he is aware that exegetically
the definition of sin must be understood in the light of man's duty to God
at the first. He selects concepts to describe the nature of sin which are
based on God's grace to man at creation, and he opens his Institutes with
a discussion of what is man's response to God. Yet neither does he lead
us far enough in defining this as a conscious procedure. The confusion of
later generations on this point, and the introduction of the covenant of
works are perhaps an index of the way Calvin failed to make explicit
systematically what is man's responsibility, and from this point to define
his concept of sin.
It thus becomes important to recognize that man's real responsi¬
bility lies in an answer to the grace of God. Man does not so much have a
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responsibility, as he is put into a responsible relation to God. He is
oo-responient to God's grace. We act as we are acted upon. Duty and res¬
ponsibility must be subordinated to this governing principle. He is
bound by the strong cord of a free and voluntary love. He is held ac¬
countable for rendering an expression of thanksgiving. This, says Calvin,
is the payment God requires of man. It is strange and even difficult at
the first to regain this concept of responsibility, for we are accustomed
to thinking of responsibility in terms of man's free choice, of his
obligation to duty and to law. Responsibility is set within terms of
reference of actual or ideal freedom, and ability for self-expression.
We think of discharging a responsibility when duty is done, of accounts
rendered, or deeds of virtue and merits accomplished. But these are the
terms of moral philosophy, which has supposed that responsibility was to
be referred to freedom and ability for self-determination. Or they are
the terms of a theology which supposed, that man in paradise was to
justify himself by his works, to discharge his duty by his works of
righteousness. This strangeness with which Calvin's concept of res¬
ponsibility strikes us is indicative of the way our thought is now per¬
meated with ideas alien to him and the way we must at the very start
beginmth his reference point of the grace of God.
Here the significance of such words as acknowledgrner_t, gratitude, or
rendering homage to him for his grace cannot be over-estimated. They may
not impress Calvin's readers at first glance, for they are not the formal
or traditional terms of theology, yet it is by subordinating all man's
duties to this single task of acknowledging God's grace and depending on it
that we find the true center of focus for Calvin's notion of responsibility.
Calvin brings this out in various ways, but five of these concepts are
peculiarly useful in defining mail's responsibility in that they stand in
antithesis to man's sin. We focus on the grace of God as we say
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first that man is to be faithful to God, to live in fidelity as he believes
in God's goodness to him. But this emphasis gives immediate rise to a
second aspect of faith. Man is to trust in and invoke God's help as he
depends on grace for his every need. This is wrought out, in the third
place, as man responds not in formal, legal, or moralistic obedience,
but in glad and willing obedience to divine law, which requires the life
of out-going and selfless love. Prom a fourth viewpoint, we consider this
response as man's love to God, when he denies himself, abandoning all self-
love and concupiscent self-1(7111. Perhaps most clearly of all the reference
point of grace for responsibility shines forth when Calvin says that man
is simply responsible for gratitude for 'God's blessing.
Man's responsibility is then worked out in the larger terms of another's
being responsible for him. He is responsible not in his exercise of free¬
dom or independence, ox- ability and will power, but in his dependence on grace,
in Ms being bound to grace for all his faculty and will. He is not and is
not supposed to be free and able, but lives responsibly as he confesses he
is not able to stand alone, that he can do nothing of himself. He is i"es-
ponsible as he allows God to be responsible for him, and as he is perfectly
grateful by trying in the strength of God to acknowledge 'God's benefits to
him, expressing his gratitude and employing his talents in obedience and
service. This was man's responsibility in the beginning and it is his
responsibility now. God discharges us of all that we owe him precisely
as we confess that we cannot discharge ourselves of the hundredth part of
our duty. God is our father and we are his children. He cares for us. In
this way Calvin sets forth a profoundly Christian concept of responsibility.
Throughout the development of such a concept of responsibility we have
constantly to contrast it with the two similar concepts of responsibility
explicit in moral philosophy and inherent in federal theology. On the one
hand, moral philosophy conceives of a man who is responsible as he is free
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and able to determine for himself some good choice of action or deed of
virtue. He creates good, he makes good. He is judged on the basis of his
deeds done by his own will and power, he has in this way an account to
render. But this is to reverse the thought of Calvin. .Responsible be¬
havior takes place not in freedom or independence, but in dependence,
not in man's use of independent ability, but in his allowing God to
enable him and his depending for all abilities on him. On the other
hand, the federal theology which followed Calvin conceived of a covenant
of works which negated this responsible relation of man to God in grace.
At the first man was not responsible as he depended on grace and was
grateful for it, but he was responsible for works of righteousness, for
moral deeds with which to justify himself. lie lived by works, not by
grace. Thus the concept of responsibility is obscured. Federal theology
could not then define man's responsibility in terms of gpace, but saw the
covenant of works as remaining always to express man's natural relation,
to God and the inherent principles of justice in the universe. Man was
accountable on the basis of his deeds.
Of course there are ways in which Calvin includes many of these ways
of thought, and rightly so. We are accountable on the basis of our deeds
in the negative sense that men who break God's law are punished while they
continue in sin. We have a responsibility to choose the right and we are
answerable for our choice. We can accept many statements in common with
these other notions of responsibility, but only when we have clearly seen
how our ultimate terms of reference differ. All these similar assertions
are to be held in subordination to the governing concept of man as co¬
respondent to the grace of God. To fail to do this means to develop in
the name of Christianity a concept of responsibility which rises not from
faith, but from the sin of man as he in ego-centricity defines responsibility
in terms of what he himself for his part has to do in independence of God.
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The natural mail's notion that he can and ought to be responsible for
himself comes to permeate our thought.
Calvin seans to .have come closest to a concept of responsibility com¬
patible with federal theology or with moral philosophy in a few passages
dealing with the culpability of man in nature. Here he takes over the
terms of his opponents to assert that at the first Adam had the faculty
and ability to know God and obey him, but that in his sin he lost these.
Now men cannot come to God in nature because they have not the faculty
or will. Where this argument stands alone Calvin may be criticised as
obscuring his case and lapsing into a more static conception of a man who
is responsible as he makes proper use of some independent talent. From
these terms of reference alone Calvin may be criticized for maintaining
that man is to be held liable in sin for something he has not the ability
and power to do. Perheps Calvin did not see here the full implications
of his larger concept of responsibility.
But it has been our attempt in this thesis to show that this thought
of Calvin ought to be interpreted in subordination to the concept of man's
essential response as an answer to the grace of God, not as the active
employment of talents and independent ability of his own in searching out
God, but as the passive acceptance of God's self-declaration and offer of
grace. Ability is to be integrated with will. Man is enabled by God's
grace as he is inclined to respond in gratitude. In this way we have seen
that Calvin's critics may be answered. Where it was formerly
objected that man ought not to be held, responsible and culpable for some¬
thing he did not have the ability and freedom to d.o, it may be replied that
culpability lies not in man's misuse of freedom or ability, or his lack of
these talents, but primarily in his failure to receive and depend on that
divine grace which might have enabled him.
Having thus set forth how Calvin's concept of responsibility is to be
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developed in the light of modern problems, we can see why we have insisted
from the start that sin is only to be interpreted in the light of God's
grace and what man's primal responsibility was. The nature of man's sin
is that he rejects this grace of God. He falls from grace. He dis-graces
himself. He breaks the divine order of grace. He does this because he
attempts to depend on himself, to be independent, and not to depend on the
grace of God. He hopes to care for himself, to help himself to righteousness.
Calvin chooses to develop this in several ways, each of which points back
to the severance of this primal relationship of grace. Five of these ways
are of primary importance. Man's sin is infidelity, he in infidelity
despised the grace of God. Man's sin is unbelief. But by this unbelief
Calvin does not mean man's refusal intellectually to accept certain
facts about God. The relation between faith and sin is one of trust and
confidence in God. That it be so interpreted is guaranteed by Calvin's
first insistence on man's infidelity. He does not so believe in the grace
of God as to trust in it for his every need. Man's sin is his disobedience.
This'refers first to his rebellion against divine law, but further to his
failure to obey the divine law of love. Man did not respond in glad and
selfless willing obedience. Man's sin is concupiscence. Man sinned as he
in self will tried to help himself to righteousness and felicity. Concupis¬
cence manifests itself in gross forms, but most secretly in man's desire for
independence from grace, as he attempts to justify himself. Man's search
after God is only a sublimated form of his sin. This concupiscence and self-
love is man's refusal to be subdued and dominated by divine love. God does
not have dominion over man's will as his grace supports man's will, but
man's will is selfishly turned toward himself. Man's sin is his ingratitude.
He did not acknowledge God's benefits as he ought to have done. He despises
God's grace.
It will be noted that in this discussion of the essential nature of sin
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the emphasis does not fall on. moral failure or simple transgression of the
law. Upon approaching Calvin's doctrine of sin it might be supposed that
sin at its root is to be set opposite the law of God. There is, we have
recognized, a tendency in Calvin to do this, particularly in the matter
of the way we come to know our sins. But in his discussions of the
nature and essence of sin, any definition of sin in terms of moral law
or simple transgression is conspicuously absent. This is even more re¬
markable when we consider the legalistic and moralistic concepts in the
medieval theology which preceded Calvin. Bach of the viewpoints from
which Calvin examines man's primal sin not only points beyond this
simpler way of thought, but is developed by Calvin so as clearly to include
mam's rejection of God's grace . This does not mean to say that in Calvin
sin is not a transgression or want of conformity unto the lav/ of God, for
this is an Important concept to him. But it must be seen that sin is very
much more than this and that to understand Calvin's concept of sin, par¬
ticularly in relation to man's responsibility, this concept of sin as a
rejection and inversion of God's grace is fundamental.
It has moreover been our thesis that Calvin's deeper thought was
obscured by the Reformed theology which followed Calvin, and by the
position of moral philosophy. The covenant of works both set forth man's
duty in terms of moral obedience and defined his sin in these simpler
terns. And while moral philosophy did not speak of sin, it yet thought
of man's blarnewortniness as essentially his failure to conform to moral
law. Calvin's position must be regained by theology as it goes beyond
the concept of sin inherent in these ways of thought.
Calvin recognizes that we must forgo a wholly rational explanation
for the origin and transmission of sin in human life when he asserts that
it is by the ordination of God that all men are made sinners in Adam. If
this concept has its offensive implications, and if it in some sense pre-
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judices both God's will toward sin and the seriousness of our sin, it is
nonetheless a frank recognition that every rational answer to the problem
only raises new questions, and that we cannot understand in human terms the
rightness of a decision of God to make all men sinners in Adam. Calvin's
assertion that here we acquiesce in God's judgment and cut short all
speculative philosophies or rational objections directs our attention not
to God's part in our sinful will and nature, but to the way we sin from
within our sinful nature. It is here Calvin's intention to define the
concept of original sin as a spiritual and volitional corruption of
the will. When Calvin chooses the concept of a divine ordination by which
sin is transmitted, and fails to employ the traditional concepts of man's
inherited sinfulness, he is rejecting the purely physical and at the risk
of mis-interpretation placing in the spiritual realm the solidarity of
man in sin. In this way he makes sin both inevitable and voluntary. But
if sin is to be defined in Adam's posterity as an inherent defect or in¬
ability, this obscures the essential character of sin as a rejection of the
grace of God. When the theology which followed Calvin again took over and
developed the concept of an inherited sinfulness it did in this way pre¬
judice man's culpability. But with Calvin our rejection of divine grace
is volitional because it springs from our will, and not from any inherited
deformity or natural and genetic considerations. Yet it is inevitable
because all are born into a situation where their will is perverse ana moves
toward the inversion of the essential destiny given by God to man.
Theology must retain Calvin's thought here to the extent that it leaves
with God's manifold v/isdom the solidarity, universality, and totality of man
in sin and recognizes that this problem is of a spiritual and not a physical
or natural nature. It is moreover necessary to recognize that we cannot put
into logical form the whole way in which we come to have perverse mils at
birth. We have to recognise a mysterious and irrational element here.
-290-
Galvih's concept has this value. Nonetheless Calvin's concept of a divine
ordination needs to be adjusted to remove from it elements of God's will
and decree usually associated with it. It was not for a moment Calvin's
intent to prejudice the seriousness of man's sin, his responsibility, or
God's unqualified opposition to sin. We have seen that Calvin begins
immediately to limit the implications of this concept of God's ordination
which makes us sinners and to work out the way man is responsible and guilty
from within the sinful nature which is his. At the same time we may question
whether the concept of an ordination of God is to be retained in its present
form. Does it not suggest, despite all efforts to the contrary, that God
somehow wills for man to sin, or plays a part in sin which lessens his
unqualified opposition to it? Despite Calvin's endeavors to show that
man is responsible from vrithin his sinful nature, this ordination of God
suggests that man is not really so responsible as before, because after
all it is a part of God's order that all men sin.
Theology must then improve Calvin's efforts at once to bring the
origin and transmission of sin into the spiritual realm, to recognize the
elements of mystery and irrationality, and yet to avoid all suggestion
that God's will or desire is included in this propagation of sin, or that
man's responsibility is in any way alleviated by the relationship between
God and the transmission of sin. Calvin's thought must be developed with
a concept which incorporates the solidarity of man in sin and yet does not
have overtones to prejudice man's real responsibility or God's grace and
holiness. It will be wiser to implement Calvin'g intention by suspending
judgment to leave with the mystery of God the bottomless abyss of man's
universal sinfulness.
We can, however, retain Calvin's notion of how man is responsible
from within his sin. If sin is inevitable in natural man, it is not to be
understood as a natural defect, but must be conceived as the voluntary and
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free acl uf an individual. Gin has therefore to be looatcd. in tho perverse
will of mankind. It is nonetheless dominant in his intellectual faculties,
in his body, or soul, for the whole mail is totally corrupted. But it is
not so much a case of man's imperfection, of his failure to progress through
his talents or lack of talents to become the highest possible human, it is
not a case of his legal unrighteousness and moral failure, but it is funda¬
mentally his unwillingness to align his will with the grace of God constantly
offered to him.
Prom this point we proceed to summarize the culpability of man in his
sin. We may first of all recognize that there are two areas of investi¬
gation in Calvin "which will here prove only frustrating and fruitless. It
is Calvin's caveat that when man searches in these directions fox* an explan¬
ation or excuse for his sin he is only being presumptuous and curious in a
way forbidden to us by Scripture. The first of these is the divine providence
of God, particularly God's predestination concerning our sins. It has been
already our criticism that Calvin at times develops this so as needlessly to
offend and antagonize, and that his concepts of God's decreeing the sin of
man, and of his creating some destined for ruin ought to be abandoned. But
nonetheless we may follow Calvin's advice to direct our attention to the
revealed Word of God which is to be our guide. "Then we sin we know that
we have broken his will. We consider the manifest and. evident cause. We
understand that our sin by accident turns God's grace to a curse, we shut
off and thwart his blessings to us.
The second way in which we are not to elaborate our culpability is with
reference to the ordination of God by which, all men become sinners. We have
just criticized Calvin here for using a concept that suggests that a will
or desire of God shuts up man in sin, and which tends to qualify our res¬
ponsibility and the seriousness with which God opposes sin. We have indicated
that this concept needs to be worked out in more adequate language. Hone-
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t: sless -e may follow Calvin's warning that we are not to relieve our
culpability by directing our attention to the way we come to receive
sinful wills, but are to emphasize the way we act freely ana responsibly
from within our sinful natures.
We have then to assert that, as far as we are permitted to see in the
matter of our culpability, we are both free and able to reject the grace
of God. In this consists man's culpability. This does not mean that we
are free and able to accept God's grace, for we have labored to show that
Calvin's concept of responsibility does not postulate such freedom or ab¬
ility for man. He is not and is not Supposed to be free and.able to do
this, but is to depend even in his acceptance on the grace of God which
enables him. Yet nonetheless when he rejects God's grace, he does not
ascribe this to any failure of God to give him, or will to give him grace
sufficient to enable his acceptance, but he ascribes it to his perverse
will which thwarts this grace. Calvin's concept of culpability is built
around the antinomy that man acts responsibly only as he is acted upon and
is moved by the grace of God, depending upon it for the whole of his res¬
ponsible behavior, and yet that man is liable and culpable when he sins,
as having cut off God's grace by his perversity.
It is thus necessary for us to deny that Calvin teaches that grace is
irresistible, as far as culpability is concerned. The elect of God are
brought to him as God imparts what Calvin terms the grace of the Holy
Spirit. They do not finally resist such grace. Yet as far as the whole
larger concept of culpability is concerned men do in a real way resist the
grace of God. There can be no question that men do constantly and continually
cut off God's grace to them, and that their culpability is as real as, and
only as real as, this rejection of God's grace. Calvin's thought about
predestination may prejudice the reality and seriousness of this sin of man,
yet notwithstanding in this rejection lies Calvin's concept of man's respon¬
sibility for his sin.
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The topic of sin and responsibility, when, brought out in the direction
of sin and culpability, proves inseparable from the concept of the judgment
and punishment of God. That we enter into Calvin's thought about divine
wrath and judgment becomes also imperative when we set as a center of
reference the single concept of the grace of God. Throughout the whole
development of Calvin's understanding of sin and responsibility we have
related these to God's grace. But also the relation of these to God's
wrath has to be considered. Having seen what man is responsible for,
what is the nature of his sin, and how he is culpable, we finally turn to
God's judgment and. punishment.
Because man has in sin usurped God's responsibility of graciously
caring for man and assumed the responsibility of caring for himself, be¬
cause in this movement man has despised the blessing of God and sought to
live independently of God, God comes over against man in judgment. God
is angry because he cannot be gracious to man, as he has wished to be. It
is Calvin's insight that the judgment and wrath of God are to be set within
this very nature of God as a God who wills to love. Calvin reminds us
constantly that God's hate, his enmity, his wrath, and. his vengeance, are
symbolic, and that these anthropomorphic expressions really tell us some¬
thing about divine love. God both hates and loves the sinner, and his wrath
is connected with and depends on his love.
Though the dangers of misunderstanding are great, yet we must affirm
with Calvin that God's judgment on sin rises more fundamentally from God's
love and grace than it does from his holiness or punitive justice. This
can never mean for one moment in Calvin that -God does not judge because
he is the fountain of all righteousness. On the contrary the concept of
God's judging out of his holiness and righteousness is so paramount in
Calvin thatihis might well seem the dominating and governing principle of
judgment, particularly if we read Calvin only in immediate contexts, or think
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only in. the narrower terms of judgment as condemnation and punishment.
And sin is ever to be set opposite the righteousness of God, nonetheless so
because we first set it opposite the grace of God. Or it might be thought
that God judges equally out of his love and righteousness, that here grace
and justice are the two feet of God. In these limited ways God's judgment
might be said to rise equally as much from his justice, or even more from it.
But here we must remember that it is God* s very nature to love. As
Galvin puts it, his glory shines forth more brilliantly when he loves us
than when he judges us. Thus the judgment of God. follows first from his
love and secondly from his justice. The widest meaning of judgment is
that God restores his order. If the order of God \rere only or primarily
a moral order, then we should affirm that God judges as he restores order
out of his holiness and justice. But Galvin asserts that this order was
most basically and at the first an order of grace. It is nonetheless
an order of morality, or law, or of justice. But it is primarily an order
of grace; all things are ordered for man's benefit. Generally the whole
order of creation is that God is gracious to us and that we acknowledge
his benefits. If this is so, then when God moves in judgment he l-estores
his order of grace. It must be then that God judges wickedness in such a
way as not to loose sight of the end of his creation. He says no to sin
so as to say yes with regard to his will to be gracious. He hates sin,
but he hates from within his love. He judges but not from the heart, for
he is still our father. He has assumed this character of judge. All this
can only mean for Galvin that this judgment rises more fundamentally out
of God's love than it does out of his moral order of justice.
It cannot be the other way round. We bring this out because theology
has in the past too often severed God's judgnent from his love and grounded
it solely or almost exclusively in his justice, holiness, and majesty.
The federal theology which came to dominate the Reformed position lost sight
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of God's ordered government set forth for man at creation as an order of
grace to man, and came more to regard it at; an order of justice and holi¬
ness. Man lived as he was just, that is, as he by his works satisfied
'God's justice. As man was set at the beginning into a covenant relation
to God based on righteous works, he was judged as God restored moral order
by his justice. And in a somewhat parallel way moral philosophy has con¬
ceived of judgment and punishment as rising fundamentally from the fact that
the universe is a moral order. Here the fact that it is the fundamental
nature of the being behind the universe to love and be gracious to man has
not been given adequate and ruling place in the concept of judgment.
Because of this tendency to see God's justice and righteousness as the
only wellspring of his judgment, and thus to loose sight of the fact that
it is God's love that judges us as he graciously restores and removes sin,
Galvin develops the concept of God's righteousness as redeeming and saving
his people. We must include in the punitive justice of God the fact that
our salvation is grounded as well in his righteousness as it is in his grace.
Calvin's insight here, which has been largely overlooked by the theologians
following him, follows out of his close Biblical exegesis in the Psalms and
prophets, and is designed to establish the fact that in any final analysis
we cannot see God's grace or mercy opposite or parallel to his justice and
righteousness, but must see them as the single expression of the very nature
of God. If it was God's will to be gracious to man in the beginning, then
he is now nonetheless righteous once again as he moves in redemption.
He is of course righteous as he prosecutes those who break his law and who
transgress his moral order, but he is righteous a3 he rectifies and makes
right the order of grace. There is no dualism between love and righteousness,
and therefore we need not build concepts of judgment, salvation, or reconciliation
on such dualism, for this popular conception runs the risk of obscuring the
Christian conception of God as one who loves.
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Yet as surely as Calvin sees the judgment of God. to be rooted in his
love, Calvin is also guilty of destroying his own position when he turns
to incorporate his idea of predestination into his idea of judgment. It
cannot be denied that when the notion of reprobation enters into the thought
of the divine act of judgment, this act is no longer exclusively one of love.
It is ultimately impossible to reconcile the idea that God judges as he
restores an order of grace, and the fact that he has created some men for
everlasting death, and judges as he visits his vengeance and executes his
everlasting decree upon them. Calvin allows the double predestination of
God to alter- lis concept of judgment so that he can even suggest that God
in punishment of the reprobate has no desire or hope that they turn to
him and receive his love. He simply executes his vengeance. Here ideas
foreign to the Christian idea of God have crept in. It is scarcel}' fair
to Calvin to see these isolated statements apart from Calvin's larger and
balancing emphases, but neither is it honest to deny that primitive ideas
appear which make God seem capricious, arbitrary, vindictive, retributive,
and angry, in such a way as to be wholly inconsistent with his love. Rather
than recognizing in God's wrath an anthromorphic expression which tells us
something about God's love, Calvin here in effect makes wrath a divine
perfection opposed to his love. He loves as he elects and he hates as
he reprobates.
In Christian theology today we shall have to abandon this part of
Calvin's thought because retributive justice is separated from divine grace.
It may well be possible and desirable to retain ideas of God's vengeance
so long as we clearly assert that it is vindicative and not vindictive. The
idea of retribution may have seme relative use if we use it to express the
elementary fact that evil must be condemned and punished. The man who
breaks God's order must pay the price, he cannot and will not go unpunished
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Insofar as Galvin uses the idea of vengeance and retribution to express
this fact we may follow him, but when retribution becomes a governing
principle of judgment so as to separate God's judgment and justice
from his love, we can no longer retain it.
But the interesting and anomalous thing in the thought of Galvin is
that the very concepts which can correct and adjust this objectionable bias
introduced into the idea of judgment by the concept of reprobation, are to
be found in Calvin's own teaching. Here Galvin actually returns from his
development of God's vengeance and reprobation in static terms, and works
once again from his dynamic concept of God's judgment as depending on his
love. Perhaps the most valuable concept that we have had to bring out
here is Calvin's constant assertion that it is the proper work of God to
love, but that it is accidental for him to judge. The punitive activity
of God is here clearly set forth as foreign to him, it is adventitious, it
comes not from him or his intent, but from somewhere else. If Galvin is
to be criticized for failing through his concept of reprobation to relate
God's vengeance to his love, he must here be commended for having left no
doubt about the fact that God's very nature is one of love. T,7e are to set
the sheer weight and frequency of the passages where God is portrayed as
being provoked against his will to judgment beside the smaller number of
passages where Galvin lapses into static ideas of judgment based on God's
immutable decrees. It will then be seen that despite the infringement
of his concept of judgment by ideas of predestination, Galvin's concept
of God's grace must govern here too. We interpret God's judgment and
punishment of man in his sin in the light of his gracious will toward man.
By bringing out the thought of Galvin in this direction, stowing his
concept of what man is responsible for, what is his sin, tow he is held
culpable, and how he is judged and punished - all in the light of the grace
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of God, we have hoped in critical analysis to present Calvin* s positive
message for contemporary theology and evaluate the apparent and real
inconsistencies in his thought. Freeing Calvin's thought from the
influence of later theological and philosophical developments, we
can see his relevance in the modern debate.
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